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Abstract
This thesis describes work on dening and modelling text comprehension. The basis of
my approach is a theory of comprehension as a form of abductive reasoning. The specic
problem addressed is inferential control and the management of alternative, competing
representations.
This problem is related to issues of representation quality, with decisions between rep-
resentations being made on the basis of quality comparisons. Simultaneously, monitoring
of representation quality determines when comprehension halts; in other words, there is
some kind of threshold against which quality is compared.
In the rst part of the thesis I analyse concepts of representation quality, describing the
structure of episodic and semantic representations and processes. I then look at metrics
for representation quality before developing my own metric. The metric is based on the
concept of incoherence, derived from the structural potential of representations.
The second part of the thesis describes a computational model of incoherence, the
Incoherence-Driven Comprehender (IDC). IDC combines AI implementation technology
with insights from cognitive psychological studies of text comprehension. I show how IDC
can be applied to various comprehension tasks.
Throughout the thesis I suggest how aspects of IDC's architecture and behaviour may
oer a fresh perspective on human comprehension.
Keywords: abduction, coherence, episodic and semantic memory, inference, interpreta-
tion, representation quality metrics, story understanding.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Approaching Comprehension
This is what things have come to in this world
The cows sit on the telegraph poles and play chess
(from `End of the World' (1916) by Richard Huelsenbeck, in [Richter, 1965])
Human conceptual activity has a `requirement for understanding' at its core. As our
senses continually gather data, we are driven to catalogue, compress and store it. When
confronted by a novel group of stimuli, we try to explain how those stimuli arrived at
our senses, where and how they originated, why they happened to be grouped together,
and so on. This process of constructing interpretations can be described by the general
term comprehension. This term applies both to tasks colloquially described as compre-
hension, such as reading, and to other tasks often considered as separate activities, such
as categorisation and visual perception. In all of these cases, the comprehension process
generates an interpretation, a representation which depicts, describes, models or `stands
for' the data which was observed.
Text comprehension is a particularly specialised aspect of this general cognitive ability.
While it has similarities with other forms of comprehension, there are peculiar complica-
tions. Most of these are derived from a statement which is (generally) true of texts, but
not of eventuality sequences in the real world: a text is (generally) composed with the
purpose of conveying meaning.
1
1
I use the term eventuality to refer to events and states, after [Moens and Steedman, 1988].
1
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This underlying purpose often leads to the mistaken assumption that the compre-
hender's aim is to uncover a text's `intended meaning'. However, the only warranted
assumption is that everything mentioned in a text contributes to its meaning; the elements
of a text are relevant with respect to each other. In turn, this implies that relationships
between elements of a text are intended (though the exact nature of those relationships
is not predetermined); and that nding relationships between these elements is desirable.
Thus, an interpretation which connects elements of the text is preferable to an interpre-
tation which leaves them disparate. In other words, the more coherent an interpretation
is, the better.
The above summary of comprehension is, naturally, incomplete and not uncontrover-
sial. It glosses over several diÆcult questions:
1. How do comprehenders make connections between elements of the text?
2. How does a comprehender know when to stop making connections?
3. Are the connections formed by the same mechanisms used for generating connections
between real world event sequences?
These issues have been approached by previous researchers, as I describe in section 2.1.
However, during the history of this research, problems which were not initially obvious
came to light, mainly as a result of implementation eorts (see section 2.2). Because
implemented models had to be very detailed to run as programs, every aspect of the com-
prehension process was minutely analysed. An obvious rst step was to program computer
models to make inferences from a text: no text explicitly contains the entire world in which
it takes place, and every instance of comprehension involves inference. However, when you
allow a program to make inferences, the problem of inferential promiscuity soon becomes
apparent: the tendency for unrestrained processing to give rise to spurious inferences
which tax the credibility and/or usefulness of an interpretation (see section 2.3).
Thus, a processing constraint on comprehension was recognised: some limit on in-
ference making had to be imposed to prevent systems from wasting energy and time
on promiscuous inferences. Presumably, in a psychological (human) context, a similar
control mechanism must be at work, otherwise the comprehender would be inundated
with the implications of a text and unable to form viable interpretations. Therefore,
some relevancy or utility criteria must be at work. In a computational context, these
criteria were naturally implemented using heuristic methods for restricting inferences and
evaluating interpretations.
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The issue of constraints on inference-making provided the initial impetus for my
research and remains central to this thesis. My approach to this issue has been the
development and implementation of a comprehension model which incorporates several
cognitively-motivated control mechanisms. The next two sections briey describe my
work, to give an idea of important concepts. I then describe my general research method-
ology in section 1.4. Finally, section 1.5 explains the structure of the thesis, hopefully
showing the `thread' of the argument as a whole.
1.2 A Broad Overview of My Work
As I mentioned in the previous section, the problem of how to constrain inferences during
comprehension provided the initial impetus for my work. In particular, I was interested in
how a comprehender's subjective assessment of their current interpretation could inuence
future inference processes. Two particular aspects of the problem became evident:
1. Inferential Decisions
Decisions about which inferences to make depend on some method of comparison.
Given two possible inferences, how can a comprehender decide which to make and
which to discard? Or whether both should be made in parallel?
2. Comprehension Halting
During comprehension, why/when/how does the comprehender decide to stop en-
riching their current interpretation and `accept' it? Presumably, any amount of
information could be added to an interpretation; so why don't comprehenders
produce exhaustive interpretations?
My approach was to adapt an idea from the eld of abduction metrics in AI research,
with the aim of modelling inferential processing in human comprehenders. Abduction
is a method of inference often used in modelling explanation generation in AI (e.g.
[Ng and Mooney, 1990], [Peng and Reggia, 1990]); more recently, cognitive psychologists
have suggested abduction as an important mechanism in human comprehension
[Noordman and Vonk, 1998]. In computational implementations, the nature of abduction
often leads to competition between explanations (see section 3.2.5). This competition has
been solved by rating explanations according to metrics which refer to appealing concepts
like simplicity, probability and coherence (see chapter 5). The explanation selected from
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the set of competitors is the one which is assigned the highest `quality' rating by the
metric (e.g. it is the simplest, most probable, or most coherent explanation).
In my work, such a metric is used for the rating of representations, based on a notion
of incoherence. Representations are rated according to the amount of incoherence they
contain; this is assigned by determining the total potential structure of the representation's
elements. Inferences can also be rated, by measuring how well they increase the coherence
of a representation by reducing its incoherence (c.f. [van den Broek et al., 1995]).
While incoherence of elements was xed with respect to a particular knowledge base,
I decided to modulate incoherence by subjective, process-based criteria. My rst step was
to incorporate a skepticism parameter: by altering the model's skepticism, the same text
can be read with the same knowledge base on dierent occasions, yet produce dierent
comprehension proles. For example, the system may make inferences at dierent points
in time, or even make dierent inferences. Some examples are given in chapter 7.
Later renements to the model added further control mechanisms, to allow it to cope
with short- and long-term memory stores and maintenance of multiple representations
(see chapter 6).
The next section denes the main characteristics of the theory.
1.3 Incoherence-Driven Comprehension
The model and implementation described in this thesis go under the collective heading
of IDC (Incoherence-Driven Comprehender). IDC is intended as a generic theory of text
comprehension which builds on much past work: I do not introduce too many complicated
new representational formalisms or algorithms, but use several existing formalisms as a
foundation. The theory is also, of necessity, simplied and abstracted away from low-
level morpho-syntactic processes, focused instead on semantic and pragmatic issues. I
have also side-stepped several important high-level elements of comprehension, such as
the ability to learn and the role of creativity. However, I recognise the importance of all of
these missing factors. In an ideal model of comprehension, parsing, learning and creative
inference would all play important roles; unfortunately, such an ideal is not realistic within
the bounds of a PhD.
The particular focus of the work is inference making. As I describe in chapter 2,
inference making has been a central concern of comprehension modelling for many decades,
being the dominant process in the construction of interpretations. Within the topic of
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inference making, the role of control in comprehension has been central to my work.
Control is of concern both in cognitive and computational systems, yet is often glossed over
in discussions of comprehension. My aim is to address this imbalance, suggesting possible
interlaced control mechanisms which act together in the management of inferences.
Control in IDC has its basis in a theory of incoherence. A rst denition of incoherence
will be useful at this point (and will be progressively rened throughout the thesis). I
intend the word `incoherence' in a sense which diverges from its intuitive denition. In
everyday conversation, incoherence is dened as `a lack of clarity' or `lack of organisation'
[Collins English Dictionary, 1994]. In IDC, the denition of incoherence is less intuitive,
yet hopefully more precise:
The incoherence of a representation is determined by the number of rep-
resentations which could possibly be derived from it via inference, or its
possible representations space (PRS). The PRS of a representation depends on
the comprehender's knowledge base: if knowledge sources exist which could
be applied to elements of the representation to produce new elements, new
representations based on those elements are possible; if such knowledge sources
do not exist, there are no other possible representations.
Note that this denition departs from the colloquial meaning of `incoherence' as it mea-
sures incoherence with respect to a knowledge base, rather than with respect to individual
texts. Human comprehenders tend to judge as incoherent those texts for which they are
unable to form sensible interpretations. However, in IDC, the emphasis is on the role of
knowledge in assessing incoherence: it is the lack of a suitable knowledge structure which
prevents construction of a sensible interpretation, rather than the text. If a knowledge
structure could be brought to bear on the text and thus allow it to be integrated, the
incoherence would disappear.
Even though this denition seems to deny that texts themselves are coherent or in-
coherent, the argument can be adjusted to show that this is not the case. Judgements
of the coherence and incoherence of particular texts are made with respect to a shared
reserve of knowledge structures, a kind of cultural knowledge base (e.g. English sentence
structure, Western genre conventions); those texts which can be integrated and structured
by that knowledge base are coherent, while those which cannot are incoherent. For
example, Agatha Christie's novels seem neat and coherent to Western readers, as the plots,
characters and language merge snugly with recognised, stereotyped knowledge structures
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common to those readers. However, it is easy to demonstrate the relativity of judgements
of coherence by examining texts from other cultures, or texts from subcultures within a
culture such as the example at the start of this chapter.
2
These texts only `make sense' or
can be made coherent with respect to certain knowledge structures: an understanding of
shared imagery, the signicance of particular plot devices, multiple meanings of particular
words, outlooks on the world, etc..
Comprehension and the assessment of coherence are thus chiey dependent on two aspects
of the comprehender's context:
1. The amount and types of knowledge (in an abstract sense) which the comprehender
brings to the text. This includes their specic, personal knowledge and shared,
cultural knowledge.
2. The abstract evaluation of representations, based on the comprehender's subjective
criteria for an acceptable interpretation (their skepticism and tolerance of incoher-
ence).
The theoretical background to this theory is described in greater depth in section 3.1.
The theory of incoherence is described in chapter 5, while the full implementation of IDC
is described in chapter 6.
In the next section, I discuss the methodological framework within which this work
was carried out.
1.4 Research Methodology
Psychological models are often concerned with describing the relationship between psy-
chological data and a generalised, natural language description. The need to cope with
real-world data means that implementations frequently have to be curtailed and drastically
simplied: for example, the stimuli involved may be reduced to propositional represen-
tations (rather than rst-order predicate calculus formulae). While these simplications
are necessary, they can mean that it is sometimes diÆcult to see how the theory would
be extended to more complex data.
2
Bartlett's early experiments on memory demonstrated the tendency for comprehenders to lever an
unfamiliar text (a folktale called The War of the Ghosts) from a foreign culture (Indian) into culturally-
familiar structures [Gardner, 1987].
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Frequently, this drive to simplication may also result in dynamic processes
(such as construction of an interpretation) being split into their component parts.
For example, these might include `deciding whether to extend an interpretation'
[van den Broek et al., 1995], `deciding which elements to retain in working memory'
[Fletcher et al., 1990], and `rating interpretations' [Thagard, 1988]. While it is often
necessary to split processes in this way, it can obscure the relationships between them
and remove the need to dene the interactions between dierent parts of a process. For
example, decisions about whether to extend an interpretation may depend on the goodness
of that interpretation; in turn, this depends on the rating mechanism used; and again,
deciding which elements to retain in working memory may depend on how useful they
may be for understanding future elements.
On the other hand, AI models are usually detailed and integrated: processes and
the interfaces between them are specied in great detail, as the program actually has
to `run'. Each process must function correctly and produce an output usable by related
processes; every piece of information involved in the task has to be dened; there is
no way to gloss over processes if they are inconveniently complex. However, this drive
to specication can give rise to an underlying yearning for `correctness' of the model.
This means that often a lot of emphasis is given to logical consistency and computational
eÆciency, such that psychological evidence can go out of the window (e.g. Ng and Mooney
[Ng and Mooney, 1990]). By concentrating on `proof', AI models can also become highly
restricted: the range of phenomena they deal with is reduced to increase the speed or
correctness of the algorithm.
In my model, I have attempted to nd a middle-ground between these two approaches,
possibly leaning more towards AI. So, while I attempt to dene the mechanisms that
might underly the choice between two explanations in a psychological experiment, I have
done so with a computational theory (abduction). And while I have aimed to make
the theory as `correct' as possible (in a computer science sense), it is impractical as a
`commercial' solution. For example, the data structures used in the rulebase are limited
in their expressive power, as they were deliberately designed to be as `process-free' as
possible. This means that some eÆciency is lost, but hopefully with a concurrent gain in
clarity.
I have also tried to produce a theory which is wide-ranging and takes into account
much current cognitive psychological research, while using the minimum number of new
theoretical constructs. Those constructs I do introduce are set against a background of sev-
Chapter 1. Introduction 8
eral well-established ideas, such as scripts [Schank and Abelson, 1977], working memory
([Shallice, 1982], [Fletcher et al., 1990]), and coherence-seeking, constructive comprehen-
sion ([van den Broek et al., 1995], [Graesser et al., 1994]).
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
 Chapter 2 covers the general background to my work. It puts in place the historical
context, and a general theoretical framework for analysing story comprehension
theories.
 Chapters 3 and 4 specify a framework for modelling comprehension, both in cognitive
and computational terms. This framework is then used as a rationale for my own
computational model.
 Chapter 5 concerns the central problem dened in this introduction: how a com-
prehender can judge the relative quality of competing representations, and how
representations are managed within the context of interpretation. My answers are
chiey computational, as is reected by the tone of the chapter.
 Chapter 6 describes my implemented model. The intention is to show how the model
maps onto the framework described in the previous chapters; I also suggest some
cognitive analogues of mechanisms in the model.
 Chapter 7 contains some tentative experimental results, with some suggestions for
comparing the output of the model with human behaviour.
 Chapter 8 discusses the achievements of my work, as well as places where it fails. I
also suggest some directions for future work.
 The three appendices cover actual program code and examples of output. These
have been removed from the main body of the thesis to improve its readability.
Chapter 2
Background to the Problem
This chapter describes the broad theoretical background to text comprehension as a whole.
It then covers in greater detail the particular question which prompted this thesis: how
can inferences during comprehension be controlled?
2.1 A Brief History of Text Comprehension
Text comprehension has already received much attention in many academic elds over
a long period of time. For example, some literary critics, such as Roman Ingarden and
Wolfgang Iser, have examined the interpretory processes involved in the act of reading
[Ingarden, 1973], [Iser, 1971]; and several psychologists have tried to specify and demon-
strate the existence of the knowledge structures underlying story recall [Bartlett, 1932].
However, these analyses typically take the form of informal verbal descriptions of the
mechanisms involved. This informality is not a deciency: it is simply an artifact of the
times in which they were written and contemporary research paradigms.
Psychologists were the rst to concern themselves with the detailed processes com-
prising text comprehension. During the reign of Behaviourism in the 1920s, 30s and 40s,
many psychologists avoided discussing mental representation: psychological theories were
to be based on observable evidence alone, without recourse to dubious hypothetical mental
entities [Gardner, 1987]. However, by the early 1950s, many researchers realised that Be-
haviourism was an intellectual dead-end, unable to provide reasonable or realistic theories
of language, planning, or other aspects of the internal organisation of external behaviour.
As a result, these psychologists turned to descriptions of comprehension which explicitly
dened individual mental components. These researchers found useful metaphors for
9
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their work in the emerging elds of computer science and cybernetics: for example,
Miller described human short-term memory capacity in terms of information theory, using
bits as a measure of capacity [Miller, 1956]; and Broadbent regarded whole organisms as
information-ow mechanisms, depicting them as owcharts resembling program designs
[Broadbent, 1958].
This shift to cognitive psychology, inuenced by advances in computer science, led
to the use of computer programs as models of human behaviour. Some of the earliest
programs to deal with language comprehension issues include Bobrow's STUDENT system
for solving algebra problem stories [Bobrow, 1968] and Quillian's system for knowledge
retrieval from semantic networks [Quillian, 1968]. Both systems had to deal with the
problem of inference: deriving implicit information from explicit data. For example,
STUDENT could infer the antecedents of pronouns and Quillian's system could infer
conceptual overlap between discrete input units.
It was obvious that inference was central to comprehension: construction of an in-
terpretation requires relating inputs to stored knowledge, such that any `gaps' in the
input are lled and connections between input units specied. No text contains all the
information required for its understanding, but gives `cues' which facilitate construction
of its `meaning'; comprehension involves a `search after meaning' where inferences build
representational units in memory, relating and grouping input units [Graesser et al., 1994].
This constructive approach to comprehension has its basis in Bartlett's theory of schemas
[Bartlett, 1932], and was highly inuential in the 1970s, particularly with cognitive scien-
tists, e.g. [Charniak, 1972] and [Rumelhart, 1975]. These 1970s researchers were trying
to nd models of human text comprehension precise enough to be implemented as com-
puter programs; in the next section, I describe their computational work as it forms the
background and impetus for my own research.
2.2 Implementing Constructive Comprehension
The models of text comprehension developed in the 1970s shared a concern with the
constructive role of inferences. An important issue was how to model the origins of these
inferences. The answer lay in adapting Bartlett's schemas to represent stored knowledge.
Schema theory states that when new data arrives at the senses, it activates stored
schemas which are used to encode that data in memory. For example, on seeing an
agglomeration of lines and colours in some particular alignment, the schema for `bird' may
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be activated. Once a schema has been activated in response to an input, the slots attached
to the schema become available for `lling'. Slots are blank `conceptual spaces' into which
actual instances are inserted as they are encountered in the input. Alternatively, slots
may be lled by default inferences: for example, the slot for the type of instrument used
in a coee stirring schema may be lled by the default value spoon. More details about
models based on schema theory are given in chapter 3.
The computational realisations of Bartlett's ideas resulted in various schema-like struc-
tures variously called `frames' [Minsky, 1975], `scripts' [Schank, 1975], `macrostructures'
[Correira, 1980], and even `schemas' (a direct borrowing from Bartlett) [Rumelhart, 1975].
Distinctions were frequently made between these structures, but at heart they are very
similar (Minsky himself compared his conception of frames to scripts). For this reason, I
will use the generic term schemas to refer collectively to these structures. For the moment,
I discuss them generally, leaving detailed discussion of their technical characteristics until
section 4.1.1.
Early AI systems based on schema theory were generally implemented as production
systems. In these systems, schemas were written as rules which represented implications
from a higher-level structure to one or more lower-level structures. This represents
the assumption that superstructures are abductively implied by the presence of their
substructures; for example, observing someone entering a bank allows a comprehender
to abductively infer that they plan to deposit some money.
1
New elements are added to
the representation by matching current elements to the right-hand side (or consequent)
of a rule; the left-hand side (the antecedent) is then inferred by backward-chaining and
asserted as a new element. An example rule in this format is:
(1) hold plan(planner:X, object:Y)  !
grasp(agent:X, object:Y).
This rule species that if some actor X grasps some object Y , a reasonable inference is
that X has a plan to hold Y . Another rule in the same format is:
(2) goal(planner:X, objective:(possess(agent:X, object:Y))  !
hold plan(planner:X, object:Y).
1
c.f. inferring causes from eects in medical diagnosis, as in PATHEXnLIVER in
[Josephson and Josephson, 1996].
Chapter 2. Background to the Problem 12
This rule species that if some planner X has a plan to hold Y , a reasonable infer-
ence is that X has a goal to possess Y . (Both rules are adapted from chapter 8 of
[Schank and Riesbeck, 1981].) If a system with these two rules were presented with an
input like:
grasp(agent:geo, object:thing1)
two inference steps are possible (with the second being derived from the rst):
1. geo is planning to hold thing1.
2. geo has a goal to possess thing1.
The above inferences are reasonable, given the input. The early systems formed chains
of such inference steps between input elements, following the maxim `To \understand" is
to establish relations between the new and the old' [Schank, 1975]. This enabled them to
perform well on simple texts.
However, part of the reason for this success was that the knowledge base consisted of
very few rules and was geared towards a small group of similar texts. This meant that
very little information could be derived, even if all the rules were applied; it also made it
likely that derived information would be (at worst) marginally relevant, as the rules were
designed for comprehending a collection of similar texts.
In summary, the small scale of the programs was partly responsible for their success.
As production systems in other areas of AI grew, researchers began to realise that as the
scale of the knowledge base increases, the number of potential inferences soon gets out
of hand [Davis, 1980], [George, 1982], [Clancey, 1983]. Other problems arise due to the
types of inference allowed, and the stringency (or lack of) with which inferences are made.
These issues are described in section 2.3.
2.2.1 A Note on Notation
Note that the format for representing `knowledge structures' (e.g. rules, scripts, schemas)
is as consistent as possible throughout this thesis, and the rules in the previous section
are no exception. Knowledge structures are assumed to have the form:
a  ! b
1
; : : : ; b
n
:
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This rule states that there is some relationship between an element a and some other
elements b
1
; : : : ; b
n
; the commas in the consequent are intended as denoting something akin
to the logical `and' (^). Elements may be either propositions, or may contain variables;
variables are treated as they are in Prolog, and denoted by capital letters. (N.B. no
quantiers are used in rules.) Another assumption I have made is that events are composed
of a predicate and a set of roles (c.f. [Alterman and Bookman, 1990], [Fillmore, 1968],
[Lindsay and Norman, 1977]).
The exact nature of rule types and components is left for discussion in later chapters.
2.3 Inferential Promiscuity
Borrowing a term from Norvig and Charniak, an excessive number of inferences could
be termed promiscuous, as it wastes the comprehender's resources: time and memory
([Norvig, 1989], [Charniak, 1986]). These resources are wasted because chains of inference
may be pursued exhaustively to irrelevant levels of detail and spuriousness. This requires
commitment of resources to producing, storing, comparing, and removing representational
elements, many of which may ultimately prove to be useless.
In production systems, the promiscuous inference problem is exacerbated by three
main factors:
1. Bi-directional chaining.
2. Incomplete matching.
3. Number of rules.
Each of these can justiably be added to a production system to increase its power;
however, each can also increase the number of possible inferences. Each factor is described
in more detail in the following sections.
2.3.1 Bi-directional Chaining
So far, the system I have described makes inferences by backward-chaining on rules: the
consequent of a rule is matched against the input and its antecedent inferred [Frost, 1986].
An alternative is to forward-chain on rules. To do this, the system matches the antecedent
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of a rule against the input and infers its consequent. This is the classical, familiar form
of logical inference represented by the syllogism:
a; a! b
b
If we again read the rules causally, forward-chaining allows inferences from causes to
their eects; or, in other words, prediction [Shanahan, 1989]. In the system I'm outlining
here, this might allow the following pattern of inference:
Observation:
goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1))).
Rule:
goal(planner:X, objective: (possess(agent:X, object:Y))  !
hold plan(planner:X, object:Y).
Inference:
hold plan(planner:emma, object:orange1).
Is the inference `emma plans to hold orange1' useful? It doesn't explain why emma has a
goal to possess orange1; it merely predicts how she may go about fullling this goal. In
this respect the inference elaborates the observation and doesn't add to the understanding
of `why' emma acts the way she does. This seems to contradict recent psychological
results, which contrast the redundancy and ineÆciency of predictive inferences with
the over-riding importance of explanatory (abductive) inferences [Graesser et al., 1994],
[Keefe and McDaniel, 1993], [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996].
However, in the system we are considering, we can justify forward ({chaining) inference
as necessary for three reasons, described below.
Coherence dependent on forward inference
While some researchers view forward inferences as being only minimally made, or as
not being drawn at all (see [Keefe and McDaniel, 1993] for a review), others have shown
that forward inferences do play a part in comprehension. Some research shows that
forward inferences are made, but that they are quickly removed from working mem-
ory unless immediately conrmed by subsequent text [Keefe and McDaniel, 1993]. In
some cases, they may even establish `predictive explanations' for statements currently in
working memory [Murray et al., 1993]. Seemingly inexplicable eventualities may only be
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explainable by reference to some expected future eventualities, for example (adapted from
[Murray et al., 1993]):
The angry waitress was totally fed up with her job. When a rude customer
criticised her, she lifted a plate of spaghetti above his head.
These two sentences do not seem to make sense (at this point in comprehension) without
the causal consequent inference `She poured the spaghetti over the customer's head'.
Unless we make the assumption that explanations only occur under complete information
(e.g. when both an antecedent event and its causal consequent event are present in
working memory), a comprehension system requires some way of making a prediction to
allow these statements to be connected.
Literary texts
Certain types of literary text rely on the comprehender's construction of predictive infer-
ences for their eects. Narratives with ashbacks, for example, encourage the comprehen-
der to predict possible consequences of the ashback, and nd inferential chains between
those predictions and the current circumstances of the narrative [Zwaan, 1996]. In the
relatively straightforward, linear narratives commonly employed in reading comprehension
studies, predictive inferences are generally unnecessary and not explicitly encouraged.
Other forms of elaborative processing may not be so obviously `predictive' (in a
temporal sense), such as occasions where a comprehender `predicts' details of an event.
For example, if an agent in a text stirs a cup of coee, the comprehender may infer that
a spoon was used as the instrument of the event. These and related forms of temporally-
concurrent inference, such as inferences about characters' emotions, are also important
in literary comprehension, where the comprehender employs a mode of processing which
facilitates their involvement and helps them `explore the stimulus' oered by the text
[Zwaan and Graesser, 1993]. The focus on `non-literary' texts in cognitive psychology has
led to an under-estimation of the importance of elaborative processing in comprehension.
Computational eÆciency
The third reason is a slightly more articial and pragmatic one: in a comprehension system
which can only form explanations by backward-chaining, some obvious and important
inferences may be missed. To demonstrate this, consider the following observations:
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drive(agent:geo, to:b, in:c), hold up(agent:geo, place:b)
and the following set of rules:
(1) rob plan(agent:X, place:Y)  !
go step(agent:X, to:Y), hold up step(agent:X, place:Y).
(2) go step(agent:X, to:Y)
 ! go(agent:X, to:Y).
(3) drive(agent:X, to:Y)
 ! go(agent:X, to:Y).
Naturally, we would like the system to interpret the observations as `geo drove to b,
which explains how he went to b; this going event was a step in geo's plan for robbing
b'. This is shown diagrammatically below:
observations
inferences
rule direction
inference direction
go(agent:geoff, to:b)
rob_plan(agent:geoff, place:b)
go_step(agent:geoff, to:b) drive(agent:geoff, to:b)hold_up_step(agent:geoff, place:b)
Figure 2.1: The necessity of bi-directional inference
Making the connection between drive(agent:geo, to:b) and rob plan(agent:geo, place:b)
requires at least one predictive inference: either from drive to go (as shown on the
diagram), or from go step to go; otherwise, the drive event cannot be considered as being
related to the rob plan.
If bi-directional chaining is added to a comprehension system, most texts will consequently
engender more inferences than if backward-chaining alone were allowed. For example,
consider the above system's interpretation of the text statement:
Chapter 2. Background to the Problem 17
go step(agent:paul, to:c)
If backward-chaining is the only mode of rule application, rule (1) alone is applicable
(by matching the statement against one of its consequents).
2
If forward-chaining is
additionally allowed, rule (2) is also applicable (by matching the text statement against
its antecedent).
2.3.2 Incomplete Matching
A second method for increasing the power and exibility of a production system is to allow
incomplete matches. In strict rule-matching, only rules whose antecedent(s) (for forward-
chaining) or consequent(s) (for backward-chaining) are completely matched may `re'.
This prevents errors being made; desirable for computational eÆciency reasons, but not
in cognitively-valid models. In the latter, it is essential to allow partial matches to account
for certain psychological phenomena [Anderson, 1983]. In recent research, one text-related
phenomena attributed to partial matching is the so-called `Moses illusion'. This eect
occurs when `a term in a sentence or question (the \critical term") is replaced with a
semantically similar but incorrect term (the \distorted term")' and the comprehender
responds `as if this distortion were not present' [Kamas et al., 1996]. The eect gets its
name from the archetypical example question:
`How many animals of each kind did Moses take in the Ark?'
People will often respond to this question with the answer `Two', even though Noah
took the animals onto the Ark, and not Moses. This eect is often attributed to partial
matching, where concepts in the question are matched against rules in memory which gen-
erate its semantic representation. Where there is suÆcient match between the meanings
of the critical term and the distorted term (e.g. both Moses and Noah are Old Testament
characters), the `switch' is not noticed; if there is insuÆcient overlap (e.g. Nixon is used
as the distorted term), the distortion is recognised and no answer given.
Another perhaps related eect occurs during the reading of role-shift texts
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981]. Here, comprehenders jump to conclusions about the roles
of characters which later turn out to be incorrect. Their early assignation of a role
to a character may be based on incomplete matches between rules in memory; once
more information becomes available, matches with other role-assignment rules may be
2
Incomplete matching would also be required, as described in section 2.3.2.
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more complete, and the initial role assignment retracted as a result. The fact that
such phenomena occur in comprehension points to the necessity of allowing incomplete
matching in a comprehension system. This kind of `interpretation revision' is central to
my work and is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
Incomplete matching can contribute to inferential promiscuity by licensing inferences
on the basis of very little information. Consider a system with the following rulebase (the
system can only backward-chain on rules):
(1) hold plan(planner:X, object:Y)  !
grasp(agent:X, object:Y).
(2) juggle plan(planner:X, object:Y)  !
skittles(Y), grasp(agent:X, object:Y).
The system works by matching observations against the consequents of rules. Given
the following text:
grasp(agent:jill, object:s)
both rules are applicable if incomplete matching is allowed. Even though the object of
the grasp has no type dened, as indicated by rule (2), the inference to juggle plan is
allowed. If only complete matching were allowed, only rule (1) would be applicable; the
missing information skittles(b) would prohibit application of rule (2), resulting in one less
potential inference.
2.3.3 Number of Rules
Imagine we added two more rules to the system described in section 2.2 to yield the
following rulebase:
(1) hold plan(planner:X, object:Y)  !
grasp(agent:X, object:Y).
(2) goal(planner:X, objective:(possess(agent:X, object:Y))  !
hold plan(planner:X, object:Y).
(3) grasp(agent:X, object:Y)  !
throw plan(planner:X, object:Y).
(4) throw plan(planner:X, object:Y)  !
goal(planner:X, objective:(dispose of(agent:X, object:Y)).
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We could continue adding rules for relationships between actions, goals and plans in
this manner, which would be absolutely necessary if the system were to cope with anything
approaching a real text. Now, when the system comprehends the text:
grasp(agent:geo, object:thing1)
even more inferences are produced: some of these are relevant and some less so. For
example, the system could generate the possibly relevant inference `geo has a plan to
dispose of thing1' by applying rules (3) and (4), rather than rules (1) and (2). The system
could also create a contradiction by applying all four, resulting in `geo plans to dispose
of thing1' and `geo plans to hold thing1'.
Each time a rule is added, an interpretation containing the elements of the rule licenses
more potential inferences. In addition, if several rules apply equally to the current
interpretation and create multiple explanations for the same element(s), contradictions
may arise.
2.3.4 Can Inferential Promiscuity be Prevented?
Each of the three factors above (bi-directional chaining, incomplete matching, and number
of rules) increases the quantity of inferences which could potentially be generated during
comprehension. When their eects are combined, this increase may be explosive, causing
a system to grind to a halt under the processing load, or produce useless interpretations
due to excessive, irrelevant detail.
However, each of the three elements is also necessary in a cognitive simulation of
comprehension. Without these facilities, a system would suer the following decits:
 Without bi-directional chaining, certain types of texts may be incomprehensible or
poorly-interpreted; computationally, the system may miss important inferences.
 Without incomplete matching, modelling of some psychological phenomena (e.g.
human comprehension errors) is awkward. For example, inputs which almost match
a rule may be completely ignored, when it would be preferable to infer the `missing'
part of the match.
 With few rules, the system's area of application would be severely limited.
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The answer is to factor in the facilities described above, but to constrain their ap-
plication, hopefully to those occasions where it is actually warranted. In other words,
there is a requirement for an inferential control mechanism which evaluates the inference
process and decides which of the potential inferences to actually make, and/or which of
the resulting information to incorporate into the evolving interpretation.
Control mechanisms are `fundamental to all cognitive processes and intelligent systems'
[Hayes-Roth, 1985]. Their importance to computational models cannot be overestimated:
they both enhance their accuracy as models of cognition and their eÆciency as computer
programs. The specic control mechanisms at work during comprehension are a central
concern of my work, and are outlined in the next section.
2.4 Inferential Control
For the purpose of explaining the types of control which could be applied to comprehen-
sion, I describe a simplied model of inference generation. This model has similarities to
many previous ones (e.g. [Alterman, 1985], [Correira, 1980], [Thorndyke, 1976]), but at
the same time has been generalised.
In this generic model, I assume that each interpretation derived by the comprehender
is encoded into memory as one or more representations. Initially, representations only
represent text statements; as more text statements are added to representations, the
comprehender generates inferences to explain and elaborate them. Useful inferences
can also be added to the representations. The items (text statements or inferences)
manipulated during comprehension are called representational elements, or r-elts.
Figure 2.2 shows how the comprehender's current set of representations may be ex-
tended to generate new representations.
3
The diagram shows a single cycle of inference generation, starting from one set of
representations and ending with a new set of representations. The processes (rectangles)
shown in the diagram are as follows:
1. Match some or all or the current representations (reprs) to rules in long-termmemory
(similar to the example rules in the previous sections).
2. Apply the rules to the current representations to generate inferences (possible new
r-elts).
3
`Representations' is intended in the sense `one or more representations'.
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Input reprs
Match to rules
to generate new inferences
Output reprs
Retrieve rules
Apply rules to reprs
to generate new extensions
Apply rules to reprs
reprs to use for matching
Match to indices
rules to apply
Choose which
Select new reprs by
comparing to input reprs
Prune inferences
3
4
5
2
1
Generate new extensions
Choose parts of and/or
Figure 2.2: Generic process model for the inference cycle
3. Attach inferences to the current representations to produce new extensions. The
term extension is used to denote the following:
 An existing representation, extended with some new inferences (or other alter-
ations, such as deletions or transfers between memory stores (see section 6.4.1
on page 146)).
 Possibly some information about the quality of the resulting, extended rep-
resentation (e.g. the probability that the new representation is correct, or a
number representing the connectivity of the new representation).
Note that paths are possible through the diagram that avoid one or more steps. For
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example, it is possible to generate extensions from current representations by applying
retrieved rules directly: in this case, inferences are not generated as separate entities which
are then attached to the representation. However, the alternative paths allow control to
be applied at one or more points, as indicated by the shaded boxes on the diagram. The
numbers in these boxes correspond to the following control mechanisms:
1. Focusing.
2. Directed rule retrieval.
3. Evaluation of rule matches.
4. Evaluation of inferences.
5. Evaluation of representations.
These mechanisms are described in the following sections.
Focusing
Before matching a representation to the rulebase, the comprehender may select a subset
of the representation to be used for matching: for example, the most recently-encoded
N elements of the representation. This restricted range of elements is usually referred to
as working memory [Laird et al., 1987]; a more satisfactory term is short-term store, as
`working memory' is often dened as a cognitive system with both storage and processing
potential [Baddeley, 1992].
In cognitively-motivated systems, the short-term store typically consists
of the elements of a representation which reach some `activation threshold'
[Just and Carpenter, 1992]. Elements whose activation falls below the threshold
are considered to have been encoded into the long-term store or forgotten; only those
elements whose activation is above the threshold are used for matching against the
rulebase.
Focusing reduces the gross number of rule matches which are possible, which can
create considerable eÆciency increases. Note that elements from long-term memory may
still be retrieved into the short-term store, so that they can be incorporated into inferences
[Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. However, those elements which go `out of focus' may be
neglected, even when subsequent processing opens a route through which they could be
integrated.
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Directed rule retrieval
Rather than matching r-elts with the whole rulebase, the rulebase may be partitioned
into sets of rules which apply under similar circumstances. Then, only those rule sets
which are contextually appropriate to the r-elts may be considered as providing potential
inferences.
For example, in Leake's ACCEPTER, the `things to be explained' in a text are
categorised as belonging to one or more anomaly categories [Leake, 1992]. Each rule
(technically, case) in the knowledge base is also categorised according to the same anomaly
vocabulary. In deciding which explanatory rules to invoke, ACCEPTER compares the
text's anomaly categories with those of the rules in the rulebase; only matching rules are
considered as potential explanations for the text. This `directed' retrieval of applicable
rules reduces search, as text elements do not have to be compared to every rule in the
rulebase: only those rules indexed under the same anomaly category are considered as
producing viable inferences. While assigning and matching anomaly categories may seem
to involve its own overheads, these are outweighed by the eÆciency benets of less rule
to r-elt matching.
Evaluation of rule matches
Once r-elts have been matched with the rulebase or to indices, there may be one or
more rules which are applicable. Each applicable rule is a potential inference which the
system could make. However, rather than making all of these inferences without further
consideration, the system may select one or more which are most likely to yield useful
extensions to representations. The decision about which potential inferences to select is
often called conict resolution [Charniak and McDermott, 1985]. Conict resolution is
usually carried out with respect to syntactic preferences, one of the most important being
specicity (see section 5.1.1). Using this criterion, if one rule matched two r-elts and
another only one, the rule which matched two r-elts is preferred; in other words, the rst
rule's match is more specic [Reichgelt, 1989]. Anderson cites specicity as important
for dealing with exceptions to rules, such as irregular plurals in language production
[Anderson, 1983].
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Evaluation of inferences
Once inferences have been constructed, it is possible to evaluate the resulting output
before it is accepted as an extension to a representation. Those inferences which do not
add any useful information are `pruned' out of the set of possible inferences; the remainder
are then used to generate new r-elts which are attached to the current interpretation.
This form of control is used in Norvig's FAUSTUS system [Norvig, 1989]. FAUSTUS
suggests inferences using a weak marker-passing mechanism, which operates using a
variant of spreading-activation (see section 4.3.1). Using the path taken by markers across
a semantic network, FAUSTUS decides which paths could add useful information to the
representation and which probably won't. Those paths deemed possibly useful are then
used to construct new representational elements; the remaining paths are discarded.
Other models which use relaxation in connectionist networks are employing a similar
principle; this seems to be the case in Kintsch's work, for instance [Kintsch, 1988]. Acti-
vation is passed between concepts, in much the same way as markers, and those concepts
which receive suÆcient activation are considered to be part of the representation. This
topic is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.5.
Evaluation of representations
After inferences have been added to an interpretation, the representations constituting
that interpretation are themselves evaluated. Those which are of the best `quality' are
retained, while the others are discarded.
For example, an interpretation may contain three competing representations. During
the next inference-generation cycle, three inferences are made, one for each representation.
These inferences are then attached to their respective representations, creating three new
representations. The comprehender then evaluates the new representations, and nds that
one is of signicantly lower quality than the others. At this point, the comprehender may
discard the low-quality representation, leaving the other two new representations.
Various metrics may be used to evaluate representations and assign quality ratings
to them, such as Ng's coherence metric [Ng and Mooney, 1990] or a simplicity metric
[Thagard, 1989]. The evaluated representations may then be sorted according to their
quality, and those below a certain threshold discarded; Ng's ACCEL system uses beam-
search to do this [Ng and Mooney, 1990].
(This description is brief as the concepts behind evaluation metrics and their use are
discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5.)
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Meta-level Monitoring
One additional form of control cannot be drawn on the diagram, as it operates between
processing cycles, not within them. This form of control could be called meta-level
monitoring.
Meta-level monitoring controls the other forms of control: it decides whether
new inference-generation cycles should be instigated at all, by monitoring the current
state of the comprehender's interpretation. This meta-level control mechanism thus
continually tracks the evolving interpretation, deciding whether it is acceptable or requires
improvement.
Interestingly, meta-level monitoring processes have received little attention in the AI
literature. Comprehension is often assumed to continue until a structure at a pre-specied
level of detail is instantiated. The reason for this may be that these systems often rely
on a `most-specic' denition of interpretation, inherited from diagnostic models, e.g.
nding one of the set of `allowable' hypotheses. For example, in Kautz's comprehension
(plan recognition) system, the system does not halt until it discovers the minimal number
of high-level plans that can be inferred from lower-level actions [Kautz and Allen, 1986].
This is not to say that these systems are bad, just that their behaviour can seem `at': each
time a story is comprehended, the interpretation contains the same densities and types
of information [Kayser and Coulon, 1981]; the interpretation also tends to be derived by
the same process, over the same period of time, on every occasion the system is run. For
example, if a system is based on scripts (see section 4.2), the triggering and instantiation
of scripts occurs at a consistent pace: an initial event triggers a script, and subsequent
events are used to ll the slots of the script. There is no method for slowing the rate at
which scripts are triggered (for example, if there is little evidence to suggest they will be
helpful); and no method for varying the amount of information which can be considered
simultaneously (which may be useful if modelling short-term memory dierences).
Evaluation of representations can give the appearance of meta-level monitoring in a
computational system. Ng's ACCEL system, for example, constructs its interpretations
to various levels of specicity, depending on whether an inference will add to their quality;
once the best interpretation has been derived (i.e. no inferences can improve its quality),
comprehension halts [Ng and Mooney, 1990]. However, this form of control is objective, as
the criteria for quality are the same each time the program is run and the `most-coherent'
interpretation will always be derived.
The important point about meta-level monitoring is the idea of acceptability. This
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is distinct from the goal to `nd the highest quality interpretation'; instead, the goal is
to `nd an acceptable interpretation', which may or may not be of the highest quality
according to abstract, absolute criteria such as simplicity (see chapter 5).
4
Acceptability
is dened with respect to subjective criteria; these criteria dier between individual
comprehenders, and may vary from `nd the best possible interpretation' (as in the most-
specic interpretation) to `infer the few most important concepts' (as in comprehension
for `gist').
Acceptability thus seems to require some notion of representation quality which would
allow interpretations (and their component representations) to be rated, alongside a notion
of quality threshold against which interpretations are compared. Once the quality of an
interpretation reaches this threshold, an acceptable interpretation has been determined
and comprehension can cease.
A detailed discussion of `quality' is deferred until chapter 5. For the moment, let it
suÆce that there is some mechanism by which the comprehender can rate and compare
representations.
I am now in a position to relate this idea back to the forms of control which are vital in
preventing inferential promiscuity while maintaining cognitively important abilities (see
section 2.3.4). In particular, representation quality and quality threshold could be used in
an implementation of control as follows:
 Focusing could be made dependent on the quality of representational elements. For
example, those r-elts of the lowest quality take priority on each inference generation
cycle. If quality of an r-elt were dened in terms of the number of relationships
between that r-elt and others, the lowest-quality r-elts would be those which are
least-connected to other r-elts, and would thus be given priority.
 Evaluation of inferences could be determined by measuring the quality improve-
ment aorded by an inference: those inferences making no improvement, or those
inferences making the least improvement, could be discarded.
 Evaluation of representations can be directly related to representation quality: those
representations falling within a certain range of quality values could be maintained
and the others discarded.
4
The idea of acceptability tallies closely with that of satiscing in problem-solving
[Simon and Kadane, 1975].
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 Meta-level monitoring is probably the most interesting and most neglected form of
control. It can be applied by comparing the quality of representations with the
quality threshold: those representations which fall outside this threshold are either
discarded, or an attempt made to improve them; representations which cross this
threshold are considered acceptable, at which point a decision to halt comprehension
may be made.
Most of the suggestions made above have been incorporated into my theory of com-
prehension, and implemented using a particular model of representation quality and asso-
ciated quality threshold.
5
Control occurs at multiple levels and allows the comprehender
to gradually lter out useless inferences and representations, hopefully leading to more
economical, yet still cognitively realistic, comprehension. Later chapters specify these
layers of control and their implementation.
2.4.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I've described the core issue of this thesis: inferential control. I've
demonstrated that inferential promiscuity can be a problem for computational models
of comprehension; I also showed that its causes must be retained, otherwise interesting
psychological aspects may be lost. I then showed that inferential promiscuity could
possibly be curtailed by applying inferential control mechanisms. In the previous section,
I suggested that a measure of interpretation quality, in tandem with a quality threshold,
could encapsulate control eectively.
However, before reviewing the role of interpretation metrics in greater detail, it is
necessary to dene the framework into which these metrics t. As I mentioned previously,
the use of metrics is centred on inference-generation cycles, where interpretations are
successively rened by the comprehender. Metrics for interpretations depend on an
intimate understanding of the nature of interpretations, their representations, and the
processes by which they are rened. To address this, the next two chapters describe the
structures and procedures which `implement' these ideas and which are common to both
computational and psychological models of comprehension.
5
Note that two of the forms of control not mentioned above, directed retrieval of rules and evaluation
of rule matches, are also part of my theory, but rely on criteria independent of the quality metric; see
chapter 6.
Chapter 3
Episodic Representations and
Inference
This chapter introduces theories of episodic representation and its relationship to infer-
ence. The main themes are:
1. How interpretation can be dened, and how this relates to theories of episodic
representation.
2. Inference processes: what an inference is, how inferences are made, and how they
contribute to representations.
3. The role of episodic representations in comprehension.
3.1 What's the Point of Comprehension?
This may seem like a strange question to ask: because comprehension is central to many
activities which we carry out on a day-to-day basis, we tend to forget that we are even
doing it. One answer might then be `Because we are human.' However, by trying to answer
this question more precisely, we can get a handle on why people comprehend texts, as
opposed to doing anything else with them. This may also give us an idea of how to apply
control in comprehension: if we know why people halt their comprehension, settling for
a particular interpretation, we may use this to shed light on control of computational
models.
28
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To answer the question, a rst step is to dene comprehension and look at alternatives
to it: what can we do with a text if we don't comprehend it? I dene comprehension as
the construction of an interpretation which contains more information than that explicitly
given in the text. In other words, an interpretation does not merely contain the data in
a text, but contains the information derived from the data in the text; in the words
of Dretske, an input containing many `information-bearing' components (the data) is
represented by fewer, less-informative components [Dretske, 1981]. This emphasises the
constructive processes of comprehension, beyond simple representation of textual data.
An alternative to comprehending a text (in the sense of inferring information from
its data) would be to represent with equal weight every datum in the text. The result
of interacting with a text would then be a `copy' of the text in memory (even the most
mechanical comprehender, learning a text by rote, produces a richer representation than
this).
There are several benets to comprehending a text, over simply representing it in
memory. The construction of text interpretations can be likened to a process of cat-
egorisation, where parts of the text are linked in memory into larger cognitive units
[Barsalou and Sewell, 1985]. Like categorisation, this has certain benets for the compre-
hender [Rosch, 1978]:
 Economy
A comprehender can't store every individual piece of data without generalisation,
as this would require greater memory storage than they have available. Instead
of representing new data individually in memory, a comprehender can `summarise'
those data by attaching them to an existing, structured concept. The more specic
the data considered, the more specic the structure which can be applied and the
less ambiguity there is in the interpretation.
 Communication
If culturally-shared structures (`frames of reference') are used to represent texts,
interpretations can be shared with those who share those structures. By contrast,
if everyone had a distinct interpretation of a set of data (e.g. a sequence of events
occurring in a text), there would be no way for them to share information about
those data. For example, if my conception of `writing a program' were represented
with unique structures that had no connection with cultural norms, there would be
no way for me to share my programming experience with other people (e.g. students
I'm teaching).
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 Learning
By structuring the information in an interpretation and associating it with other
parts of memory, a comprehender may learn new cognitive structures. While these
structures are based on existing ones, they may contain insights which improve the
comprehender's understanding of the world around them [Mooney, 1990]. Here, I
don't mean that they can only learn about the mating habits of mosquitoes or the
densities of stars, for instance; rather, they may learn more broadly, about how to
interact with other people or even themselves, which in turn increases their chances
of `survival' (in the broadest sense).
If text data are stored as an undierentiated mass, there is no way to relate the text
to what the comprehender already knows. This then precludes the formation of
cognitive structures: learning depends on processes such as analogy and induction,
which are impossible without recognition of relationships between fragments of
information [Kaplan and Berry-Rogghe, 1991].
By comprehending a text, it may be stored economically and in a format where it can
be communicated to other people. In addition, it may be used as a basis for learning new
cognitive structures which increase the comprehender's chances of functioning eectively
in the world.
The most important of these issues as far as my own work is concerned is that of
economy, or how the comprehender structures text interpretations. Given that there are
many possible interpretations which could be generated (see section 2.3), it is important
to dene how these possibilities are explored, accepted and rejected, leaving a nal
interpretation. One way to think of this is as a process of reducing the number of possible
`text worlds' spawned by a text, to leave a single text world [Enkvist, 1989]:
...when we are exposed to an emerging text, certain elements and their col-
locations in the text activate references to a semantic universe of discourse,
denable as a conceptually organised and retrievable system of models of real-
ity, and lead us to a specic text world characterised by a highly constrained,
specic set of states of aairs.
If we equate `text worlds' with representations in memory, and the `semantic universe
of discourse' with the comprehender's knowledge base, the resulting `specic text world'
can be seen as the comprehender's nal interpretation. We can begin to formalise this
reduction process with Hobbs' pseudo-equation for comprehension [Hobbs, 1990]:
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F (K; T ) = I
where F is the comprehension process, taking as inputs the comprehender's knowledge
base K and a text T . The output of this process is an interpretation, I. The important
aspects of this formula are its emphasis on the combined role of knowledge and the text
in determining the interpretation: there is no interpretation `hidden' in the text which
is wheedled out, but a dynamic process of construction and selection of representations,
eventually leading to the comprehender settling on a set of the possible representations.
This nal set of representations constitutes their interpretation of the text.
The formula above expresses a relationship between the inputs and outputs of compre-
hension, but doesn't specify how representations are constructed and selected. Specifying
these processes requires a model of how representations are constructed from input data;
implementing these processes requires specications which are computable. For this
purpose, I next dene how texts (T ), representations (K and I) and comprehension
processes (F ) can be described computationally.
3.2 Computing Comprehension
In this section, I use deductive-nomological explanation as the foundation for a denition
of comprehension [Hempel, 1966]; this model underlies computational work on abduction
[Charniak and Shimony, 1994], which I describe in detail later in the section (expanding
on section 2.3.1).
The general form of a deductive-nomological argument is [Hempel, 1966]:
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In this equation, l
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are called the explanans (the things doing
the explaining), and E is the explanandum (the set of things which are explained). The ex-
planans consists of two types of element: laws (l
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) and assertions (a
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).
In the eld of scientic explanation (where this formula was rst dened), the scientist
is assumed to take a set of assertions a
1
; a
2
; : : : ; a
k
, such as facts about the world, and a
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phenomenon to be explained, E; their aim is then to determine l
1
; l
2
; : : : ; l
r
which make
the above formula true.
1
Although this provides the basis for theories of abduction, there is a crucial dierence.
In abduction, the laws are known and the aim is to derive the assertions which, together
with the laws, will semantically entail the explanandum. In other words, the aim is to
derive A = a
1
; a
2
; : : : ; a
k
, where L = l
1
; l
2
; : : : ; l
r
and E are known, such that
A [ L j= E (3.1)
is true. A is determined by inference from E and L.
If the members of L are rules relating causes to eects of the form cause  !
eect
1
; : : : ; eect
n
, and E is a set of eects or symptoms of unknown causes, abduction
can be further characterised as inference from eects to causes or `deduction in reverse'
[Charniak and McDermott, 1985].
2
The A of formula 3.1 thus consists of the set of
explanations for elements of E which make the above formula true. Each explanation
is generated by application of the standard abductive syllogism [Brewka et al., 1997]:
b; a  ! b
a
(3.2)
For example, if wet lawn is to be explained (wet lawn 2 E), and L contains the rule
rain  ! wet lawn, the following inference can be made:
wet lawn; rain  ! wet lawn
rain
i.e. rain is inferred as a cause of wet lawn. Note that the resulting inference of the
explanation rain makes formula 3.1 true:
rain; (rain  ! wet lawn) j= wet lawn
It is important to note that abduction is not logically sound. Despite this, it can nd
instantiations of A which satisfy the criteria for a valid explanation.
1
This is an extremely simplied version of Hempel's theory, and it has many opponents in philosophy
of science, e.g. [van Fraassen, 1977]. However, as I show in the rest of this section, it provides a reasonable
grounding for a computational theory of comprehension.
2
This interpretation of abduction is largely derived from diagnosis systems, where a set of
hypotheses and their eects (e.g. medical conditions and their symptoms) can be easily encoded
[Peng and Reggia, 1990].
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This may seem a long way from text comprehension. However, many language
comprehension tasks, such as resolution of pragmatic ambiguity and plan recognition,
are particularly amenable to abductive techniques [Goldman, 1990], [Hobbs et al., 1993],
[Ng and Mooney, 1992]. This is because abductive reasoning is a formalisation of
`reasoning to the best explanation', and it is a small leap of faith from this to dening
comprehension as `nding the best explanation for a text'. This perspective is backed up
by much research which shows how explanation is the driving force behind comprehension:
while comprehending a text, people look for answers to `Why?' questions, as opposed to
`What happens next?', `How?', `Where?', or `When?' questions [Graesser et al., 1994].
Empirical studies based on verbal protocols have also shown the predominance of
explanatory inferences over elaborative or predictive ones [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996].
Researchers in psychology have even begun citing AI research into abduction in
papers about comprehension [Noordman and Vonk, 1998]. However, despite this, I have
reservations about abduction as a complete theory of comprehension (see section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Formalising and Visualising Comprehension
Text comprehension can be formalised as an abductive task by making the following
assumptions:
1. Texts can be represented in some kind of semantic formalism. The formalism chosen
is usually a propositional representation [Goldman, 1990], [Ng and Mooney, 1992];
my work follows this tradition, being generally classiable as symbolic AI
[Newell and Simon, 1972]. There is also signicant evidence that propositions are
valid units of psychological processing [Kintsch, 1998].
2. Propositions in the text are called observations. The set of observations comprising
the text is designated by T .
3. Propositions can be manipulated by rules to generate new propositions and/or
explanatory relations (I have already been using this assumption throughout the
previous chapters). The set of rules is called a knowledge base and is denoted by K.
4. Observations and inferred propositions are incorporated into the comprehender's
representation R as nodes. It is important to distinguish between nodes, which
represent propositions in memory, and the propositions from which they are derived.
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The latter are used in tandem with explanatory relationships in deciding whether a
particular set of propositions satises the abductive criteria of formula 3.1.
5. An explanatory relation can be constructed if a proposition B (either derived from
the text or a previous inference) is in R and there is some rule A  ! B in K. In
this case, the comprehender infers A  ! B by copying a relationship from semantic
memory into episodic memory (see chapter 4). The comprehender also infers A as
support for the relation. Note that this is inference by abduction, reasoning from
eects to causes.
The nal representation R therefore consists of the following elements:
 Observations represented as nodes.
 Inferred propositions represented as nodes.
 Inferred explanatory relations represented as arcs.
Returning to the simple example from chapter 2, we could use abduction to infer an
explanation for someone's plan as follows:
Proposition from text:
take plan(planner:emma, object:orange1).
Rule:
goal(planner:X, objective: (possess(agent:X, object:Y))  !
take plan(planner:X, object:Y).
Inferred proposition:
goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1))).
Inferred relationship:
goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1)))
 ! take plan(planner:emma, object:orange1).
This inference is based on syllogism 3.2. Note also that formula 3.1 is satised as the
inferred relationship and proposition semantically entail the observation, i.e.
goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1))),
goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1)))
j= take plan(planner:emma, object:orange1).
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I have slightly changed the criteria of formula 3.1 by requiring that the representation
alone explains the text, rather than a set of assertions and a knowledge base. This is done
by copying relationships from the knowledge base into the representation, so that the
representation becomes a valid abductive interpretation in isolation from the knowledge
base.
The resulting representation can be visualised as an episodic network, simi-
lar to those used by psychologists [Kintsch, 1998], [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996],
[van den Broek and Lorch, 1993]. The above representation can be converted into a
network with two nodes, one for each proposition, and a single arc representing the
explanatory relationship between them, as shown in gure 3.1.
#goal(planner:emma, objective:(possess(agent:emma, object:orange1)))
@take_plan(planner:emma, object:orange1)
Figure 3.1: Episodic network representation of an abductive explanation
Also note that the nodes in the network have been marked with their origins:
 @ = nodes derived from observations.
 # = nodes derived by inference. These nodes are also shaded to make the distinction
clearer.
This section has demonstrated how the criteria and syllogism for abductive explanation
can be applied to interpretations of texts. However, there are important questions which
are not answered by the basic model of abduction:
 Are interpretations just explanations?, i.e. can abduction deal with other types of
non-explanatory relations?
 Can observations explain each other?, or must all explanatory relationships be
constructed from inferred explanations to observations.
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 Should all observations be explained? Are there any occasions on which it is better
not to explain a text?
 Are multiple representations maintained? If comprehenders maintain multiple rep-
resentations, can abduction model this?
In the next four sections, I show how these questions may be answered.
3.2.2 Are Interpretations Just Explanations?
If a model of comprehension is based entirely on abduction, this prioritises explanation
to the exclusion of other kinds of inference. In particular, it prioritises explanation on the
basis of logical implication. As I've stated before, explanation is by far the most important
form of inference. However, other forms of inference do play a role: up to 30% of inferences
made by readers of narratives are non-explanatory [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. In
section 2.3.1, I described why it is necessary for a comprehension system to be able to
make inferences by forward-chaining on schemas, which allows predictive and other types
of inference to be made. In that section, I deliberately avoided technical detail for the
sake of clarity. Now, with the technical background of section 3.2, it is possible to show
more precisely how non-explanatory inferences relate to abduction.
What are these other forms of inference? This is a complex and confusing question
to answer, because dierent researchers make dierent assumptions about the meanings
of words like `explanatory', `elaborative' and `predictive'. For example, one denition
of `elaborative' contrasts it with `bridging', stating that elaborative inferences are not
necessary for comprehension while bridging inferences are [Singer, 1994]; another deni-
tion claims that predictive inferences, possibly unnecessary for comprehension in most
circumstances, can have an explanatory function in some situations [Murray et al., 1993].
Another example: some researchers dierentiate between predictive and elaborative in-
ferences [Whitney et al., 1991], while others treat predictive inferences as a subset of the
class of elaborative inferences [Keefe and McDaniel, 1993].
To circumvent this confusion, I consider representations to consist of propositions
and relationships between them, as in section 3.2. All relationships are directional, that
is, they point from one proposition (the parent) to one or more other propositions (the
children). Each relationship is treated as specifying a `connection': the parent is a point of
connection for the children; or, the parent is a more specic way of describing, classifying,
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or linking the children. The structure formed by a parent and its children is termed a
tree. An example in network form is shown in gure 3.2.
@go(agent:harry, to:c) @explore(agent:harry, place:c) #leave(agent:harry, from:c)
#visit(agent:harry, place:c)
Figure 3.2: A tree representing a script-like explanation
The tree in gure 3.2 shows a relationship between a proposition representing a script-level
event and several propositions at a lower level, representing the subevents of the script
[Read, 1987]. (This tree is based on the schema described in section 4.2.1.) Note that
both the parent and one of the children are inferred (marked with #). Also note that
the relationship depicted is more complex than the one-to-one relationships previously
described: this relationship connects a single parent to several children (one-to-many).
The ability to create one-to-many connections is signicant, for the reasons described in
section 4.2.2.
I am now in a position to relate this simplied view to notions of explanation and
elaboration. Each tree represents a relationship between the parent propositions and its
children, providing a rationale for their co-occurrence in the representation. Trees may
be generated either by forward- or backward-chaining, depending on which propositions
are present in the representation when the inference is made.
The distinction between an elaboration and an explanation is in terms of the utility
of a tree. If a tree's children have no basis in the text (i.e. all of its children are inferred
and marked with #), and the children are not parents of any trees themselves, then
the children elaborate the parent, and the tree is classed as elaborative. This functional
view of representational elements species exactly when inferences are elaborative: when
the resulting tree does not contain any children which are parents of trees, i.e. when its
children have no explanatory function. An example elaborative tree is shown in gure 3.3.
Note that elaborations don't invalidate formula 3.1. The explanatory relationship
between inferred propositions and observations still holds, but the formula is altered to
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#leave(agent:harry, from:c)
#visit(agent:harry, place:c)
#go(agent:harry, to:c) #explore(agent:harry, place:c)
Figure 3.3: An elaborative tree
discriminate between propositions which explain observations and propositions which are
just inferred children. The revised formula which takes account of this is:
X [ E [ C j= T (3.3)
where:
 X is the set of inferred propositions which are parents (explanations).
 E is the set of inferred propositions which are children and not parents (elabora-
tions).
 C is the set of relations, described as trees.
 T is the set of observations.
In this case, the presence of E makes no dierence to the truth of the formula, as the
propositions in E do not explain any of the propositions in T ; another way of looking at
this is that they do not occur as parents in C. While this may make elaborative trees
seem redundant, they are signicant in terms of the interpretation metric I describe in
chapter 5.
The other types of inference commonly referred to in the literature can also be incor-
porated into this framework, as described in the following sections. While some appear to
be obviously explanatory (such as causal inferences) and others obviously elaborative (e.g.
instrumental inferences), I attempt to show that the functional signicance of an inference
is more important than the supercial classication which it may be given. All types of
inference may be either elaborative or explanatory, depending on their contribution to the
quality of an interpretation.
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Causal Inferences
Causal antecedent inferences establish suÆcient causal explanation for an event
[Graesser et al., 1994], [van den Broek et al., 1995]. For example, `John struck a match'
is a suÆcient condition for `John lit his cigarette'. Given a node `John lit his cigarette', a
proposition representing `John struck a match' may either be retrieved from the current
representation or a new proposition may be created.
The dierence between causal antecedent inferences and causal consequent inferences
(the latter are often called predictive inferences [St. George and Kutas, 1998]) is the con-
text in which the inference is made. For instance, if a comprehender reads a text containing
the two `cigarette-lighting' events above, there are two ways in which they could establish
a causal relationship, as shown in gure 3.4 (next page).
In the causal antecedent condition, the inference is backward in narrative time, from
the lighting of the cigarette to the striking of the match. In the causal consequent
condition, a prediction of a cigarette lighting event is inferred on the basis of a match
being struck; this prediction is then instantiated when the lighting event occurs in the
text [DeJong, 1979]. Note that in this case one proposition from the text is providing a
causal explanation for another. The criteria for abductive explanation in formula 3.3 do
not allow this, but I suggest an extension to amend this in section 3.2.3.
Causal antecedent inferences are one type of the broader class of bridging inferences
[Singer, 1994]. Bridging inferences are considered by some to consist of inferences nec-
essary for comprehension, as opposed to inferences which are purely elaborative (ibid.).
This is the denition of bridging which I use here: any inference which contributes to
explanation (as dened broadly in section 3.2) is considered a bridging inference. As
such, causal inferences may be bridging inferences, or they may be elaborative, depending
on their function in the interpretation.
Associative Inferences
I'm using the term `associative' here in the sense of [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]: in-
ferences from a proposition which refer to information neither temporally consequent
nor temporally antecedent to that proposition. Such inferences generally involve adding
information about `features, properties, relations, and functions of persons, objects or
concepts' (ibid.). This information is temporally concurrent with the source proposition:
for example, an inference from `Ted is a dog' to `Ted is a mammal' is not a causal
antecedent or consequent inference, as Ted's being a dog and a mammal are temporally
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concurrent. Some examples of associative inferences include inferences about instruments
used in an event [O'Brien et al., 1988] and inferences about the spatial layout of locations
in a narrative [Zwaan and Van Oostendoorp, 1993].
The structure generated by associative inferences is considered to be a tree expressing
a connection between nodes, the same as other types of inference. Again, associative
inferences may serve an explanatory or elaborative function [van den Broek, 1994]. For
example, consider the following text:
Jane was reading a newspaper. A y was annoying her. She swatted it.
The node representation of this text is shown in gure 3.5.
@read(agent:jane, pat:n) @annoy(agent:f, patient:jane)
@type(f, fly)@type(n, newspaper)
@swat(agent:jane, patient:f, inst:X)
Figure 3.5: Representation of the `y swatting' text
Imagine that the comprehender has the following two rules:
(1) y swatting(agent:X, patient:Y, inst:Z)  !
swatted(agent:X, patient:Y, inst:Z), type(Y, y),
type(Z, swatter).
(2) type(X, newspaper)  ! type(X, swatter).
The comprehender is able to infer a y swatting on the basis of a swat event and an entity
of type y. However, this leaves the instrument of the `swatting' unspecied. By inferring
that a newspaper can be used as a swatter using rule (2), the comprehender can specify
the instrument of the swatting event. This chain of inferences is shown in gure 3.6.
The inference from newspaper to swatter is associative (concurrent in narrative time,
not a prediction, and not directly explanatory); however, it creates coherence by forming a
connection between an explicit observation (the existence of a newspaper) and an inferred
proposition which is part of the explanation of the swatting. Another way of stating this
is that Jane's possessing a newspaper `causes' her to have a swatter to hand.
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@annoy(agent:f, patient:jane)@read(agent:jane, pat:n)
@type(f, fly)
@type(n, newspaper)
@swat(agent:jane, patient:f, inst:n)
#type(n, swatter)
#fly_swat(agent:jane, patient:f, inst:n)
Figure 3.6: Inferences connecting newspapers and y swatting
Although associative inferences seem to have little direct explanatory capability, they
are important for instantiating roles within events, which can establish indirect explana-
tory connections between them. Other types of association, such as inferring the type
of an instrument used in an event, may have a similar role in creating connections, for
example:
Felicity drove the nail into the wood. Then she hit Mike.
Unlike the previous text, the type of the item being used to drive the nail is not mentioned.
However, use of the word `nail' may lead to an inference that a hammer is being used as
an instrument. In turn, Felicity's hitting Mike mentions no explicit instrument; however,
if the existence of a hammer has been inferred, the availability of this in the representation
makes it a likely candidate for this role.
Any type of inference may thus contribute to interpretation quality if it species
relationships between elements of a representation. This formulation ties in with the
idea of convergence and constraint satisfaction described in [Graesser et al., 1994]: an
inference may be made when it receives `a high strength of activation from multiple
information sources, and it satises the constraints from multiple information sources'.
This is regardless of the direction of an inference (relative to narrative time) or the type
of inference (causal, bridging, associative etc.). The important distinction is between
explanatory inferences and elaborative ones; the time when an inference is made depends
not on its type, but on whether making that inference will prove protable at a certain
point in comprehension [Noordman and Vonk, 1992], [van den Broek et al., 1995]. My
computational interpretation of this idea is explored in depth in chapter 5.
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3.2.3 Can Text Propositions Explain Each Other?
This question returns us to a consideration of how abduction can account for interpreta-
tions of texts. In formula 3.3, I showed how elaborative trees would have no impact on
the truth of the formula, which still required a set of inferred parent nodes to explain the
text. In other words, the observations stay on the right-hand side of the formula (they
are the `things to be explained') and the inferred explanations stay on the left-hand side.
However, in some circumstances, it may be necessary for observations themselves to
provide explanations. This is often the case in AI models of abduction, such as ACCEL
[Ng, 1992]. In one example from Ng's thesis (ibid.), the following text is used:
Mary had a heart attack. John is depressed.
The explanation produced by ACCEL uses the observations had(mary, h) and
heart attack(h) to explain the observation depressed(john), via the inferences: (1) if X
has a heart attack, then X is in a bad condition; (2) if Y likes X, and X is in a bad
condition, and X is irreplaceable, then Y is depressed. Again, formula 3.3 is satised by
the propositions in the representation (adapted from Ng's notation):
@had(mary, h), @heart attack(h), #illness(h),
#bad condition(mary), #like(john, mary), #irreplaceable(mary)
[@heart-attack(h)  ! #illness(h)],
[@had(mary, h) ^ #illness(h)  ! #bad condition(mary)],
[#bad condition(mary) ^ #like(john, mary) ^ #irreplaceable(mary)
 ! @depressed(john)]
j= @depressed(john), @had(mary, h), @heart attack(h).
(Note that the observations which are also explanations must appear on both sides of the
formula.)
Is it important that observations are being used to explain each other, rather than
inferred propositions? In a situation where two or more representations could satisfy
the formula, priority should perhaps be given to those representations which contain the
lowest number of inferred elements and hence the `smallest' explanations (see sections 5.1.1
and 5.1.2). In other words, preference should be given to representations where paths of
explanatory relationships originate and terminate at observations, over representations
where inferred propositions are providing explanations. This is a version of the idea
that some elements of the representation have priority over others, e.g. propositions
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derived from observation or experiment [Thagard et al., inpr]. In the case of comprehen-
sion, observations have priority because they are known to be true; by contrast, inferred
propositions always carry some degree of uncertainty. ACCEL relies on this for rating
interpretations: the more paths there are between observations, or from intermediate
nodes to pairs of observations, the higher the quality of an interpretation (see section 5.2.4
on page 103 for a fuller description of this metric).
By distinguishing between observations which are explained by inference and those
explained by other observations, a system is not merely seeking to satisfy formula 3.3 but
also trying to optimise how the formula is satised. This requires heuristic criteria which
are diÆcult to dene in terms of logical proof (see chapter 5).
3.2.4 Should All Observations be `Explained'?
Does every element of the text have to be `explained' (or `proved', in the abductive
framework)? An alternative is to not explain observations, instead maintaining their
ambiguity. Cases where ambiguity should be maintained (or further investigated) occur
where there is insuÆcient evidence to point to a denite representation. For example,
if a comprehender reads the sentence `John is depressed', it is probably more eÆcient
to attempt no explanation than to produce one of the many possible explanations for
depression.
3
A comprehender may also be unable to explain a phenomenon if they lack the necessary
cognitive structures for its comprehension. In such cases, an attempt may made to either
nd an analogical representation or generate a new structure which can account for the
phenomenon (c.f. [Thagard, 1997]). In my model, I do not account for these creative
mechanisms, concentrating instead on situations of the rst type.
If no explanation is attempted of particular observations, the criteria for abduction
(as dened in formula 3.3) are not met. Instead, we end up with the following:
X [ E [N [ C j= O [N (3.4)
where:
3
In safety critical situations, it may make more sense to attempt clarication of ambiguity rather than
maintain it [Norvig and Wilensky, 1990]. During comprehension, attempts at clarication may take the
form of actively seeking `missing information', e.g. searching for more evidence to back up a potential
interpretation.
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 X is the set of propositions which are parents (explanations); these may be inferred
or observed.
 E is the set of inferred propositions which are children and not parents (elabora-
tions).
 C is the set of relations, described as trees.
 N is the set of observations which are not explained, i.e. observations which are
neither parents nor children.
 O is the set of observations which are explained, i.e. observations which are children.
 O and N together comprise the text (T ).
It seems as though the formula with which I began (formula 3.1) is becoming less and
less adequate for deciding when a representation is satisfactory. The neat relationship
between text propositions on the right-hand side of the formula and inferred explanations
on the left is disappearing, as some observations provide explanations for others, and some
observations are maintained without explanation.
While a valid representation may be considered primarily as an inferred set of explana-
tory propositions which must satisfy the formula, this gives no basis for deciding between
competing representations. The problem comes from the formula's failure to recognise
what is important about a representation: that is, the eort required to produce it (the
number of inferred elements it requires) and the explanatory relationships it contains. The
j= relationship doesn't really capture the nuances of the representation, instead describing
it at a relatively abstract level, divorced from its content.
Some form of heuristic, such as a metric for interpretation quality (as suggested in
the previous section), may be more eective in capturing these nuances. In my model,
deciding whether or not to explain (or elaborate) an observation depends on the number
of potential representations which could be generated from it: the greater the number
of choices, the less impetus there is to generate one of those representations. However,
the interaction between nodes which could be explained within the same tree causes the
model to make a decision between those representations, discounting some of them and
aÆrming others. This is described in detail in section 5.3.2 (page 110).
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3.2.5 Are Multiple Representations Maintained?
A nal issue is the extent to which competing interpretations and/or representations are
maintained by comprehenders. In psychological research on syntactic ambiguity, it is
often suggested that multiple representations are maintained until ambiguity is resolved
[Just and Carpenter, 1992]. This is related to the issue of the previous section: an
alternative to not explaining an observation (as in the previous section) is to generate
and maintain all (or some) of the potential explanations, and collapse this set when some
denitive evidence for one explanation over the others is encountered.
In comprehension at the level I am describing, there may be alternative representations
for a text. As an illustration, consider a text consisting of a single sentence, `Mary was
walking to school', represented by proposition W . Imagine a comprehender who knows
two possible explanations for this sentence: (1) Mary is walking to school because she
is a schoolchild (S); (2) Mary is walking to school because she is a teacher (T ). There
are thus three possible explanations for the sentence; the propositional representations of
these explanations satisfy formula 3.4:
4
1. Mary is walking to school (i.e. no explanatory relations are created).
This `explanation' can be expressed propositionally as
@W j= @W:
2. Mary's being a schoolchild causes her to walk to school.
This explanation can be expressed propositionally (assuming causal rules) as
#S; (#S  ! @W ) j= @W:
3. Mary's being a teacher causes her to walk to school.
This explanation can be expressed propositionally as
#T; (#T  ! @W ) j= @W:
The next question is how the comprehender stores one or more of these representations.
There are three possible strategies which could be employed:
1. Single best representation strategy
Maintain a single representation which is of a higher quality than any other derived
4
Note that there are no possible elaborations, as there are rules which would facilitate construction of
a tree with only inferred children.
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representation. If a single representation is maintained, conicting information may
force a re-evaluation of the representation and require extensive modication and
deletion of information. In cases where the best representation turns out to be
`correct', this strategy should be most eÆcient, as it requires less storage of elements
which eventually turn out to be irrelevant.
2. Multiple representations strategy
Maintain all competing representations as separate, discrete entities. By having
separate representations available, a comprehender has the benet of maintaining
ambiguity: for example, if an action has two possible explanations, a comprehender
may tentatively infer and store both; when further evidence supports one explana-
tion over the other, the incorrect explanation may be deleted from memory. All
representations may be maintained, or some criteria may be applied so that only
the best subset of the representations is kept.
In cases where a text is misleading or diÆcult (either accidentally or deliberately),
this strategy allows faster switching between representations: instead of deleting
irrelevant segments of a representation and constructing new ones, a comprehender
integrates information with representations which are best able to incorporate it.
The disadvantage is that multiple representations have to be stored, which may be
ineÆcient for easy and unambiguous texts.
3. Partitioned relations strategy
Maintain a single representation of the nodes, with multiple representations of
relations between them. In this condition, the nodes common to all alternatives are
stored without duplication. Each partition describes a set of relations connecting
certain of the common nodes. Each set of relations and the nodes they connect
is thus equivalent to a representation. (In some respects, this strategy is only an
eÆcient method for implementing strategy (2).)
In each case, the one or more representations constitute an `interpretation'. Diagrammatic
depictions of these strategies are shown in gure 3.7.
How can these strategies be realised computationally? In the next section, I describe
one possible implementation technology.
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@W#S
#S @W
Single best representation
#S #T @W
@W#S
@W#T
empty
Partitioned relations
@W
@W#S
#T @W
@W#T
#S @W
Multiple representations
representation interpretation partitions
Figure 3.7: Possible structures for an interpretation
Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance
The Assumption-Based Truth Maintenance System (ATMS) provides support for multiple
representations in an abductive context [de Kleer, 1986], [Ng, 1992]. In an ATMS, each
node in the interpretation has a label describing the ways in which it could be explained
abductively. A label consists of one or more environments, with each environment itself
composed of assumptions. Assumptions are nodes which could explain the labelled node;
that is, an environment for a node N must satisfy the familiar formula E[K j= N , where
E is the environment and K is the knowledge base (see section 3.2). Additionally, other
criteria may be enforced, such as requiring that an environment be minimal (i.e. not be a
subset of another environment) and logically consistent [Brewka et al., 1997]. The format
of a label is fE
1
; : : : ; E
j
g, where E
1
; : : : ; E
j
are environments. Each environment has the
form fA
1
; : : : ; A
k
g, where A
1
; : : : ; A
k
are assumptions. An example labelling of an ATMS
is shown in gure 3.8.
In a comprehension context, the aim is to nd the labels for the nodes representing
Chapter 3. Episodic Representations and Inference 49
{{Y,Z},{A,B,Y},{B,C,Y},{B,D,Z},{A,B,D},{B,C,D}}Interpretation = 
A B
Z
{{C}}
{{A},{C}} {{B}} {{D}}
{{Z},{A,B},{B,C}} {{Y},{B,D}}
C
Y
D
Figure 3.8: A labelling of an ATMS
the observations; the cross-product of these labels is the label for the whole text
[Ng and Mooney, 1992] (cross-products are explained in a moment). As an example,
consider a text consisting of two propositions, Y and Z. (I've dropped the @ and #
symbols temporarily to aid exposition.) These are represented in the ATMS as two nodes,
as shown in gure 3.8. The aim is thus to nd a labelling for Y and Z; the label for the
whole text (its interpretation, in the sense of the previous section) is the cross-product of
their labels.
The label of a node is a list of environments, and the rst environment of any node
is itself: in other words, for the node Z, the node may simply be assumed, creating the
environment fZg. Each of the other environments in a node's label are determined by
backward chaining on rules which have that node as their consequent. The antecedents
of the rule are a possible explanation for the node, so the cross-product of their labels is
added to the existing label of Z. The cross-product of a pair of labels itself consists of
environments; each of these new environments is produced by nding the set union of one
old environment from each antecedent. For example, if the node being labelled is Z and
there is a rule:
A ^ B  ! Z
then the existing label of Z is appended to the cross-product of the labels of A and B. If A
and B cannot themselves be explained, they have the labels ffAgg and ffBgg respectively
(derived by the assumption that a node can always `explain itself'). The cross-product
of their labels is produced by nding the set union of pairs of environments from A and
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B, such that each environment of A is crossed with each of B.
5
For example, the only
environment in the cross-product of the labels on A and B = fAg [ fBg = fA;Bg. This
is added to the existing label of Z to give ffZg; fA;Bgg.
If there are rules which in turn provide possible explanations of an antecedent, the
label on the antecedent is more complex. For example, if there is a rule
C  ! A
then the label on A becomes ffCg; fAgg, as C is a way of explaining A. This in turn
means that the cross-product of the labels of A and B = ffA;Bg; fC;Bgg, and the label
on Z = ffZg; fA;Bg; fC;Bgg (this is part of the example shown in gure 3.8). Labels
are constructed by depth-rst search, so that the root nodes of the ATMS are labelled
rst then the labels below generated recursively.
Having outlined the ATMS, I am now in a position to show how this corresponds with
the possible structures for interpretations shown in gure 3.7. In the ATMS of gure 3.8,
the cross product of the labels on the observations Y and Z is:
ffY; Zg; fA;B; Y g; fB;C; Y g; fB;D;Zg; fA;B;Dg; fB;C;Dgg
This label is actually that of a `virtual node' (V ) added to the network by the ATMS,
where V is equivalent to a node implied by the conjunction of the observations. For
example, in this case, the virtual node V is implied by the conjunction of Y and Z; in
other words, a rule is added to the knowledge base of the form [Ng, 1992]:
Y ^ Z  ! V
.
Each environment in the label for V is an abductive explanation for the text consisting
of Y and Z, in accord with formula 3.1. To create a full representation (as dened in
section 3.2), each environment could be extended with details of how it was derived and
each of its nodes marked with its origin (i.e. inferred or observed). For example, the
environment fA;B; Y g is derived by using A and B to prove Z, so this relation is added
to the environment; in addition, its nodes are marked appropriately. This gives:
5
If there were three antecedents, each environment added to Z would be produced by nding the union
of trios of environments, rather than pairs; and so on for four or more antecedents.
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Nodes:
@Y, @Z, #A, #B.
Relations:
(#A, #B)  ! @Z.
Note that the `and' (^) between #A and #B has been replaced by a Prolog-style comma.
This `extended environment' can also be represented as a list:
[[@Y;@Z;#A;#B]; [((#A;#B)  ! @Z)]] (3.5)
To implement the strategies described on page 46, a system could be supplied with a
heuristic for limiting the number of environments generated for each node. Ng employs
this method in ACCEL, truncating the label on each node as it is generated [Ng, 1992].
This is done by sorting the environments according to a quality metric (see chapter 5),
then keeping only the rst n environments of the sorted list as the new label of the node.
This method is basically a form of beam search, where n is the width of the beam.
To demonstrate this, consider a heuristic labelling of gure 3.8, based on sorting
environments according to a quality metric. The quality metric used here is based on
simplicity: quality is determined by dividing the number of observations explained by the
number of assumptions in an environment [Ng, 1992]. For example, the above environment
(labelled 3.5) has quality =
1
3
(@Z is explained, @Y;#A and #B are assumed). Each
environment is annotated with its simplicity rating.
Now, to implement maintenance of a single representation, the label of each node
is truncated so that only the highest quality environment is maintained. To implement
maintenance of multiple representations, the n (n > 1) best environments are kept in each
label (or one environment, if only one is derivable).
The table on the next page shows the dierence between maintaining single or mul-
tiple representations. Each environment of gure 3.8 has been extended as suggested
in formula 3.5 and annotated with its quality. The resulting format for an environment
is [Nodes;Relations;Quality], where Nodes and Relations are lists and Quality a real
number. Labelling is carried out as described previously. Environments discarded due to
truncation of labels are marked with `*' and are in italics; where there are two equally
good environments, the one with fewest nodes is maintained and the other discarded.
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ACCEL uses this method to control the construction of representations, storing a set
number of environments on each label (including the label representing the nal interpre-
tation). It can thus simulate the single vs. multiple representations strategies. However,
labels are truncated according to the number of environments they contain, rather than
the quality of those environments; quality is merely used to sort the alternatives. If there
are many environments close in quality, some may be discarded simply on the basis of
quantity; if there are two environments, one of very high quality and one of low quality,
both may be maintained. This problem is caused because the criteria for truncating labels
are based on volume, rather than content, of labels.
In my own model, IDC, the mechanism for managing the interpretation is broadly
based on an ATMS architecture, though this is not particularly explicit (see chapter 6 for
details). More importantly, IDC incorporates a parameter which can be set to simulate
strategy (1) or (2) (strategy (3) is not directly implemented, only simulated - see sec-
tion 6.3.3 on page 143). However, decisions about which representations to maintain are
based on representation quality: any representations which are signicantly worse than the
best representation may be removed from consideration. Because the decisions are based
on quality dierences (rather than maintenance of a xed number of representations), in
cases where quality dierences are small, all of the alternatives may be maintained; and in
cases where there are few representations with widely diering qualities, the poor quality
representations may be removed regardless of how `full' the stack is. The elements of my
model which handle representation choice are described in greater detail in section 6.4.2
(page 6.4.2).
IDC also uses ideas from the ATMS in calculating the incoherence of nodes in the
knowledge base. Very briey, the knowledge base is labelled in an ATMS-like way; the
occurrence of nodes in labels is then used to determine how often nodes are likely to occur
in representations. This process is described in more detail in section 5.3.3 (page 114).
There is an alternative view of comprehension which is related to the question of multiple
representations. This strand of research is currently important for text comprehension
psychologists, and can be broadly classied as `symbolic-connectionist': a hybrid the-
ory whose models combine elements of propositional representation, production system
architectures, and connectionist algorithms for constraint satisfaction [Holyoak, 1991].
Proponents of these models often criticise `pure symbolic' models for the following reasons:
1. Their view of representations as discrete, distinct, symbolic structures in memory.
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2. Their lack of exibility in processing.
Point (2) is discussed in detail in chapter 4, and particularly in section 4.2.1.
I now discuss point (1), describing symbolic-connectionist theories of interpretation
and how these relate to traditional symbolic models.
Symbolic-Connectionism and Interpretation
A chief aspect of the symbolic-connectionist approach to comprehension is the rejection
of models which nd the correct representation of a text using very `smart' processes,
such as models based on scripts or other schemas [Kintsch, 1988]. One problem with
smart models is that very little irrelevant information is produced during comprehension:
the representation evolves in an orderly, tidy fashion. This does not mean that the
wrong representation is never produced; often, a drastically poor representation may be
derived based on tiny amounts of irrelevant information. Rather, it is the fact that these
models only nd one representation to which they cling tenaciously, even in the face of
contradictory or ambiguous information.
Kintsch contrasts this with a view of comprehension as the initial promiscuous con-
struction of inferences, some of which may be incorrect, irrelevant and/or contradictory,
followed by integration of this information into a stable representation (ibid.).
6
Alternative
explanations or elaborations may loiter in memory for a while, but can gradually fade out
of the representation if they prove to be unhelpful in forming coherence. The resulting
representation is a network of nodes with attached activation levels; van den Broek et al.
suggest that the level of activation of a node corresponds with its recall probability, which
in turn corresponds to the strength of its encoding [van den Broek et al., 1996].
A couple of issues are raised by this viewpoint:
 How is a stable representation in memory maintained, given that the representation
for a text is characterised as a pattern of activation?
 How could several stable (though perhaps competing or contradictory) representa-
tions be maintained? For example, is there some way of indicating that one pattern
of activation denotes one representation, while a second pattern denotes another?
6
Note that this characterisation of the inference cycle can be mapped onto gure 2.2 of chapter 2,
with the only controls applied being of type (3) (the rules applied are chosen probabilistically) and type
(5) (a relaxation algorithm is used to settle on a new representation).
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In answer to the rst point, Kintsch states that episodic network representations of
texts are separate from the semantic networks used to construct them [Kintsch, 1988] (I
return to this distinction in chapter 4). In a sense, episodic representations are constructed
by copying elements from semantic memory [Alterman and Bookman, 1992]. A (tiny)
example is shown in gure 3.9.
inhibitory connections
excitatory connections
rivermoney bank_of_riverfinancial_bank
0.5 0.5
-0.5
-0.5
-1
Figure 3.9: A representation of the meaning of `river bank' (after [Kintsch, 1988])
This representation shows both nodes constructed as a result of encountering certain
words in an input, and inferred associates of those nodes. Each node is assigned an initial
activation value, according to whether it is part of the text or inferred. For example, if the
comprehender encounters the phrase `river bank', we could assume that river and both
nancial bank and bank of river receive some activation. The network is then `relaxed'
by spreading activation between the nodes, according to the connections between them.
This causes the activation of some nodes to drop to zero, while others remain activated
(see [Kintsch, 1988] for full details of the algorithm). Those nodes which remain activated
constitute the `meaning' of the initial input. The program for performing relaxation of
the network is relatively simple; my own implementation produces an `activation prole'
for the four propositions of gure 3.9 as shown in gure 3.10:
7
As can be seen from this prole, the propositions river and bank of river remain active,
while the activation of nancial bank, initially above zero, is quickly inhibited until it
`drops out' of the representation.
7
My own implementation of it is written in SICStus Prolog and based on Kintsch's presentation of
the Construction-Integration model in [Kintsch, 1988]; technical information on matrix multiplication
came from Pearl [Pearl, 1988]. I tested the implementation on Kintsch's examples to ensure that the
implementation was producing the correct results (it was).
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Figure 3.10: Activation prole for concepts involved in comprehending `river bank'
How does this relate to the issue of multiple representations? The activation prole
demonstrates how simultaneous meanings for a word, phrase or other cognitive unit which
are initially contradictory may be resolved to a single unambiguous representation. In this
case, the meanings of bank as `nancial bank' and `bank of a river' initially compete for
activation; however, the extra activation aorded the latter meaning by the presence of
the word `river' eventually proves decisive. The nal episodic representation is therefore
a pattern of activation across a set of nodes; those nodes which carry no activation are
`absent' from the representation.
If the word `bank' is encountered in the context `the bank collapsed', the resulting
activation prole might look like gure 3.11 (page 57). Here, the representation has not
settled on a single meaning of the word `bank', but instead maintains both alternatives.
This is because the word `collapsed' is equally connected to both the `nancial institution'
and `river bank' meanings for `bank'. Distribution of activation over the alternatives
therefore corresponds to an ambiguous interpretation where alternative representations
are implicitly maintained.
The relaxation process produces activation proles which can be compared with psy-
chological data (for example, Kintsch compares the Construction Integration model with
reaction time data in [Kintsch, 1988]). However, while `relaxing' representations show the
time course of activation over concepts, there is no `meaning' within those activations
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Figure 3.11: Activation prole for concepts involved in comprehending `the bank collapsed'
beyond `concept A is activated more strongly than concept C'. There is no content in the
connections between concepts, and it is thus diÆcult for a report of comprehension to be
extracted from them. This lack of content arises from the treatment of nodes as `associ-
ations'; there is no explicit process of explanation, and the processes for reasoning about
texts are often absent. For example, Kintsch states that the basic construction-integration
model provides no account of strategic inference processes, such as the construction of
bridging inferences [Kintsch, 1988]:
...the generation of additional inferences [...] is necessary because not all
inferences that are required for comprehension will, in general, be obtained
by the random elaboration mechanism [that is, the promiscuous construction
phase described above]. In some cases more focused problem-solving activity
is necessary to generate the desired inferences. Exactly how this is to be done
is, however, beyond the scope of this article. [Kintsch, 1988]
Garnham notes this tendency in [Garnham, 1996]:
...the relation of association is not suÆcient to model links between pieces of
information conveyed by texts. One piece of information may be strongly (or
weakly) linked to other pieces in various ways.
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He also notes that relations of dierent types cannot be expressed by associative links
alone. (Although my own model uses a single kind of `link', other types of relation can
be expressed by treating them as nodes (see chapter 6).)
In contrast to symbolic-connectionist models, pure-symbolic models explicitly describe
the processes which lead to a particular representation. In addition, the reasoning process
which constructs episodic representations is intimately coupled with the mechanism for de-
ciding which representations to maintain. This reasoning process is also implicitly encoded
into the representation: concepts are explicitly `bundled' into structures which reect their
derivation (c.f. phrase-structure trees or proofs). This gives far greater scope for retrieving
something akin to a verbal protocol from such systems [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996].
3.2.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have begun to address some of the issues I introduced in chapter 2:
 I have shown how comprehension can be characterised computationally.
 I have dened how interpretations and representations relate to one another: inter-
pretations can be described as sets of representations.
 I have established that representations may be constructed and manipulated com-
putationally, and that the resulting representations broadly qualify as an interpre-
tation.
 I have demonstrated that abductive explanation alone cannot be assumed to dene a
representation; instead, some form of heuristic is necessary to specify representation
quality. The quality ratings can then in turn be used to manage the interpretation.
In chapter 4, I turn to denitions of semantic representations (abstract representations
in long-term memory). This helps dene more accurately the sources of episodic repre-
sentations (i.e. representations which are part of an interpretation). This chapter and the
next are thus complementary: the episodic representations I have been concerned with
in this chapter are intricately connected to the semantic representations described in the
next.
Chapter 4
Semantic Representations
This chapter introduces some central theories about semantic representations in compu-
tational models of comprehension. The main themes are:
1. The role of semantic representations in comprehension.
2. Misconceptions about schemas and the distinction between declarative and opera-
tional aspects of comprehension.
3. An analysis of associative networks as a representational scheme, and an argument
for my use of structured schemas.
This chapter also continues the discussion of inference which underlies this thesis.
4.1 The Semantic/Episodic Distinction
The distinction between episodic and semantic representations was initially proposed by
[Tulving, 1985]. A principle dierence between these forms of memory is their dependence
on context [McKoon et al., 1986]: episodic memory contains representations of specic
events, places, people etc., at particular times and in particular places, and is thus context-
dependent; semantic memory contains general abstractions from instances in episodic
memory which are context-independent and may be culturally shared [Hintzman, 1986],
[Tulving, 1986].
This is the standard paradigm for descriptions of memory in comprehension research.
However, there have inevitably been attempts to show that there is really no distinction
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between the two types of memory [McKoon et al., 1986]. As a small example: McKoon
et al. performed an experiment using recognition and lexical decision, hypothesising
that the former was a `prototypical' task for episodic information, and the latter a
`prototypical' task for semantic information [McKoon and Ratcli, 1979]. They argued
that information from one memory store should not inuence performance on the task
which probes the other store. However, their experiments instead showed that episodic
information led to priming in the lexical decision task, and semantic information led to
priming in recognition.
The separation of semantic from episodic information is easier in computational mod-
els. This is because there is a sharper boundary between the rules which are used to
manipulate data (semantic memory content) and the data themselves (episodic memory
content). For example, in a language processing system, a structure derived by parsing a
sentence resides in episodic memory, while the rules used to produce the parse reside in
semantic memory.
Even here, though, recent research has sought to break down the boundary: for
example, the content of episodic memory is not extensively abstracted to form semantic
content (as in case-based reasoning [Kolodner, 1992]); or actual episodes may be used in
place of rules (as in instance-based reasoning [Aha et al., 1991] or example-based pars-
ing [Somers, 1992]). These approaches delay the need for abstraction until a pertinent
situation arises.
The approach I take is traditional, in that I assume a separation between semantic and
episodic memory. I assume representations in semantic memory which have been derived
by some learning process (such as abstraction from representations in episodic memory
[Mooney, 1990]). However, I do not concern myself with these learning processes.
The representations in episodic memory are constructed via inferences which employ
schemas (see below) in semantic memory. The basic mechanism behind this is copy-based
[Alterman and Bookman, 1992]. In eect, this means that the representations in episodic
memory are formed by copying representations from semantic memory; the central dier-
ence is that the representations in episodic memory have instantiated variables.
The schema is a particularly important form of semantic representation. In chapter 2,
I briey introduced schemas and their computational manifestations. In the remainder
of this section, I describe schemas in more detail, as they form the basis of the semantic
knowledge representation of IDC. In particular, I describe the following aspects of schemas:
 Their general characteristics.
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 Criticisms which have been directed at schemas. I show how these criticisms are
based on a misleading conation of `top-down' processing with `predictive' process-
ing.
 By emphasising the declarative aspects of schemas, I can compare them to related
representational formalisms, such as associative networks. I then show how associa-
tive networks and schemas can be uniformly represented.
4.1.1 Overview of Schemas
A schema is a structure in semantic memory which represents a `cluster of concepts'
[Eysenck and Keane, 1995]. Although schemas are interpreted dierently according to
the kinds of knowledge they are structuring, they have many common characteristics,
as described below (extended and generalised from Minsky's statements about frames in
[Minsky, 1975]).
Schemas Support Interpretation through Inference
The forms of inference supported by schemas include both forward- and backward-chaining
(see section 2.3.1). These can be implemented by assuming that a schema is equivalent
to a logical implication, and is thus a valid basis for logical inference (see section 4.1.2).
Schemas are Networks within Networks...
Minsky states that `We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations', obviously
inuenced by Quillian's theory of semantic networks [Quillian, 1968]. Similarly, schemas
can be conceived of as collections of nodes and relations; each node represents a concept,
and relations show connections between related concepts. Relations may be typed, to
represent dierent kinds of connection: isa relations (read as `is a', as in `a dalmation is a
dog') and `has-part' (as in `car has-part steering wheel') are two examples. In addition, a
schema for one type of situation may be linked to a schema for another type of situation.
For example, the `living-room' schema may be connected to the `house' schema. So, a
schema is a network of related elements which can itself be a node in a larger network;
presumably, this larger network may be a node in another network, and so on...
The main dierence between semantic networks and schemas is the bundle of links
inherent in schemas. In a semantic network, relations between nodes are accessed one
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at a time; in a schema, a bundle of links may be accessed en masse. This has led
some researchers to criticise schemas as being `too top-down'; however, they seem to
be confusing the declarative denition of scripts with their operational denition (see
section 4.2.1).
Schemas Contain Slots
Once a schema has been activated in response to an input, the nodes attached to the
schema become available for `lling'. These nodes are slots: conceptual spaces into which
actual instances are inserted as they are encountered in the input. A slot can carry
constraints which specify the range of values with which the slot may be lled; for example,
a slot for `human height' might carry a constraint like 'greater than 30cm and less than
270cm' (to accept both exceptionally short and tall people). A slot may also carry a
default which is used if no information is available to the contrary: for example, the
`human height' slot may carry a default like `180cm'. Defaults may be overridden if
actual values are specied.
Schemas Can Bypass Logic
Minsky intended his theory of frames to allow types of inference which were unacceptable
in classical logic, such as making default assumptions based on incomplete evidence (see
above). However, since publication of Minsky's theory, logic has evolved to accommo-
date exactly these kinds of inference, e.g. Default Logic [Reiter, 1980] and Circumscrip-
tion [McCarthy, 1980]. In addition, others have demonstrated the correlations between
schemas and logic [Hayes, 1980]: as I show in section 4.1.2, both schemas and the forms
of inference associated with them can be represented in logical form. In some respects,
this makes redundant the claim that schemas can perform non-logical inference.
Schemas Can Be Implemented
Schemas are data-structures which can be implemented computationally in several ways,
for example, as production rules or declarative formulae. In the former case, the schema
contains information about how it is to be applied and how to construct representations;
in the latter, schemas contain only descriptive information, without any indication of how
it is to be applied. However they are implemented, perhaps the most important point is
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that schemas can be represented with enough precision to be manipulated consistently by
an algorithm.
As I have hinted here, schemas share similarities with several other representational for-
malisms. In particular, schemas may be expressed as pseudo-logical expressions, which can
in turn be implemented in a computer language such as Prolog. The next section claries
this as a background to my discussion of scripts and a justication of the representation
of semantic information in IDC.
4.1.2 Schemas and Logic
One criticism faced by advocates of schema-based theories of representation, particularly
in the eld of articial intelligence, is that schemas have no well-dened semantics or
proper rules of inference [Bartsch, 1987]. In psychological accounts of schemas, there
is no real need for either, as abstract descriptions of frame content and the processes
are suÆcient to make predictions about behaviour (e.g. Haberlandt and Bingham's
anticipation of a processing advantage for events presented in `script' order, as opposed to
reverse order [Haberlandt and Bingham, 1984] - see section 4.2). In AI, though, systems
with ad hoc representations quickly become very messy and complicated, with algorithms
having to be tailored to the particular formalism [Norvig, 1989]. This is a problem in
traditional production systems, where semantic knowledge is mixed with instructions
which make changes to memory states [Laird et al., 1987].
An alternative is to represent semantic knowledge in some form which has a clear
semantics and associated inference rules. First-order predicate calculus (FOPC) is an
example of such a formalism. Although limited in its expressivity, it can easily encap-
sulate schema-type knowledge. These FOPC expressions contain no instructions about
what to do with concepts, instead just stating the static semantic relationships between
them. Several researchers have suggested how schemas may be represented in FOPC
([Hayes, 1980], [Hobbs et al., 1993], [Hongua, 1994]) and related formalisms such as Dis-
course Representation Theory ([Bartsch, 1987]). These suggestions can be merged to yield
a useful notation for schemas, as follows:
1
Schema concept  ! Slot concept
1
; : : : ; Slot concept
n
:
1
This is the notation I introduced briey in section 2.2.1.
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I assume that schemas express a relationship between a concept at one level of detail
and one or more other concepts at a lower level of detail (the researchers I referenced above
take the same tack). Concepts themselves are represented as predicates with associated ar-
guments, in line with standard FOPC and theories such as case grammar [Fillmore, 1968].
One major dierence in my notation is the use of a Prolog-like representation for variables
which does not use explicit quantication. Bringing these threads together yields schemas
such as:
shopping(shopper:S, store:T, thing bought:B)  !
go(agt:S, loc to:T), nd(agt:S, obj:B), buy(agt:S, obj:B),
leave(agt:S, loc from:T), type(T, shopping place).
Here, the schema concept is a shopping event, and the slot concepts are the various
events which make up a shopping event, or the steps of the shopping schema. The slot
concepts are considered to be conjoined by the commas, which stand for ^. Each concept
has a list of roles: for example, a go event has an agent (agt) and a location which is the
destination of the event (loc to).
The most diÆcult thing to dene when writing schemas as logical expressions is the
exact meaning of  !. In logic, this is treated as an implication, specifying that `if the
antecedent of an expression is true, then its consequent is also true'. Note that the schema
is still declarative, as it doesn't specify how information is added to a representation (as
production rules do); instead it species a relationship which can be employed in inferring
new information, e.g. by modus ponens [Copi, 1978].
Implication is quite restrictive when writing schemas for comprehension. We also want
to use schemas to infer the left-hand side elements, given the right-hand side elements, on
some occasions (see section 2.3.1). For this purpose, it is useful to read  ! as specifying
a relationship like `associates with', so that a schema can be read as `the antecedent and
consequent elements of the schema frequently occur together'. The presence of a schema's
consequent elements in a representation can be used as evidence that the antecedent
elements may also be represented (and vice versa). However, the directionality of the arrow
is still important, denoting an asymmetry in the relationship: the antecedent elements
provide a more precise, more specic description of the consequent elements, or a reason
why they may co-occur in a representation (c.f. macrostructures [van Dijk, 1977]).
Although I started this section with the claim that logic provides a semantics and
inference rules for representing schemas, I proceeded to twist this claim to admit non-
logical behaviour. However, by maintaining the essentially declarative form of logical
Chapter 4. Semantic Representations 65
formulae, but allowing schemas to be used in various ways by inference processes, it is
possible to remove some of the procedural baggage of production rules. This emphasises
the separation between the content of schemas and the uses to which they may be put.
In the next section, I describe a particular class of schemas often implicated in studies
of comprehension: scripts. Throughout this discussion, I emphasise their status as
declarative structures, using notation I have introduced in this section, with the aim
of pointing out where they have been unfairly criticised by some researchers.
4.2 Scripts
Scripts have received much attention in studies of comprehension
[Schank and Abelson, 1977]. Although they are now rather unfashionable, some
researchers still covertly refer to them under other names, perhaps wary of appearing
out-of-touch (e.g. `causal schemes' in [Noordman and Vonk, 1998]).
Scripts can be thought of as schemas which possess all of the aforementioned schema
characteristics, but which additionally contain event order information; this is not
considered to be included in other types of schemas, such as those for categorisation
[Barsalou and Sewell, 1985]. In other words, scripts contain sequencing information
(normally causal) which facilitates integration of the input text into the representation
[Haberlandt and Bingham, 1984], [Schank and Abelson, 1977]. Sequencing information
has two eects:
 Comprehension speed-up: events presented in the text in same order as in the script
will be comprehended more quickly [Haberlandt and Bingham, 1984]. Presumably
this is because the initial activation of the script by an event A (its `triggering')
makes the consequent elements of the script (those ahead of A in the causal chain)
more available to the processor. Subsequent events which t these consequent
elements can therefore be smoothly integrated into already-active slots, without the
requirement to retrieve knowledge structures for their integration. If the event order
is disrupted, as it is in [Haberlandt and Bingham, 1984], the `predicted' elements do
not occur and activation must be redistributed to account for the causal break.
2
 Recall improvement: the ordering of the script's events allows them to be recalled
more readily and to be recalled in the correct order [Bower et al., 1979]. This is
2
This point has never been explained to my satisfaction, so this is my own suggestion.
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because a representation produced using a script contains causal information which
can be utilised during recall: rather than having to recall events individually, causal
chains provide a means for linking events. Once an initial event has been recalled,
the other events connected to that event are also activated via these causal chains,
and are thus easier to retrieve from memory.
So, the important dierence between scripts and other kinds of schema is the kind of
information that scripts contain which other types of schema do not. Other types of
schema generally take the form of frames, which typically represent objects, scenes or
`static' entities, and lack causal ordering information [Minsky, 1975].
3
However, apart
from the presence of causal relations, scripts have much the same characteristics as other
types of schema (see section 4.1.1). Points made about scripts can thus be taken as being
applicable generally to schemas.
The reason for taking time to describe scripts separately is because they are typically
associated with a certain mode of processing, generally known as expectation-based or top-
down [Singer et al., 1994], [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. In the next section, I describe
how expectation-based processing has been criticised for its failure to account for human
comprehension. This failure has been taken to indicate the inviability of scripts as a
theory of representation. However, I show how this criticism is based on confusion of
denitions, and can be partially remedied by clarifying some key terms.
4.2.1 Are Scripts Too Top-Down?
According to Kintsch, systems based on scripts rely too heavily on top-down processing
[Kintsch, 1988]. Kintsch quotes Schank's statements about comprehension in relation to
this criticism [Schank, 1978]:
We would claim that in natural language understanding, a simple rule is
followed. Analysis proceeds in a top-down predictive manner. Understanding
is expectation-based. It is only when the expectations are useless or wrong
that bottom-up processing begins.
As Kintsch points out, expectation-based processing seems to be the exception rather
than the rule. If comprehension were expectation-based, one would expect the compre-
hender to be involved in so-called `predict-and-substantiate' processing [DeJong, 1979]. In
3
Note that the term `frame' has again been modied to describe script-like, frame-like and prototypical
structures which can be dynamically modied in [Barsalou, 1992].
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predict-and-substantiate processing, the comprehender typically makes many predictions
about forthcoming text, which are either supported or denied by the text. However, the lit-
erature indicates that predictive inferencing is limited in scope, and highly constrained by
the content of the text read so far (see [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996], [Singer et al., 1994]
and section 2.3.1).
An important point is that Kintsch's criticism applies to the mode of processing associ-
ated with script-based systems, rather than the actual `static' structure of scripts. To use
a term from computer science, the criticism is directed at the operational interpretation
of scripts, rather than their declarative interpretation [Sterling and Shapiro, 1994]. To
make this point clearer, consider the following rulebase:
(1) rob(agent:X, place:Y)  !
go(agent:X, to:Y), hold up(agent:X, place:Y),
leave(agent:X, from:Y).
(2) visit(agent:X, place:Y)  ! go(agent:X, to:Y)
(3) visit(agent:X, place:Y)  ! explore(agent:X, place:Y)
(4) visit(agent:X, place:Y)  ! leave(agent:X, from:Y).
If we treat these rules as declarative structures, there are several ways in which they
could be applied to an input text. For example, rule (1) could be treated as a script, in
the sense suggested in [Hobbs et al., 1993] (see section 4.1.2): if the event go(agent: jack,
to: wimpy) were observed, for instance, it would be possible to `trigger' the script and
infer rob(agent: jack, place: wimpy). This triggering could then be used as the basis for
a set of predictions: for example, forward-chaining from rob(agent: jack, place: wimpy)
(see section 2.3.1) would yield the two predictions hold up(agent: jack, place: wimpy) and
leave(agent: jack, from: wimpy). The comprehender's aim might then be to substantiate
these predictions, seeking conrmation in the remaining text. This method for applying
a script treats it as a `cognitive unit': activating a script activates all of the elements it
contains [Walker and Yekovich, 1984].
However, it would also be possible to hold back from making any predictions, instead
ignoring the unmatched consequents of the rule. Here, the script is being partially applied,
and only selected elements are being activated. The inference that rob(agent: jack, place:
wimpy) could still be represented in memory, but the remaining component events left
unspecied.
By comparison, rule (2) could be triggered to yield a single new inference, visit(agent:
jack, place: wimpy), based on the same go(agent: jack, to: wimpy) event. This time,
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there is no need to make predictions based on this rule, as its `slots' have been completely
lled (see section 4). However, note that `top-down' predictions are possible using other
rules: even though the events are not gathered into a script, there are still other possible
consequences of visit(agent: jack, place: wimpy), namely explore(agent: jack, place:
wimpy) and leave(agent: jack, from: wimpy).
From this simple demonstration, we can see how structures which look like scripts (rule
(1)) and structures which look like links in an associative network (rules (2) - (4)) can be
expressed in a similar format. The point is that scripts in themselves are not top-down, in
the predictive sense; they can be used to perform expectation-driven comprehension, but
in some senses the triggering of a script is still bottom-up. By the same token, models
which employ rules representing associations between pairs of elements, like rules (2) - (4)
above, are still capable of top-down inference: they can be used to produce predictions,
if these kinds of inference are allowed by the algorithm. But because rules which connect
pairs of elements resemble an associative network (see section 4.3) when drawn on paper,
there is a tendency to forget the network's computational equivalence to a rulebase. There
is also a tendency when drawing such networks to remove the `arrows' which represent
the ow of information, so that there no longer appears to be a `top' and `bottom', only
`associations'. Figure 4.1 demonstrates how both script-type and associative rules may be
interpreted as a network. Note that the links in the diagram are non-directional, so that
inferences may be made (activation passed) in either direction; if bi-directional chaining
with the rules were allowed, their directionality could be overridden, yielding the same
behaviour as an associative network.
So, scripts are no more `top-down', in the predictive sense, than associative networks.
This is the usual interpretation of top-down in the context of scripts. However, another
possible meaning for the term top-down is `conceptually-driven', as opposed to `stimulus-
driven' (bottom-up) [Eysenck and Keane, 1995]. This is a more important criticism,
which I discuss in the next section.
4.2.2 Scripts and Information Accessibility
The conceptually-driven nature of scripts is derived from the way they struc-
ture information: they cluster concepts and make them accessible en masse
[Walker and Yekovich, 1984]. Scripts thus support conceptually-driven comprehension
by making large amounts of information available by application of a single rule. By
comparison, associative rules are more data-driven, in that new information is introduced
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visit(agent:X, place:Y)
explore(agent:X, place:Y) leave(agent:X, from:Y)go(agent:X, to:Y)
visit(agent:X, place:Y) ---> leave(agent:X, from:Y).
visit(agent:X, place:Y) ---> explore(agent:X, place:Y).
visit(agent:X, place:Y) ---> go(agent:X, to:Y).
Figure 4.1: Representing rules as a semantic network
slowly and in small amounts; there is more of a tendency to stay close to the `data' of the
text.
The `size' of a rule describes the amount of information it makes available: the greater
a rule's size, the more information it `makes accessible' when it is triggered. To make this
more concrete, consider some concepts related to robberies structured in two dierent
ways: rst, as a large script-like rule, relating a single higher-level element to several
subordinate elements; second, as a set of smaller rules, associating pairs of elements. This
yields two representations of the robbing concepts:
1. Script-like rule
rob(agent:X, place:Y)  !
go(agent:X, to:Y), hold up(agent:X, place:Y), leave(agent:X, from:Y).
2. Set of associative rules
(a) rob(agent:X, place:Y)  ! go(agent:X, to:Y).
(b) rob(agent:X, place:Y)  ! hold up(agent:X, place:Y).
(c) rob(agent:X, place:Y)  ! leave(agent:X, from:Y).
Imagine also a comprehender who can forward- or backward-chain on rules, as dened
previously, and has the capability to instantiate unmatched elements of a rule once it has
been triggered (uninstantiated elements are thus made accessible by triggering).
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For example, if a comprehender with rule (1) matches it against the event
hold up(agent: jack, place: wimpy), they can infer rob(agent:jack, place:wimpy); the other
elements of the rule, go(agent: jack, place: wimpy) and leave(agent: jack, place: wimpy)
are made accessible, and may be instantiated immediately (or left uninstantiated).
Instead, if a comprehender had rules (2a) - (2c), they could also infer rob(agent:
jack, place: wimpy) from hold up(agent: jack, place: wimpy). However, no additional
elements are made accessible by triggering the rule, as both sides of the rule have been
fully instantiated. This could be remedied in subsequent inference generation cycles, by
applying rules (2b) and (2c); eventually this would access all of the information clustered
in rule (1).
Note that the predictiveness (in the temporal sense) of the inferences is not really the
issue here. Instead, the way the rules package information determines how they make the
comprehender aware of possible large-scale structures. Another way of thinking about
this is in terms of how the size of a semantic representation allows the comprehender
to exercise control over their comprehension. It is important to note that this doesn't
necessarily mean that temporally predictive inferences will be made, or that inferences
outside the scope of the schema will not be made. Rather, the clustering of information
makes it possible for the comprehender to predict which information is likely to be useful
for comprehension of the remaining text.
To clarify this, I discuss what I perceive as more telling dierences between associative
networks and schemas in the next section.
4.3 Associative Networks
As I've shown in the previous sections, the usual criticism of scripts is that they are too
top-down and/or too predictive. This criticism is based on a confusion of how scripts
structure information (declarative denition) and how that information may be applied
(operational denition). I also showed how these issues could be separated out from one
another, and how complaints about the operational denition can be countered.
However, there remains the criticism that scripts are just `too big' and make too much
information accessible per processing cycle. As this also applies to schemas in general, I
will widen the discussion to encompass them.
An alternative to `bulky' structures (schemas) in semantic memory is provided by asso-
ciative networks. I use this term here to encompass a range of models with similar features,
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such as the semantic networks of [Quillian, 1968], the event concept coherence networks
of [Alterman and Bookman, 1992], and the numerous psychological models which contain
networks of propositions (e.g. [Kintsch, 1988], [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]). In terms
of semantic representation, the dierence between a schema and an associative network
is the arrangement of the links between memory nodes:
 In a schema, links may represent one-to-many relationships: a single link may attach
one schema-level node to several, grouped lower-level nodes.
 In an associative network, the links between nodes are one-to-one: each link connects
only a pair of nodes.
This is the only real dierence between associative networks and schemas when decid-
ing which is the more viable decription of semantic memory structures. Kintsch claims
that the distinction between associative networks and schemas is that associative networks
contain no `prestored structures' [Kintsch, 1988]. I suggest that both contain prestored
structures, but that the size of these structures is reduced in an associative network to
pairs of nodes. The distinction is illustrated in gure 4.2.
buy_ticket view_movie buy_ticket view_movie
movie_going movie_going
Associative networkSchema
Figure 4.2: Alternative semantic representations of the same knowledge
Both (a) and (b) represent the same knowledge, in the formats introduced
previously: a movie going event has a buy ticket event and a view movie event as
two of its subevents (other subevents have been omitted from the diagram) (after
[Alterman and Bookman, 1990]). However, the arc in the schema illustrates that the
concepts are clustered under the schema node: they are considered to be collectively
implied by the presence of that node in a representation. The arrows in the schema
indicate this clustering eect.
Chapter 4. Semantic Representations 72
In terms of processing, this gives the benets described in section 4.2.2: the comprehen-
der potentially has immediate access to a bundle of related information. The declarative
dierence thus yields a processing benet which may create operational dierences between
schemas and associative rules: clustering of information can be utilised when exercising
control over comprehension, as described in the next section.
4.3.1 Control and Marker Passing
In section 4.2.1, I argued that dierent declarative formulations of rules could produce the
same behaviour under the right kind of `controller'. The controller thus seems to dictate
the general operational interpretation of the knowledge base.
However, the fact that a schema makes a cluster of information available could be
exploited by the controller; in this way, the comprehender's behaviour is inuenced
operationally by schema structure. For example, the controller could use the currently-
active script to direct rule retrieval (see step 2 of gure 2.2 on page 21): that is, the
currently active schema may be used to retrieve a set of potentially useful rules for
processing the remainder of the text. Or, the inferences allowed may be prescribed by the
content of the schema; any parts of the text which do not match slots of the schema are
discarded.
By contrast, if the comprehender has rules which contain minimal structure, there is a
greater tendency for irrelevant information to be inferred; often, exibility is achieved by
sacricing control. Irrelevant informationmay, of course, be pruned out of a representation
(for example, using the kind of integration process suggested in [Kintsch, 1988]; or by
using probabilistic retrieval rules for generating associates of text propositions to limit
the amount of associations made (ibid.)). However, in any realistic model which actually
has to construct representations, there are far too many pitfalls in allowing rampant
activation of associated nodes.
An example from AI illustrates this point. A particular class of comprehension mod-
els in AI is based on a theory of marker passing ([Alterman, 1985], [Charniak, 1983],
[Norvig, 1989]). Marker passing is a computational realisation of spreading activation
over an associative network; it has the following general features:
 The nodes and connections of the associative network are represented by appropriate
data structures, e.g.
{ node(shopping), node(store).
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{ connection(store of, shopping, store). This connection encodes the in-
formation that the shopping node and the store node are connected by a
store of relationship.
 When comprehending a text, each proposition initiates the passing of a mark from
the node representing the proposition to other nodes in the network.
4
The markers
thus carry activation around the network.
 Marker passing involves copying a marker at one node to create a new marker at
another node of the associative network. Each marker has a level of activation and
a record of the path from its origin node to its current location. For example, if a
marker were passed between the two nodes described above, the path might be:
path(shopping, store of, store)
 Activation is degraded as a marker moves further away from its origin, and as its
age increases.
 Where two markers meet at a node, a path connecting the origins of the two nodes
is returned.
 Inferences are made either by using the returned paths directly, or by deriving a
representation from the most useful paths.
This is a generalised description of marker passing, mainly derived from [Charniak, 1986].
All marker passing models suer from a variant of the promiscuity problem described
in section 2.3. Often, too many paths are returned, most of which prove to be worthless
(Norvig cites a gure of 10% useful paths returned [Norvig, 1989]). One particular problem
occurs where concepts have a large number of links attached to them; for example, a class
like `mammal' is connected by isa relations to many animal classes, such as `dog', `human',
and `cat'. Marker passing has a tendency to nd many paths between concepts which are
isa related, but this information is seldom useful: given the sentence `John walked his dog'
the information that both John and his dog are mammals is not particularly enlightening.
However, this is the kind of inference which unbounded marker passing can return.
What is causing this problem? Returning to the idea of information clustering, marker
passing suers from a lack of context recognition: because the marker passing mechanism
4
In Charniak's formulation, markers can also be passed from individual words.
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treats each node in isolation from others in the representation, there are few clues as
to which groups of propositions from the text are likely to `belong together'. (This
problem also feeds into probabilistic methods for rating interpretations, as described in
section 5.1.5.)
By contrast, if schemas are used in a comprehension system, the retrieval of information
as a cluster suggests the kinds of relationships which may be found during comprehension
of subsequent text. In fact, scripts were initially developed as mechanism for controlling
the kind of promiscuity exhibited by marker passing systems: by suggesting the kinds
of information to be expected in the remaining text, inferences can be directed along
productive lines [Dyer et al., 1992]. However, the early realisations of these ideas were
too extreme, for the following reasons:
 Too much information was contained in a script and made inaccessible to the other
scripts (i.e. information about events could not be shared between scripts). The
MOP was developed as an antidote to this problem [Schank, 1982].
 Expectations about the remaining text were actually asserted into the text as
temporally-predictive inferences.
As an alternative to this extreme view of scripts, consider a case where the information
clustered by a schema is not necessarily asserted whenever the schema is accessed. Instead,
the amount of information clustered could direct inference generation: the volume of
information made available by the schema is used to estimate the utility of applying
it. Schemas which supply a few quality-increasing inferences should be asserted, while
schemas which would require many assumptive inferences (e.g. temporal predictions,
inferences about the types of entities involved in the schema's events) should not be
employed.
This is comparable to a form of control suggested for marker passing models, the
so-called anti-promiscuity rules suggested in [Norvig, 1989]. There are two forms of anti-
promiscuity rule, static and dynamic:
1. Static anti-promiscuity
Designate as `promiscuous' those nodes in the network which have more than n links
attached to them, where n is some constant set by the system designer. Promiscuous
nodes are barred from receiving markers.
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2. Dynamic anti-promiscuity
Run the system on a representative sample of texts; on each run, count the number
of markers on each node which received markers; next, total these counts for all runs;
then designate as promiscuous those nodes in the associative network which have
accumulated more than nmarkers, where n is again set by the designer. Promiscuous
nodes cannot be used as part of certain classes of inference.
In both cases, nodes which tend to occur frequently in representations are assumed to
denote less useful information; the metric used to measure promiscuity of a node is thus
being used to control the system's inference generation.
The extension of this idea to schemas (with some input from other formalisms) is be-
hind my own metric for decision making during inference generation. The main dierences
are:
 I take advantage of the inherent structure of the knowledge base to determine the
`utility' of individual nodes. Utility measurement depends on analysis of the clusters
of knowledge associated with each node.
 The utility of making an inference using a schema depends on:
1. The utility of its component nodes.
2. How closely those nodes match elements of the current representation.
The utility of applying a given schema is measured in terms of the quality the resulting
inferences will add to the representation. The full realisation of this idea is left until
chapter 5.
This section has given reasons why clustering of concepts within a schema is advan-
tageous to the comprehender. Because the knowledge in a schema comes `pre-packaged',
the comprehender has an idea of the information it potentially entails. If the commitment
required to infer this information is too great, the comprehender can decide not to apply
the schema. In addition, if there are two or more schemas competing to represent a text,
their size may be used to settle the competition.
By contrast, when using an associative network to suggest or generate inferences the
controller has no knowledge about what other concepts are likely to be retrievable once a
particular node is activated; activation of subsequent nodes is not directed.
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However, this may not be the whole story. Is there any way in which associative
networks could produce the same kinds of eects as schemas? For example, are there psy-
chological eects associated with schema application which can be simulated by associated
networks? I turn to this issue in the next section.
4.3.2 Are Schemas Necessary?
The claim made by advocates of associative networks is that the weak method of
associative retrieval, coupled with an appropriate set of weights and a relaxation
algorithm, can produce the same eects as a schema-based approach. One testing ground
for this idea is given by [Kintsch and Mannes, 1987]. In their model, based on the
Construction-Integration framework previously discussed in section 3.2.5, they attempt to
show how experimental data attributed to schemas can be accounted for by a minimally-
organised associative network.
The particular data they are interested in are how people generate a list of a script's
subevents. They compare this task with performance on the generation of category
members. For example, when subjects are asked to generate members of categories, they
typically produce `an initial burst of typical exemplars for categories via superordinate
relations during unconstrained and typicality generation' [Barsalou and Sewell, 1985].
By contrast, when asked to generate script subevents, retrieval proceeds smoothly;
the number of items retrieved is linear in the amount of time spent on the task
[Kintsch and Mannes, 1987]. This phenomenon has been taken as evidence of the
existence of scripts: it is argued that a script contains temporal sequencing information
which is made available once it is activated; this then allows smooth retrieval of the
information encapsulated by the script [Barsalou and Sewell, 1985].
Kintsch and Mannes demonstrate how the linear retrieval eect can be replicated
by augmenting an associative network with nodes representing the temporal relation-
ships between pairs of event nodes. For example, they add a node representing be-
gin(grocery shopping, enter). The network is then manipulated by spreading activation
and the most highly-activated nodes are assumed to be retrieved. The resulting graph
shows retrieval of script subevents to be linear in the time spent on the task (see gure 6
of [Kintsch and Mannes, 1987]).
While there is no organisation in this associative network in the sense I've suggested
previously (i.e. information clusters on a large scale), there is denitely structure inherent
in the network. Although there is no explicit hierarchy, the fact that some nodes repre-
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senting `script headers' are highly connected to many other nodes allows them to pass
activation quickly and eÆciently to relevant parts of the network. These groups of highly-
connected nodes are functionally equivalent to a schema, in the sense that once one element
of the group is activated and added to the representation (e.g. a node corresponding to a
script episode) the other elements of the group are virtually guaranteed to follow suit. The
weights attached to the nodes in the group are such that they quickly excite each other
and inhibit nodes outside the group. This model of script-like eects is closely related to
the `cluster of closely associated concepts' notion of [Walker and Yekovich, 1984] (despite
Kintsch's protestations to the contrary).
In a pure-symbolic model (see section 3.2.5), the same eect occurs but at a much
faster rate. Once a schema is selected, its `activation' is immediately maximised, while
that of other schemas is immediately dampened to zero. All of the items in the schema
may then be retrieved from the activated schema one after the other in order.
5
What
may take several cycles to achieve in a symbolic-connectionist model is thus achieved in a
single cycle by the pure-symbolic model; this is not all good news, though, as the gradual
deactivation curve of irrelevant schemas is reduced to an immediate drop from `activated'
to `deactivated'.
It seems as though script-like retrieval eects can be reproduced without immediate,
equalised activation of whole groups of nodes in semantic memory (as is hypothesised
to occur in schemas). It also seems as though the graceful curves associated with hu-
man behaviour are much closer to the output of associative network models than the
steep, all-or-nothing activation proles of pure-symbolic models.
6
This is a perennial
problem in trying to get pure-symbolic models to concur with human reaction-time data
[Garnham, 1996].
4.3.3 Benets of Schemas
In this chapter, it may seem that I have tried to condemn associative networks. It
is important to note that this is not my aim; instead, I am reinforcing the comments
already made by those who employ these forms of representation: associative activation
5
Walker and Yekovich criticise the assumption of equal activation across all of a script's
concepts by showing that peripheral script events receive less activation than central events
[Walker and Yekovich, 1984].
6
Other models based on symbolic-connectionist frameworks show a similar correspondence with human
data (e.g. [Sharkey, 1990]).
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of concepts cannot cover all forms of inference, and provides a sparse model of strategic
inferences in particular (see section 3.2.5).
Some of my criticisms are based on computational criteria: for example, associative
networks tend to suer from inferential promiscuity. It is diÆcult to see how this could
always be solved by a relaxation process which takes no account of structural information,
as provided by schemas.
I am also suspicious of hand-coding of the networks which are used to prove the eÆcacy
of the Construction-Integration model. Because the process which constructs the networks
is based on intuition, much of the mess which would be returned by a computational model
is removed. In some of Kintsch's examples, there seems to be no rational reason why some
inferences are included and others not. This is true of one case where Kintsch discusses
pronoun resolution for the following text:
The lawyer discussed the case with the judge. He said \I shall send the
defendant to prison".
Kintsch wants to show how the Construction-Integration model resolves the pronoun
`he' to the judge, rather than the lawyer. To this end, he constructs the network shown
in gure 4.3.
Note that there is no association from send(lawyer, defendant, prison) to a corre-
sponding sentence(lawyer, defendant). Why is this the case? Kintsch states that it is
because `the process of associative elaboration generated some additional information for
SEND[JUDGE, DEFENDANT, PRISON] but not for SEND[LAWYER, DEFENDANT,
PRISON]' [Kintsch, 1988].
But, if a computational system generated the sentence(judge, defendant) inference
using a rule like
send(A;B;C) ! sentence(A;B):
why would the same rule not generate sentence(lawyer, defendant)? The reason for the
exclusion of the latter inference is because the intuitive rules applied by Kintsch constrain
the retrieval of associated nodes according to the types of entities involved in a proposition
(c.f. the role traditionally ascribed to scripts): sentence(lawyer, defendant) is not retrieved
because lawyers don't sentence people.
The computational rules which could actually automate this process are not as discrim-
inating as Kintsch, however. They would need explicit denition of the types of entities
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inferences 
inhibitory connections
excitatory connections
speech1 = "I shall send the defendant to prison"
discuss(lawyer, judge, case)
sentence(judge, defendant)
send(judge, defendant, prison)
say(judge, speech1)
send(lawyer, defendant, prison)
say(lawyer, speech1)
Figure 4.3: Pronoun resolution network (gure 7 of [Kintsch, 1988])
that can be involved in events. This immediately complicates the rules and increases the
number required; this consequently increases the risk of inferential promiscuity.
Because I am interested in producing a computational model which both constructs
and evaluates representations, I am compelled to utilise the computational benets of
schemas.
7
This relies on using them to guide inference generation by exploiting the amount
of information they make available to the comprehender. Because concepts are clustered
into schemas the information which is common to concepts in the cluster is readily
distributed: for example, if the types of several entities in a text correspond to a cluster
of types dened in a schema, it is likely that the script is applicable. This commitment to
schemas does not necessarily mean a commitment to excessive elaborative and predictive
processing: this can be avoided by separating the operational and declarative denitions
7
It is interesting to note that Kintsch seems to have recently admitted scripts as useful comprehension
tools [Kintsch, 1998]. He even seems to be suggesting that scripts make information available in the
manner I described in the section 4.3.1 (i.e. text statements processed after activation of a script can be
`slotted' into its structure).
Chapter 4. Semantic Representations 80
of schemas.
4.4 Chapter Summary
A central aim of this chapter and the previous one has been denition and separation
of several facets of comprehension which are often poorly dened or confused with one
another, namely:
1. The reasons why interpretations are constructed.
2. The form of the episodic representations and interpretations produced.
3. The processes by which episodic representations are constructed (i.e. inferences).
4. The semantic representations used as the basis of inference generation.
5. The distinction between the operational and declarative denitions of rules in se-
mantic memory.
Detailed descriptions of the mechanisms used to resolve these issues in my own model
are given in chapter 6.
I have deliberately avoided one main issue so far which binds together several facets
of comprehension: the issue of representation quality. In the discussion of schemas, I
outlined how the amount of information contained in a schema can be used to measure the
usefulness of an inference in terms of how it contributes to the quality of a representation.
In the next chapter, I dene how the utility of inferences can be determined by reference
to their impact on representation/interpretation quality. This includes descriptions of:
 Previous attempts to dene quality metrics for interpretations;
 Commonalities between those metrics;
 The role of coherence in comprehension;
 Computational models of coherence;
 A model of incoherence which attempts to unify themes from several other metrics.
Chapter 5
Metrics for Comprehension
In the previous chapters I have discussed the mechanisms underlying comprehension. An
important distinction made in those chapters was between the declarative aspects of the
comprehension system (e.g. static knowledge structures) and the operational aspects
of the system (e.g. how those knowledge structures are applied). The framework I've
developed so far depends on the following elements:
 A production system architecture based on cognitive principles.
 A knowledge base consisting of schemas.
 A characterisation of comprehension as reasoning with both forward- and backward-
chaining.
 An abstract characterisation of interpretations as sets of representations which
`compress' and structure the information in a text.
 A computational description of representations as episodic networks.
Throughout I have also described the inuence of control on comprehension; particularly
important are the roles of quality and quality monitoring. So far, I have resisted the
temptation to discuss what quality might actually be as this chapter is reserved for that
purpose.
Although quality is intricately tied to the processes of many models and is thus diÆcult
to separate out at times, I have attempted to do so in this thesis. The reasons for this
are:
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 Many AI systems actually have the same underlying model of comprehension
processes, diering instead in their characterisation of quality: for example,
abduction is the mechanism in both ACCEL [Ng and Mooney, 1992] and Wimp3
[Goldman, 1990], but the quality metrics used are coherence-based and probability-
based respectively.
 In cognitive psychological models of comprehension, the actual processes by which
representations are constructed vary from theoretical ([Kintsch, 1998]) to pseudo-
coded ([Fletcher et al., 1996]); very few of these models have a fully-edged inference
engine. However, the metric for comparison of representations, whether implicit
(see section 3.2.5) or explicit [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993], is often more fully
developed.
 For engineering reasons, isolation of the metric in a separate `module' makes program
modication and testing easier. However, this can make metrics more open to
criticism. When reduced to their bare bones, many of them appear quite spartan;
if buried in code, they seem far more exotic and much more diÆcult to analyse. I
have attempted to isolate previous metrics from the processes which employ them.
This has a twofold eect:
1. It allows more accurate comparisons between and description of the metrics.
2. It allows discussion of metrics in isolation from inference processes. The ten-
dency in papers on AI text comprehension systems is to obfuscate metrics
by making them an adjunct to the description of the inference processes.
Sometimes, they are even treated as an aside, almost unworthy of comment.
In cognitive psychology, the tendency is more towards treatment of representa-
tions as a `given' input to a connectionist relaxation metric, with little attention
being given to how the structure of a representation aects how a network will
relax (a notable exception being [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993]).
This chapter therefore attempts to discuss quality metrics with respect to some `given'
representations; however, I hope the previous chapters have dened suÆciently how these
representations may arise.
One aim of the metric described in this chapter is to dene how gross-level structural
information may provide a more computationally attractive and simple model of quality
than other models (such as those based on probability). In addition, incoherence also
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provides an appealing account of quality monitoring which is lacking in AI models, and
seems necessary given psychological data.
5.1 Representation Quality
In section 3.1, I briey described how I view quality with respect to economy: the
comprehender is attempting to nd an interpretation for a text which relates it to as
much previous knowledge as possible, allowing it to be usefully structured for recall and
learning. Economy can be described in terms of possible representations, where the nal
interpretation compresses the text's potential entailments to within the comprehender's
threshold for incoherence. The quality of the nal interpretation is therefore determined
by the quality of the representations of which it is composed.
This is a very general categorisation of interpretation, and one which some researchers
would dispute (for example, it makes no explicit use of probability in the world). The
following sections lead into a justication of my concept of incoherence (that is, reduc-
tion of possible structural complexity) by rst describing some previous approaches to
representation quality. Perhaps the most important and psychologically relevant of the
approaches is based on coherence, to which I devote more time. I tentatively link each
description to the later denition of incoherence, where the links become more explicit.
A brief aside: it may seem as though I have switched from talking about interpretation
quality to talking about representation quality. This is because most researchers do not
distinguish between an interpretation, possibly consisting of several representations, and
the representation as an entity in its own right. More often, the representation and the
interpretation map one-to-one onto each other; in many cases, a representation is reduced
even further, to the level of an explanation of a text (in the abductive sense of section 3.2).
For the purposes of this chapter, I initially talk about single representations, and assume
that an interpretation is composed of a lone representation. In the next chapter, I will
return to the distinction between interpretations and representations.
5.1.1 Specicity
The rst characteristic of a good representation is that it should represent as specic a fact
as it is possible to determine from a text [Wilensky, 1983]. Text propositions are specied
by concretion, `a kind of inference in which a more specic interpretation of an utterance
is made than can be sustained on a strictly logical basis'. Concretion constitutes a
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mechanism of `default classication': vague collections of text propositions are `concreted'
into more substantial, integrated structures [Jacobs, 1988], [Wilensky et al., 1988].
An example due to Jacobs is based on the sentence `John gave a kiss to Mary'
[Jacobs, 1988]. The word `gave' has a primitive semantic meaning akin to `transfer';
however, in this example, the more specic meaning `John kissed Mary' is more `useful'
or concrete.
1
By rening the ambiguous representation `John transferred a kiss to Mary'
to `John kissed Mary', a more accurate representation is formed.
Specicity is also an important element in the comprehension of texts. For example,
representations of the following text are possible at various levels of specicity:
John went to the supermarket. He put on the uniform.
One possible representation could delineate the causal relationships between the sentences
of the text: in this case, John's travelling to the supermarket enables him to put on
the uniform [van den Broek, 1990b]. Alternatively, the comprehender could infer that
John went to the supermarket in order to work there [Ng and Mooney, 1990]. Another
possible representation may involve the inference about John's motivation, plus some
elaborative inferences which detail John's means of transport, what his uniform looked
like, what the supermarket looked like, and so on [Whitney et al., 1991]. Each of these
representations has a level of specicity associated with it, though this may be diÆcult
to discern. Are representations describing causal interactions more or less specic than
those which describe motivations? Does elaboration make a representation more specic?
A rst step towards dening representation specicity may be to consider what is being
specied. As I have stated before, a representation is composed both of observations
and inferred propositions which explain or elaborate those observations. The latter
may themselves be explained or elaborated. For example, given the text above, if a
comprehender knows that John's going to the supermarket (G) can be explained by his
goal to work there (W ), and his goal to work there explained by his desire to earn money
(D), then the following representation could be constructed:
D explains W explains G
Depending on whether the comprehender possesses other knowledge about earning
money, supermarkets, uniforms, etc., there may be other possible explanations. However,
1
I'm using the idea of `primitive' semantics loosely here, in the sense suggested in
[Wilensky et al., 1988].
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if a proposition is an `end in itself' and cannot be further explained, it could be considered
completely explained. Similarly, if there are no other representable consequences of a
proposition, it could be considered completely elaborated.
2
In the ideal (exhaustive)
situation where all the possible explanations and elaborations of a text are part of its
representation, the representation could be considered maximally specic. The specicity
of a representation may therefore be dened as the level of completion of its potential
entailments and elaborations: the more missing information in a representation, the
greater its level of vagueness (see section 5.1.2), and the lower its specicity.
However, in practice, a comprehender doesn't form maximally specic representations.
This would require exhaustive, time-consuming inference and memory-intensive storage.
Instead, representations are constructed to a particular level of specicity. Previous
approaches have either ignored the possibility of varying the level of specicity or as-
sumed that the instantiation of structures at a particular level of specicity is the aim of
comprehension. By contrast, IDC is able to make more-or-less specic inferences according
to how its parameters are set; the measurement and tracking of specicity is described in
section 5.3.
5.1.2 Simplicity
Simplicity is important in dening good explanations: the simpler an explanation, the
better the quality of that explanation. This criterion can be traced back to Occam's Razor,
which species criteria for deciding between explanations on the basis that `entities are not
to be multiplied beyond necessity' [Carroll, 1998]. In other words, the best explanations
are those which require the fewest unique or new entities to be invented/assumed. This
criterion is important in elds such as medical diagnosis, where an examiner will prefer
to infer the fewest diseases which could cause a set of symptoms. For example, given that
someone is gaining weight, has an upset stomach and is feeling tired, it may be better to
infer that they are pregnant, rather than inferring that they have have stopped exercising
(explains `gaining weight'), have a stomach virus (explains `upset stomach'), and have
mononucleosis (explains `feeling tired') [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993]. Simplicity is
also useful for assessing the quality of explanations whose a priori probabilities are not
known (e.g. competing scientic theories; see [Thagard, 1988] and section 5.1.5).
Simplicity is a popular criterion in AI, because it can be implemented by counting the
2
In a computational model, `completely explained' usually means that no rule for explaining that
statement is present in the knowledge base; similarly for `completely elaborated'.
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number of assumptions required for a logical proof and comparing this with the number
of elements of the input which are explained. This returns us to equation 3.1 from the
last chapter, which is repeated here:
A [ L j= E
The simplest explanation is the one which maximises
j E j
j A j
(5.1)
where A is the set of assumptions and E is the set of things explained (L denotes the
set of rules (`laws') in the knowledge base). j X j denotes the cardinality of the set X.
Charniak uses a variant of this, where he requires that j E j   j A j be greater than 0
[Charniak, 1986].
One model which uses simplicity as a central criterion is Kautz's circumscriptive theory
of plan recognition [Kautz and Allen, 1986]. This model infers explanations for an agent's
actions by abduction, resulting in one or more plan hypotheses; the best plan hypothesis is
the one which provides a minimum covering model for the observations (i.e. an explanation
requiring the minimum number of inferred plans) [Kautz, 1990].
However, simplicity alone cannot decide on the most appropriate representation in
many cases. This is because the simplest representation in terms of equation 5.1 with
respect to a rulebase may not be best representation according to human intuitions
[Ng and Mooney, 1990]. This is because the equation doesn't consider the possibility
of increasing the number of assumptions if this better ties together elements of the
representation (i.e. increases coherence; see section 3.2.2).
If the number of assumptions (a measure of `complexity') is used in addition to other
criteria, it may allow ties produced by those criteria to be decided: given two representa-
tions which have equivalent quality by other criteria, prefer the one which requires fewest
assumptions. (This is done in ACCEL; see section 5.2.4.) This shifts the emphasis from
the relationship between explanation and assumption (central to equation 5.1) back to
Occam's original formulation (which focuses on assumption alone).
A nal point worth mentioning concerns the denition of assumption: a node is
assumed if it is not explained by another node. Consider a comprehender with the
following rules (after [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993]):
(1) pregnant(A)  ! feeling tired(A), gaining weight(A)
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upset stomach(A).
(2) stopped exercising(A)  ! gaining weight(A).
Given the text fgaining weight(mary)g, there are two derivable representations, shown in
gure 5.1.
(a)
(b)
#pregnant(mary)
#upset_stomach(mary)#feeling_tired(mary) @gaining_weight(mary)
@gaining_weight(mary)
#stopped_exercising(mary)
# (and shaded) = inferred@ = observed
Figure 5.1: Alternative explanations for `gaining weight'
The simplicity criterion cannot distinguish between these representations, as both use
a single assumption (each has one unexplained node); equation 5.1 assigns a simplicity
rating of 1 to both. However, in representation (a), two extra inferred nodes are required
to apply rule (1). The idea of assumption thus needs to be extended to cover both:
 Nodes which are not explained.
 Inferred nodes which are explained but which do not explain another node. These are
more like presumptions (uncertain propositions deduced from existing propositions)
than assumptions (propositions taken for granted). (The presumptions required in
a representation denote the missing information mentioned in section 5.1.1.)
The total count of these classes of nodes then gives a measure of a representation's
reliance on uncertain nodes, or its vagueness. This then means that representation (a) is
more vague than (b). The simplicity equation can now be rewritten as:
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j E j
j V j
(5.2)
where E is the set of explained observations and V = the set of assumptions and pre-
sumptions.
5.1.3 Breadth
`This principle states that, all other things being equal, an explana-
tory hypothesis that explains more facts is more coherent and therefore
viewed as a better explanation than an explanation that explains fewer
facts.'[Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993]
In other words, if explanation E
1
explains one observation fO
1
g and explanation E
2
explains two observations fO
1
; O
2
g, then E
2
has greater breadth than E
1
. Breadth may
thus be calculated by counting the number of explained observations in a representation.
Remember that this number was used in equation 5.1; that equation can thus now be
rewritten:
j B j
j V j
(5.3)
where B (breadth) = the set of explained observations in the representation, and V the
set of assumptions and presumptions. This equation calculates the overall simplicity of a
representation.
Equation 5.3 makes explicit the relationship between breadth and vagueness, some-
thing which is missing from the original equation 5.1. Applying this equation gives
representation (a) of gure 5.1 a simplicity of
1
3
, and representation (b) a simplicity of
1
1
= 1. This seems closer to our intuitions than the result returned by the primitive
equation for simplicity (equation 5.1).
If the observation feeling tired(mary) is added to the representation, representation
(a)'s simplicity changes to
2
3
(the inference that mary is pregnant explains both her
feeling tired and gaining weight); while the simplicity of representation (b) changes to
1
2
(as the new observation has to be assumed because there is no rule which can explain it).
This is because pregnant(mary) is the broader explanation: it explains two observations
while stopped exercising(mary) explains only one. Read and Marcus-Newhall's work has
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experimentally conrmed that comprehenders prefer a single broad explanation to the
conjunction of multiple narrow explanations [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993].
According to Thagard ([Thagard, 1988]), another area where breadth (which he terms
consilience) is important is in the evaluation of scientic theories. In general, he claims
that broad theories have a competitive edge over narrow theories. Thagard gives the ex-
ample of how the general theory of relativity is more consilient than Newtonian mechanics,
as the phenomena explained by the latter (the motions of planets, tides etc.) are a subset
of the phenomena explained by the former (which additionally explains the bending of
light by gravity, the perihelion of Mercury, etc.).
5.1.4 Competitiveness
Simplicity, derived from breadth and vagueness, is not suÆcient to capture all the qualities
of a good explanation. Consider the pair of representations shown in gure 5.2 (page 90).
In (a), each of a patient's symptoms is explainable by a separate hypothesis, and there
is no hypothesis which can explain all three symptoms. In (b), the hypothesis that a
patient is pregnant can be used to explain all three symptoms, or individual causes may
still be used to explain individual symptoms. However, simplicity rates (a) and (b) with
equal quality.
Read and Marcus-Newhall experimentally manipulated the number of
hypotheses available to their subjects as explanations for story events
([Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993]). They found that `explanatory goodness' ratings for
separate hypotheses were higher when no alternative, broader hypothesis was available.
In other words, the goodness ratings of the separate hypotheses in (a) were found to
be higher than those in (b). They attribute the discrepancy to the competition created
by the presence of the broad hypothesis. They compare this eect to Kelley's idea of
discounting: `the principle that the strength of a possible cause is reduced to the extent
that there are alternative plausible causes' [Kelley, 1973].
I thus hypothesise that the quality of a representation is improved to the extent that
there are few or no competing representations. From where does this eect arise? In
case (a), the comprehender is not aware that the pregnant hypothesis could explain all
three symptoms (though they probably could have come to this conclusion given suÆcient
time); in case (b), the comprehender is aware of the broader explanation.
The important dierence here is in what the comprehender explicitly knows. Compu-
tationally, this could be represented by two knowledge bases. The pregnant rule could be
Chapter 5. Metrics for Comprehension 90
(a)
(b)
#has_mononucleosis(mary) #virus(mary)#stopped_exercising(mary)
@gaining_weight(mary)@feeling_tired(mary) @upset_stomach(mary)
#has_mononucleosis(mary)
@feeling_tired(mary)
#virus(mary)#stopped_exercising(mary)
@upset_stomach(mary)@gaining_weight(mary)
@ = observed
= elements of competing explanation
# (and shaded) = inferred
pregnant(mary)
Figure 5.2: (a) Explanations without competition; (b) Explanations with competition
(after [Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993])
represented as described in section 5.1.2; this rule would be present in case (b) but absent
in case (a). The system utilising the rulebase could then be given access to information
about the potential explanations for each type of eventuality. In cases where there
are several rules which could account for observations or previously inferred nodes, the
comprehender could use this information to degrade the quality of a representation which
employs one of those rules. In cases where there is only a single possible representation,
quality is not degraded.
This principle is used in IDC to penalise an explanation for a set of observations if
another explanation for the set of observations is possible. This is described in detail in
section 5.3.5.
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5.1.5 Probability
Probability theory, usually embodied in Bayesian Networks, is a popular tool for deter-
mining the quality of representations: it can be used to determine the probability that a
representation is appropriate for a given text. One particular area of application within
AI is plan recognition; here, the aim is `to choose the most likely interpretation for a
set of observed actions' [Charniak and Goldman, 1993]. The main dierence between the
probabilistic approach and more traditional approaches (e.g. those of section 3.2 and
page 42) is that the rulebase is annotated with probabilistic information about relations
between concepts. Each rule requires addition of information about the probability of
its consequents, conditioned on the probability of its antecedents [Goldman, 1990]. For
example, consider the following rule:
(1) visit(agent:X, place:Y)  !
go(agent:X, to:Y), explore(agent:X, place:Y),
leave(agent:X, from:Y).
The rulebase is annotated with the following probabilities:
 The prior probabilities for antecedents which are not themselves the consequent of
a rule. In this case, this is:
P(visit(agent : X ; place : Y )):
Two values are required: the probability that visit(agent:X, place:Y) is true, given
no other information; and the probability that it is false. Charniak and Goldman
assume that the number of events of a given type is nite with respect to the world
described by a story; they then use this to estimate the prior probability that a
particular type of event will occur [Charniak and Goldman, 1989]. Following their
lead, reasonable estimates are:
P(visit(agent:X, place:Y))
= (P(visit(agent:X, place:Y)=true), P(visit(agent:X, place:Y)=false))
= (10
 7
; 1  10
 7
).
Note that the probabilities sum to 1.
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 The conditional probabilities of consequents conditioned on their antecedents. In
this case, these are:
P(go(agent:X, to:Y) j visit(agent:X, place:Y)) = (0.9, 10
 6
).
P(explore(agent:X, place:Y) j visit(agent:X, place:Y)) = (0.8, 10
 7
).
P(leave(agent:X, from:Y) j visit(agent:X, place:Y)) = (0.9, 10
 6
).
The values are in the format:
(P (a = t j b = t); P (a = t j b = f)):
where t stands for `true' and f for `false'. The remaining probabilities, P (a = f j
b = t) and P (a = f j b = f), can be determined from the dened values:
P (a = f j b = t) = 1  P (a = t j b = t):
P (a = f j b = f) = 1  P (a = t j b = f):
The rulebase shown here is the most simple case. In cases where a node occurs in multiple
rules, the situation becomes more complicated. The rulebase is again visualised as a
network (see section 4.2.1), with each node being possibly connected to one or more
parents and/or children. Each node then has an entry in the rulebase, dening its
probability distribution conditional upon the probability distributions of its parents. For
example, if the following rule were added to the knowledge base containing rule (1):
(2) rob(agent:X, place:Y)  !
go(agent:X, to:Y), hold up(agent:X, place:Y),
leave(agent:X, from:Y).
the go(agent:X, to:Y) now has two possible parents. Its probability distribution is altered
to account for this and contains the following probabilities:
P(go(agent:X, to:Y)=t j visit(agent:X, place:Y)=t, rob(agent:X, place:Y)=t).
P(go(agent:X, to:Y)=t j visit(agent:X, place:Y)=t, rob(agent:X, place:Y)=f).
P(go(agent:X, to:Y)=t j visit(agent:X, place:Y)=f, rob(agent:X, place:Y)=t).
P(go(agent:X, to:Y)=t j visit(agent:X, place:Y)=f, rob(agent:X, place:Y)=f).
etc.
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As can be seen from this brief example, the number of probabilities which must be dened
for a node is exponential in the number of parents it has.
Other probabilities are also required:
 `Probability of equality' statements, which specify the probability that two objects
of the same type are actually the same object;
 Probabilities that `a word will be used given that the thing it denotes is of a
particular type' [Goldman, 1990], and probabilities relating to syntactic relations. I
will not be discussing these, as they only apply when the input to the program is
natural language.
In the next section, I describe how probability is applied to comprehension; I use
Goldman's Wimp3 program as the basis for the discussion [Goldman, 1990].
Applying Bayesian Networks to Comprehension
In systems which use probability to rate representations, comprehension is carried out
in the manner described in the previous chapters: rules are applied to observations
to construct representations. In this case, the representations are contained within a
Bayesian network which denotes relationships between plans and the types of events they
manifest. Given some observations which specify the probabilities of some of the nodes in
the network, the probabilities of the other nodes can be derived using various algorithms
(the one used by Goldman is Jensen's clustering algorithm [Goldman, 1990]). For example,
assuming a comprehender with rules (1) and (2) of the previous section, and the following
observation:
go(agent:burt, to:l)
the network of gure 5.3 could be constructed.
3
In the diagram, each node n has an
associated tuple of the form (P (n = t); P (n = f)).
I've used probability values from the previous section, plus some which I left unspecied
earlier. It is easy enough to distinguish the two possible plan hypotheses which could
explain the observation, rob and visit. Each hypothesis may be inferred to explain the
go observation, but because the rob hypothesis has a lower a priori probability, it is
3
The probabilities in the diagram were derived using a piece of software called JavaBayes, implemented
by Fabio Gagliardi Cozman and available from http://www.usp.br/ fgcozman/home.html.
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#leave(agent:burt, from:l) (0.429, 0.571)@go(agent:burt, to:l) (1, 0)
#hold_up(agent:burt, place:l) (0.004, 0.996)
#rob(agent:burt, place:l) (0.005, 0.995)
#explore(agent:burt, place:l) (0.424, 0.576)
#visit(agent:burt, place:l) (0.472, 0.528)
Figure 5.3: A Bayesian network representation of a text
discounted in favour of the visit hypothesis. However, note that multiple representations
are implicit in the network, which is thus comparable to an interpretation (in the sense of
section 3.2.5). Plan hypothesis nodes are privileged in Goldman's system and the preferred
representation may thus be designated as the plan hypothesis with the highest probability
of being true.
4
(Although this example focuses on plan recognition, the principle can be
applied to other areas of language comprehension, such as resolution of ambiguity: see
[Goldman, 1990] for examples.)
It is interesting to compare probability with other methods for measuring quality. For
example, the competing explanations of gure 5.3 cannot be discriminated by equation 5.3
(page 88). Because both have the same vagueness and breadth (see sections 5.1.2 and
5.1.3), they receive the same quality rating (=
1
3
). By comparison, the probabilistic
approach assigns a much higher probability to visit than rob by virtue of the facts that:
(1) visits are more probable a priori; (2) the most important evidence for robbing (i.e.
the hold up event) is absent.
Note that if a hold up event is observed, the approach based on breadth can make a
decision between the two plan hypotheses. The probabilistic approach can also make an
equivalent decision: observation of the hold up node changes the probability of rob being
true to 0.999, while the probability of visit being true falls to 0.0001.
Probability thus seems sensitive to both evidence which is present and evidence which
is absent; it also allows the system to weight evidence according to the frequency of its
4
It would perhaps be interesting to combine the probabilistic approach with a relaxation algorithm
in the Kintsch style. The initial probabilities could then be subjected to spreading activation, so that
low-probability nodes are removed from the representation entirely. As Goldman's system stands, there
is no `pruning' of nodes from the representation, merely a lessening of their probability.
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manifestation. While this makes the probabilistic approach seem attractive and intuitive,
it rests on several assumptions with which I take issue below.
Problems with Probability as a Metric
In this section, I describe the assumptions upon which Goldman's Wimp3 program rests.
This involves a fairly technical exposition of his ideas, which is necessary for my objections
to become clear.
In the previous section I used various probabilities without justifying their origins.
I now attempt to remedy this omission. The rst question, then, is `What do these
probabilities actually mean?' The answer for priors such as P (visit(agent : X; place :
Y )) is: the probability that a given entity is of type visit, given a universe of discourse
containing many entities of various types. This value is derived by dividing the total
number of visit events in the universe of discourse by the total number of entities in that
universe [Goldman, 1990]. A similar technique is used for all other entities, such as cars,
ropes, people etc.. The general equation is therefore:
P (type(X; Y )) =
j Y j
j U j
(5.4)
Where:
 X is some entity.
 Y is a type token.
 j Y j is the number of entities in the universe which are of type Y .
 j U j is the total number of entities in the universe.
For example, if there are 10
20
entities in the world and 10
9
ropes, then the probability
that an entity is of type rope =
10
9
10
20
= 10
 11
.
This becomes critical when trying to determine whether two entities mentioned in a
discourse are of a given type. Goldman's demonstration of this is based on the (rather
grisly) text:
Jack got a rope. He killed himself. [Charniak and Goldman, 1989]
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The obvious inferences are that: (1) Jack killed himself by hanging; (2) the rope which
Jack gets in the rst sentence is the same rope with which he hangs himself. If the get
event is designated g and the inferred hang event h, the probability of equality between
the two ropes can be represented as:
P (pat of(g) == instr of(h) j type(pat of(g); rope); type(instr of(h); rope))
(i.e. the probability that the patient of (pat of) the get event is the same entity as
the instrument of (instr of) the hang event, given that they are of the same type rope).
Goldman sets the probability that two references to an entity of a single type actually
refer to the same entity as:
1
P (type(X; Y )) j U j
(5.5)
where X; Y and j U j are dened as previously. Also note that if equation 5.4 is substituted
into this equation it becomes:
1
j Y j
(5.6)
For the case of whether two references to ropes refer to the same rope, this evaluates
to
1
10
 11
10
20
= 10
 9
. Given this evidence, the probability that a hang event did occur
is 0.001. These are obviously very small numbers indeed; though, intuitively, a human
comprehender makes this inference with little eort and considerable condence. The
problem is the system's ignorance of the fact that the events described by a text are part
of a coherent discourse; as Wilensky states, `The network treats the text as describing
completely unrelated events' [Wilensky, 1992].
To counter this, Charniak and Goldman distinguish between the size of the set of
things in the real world and the size of the set of things in the universe of discourse.
They do this by making an assumption about `spatio-temporal locality' which `raises the
probability that two things will be equal, because when restricted to a small part of space-
time there are fewer dierent objects around' [Charniak and Goldman, 1990]. The eect
of this assumption is that the number of things of a particular type shrinks; Charniak and
Goldman suggest changing the number of ropes to 10, so that the probability that the
two references to ropes refer to the same rope becomes
1
10
= 0:1 (by equation 5.6). The
probability that a hang event occurred consequently rises to 0.3.
These techniques are further extended by a theory for modulating the probability
that two references to an entity of a single type are references to the same entity.
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Charniak and Goldman model this by setting a parameter which sets the level of
likelihood for equality (i.e. in eect it changes the `size of the universe of discourse')
[Charniak and Goldman, 1990]. They also incorporate a theory of mention which
increases equality probabilities: if an entity E of type T is specically mentioned in
a text, rather than inferred, then the probability that other entities of type T in the
representation are E is increased (by some constant factor) (ibid.). My own theory of
Skepticism is similar to this idea, and is discussed in section 5.3.6.
Having unravelled the complexities of Wimp3 somewhat (and I haven't even touched
upon the algorithm for handling propagation of probabilities around the network), I am
now in a position to focus on the problems with probability as a quality metric.
Spatio-temporal locality is a bad assumption The spatio-temporal locality as-
sumption seems very odd and haphazard. As Wilensky notes, it also produces strange
predictions. For example, consider the following texts:
(1) Jack went out for a meal. There was a Wimpy restaurant not far from his
house.
(2) Jack went out for a meal. There was a McDonalds restaurant not far from
his house.
A fragment of a possible Wimp3 network for these texts is shown in gure 5.4.
mcdonalds(r) wimpy(r) rest_visit(e)
rest(r) rest(rest_of(e))
r == rest_of(e)
Figure 5.4: Representation of equality between restaurants
In this gure, rest(r) stands for `r is a restaurant'; rest of(e) is a function which returns
the restaurant visited during restaurant visit (rest visit) e.
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As there are more McDonalds restaurants in the world than Wimpy restaurants, it
seems reasonable to assume that the prior probability of the former is greater than that
of the latter. However, this results in discrepancies: because the Wimpy is less probable a
priori, the probability that r == rest of (e) is higher in text (1) than text (2). Similarly,
if two instances of a type are observed in a text, they are more likely to be the same entity
if there are fewer of them in the universe of discourse.
Some knowledge is not probabilistic Probability breaks down in situations where
the frequency of occurrence of entities cannot be dened. For example, in assessing the
comparative strengths of two scientic theories, there is no a priori way to dene which is
most probable [Thagard, 1989]: the scientic theories are actually determining probabili-
ties in the world. Consider the competition between the Copernican and Ptolemaic astro-
nomical theories: which is more probable, a priori? [Nowak and Thagard, 1992]. In the
context of a world where the Ptolemaic theory (T
p
) provides the paradigm, P (T
p
) = 0:99,
with competing theories each having a probability close to 0. But, once the Copernican
theory T
c
becomes the paradigm, the probabilities may shift so that P (T
c
) = 0:99.
The creativity of interpretation In the case of complex narrative texts, it seems
unlikely that one interpretation is more probable than another with respect to probabilities
in the real world. Narrative comprehension requires a relaxation or rejection of real-world
probability; more often than not, the improbable or impossible provides a narrative's topic.
A more acceptable view of interpretation allies it with the construction of scientic theories
(see previous paragraph). Comprehension of narratives similarly involves constructing a
world where the narrative's events become probable. An interpretation is a `theory of why
the observable world behaves the way it does'; it is not just a theory of why the author
wrote the text, but a theory of how it should be represented, how its parts interconnect,
how it attaches to the historical context, and so on.
Complexity and sensitivity Hopefully, the previous paragraphs will have convinced
the reader that the probabilistic approach is horrendously complicated and requires a large
amount of work in dening probabilities. Some of this work may be alleviated by automa-
tion, possibly by using a technique such as Latent Semantic Analysis [Kintsch, 1998].
However, Charniak and Goldman do not discuss this possibility.
Even once probabilities have been assigned, the model is very sensitive to slight under-
estimation of probabilities; in particular, a change to a single probability (of the order of
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0.009%) can cause massive changes in preference for one representation over another (see
above and [Ng, 1992] for details).
For these reasons, I feel that probability is not suÆcient as a measure of quality. It relies
on dening many seemingly obscure probabilities which depend on `how large the universe
is'. The probabilistic metric also ignores one important fact about texts: they contain
entities which are related to each other, if only by virtue of being present in the same
text. As a text reports on observations generated by someone (or something) other than
the comprehender, relevance must be inferred: the comprehender must determine why
objects and events are mentioned in the text, and provide reasons for their co-occurrence.
This diers from comprehension of the real world, where pointless events may occur and
irrelevant observations be made. The distinction can be summarised as:
Data in a text has been selected; data in the real world happens.
This highlights the importance of coherence in rating the quality of representations:
the comprehender's aim is to rationalise why the data have been chosen for inclusion
in the text. The representation which denes the relatedness and connectivity of text
observations must be aorded a higher quality rating than one which ignores these factors.
Coherence of a representation increases as the rationale for why the data are in a text is
strengthened.
This is not to say that the quality metrics considered throughout this chapter are
irrelevant or wrong. Instead, I see these metrics as components which contribute to
coherence. For example, the simplicity of a text depends on its vagueness, which in turn
depends on the presence of unexplained nodes and inferred, explanatory nodes which
are not themselves explanatory (see section 5.1.2). This can be recast as follows: if a
node could be explained, but has not been, then it has potential explanation(s); in other
words, a connection to other nodes could be inferred but has not yet been. A coherent
representation is thus simultaneously one with a low level of vagueness, as the connections
which make it coherent also realise the potential connections which would otherwise make
it vague.
So far, I have discussed coherence in an intuitive fashion, by reference to connections,
potential explanations, relatedness, and so on. However, this is not precise enough if one
wishes to produce a computational model of coherence generation. To increase precision,
the following questions must be answered:
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 How is coherence judged by comprehenders and where does it originate? Is it `in'
the text, the representation, the comprehender, the author, or somewhere else?
 Can coherence be quantied using a technique similar to that used for simplicity,
breadth etc.?
The next section tackles these questions.
5.2 Coherence
In this section, I describe several theories of coherence. Some of these theories emphasise
the psychological aspects of coherence, such as the levels and quantities of coherence estab-
lished during comprehension by human subjects. Others concentrate on the computation
of coherence in the service of resolving competition between representations.
My emphasis is on showing how coherence is dependent on the context of compre-
hension. Whether a particular representation is coherent depends both on the knowledge
available during comprehension, and the goals of the particular comprehension session.
To this end, I am interested in abstracting away from individual structures involved in
establishing coherence (e.g. causal and temporal relations), instead viewing all cognitive
structures as tools for connecting r-elts. The coherence of a representation depends on
which structures could be used to create a representation, and which structures are actually
used.
5.2.1 Coherence in the Text
Early characterisations of coherence treated it as a property of a text. According to
these theories, `a discourse is coherent because successive utterances are \about" the
same entities' [Hobbs, 1979]. An example of this characterisation of coherence can be
found in the early work of Kintsch and van Dijk [Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978]. In their
comprehension simulation, connections between successive clauses of a text are determined
by argument overlap. (An argument is usually taken to mean some discourse entity such
as a character or eventuality.) If two propositions derived from subsequent clauses of a
text share an argument, they can be connected in the memory representation of the text.
A text is coherent to the extent that it allows the formation of such links between its
clauses. Consider the following:
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John took a train to Paris. He arrived ten minutes late.
According to the argument overlap criterion, these two sentences are coherent because
they are `about' John.
However, as Hobbs points out, this characterisation of coherence does not aord
suÆcient explanatory power. He cites the following example in support of his claim:
John took a train from Paris to Istanbul. He likes spinach.
It is clear that this text is disjointed in some way, and would be regarded as incoherent
by most readers (barring the possibility that coherence could be supported by previous
text, or by `perverse' reader goals). Hobbs' alternative view is that coherence resides
in the relations established between text elements by the comprehender; in other words,
coherence is in the representation, rather than the text. I turn to this idea in the next
section.
5.2.2 Coherence in the Representation
Instead of argument overlap, Hobbs suggests that coherence depends on the relations
which obtain between pairs of text constituents, as inferred by the comprehender. The
relations include Elaboration, Contrast, and Parallel, which are common in the litera-
ture on relations. Such relations describe semantic connections between clauses, and
have been formalised by numerous writers ([Eberle, 1992], [Kehler, 1995], [Asher, 1993],
[Dahlgren, 1988]). A simplied example is:
a elaborates b is true if event a describes event b in more detail. (after
[Eberle, 1992])
This relation could be established between the following sentences:
John went to Germany. He was stopped at the border.
(He was stopped at the border.) elaborates (John went to Germany.)
Note that viewing relations as central to coherence moves the emphasis from coherence
`in the text', to coherence in the comprehender's representation of the text. Relations `hold
the representation together'.
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The idea of relationships naturally extends to other forms of representational element,
such as those derived from a script or other type of schema. Scripts and schemas provide
a coherent, connecting explanation for the co-occurrence of representational elements
(including elements of the text), and so contribute to the overall coherence of the repre-
sentation.
Psychologists have catalogued the variety of structures which are important for estab-
lishing representational coherence. These are frequently divided into structures which form
local coherence and those which form global coherence [Graesser et al., 1994]. I discuss
these types of coherence in the next section.
5.2.3 Local and Global Coherence
Local coherence `refers to structures and processes that organize elements, constituents,
and referents of adjacent clauses, or short sequences of clauses' [Graesser et al., 1994]. To
paraphrase Alterman [Alterman, 1991], it could also be called coherence-in-the-small, as
it concentrates on the coherence of small amounts of low-level information.
Global coherence `is achieved to the extent that most or all of the constituents can
be linked together by one or more overarching themes.' [Graesser et al., 1994]. This
level of coherence depends on nding `higher order chunks' which capture the higher-level
connections between already locally-coherent parts of the text (ibid.).
Much recent research has been concerned with ascertaining the amount of coherence
generated in representations. This has been done by examining the kinds of informa-
tion encoded into them. The classication of structures as `local' or `global' is then
used to demonstrate the level of coherence sought by the subject: for example, Singer
used a question-answering task to determine whether causal knowledge had been ac-
tivated during comprehension under local coherence; he used this to demonstrate how
even globally-coherent representations are constructed under conditions of local coherence
[Singer and Halldorson, 1996]. This position is frequently referred to as constructionist.
By contrast, McKoon and Ratcli wanted to demonstrate that global coherence is not es-
tablished except under conditions of local coherence breaks [McKoon and Ratcli, 1992].
Their position is often referred to as minimalist.
In section 3.2.2, I made a passing comment about the functional importance of con-
structing certain types of representational element (r-elt): generation of associative and
predictive inferences is dependent on their contribution to coherence. I take the same
position as regards the local/global distinction. Rather than attempting to specify that
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certain types of structure produce local coherence, and others global, I instead treat all
kinds of coherence in the same manner, using the same notation etc. The main dierence
between r-elts is the quantity of coherence they generate. This depends both on the level
of t with the text (i.e. whether new r-elts have to be inferred) and the ratio of high-level
elements to low-level elements.
This approach has its basis in a syntactic treatment of coherence, inuenced by the
work of Ng and Mooney [Ng and Mooney, 1990], [Ng and Mooney, 1992]. Their approach
is detailed in the next section.
5.2.4 Quantifying Coherence in the Representation
ACCEL is an abductive plan recognition system which utilises coherence as a metric for
deciding between competing interpretations [Ng, 1992]. Coherence measures `how well
the various observations are \tied together" in the explanation' (ibid.).
Ng's ACCEL system directly uses the idea of coherence in its quality metric. The
actual content of the representational elements is of secondary signicance; what matters
instead are the explanatory relationships between elements.
The metric itself is implemented by computation over directed graphs. These graphs
are ACCEL's episodic representations; the arcs in the graph represent explanations and
the nodes represent propositions. The coherence of a representation is calculated by
dividing the number of actual connections between observations (A) by the number of
possible connections between observations (P ), i.e.
Coherence =
A
P
(5.7)
P is calculated as:
n (n  1)
2
where n is the number of nodes in the graph. For any graph, this equation returns the
number of possible connections between pairs of nodes, not counting connections from
a node back to itself. ACCEL uses this metric to rate representations. Examples of
coherence ratings are given in gure 5.5 (page 105). In both (a) and (b), the #go  
step(S; go1) node creates a connection between the @inst(go1, going) and @goer(go1,
john1) nodes (observations), so A = 1. As the number of nodes in each representation =
5, P =
5(5 1)
2
= 10. By equation 5.7, Coherence =
A
P
=
1
10
= 0:1.
The coherence ratings are used to control comprehension in two ways:
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1. At the end of each processing cycle, the list of current representations is pruned
so that only x representations with highest coherence are maintained into the next
cycle (see section 3.2.5).
2. When no more-coherent representation is produced during a cycle, that cycle is
halted. Similarly, comprehension halts when the text has been fully observed and a
set of most-coherent representations has been constructed.
The approach taken by Ng seems to provide a good basis for computation of quality.
The metric acknowledges the importance of connectivity, yet avoids problems caused by
metrics such as simplicity or competitiveness. However, ACCEL misses some aspects of
coherence which I believe to be important. The central issues concern the comprehender's
context (see section 1.3):
1. Coherence is based purely on the representation, without reference to the knowledge
base from which it was constructed.
2. Coherence is determined without reference to the comprehender's quality assessment
mechanism. As representations are constructed, their coherence is rated according to
connectivity between observations. However, an inference's value depends wholly on
connecting observations; if there is a way to generate at least one connection between
a pair of observations, a connection is made, regardless of the existence of other
potential explanations and the amount of evidence missing from the interpretation.
These problems can be demonstrated by reference to gure 5.5 (page 105) (based on
rules described in [Ng, 1992]).
In (a), ACCEL has linked two observations via an inferred shopping trip. However,
the greyed-out parts show an alternative interpretation, that a robbing is taking place.
ACCEL prefers to infer either of the interpretations shown, rather than hold o from
explaining observations. Here this seems to reduce the coherence of interpretations, as
it introduces elements which have their basis in little evidence and thus seem slightly
spurious. In (b), a similar situation occurs when ACCEL creates an explanation which
has potential implications. Although the rules are not used deductively (as suggested by
the diagram), this is where important discriminating information resides. ACCEL doesn't
consider information which is possibly entailed by an explanation; if it did, it might decide
that there are too many unspecied constraints to justify inference of a shopping trip (e.g.
the absence of a store as a destination of the `going' event).
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@ = observed parts of interpretation
# = inferred parts of interpretation
Alternative interpretation elements
#inst(S, shopping) #go-step(S, go1) #shopper(S, john1)
@inst(go1, going) @goer(go1, john1)
(a)
robber(R, john1)go-step(R, go1)inst(R, robbing)
Coherence = 0.1
# = inferred parts of interpretation
@ = observed parts of interpretation
Alternative interpretation elements
#inst(S, shopping) #go-step(S, go1) #shopper(S, john1)
(b)
@goer(go1, john1)
inst(SP, shopping-place) @inst(go1, going)
store(S, Str)
dest-go(go1, Str)
Coherence = 0.1
Figure 5.5: How ACCEL fails to account for potential implications
ACCEL's quality assessment mechanism is not coupled to knowledge of the kinds of
representations which are derivable. Human comprehenders do not necessarily generate
every inference which could form a connection between observations (elements of a text).
Instead, they are able to suppress inferences and bar them from a representation until
they become appropriate [Gernsbacher et al., 1990]. The coherence of the evolving repre-
sentation is not merely dependent on connections between elements, but also on `absent
connections' between them.
To make this more concrete, consider the following question:
Is the coherence of a representation independent of the context in which it was
produced?
In gure 5.6 (on page 106), the same representation has been produced in two dierent
contexts: in (a), the comprehender has two rules, one of which has been applied to connect
observations x and y; in (b), the comprehender has a single rule, which has also been used
to connect x and y.
ACCEL assigns each of these representations the same coherence rating (
1
3
= 0:333);
yet representation (b) is as coherent as possible, given the rulebase, while representation
(a) potentially contains more structure, as another connection could be created. In a
similar vein, (a) may contain suÆcient coherence to satisfy the goals of the comprehender
of (a).
My answer to the above question thus runs as follows: the coherence of a representation
depends on the context in which it was generated. Deciding whether a representation
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@z
@y
@x
@z
@y
@x
Knowledge base:
x --> y
Knowledge base:
x --> y
y --> z
(a) (b)
Coherence = 0.333Coherence = 0.333
Figure 5.6: The role of the knowledge base in measuring coherence
is `coherent enough' in turn depends on knowing the quantity of coherence which is
potentially available; it is also reliant on an assessment mechanism which denes the
proportion of potential coherence which must be established. The latter is similar to the
notion of `coherence need' of van den Broek et al., which they summarise as follows:
...the reader proceeds step by step through the text, at each point ascertain-
ing whether the information that is being processed in that step has been
adequately comprehended. [...] The need for coherence drives the inferential
process. [van den Broek et al., 1995]
According to the `need for coherence' theory, inferences are made to satisfy the com-
prehender's criteria for `causal suÆciency'. Experimental support for the theory is given
in [van den Broek et al., 1995], and several other researchers have incorporated it, or a
version of it, into their own work (e.g. [Graesser et al., 1994]). These theories state that
comprehension only proceeds to the point where coherence need is satised; this point
is not necessarily that of optimum coherence. However, these researchers do not specify
the terms in which this need is expressed. By viewing coherence need as the proportion
of potential coherence which must be established in a representation, as I'm suggesting
here, it is possible to give an abstract characterisation of the mechanisms which control
comprehension.
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In the next section, I describe in detail how I compute potential coherence in a
representation; I do this by employing a notion of incoherence. I also describe how IDC
decides when to make an inference based on the structure it adds to a representation; and
how the system recognises when suÆcient coherence has been established.
5.3 Incoherence
5.3.1 Basic Concepts
The basis of the incoherence metric is a fairly traditional set of knowledge sources,
consisting of production-rule-like schemas with case-grammar-style roles, e.g.
(1) event(dine, [diner:A, place:R, thing ordered:O, utensils:I])  !
[
event(go, [agt:A, loc to:R]),
event(order, [agt:A, pat:O]),
event(ingest, [agt:A, pat:O, inst:I]),
event(pay, [agt:A, paid for:O]),
type(eating place, [exp:R])
].
(2) event(shop, [shopper:S, store:T, thing bought:B])  !
[
event(go, [agt:S, loc to:T]),
event(find, [agt:S, pat:B]),
event(buy, [buyer:S, bought:B]),
type(shopping place, [exp:T])
].
(3) event(rob, [robber:A, weapon:W, place robbed:P, thing robbed:V,
victim:M])  !
[
event(get, [agt:A, pat:W]),
event(go, [agt:A, loc to:P]),
event(point, [agt:A, pat:W, obj:M]),
event(get, [agt:A, pat:V, from:M]),
type(valuable, [exp:V]),
type(business, [exp:P]),
type(weapon, [exp:W]),
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habit(in charge, [agt:M, pat:P])
].
The set of schemas constitutes a lattice comparable to a semantic network. The arrow
in a schema is treated as a `connects' relationship: the antecedent node connects the
consequent nodes; or, the antecedent node is a more specic way of describing, classifying,
or explaining the consequent node(s). Despite the arrows, schemas may be used for both
forward- and backward-chaining. I will have more to say about the justication for and
details of schemas in the next chapter (chapter 6).
I approach coherence by examining the `absolute incoherence' of nodes in the schema
lattice, or their `unrealised potential entailments'; in other words, each time an instance
of a node is observed in a text, the schemas dene the set of potential entailments (not
in the strict logical sense) of that instance. Intuitively, incoherence corresponds to how
well specied an r-elt is. For example, an r-elt representing the statement `Bill went to
the restaurant' is not completely specied because there are schemas available which can
explain the event. Until Bill's going to the restaurant has been explained (e.g. `He went
because he was hungry'), the comprehender is not sure why it occurred; and until the
comprehender is sure of exactly which restaurant Bill is in, how he entered it, how he got
there, and so on, the `details' of the representation are blurry.
In terms of the schemas above, we can label each node with all the higher-level
nodes which can explain it. For example, the `Bill went to the restaurant' r-elt can
be explained by the node corresponding to `Bill was the agent of a dining event'; in other
words, each time instances of the event(go, [agt:bert, loc to:r]) and type(eating place,
[exp:r]) nodes occur in a representation, they abductively entail (or `can be explained
by') an instance of the event(dine, [...]) node.
5
Alternatively, a comprehender could
elect to simply assume that those instances occurred, without inferring why. (This
distinction between assumption of a node and abduction of an explanation comes from
work on abductive reasoning, especially ideas from Truth Maintenance [Doyle, 1979,
de Kleer, 1986].) Simultaneously, instances of all of the nodes below the dine(...) node
also become possible; so, we can label that node with the nodes it potentially entails.
Thus, each node in the schema lattice can be thought of as having a `eld of inuence':
all of the nodes which could potentially explain it, and all of the nodes it potentially
explains or `makes possible'. For each node n in the schema lattice, the size of the set of
potential forward entailments (nodes `explained by' n) and of the set of potential backward
5
Where the details of role values are not important, I use the shorthand [...].
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entailments (nodes n is `explained by') can be determined. The more other nodes n
explains, the higher the informativity of n (the more nodes n informs the comprehender
about); the more nodes which can explain n, the higher the ubiquity of n (the more
ubiquitous n is in representations). The chaining together of schemas also inuences
informativity and ubiquity: for example, if one of the forward entailments of n can itself
explain the node p, then n can also indirectly explain p.
At the lowest level of the schema lattice are leaf nodes which explain no other nodes;
these are the most `primitive' nodes, and have a low informativity coupled with high
ubiquity. They can often be explained by several higher-level events, but cannot be used
to explain any lower-level events. At the highest level of the schema lattice are nodes which
cannot be explained; in a sense, they require no justication and just `happen'. (Basic
human motivations possibly fall into this class, c.f. the top-level acts of Kautz and Allen's
plan recognition system [Kautz and Allen, 1986].) These nodes have a low ubiquity, as
they require no explanation; however, they have a large capacity for explanation, and thus
make possible many lower-level nodes
The potential entailments of node instances in R, derived from their informativities
and ubiquities, together demarcate the `potential representations space' (PRS) of R. The
size of the PRS of R is proportional to the `incoherence' of R, or `the number of other
representations which R potentially entails'. An example of the PRS of a representation
is shown in gure 5.7 on page 113.
The comprehender's aim can now be specied as follows:
Given the observations, construct an interpretation which delineates the con-
nections between them, while at the same time introducing as few new r-elts
as possible. In addition:
1. Maintain an interpretation (I) which does not overload memory storage.
2. Cease making inferences when they fail to decrease the PRSs of the rep-
resentations of I.
This aim is basically a combination of the principles of coherence (connectivity) and
simplicity (minimum vagueness allied with maximum explanation). A central dierence
is the emphasis on control: restriction of the size of the interpretation maintained, both
in the short-term and long-term stores; and halting the inference process once a set of op-
timally coherent representations has been produced. Note that the latter condition is not
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dependent on a global, objective criterion but on a subjective calculation of incoherence
change (see section 5.3.7).
To show how these ideas work in practice, the next section gives an informal de-
scription of how IDC constructs representations, with the emphasis on incoherence. The
specic mechanisms for inference processing, integrating observations etc. are detailed in
chapter 6.
5.3.2 Incoherence in IDC
Comprehension in IDC proceeds as follows: statements from the text are observed and
integrated into one or more evolving representations, which together constitute IDC's
interpretation. For example, when comprehension begins IDC has no current representa-
tions. When the rst observation is processed, a single new representation is generated,
containing only that observation. This representation may then be extended by inference,
to generate one or more new representations.
When the next observation is processed, it is initially integrated with each of the
current representations. Then, further inferences are made, producing further represen-
tations, and so on. IDC also discards representations whose incoherence exceeds the best
representations by a set amount (see section 6.4.3 on page 152).
For each representation R
i
, integrating an observation introduces some new potential
representations into PRS(R
i
). The new set of possible representations is also a PRS: this
is the case because even a representation composed of a single element has a PRS. So, the
new PRS of R
i
can also be considered as the combined PRSs of its component elements.
As a simple example, consider the case when IDC observes the observation O
1
=
event(go, [agt:burt, loc to:r]). As this is the start of comprehension, IDC produces a
single representation containing O
1
, which I'll call R
1
.
Next, the possible representations space of R
1
is determined by examining the rep-
resentations which could be generated from R
1
. Using the rules of the previous section
yields a PRS composed of three potential representations:
 P
1
(R
1
): a representation where burt dines in the restaurant r.
 P
2
(R
1
): a representation where burt goes shopping in store r.
 P
3
(R
1
): a representation where burt robs the business r.
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where P
i
(R
1
) is the ith representation which could potentially be generated from R
1
.
Note that the potential representations here depend only on O
1
, as this is the only
element in R
1
. The more potential representations introduced by an observation, the
greater the incoherence of that observation.
As more observations are incorporated into R
1
, PRS(R
1
) increases. Once the size
of PRS(R
1
) reaches some threshold, IDC is driven to generate inferences which reduce
PRS(R
1
). Inferences reduce the PRS of a representation by actualising one or more of
the potential representations and discounting the remaining potential representations; in
other words, part of the PRS is given extra credence, while the remainder is considered
less viable. In other words, IDC actualises one of the potential representations to generate
R
2
, which replaces R
1
. The decision of which possible representations to actualise and
which to discount depends on overlap between the possible representations introduced by
elements: the best structures to actualise are those which are introduced by the most
observations.
Continuing the example, imagine that the next observation O
2
= event(order,
[agt:burt, pat:b]). This observation can be integrated into R
1
, increasing PRS(R
1
) by
introducing the potential representation:
 P
4
(R
1
): a representation where burt orders b in some restaurant.
The PRS of a representation is therefore considered to consist of the sum of the number
of potential representations introduced by each r-elt. In this case, the only r-elts to be
considered are observations, but inferred r-elts (if present) also increase the size of the
PRS.
IDC is now in a position to actualise a representation and reduce the PRS of R
1
. It
does this by comparing representations in the PRS. A new representation which unies
with the most representations in PRS(R
1
) is the best representation which can be derived
from R
1
. In this case, a new representation R
2
which unies with both P
1
(R
1
) and P
4
(R
1
)
is considered the best representation to actualise; this is because there is no representation
which will unify with both P
2
(R
1
) and P
3
(R
1
). R
2
has the form:
R
2
: burt dines in the restaurant r; he orders b.
The operation of actualising a representation from a PRS is shown diagrammatically in
gure 5.7 on page 113. Inferred nodes are shaded and marked with `#'; observations are
marked with `@'. In each of the potential representations, only the parent node of each
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tree is shown; the other nodes implied by each parent are shown as a single shaded node
and are considered to be present in the representation. The roles of each event either
have a lower- or upper-case value: lower case values represent roles which have been
instantiated by observations, while upper-case values have been created by inferences.
Each potential representation is represented as a dotted box connected to an observa-
tion by a dotted arrow. In the lower part of the diagram, a representation made potential
by both observations has been accepted as a way of connecting those observations; in
other words, the structure which is common to both entering the restaurant and ordering
has been actualised to produce R
2
, while the other potential representations have been
discounted. The resulting representation thus integrates the observations by incorporating
them into a single structure; the representation also decrements the viability of the
remaining potential representations, while not necessarily removing them altogether from
consideration (note that P
2
(R
1
) has now become P
1
(R
2
), and P
3
(R
1
) has become P
2
(R
2
)).
As I stated earlier, the incoherence of a representation is proportional to the size of
the PRS; in turn, the size of the PRS is proportional to the entailments introduced
by individual r-elts; thus, each r-elt can be considered to have its own incoherence.
The absolute incoherence of r-elts is dependent on their informativity and ubiquity, as
stated before. However, this is not the whole story, as the comprehender's perceived
incoherence of a representation is not always equal to its absolute incoherence. The
perceived incoherence of a representation R is a function of the absolute incoherence
values of the elements of R (instances of nodes in the schema lattice) with respect to
the comprehender's Skepticism. Those representations which were not actualised are
considered `discounted' in proportion to Skepticism: the higher Skepticism is, the more
cautiously potential representations are discounted. Skepticism is described in greater
detail in section 5.3.6.
A point worth emphasising is that incoherence is a double-edged sword. On one hand,
elements of the text introduce incoherence which can be used to build new representa-
tions; they provide an impetus for the comprehension process. On the other hand, the
representation built should not rest on potential structure which comes from outside the
text (i.e. inferences and assumptions). As far as possible, the representation should be
constructed using the structure inherent in the text.
As an analogy, imagine some workmen who are told to build a house from a pile of
bricks. While it is possible to acquire more bricks and build a bigger house, it is most
economical to use the bricks provided; they are a resource, as are the elements of a text.
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ordergo
R2 dine3
go
shop
go
rob
1 2P (R ) 2 2P (R )
P (R )1 1
ordergo
R1
go = @event(go, [agt:burt, loc_to:r])
order = @event(order, [agt:burt, pat:b])
dine1 = #event(dine, [diner:burt, place:r, thing_ordered:T1, utensils:I1])
dine2 = #event(dine, [diner:burt, place:P1, thing_ordered:b, utensils:I2])
dine3 = #event(dine, [diner:burt, place:r, thing_ordered:b, utensils:I2])
shop = #event(shop, [shopper:burt, store:S, thing_bought:T2])
rob = #event(rob, [robber:burt, weapon:W, place_robbed:P2, thing_robbed:T3, victim:V])
go
dine1
go
shop
go
rob dine2
order
P (R )1 P (R )1 P (R )12 3 4
Figure 5.7: Actualising potential representations reduces the PRS
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The manipulation of incoherence is thus similar to that of cognitive economy: represent
the text so that it remains as distinct from representations of other texts as possible, at
the same time avoiding inferences which rely on excessive assumption (c.f. [Rosch, 1978]).
This seems to connect to our intuitions about text comprehension: it is not so much that
we generate coherence, rather that we reduce incoherence by exploiting structure inherent
in the interaction between the text and our knowledge sources.
In the next section, I explain the technical details of how informativity and ubiquity
are calculated.
5.3.3 Computing Informativity and Ubiquity
In early versions of the system I used an Assumption-based Truth Maintenance Sys-
tem (ATMS) to perform calculation of informativity and ubiquity, modelled on ACCEL
[Ng and Mooney, 1992]. At each node n, the label at n is the set of environments which
would make n true, as dened in section 3.2.5. The length of the resulting label was then
used to calculate ubiquity. In the same manner, each node can be labelled with a list of
nodes which may be derived from it by deduction (forward-chaining); the length of this
label is then assigned as the node's informativity.
However, it turns out that this method is unnecessarily complicated. Instead, the same
measure can be derived by simply analysing how often nodes occur in the knowledge base.
I compute the informativity and ubiquity of nodes in the schema lattice by noting that
each node n can explain the set of nodes P and can be explained by a set of nodes Q.
That is, P is the set of nodes which occur in the consequent of a schema with n as its
antecedent; and Q is the set of nodes which occur as antecedents of schemas with n in
their consequent.
Using this information, the following equations recursively calculate informativity and
ubiquity:
informativity(n) = 1 +
X
p2P
informativity(p): (5.8)
ubiquity(n) = 1 +
X
q2Q
ubiquity(q): (5.9)
If a node cannot explain any other node, its informativity is 1; if a node cannot be
explained by any other node, its ubiquity is 1.
To illustrate this, consider the simple set of schemas shown below:
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z  ! a, b, c.
a  ! m, n.
These schemas can be represented diagrammatically as the schema lattice shown in
gure 5.8.
nm
a b c
z
i(m) = [m]
u(m) = [z,a,m] u(n) = [z,a,n]
i(n) = [n]
i(b) = [b]
u(b) = [z,b]
i(c) = [c]
u(c) = [z,c]
u(x) = list of nodes by which x is potentially explained
i(x) = list of nodes potentially explained by x
i(a) = [a,m,n]
u(a) = [z,a]
i(z) = [z,a,b,c,m,n]
u(z) = [z]
Figure 5.8: A simple schema lattice with labels
In the diagram, each node has been labelled with a u-list and an i-list. The u-list of
node X represents those nodes which could explain X. The length of this list is used to
determine ubiquity; for example, the length of u(a) is 2, so the ubiquity of node a is 2.
Similarly, the i-list at node X represents the lower-level nodes that X could explain. The
length of this list is used to calculate informativity; for example, the informativity of a is
3.
These values have been determined using the ATMS method (see above), but the
simpler equations 5.8 and 5.9 give the same results. The equations are applied as follows:
1. Leaf nodes of the lattice are assigned informativity = 1.
2. Root nodes are assigned ubiquity = 1.
3. Internal nodes (not leaves or roots) are assigned informativity = 1 + informativity
of their immediate children, working from the leaf nodes upwards.
4. Internal nodes are assigned ubiquity = 1 + ubiquity of their immediate parents,
working from the root nodes downwards.
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The informativities and ubiquities of the schema nodes of section 5.3.1 are shown in
table 5.1 on page 117 (as derived using the IDC setup program).
6
In the table, the variables associated with roles have been replaced by anonymous
Prolog variables. The variables are not important when determining informativity and
ubiquity, but the predicate of a node and the pattern of its roles are. If a node shares a
predicate and a role list with another node, then those two nodes are considered to be the
same node in the schema lattice. The role lists of the two nodes must have exactly the
same roles in exactly the same order for this to be true.
Having described how nodes are assigned their informativities and ubiquities, I can
now describe how perceived incoherence is derived from these values. The incoherence
of a representation is determined in two parts: (1) the incoherence of instances of nodes
(instances) in the representation; (2) the incoherence of trees which connect instances.
Both are described in the following sections.
5.3.4 Incoherence of Instances
The incoherence of instances depends on whether they are explained by another instance
and/or whether they explain another instance. An instance of a node which is not
explained by other instance(s) and which does not explain other instance(s) is considered
more incoherent than an instance of that node which is explained and/or does explain.
Incoherence also depends on whether an instance was observed or inferred: an observed
instance of a node is more incoherent than an inferred instance of that node, as the
presence of observed instances requires more justication than the presence of inferred
instances. The latter are represented because of observations: they are explanations for or
elaborations of observed instances, so their presence is motivated by their role in reducing
incoherence. The calculation of instance incoherence (instance inc) is summarised in
table 5.2. Figure 5.9 on page 119 represents this information diagrammatically.
In the table, the Explained by?/Explainer? column denotes whether the instance
is explained by another instance/explains another instance. The S in the formulas stands
for Skepticism (see section 5.3.6 for more details). 0 < Skepticism < 1 is always true.
Note that the incoherence of observations is not aected by Skepticism. Also note that
ubiquity only aects incoherence if an instance is not explained by another instance, and
informativity only aects incoherence if an instance does not explain another instance.
6
Note that these values are lower than those in the actual implementation, as other schemas employ
these nodes.
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Node Informativity Ubiquity
(inf) (ubi)
event(buy, [buyer: , bought: ]) 1 2
event(dine, [diner: , place: , 6 1
thing ordered: , utensils: ])
event(nd, [agt: , pat: ]) 1 2
event(get, [agt: , pat: , from: ]) 1 2
event(get, [agt: , pat: ]) 1 2
event(go, [agt: , loc to: ]) 1 4
event(ingest, [agt: , pat: , inst: ]) 1 2
event(order, [agt: , pat: ]) 1 2
event(pay, [agt: , paid for: ]) 1 2
event(point, [agt: , pat: , obj: ]) 1 2
event(rob, [robber: , weapon: , 9 1
place robbed: , thing robbed: , victim: ])
event(shop, [shopper: , store: , 5 1
thing bought: ])
habit(in charge, [agt: , pat: ]) 1 2
type(business, [exp: ]) 1 2
type(eating place, [exp: ]) 1 2
type(shopping place, [exp: ]) 1 2
type(valuable, [exp: ]) 1 2
type(weapon, [exp: ]) 1 2
Table 5.1: Informativity and ubiquity example
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Case Type of instance I Explained by?/ Incoherence
Explainer?
1 I is observed no/no (ubi(I)  1) + (inf (I)  1)
2 I is observed no/yes (ubi(I)  1)
3 I is observed yes/no (inf (I)  1)
4 I is observed yes/yes 0
5 I is inferred no/no (ubi(I)  S) + (inf (I)  S)
6 I is inferred no/yes (ubi(I)  S)
7 I is inferred yes/no (inf (I)  S)
8 I is inferred yes/yes 0
Table 5.2: Incoherence of instances
5.3.5 Incoherence of Trees
A tree is a structured object consisting of a parent instance and one or more child instances.
Trees are constructed by either forward-chaining with a schema from a parent instance,
or backward-chaining with a schema from a child instance. Whenever a schema is used to
construct a tree, all of the elements in the tree must either be retrieved from the existing
representation or inferred as new instances.
For example, given the following observation and schema:
Observation:
@event(order, [agt:terry, pat:b]).
Schema:
(1) event(dine, [diner:A, place:R, thing ordered:O, utensils:I])  !
[
event(go, [agt:A, loc to:R]),
event(order, [agt:A, pat:O]),
event(ingest, [agt:A, pat:O, inst:I]),
event(pay, [agt:A, paid for:O]),
type(eating place, [exp:R])
].
this tree could be constructed:
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@A@A @A @A
#A #A#A #A
inc(@A) = inc(@A) =
ubi(A) - 1inf(A) - 1
inc(@A) = 0
+ (ubi(A) - 1)
(inf(A) - 1)
inc(@A) =
inc(#A) = 0inc(#A) =
ubi(A) * S
inc(#A) =
inf(A) * S
inc(#A) =
(inf(A) * S)
+ (ubi(A) * S)
# = inferred node instance
S = Skepticism
@ = observed node instance
ubi(A) = ubiquity of node A
inf(A) = informivity of node A
Key:
inc(N) = incoherence of element N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Figure 5.9: Calculation of instance inc
Parent:
#event(dine, [diner:terry, place:R, thing ordered:b, utensils:I]).
Children:
#event(go, [agt:terry, loc to:R]),
@event(order, [agt:terry, pat:b]),
#event(ingest, [agt:terry, pat:b, inst:I]),
#event(pay, [agt:terry, paid for:b]),
#type(eating place, [exp:R]).
(The exact mechanism for tree construction is left for discussion in the next chapter.)
The incoherence of a tree is measured in two parts: altelabs inc and altexpls inc. Both
are described in the following paragraphs.
1. Incoherence caused by possible alternative elaboration sets (altelabs inc)
If a tree is created which has no observed children, the tree's children have no basis in the
text. The incoherence of such groundless trees is calculated as:
altelabs inc(Parent ;Children) = (informativity(Parent)  
X
c2Children
informativity(c))  S  0:8:
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Children is the set of inferred children of the tree; 0:8 is a constant which simulations have
shown to produce the most interesting results (i.e. it ensures that trees are constructed if
an instance has many possible sets of elaborations, but not if it has few sets: this prevents
excessive elaborative inferencing).
If a tree does have at least one observed child, it is suÆciently justied by the text
and has no incoherence.
Both situations are shown in gure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Calculation of altelabs inc
2. Incoherence caused by possible alternative explanations (altexpls inc) This
form of incoherence is more important and complex than altelabs inc. The formulae are
summarised in gure 5.11 on page 121.
This gure demonstrates the four cases where altexpls inc is calculated. The equations
show the case where there is a single alternative explanation for the observed nodes of a
tree. In the case of several parents for the tree (AltParents), altexpls inc is calculated using
the total ubiquity of those parents. In all the equations below, the following shorthand is
used:
A =
X
a 2 AltParents
ubiquity(a)
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Figure 5.11: Calculation of altexpls inc
where A is the total ubiquity of all alternative parents of the children of a tree (not
including the tree's actual parent).
The details of the diagram are commented on below:
1. T
1
: a tree's parent is inferred, and all of its children are observed. In this case, if there
are any other possible parents for the observed children, their ubiquity is gured
into the tree's incoherence. Other possible parents are determined by looking for
schemas (bar the schema used to create this tree) where all of the observed children
occur in the consequent.
altexpls inc(Parent ;Children) = A  (S + 0:5)  S:
2. T
2
: a tree's parent is observed, as are all of its children. Again, other possible parents
contribute incoherence according to their ubiquity, as described above; however, less
incoherence is caused than in case (1), because the schema is fully instantiated by
the text.
altexpls inc(Parent ;Children) = A 
S
2
2
:
3. T
3
: a tree's parent is inferred, and some of its children are inferred (i.e. they are
not present in the text). This case causes the most incoherence as it rests on the
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shakiest foundations: instantiation of the schema from the text is less complete than
in any of the other three cases.
altexpls inc(Parent ;Children) = A  (S + 0:5):
4. T
4
: a tree's parent is observed, and some of its children are inferred. This causes
less incoherence than T
3
, but more than T
1
or T
2
.
altexpls inc(Parent ;Children) = A 
S
2
:
An important point to note here is that the more information missing from a tree (i.e.
the more inferred instances it contains), the greater its altexpls inc. This is because trees
based on inferred instances are more unstable than those based on observations. Note also
that altexpls inc only applies if the observed children of a tree could have been explained
by some other instance: if a tree contains only inferred children, there is a penalty for
altelabs inc (as dened above), but no penalty for alternative explanations, as the children
have been inferred for the purpose of constructing the tree. So, there is no need to consider
alternative ways for explaining them.
5.3.6 Skepticism
In the previous sections, I referred to the inuence of Skepticism on incoherence. Skepti-
cism is the main means by which IDC's subjectivity is embodied in the implementation.
Its role is to modulate the incoherence of r-elts produced by inference. Observations
are treated as having a xed incoherence, which is derived from the knowledge base
alone; the assumption is that observations always carry a `cognitive load' which drives the
comprehender to form representations. By contrast, inferred r-elts are in a representation
as explanations or elaborations of observations; Skepticism governs the extent to which
these r-elts are considered spurious. The lower Skepticism is, the less cautious the
comprehender is, and the more willing they are to form full representations on the basis
of little evidence.
In one sense, Skepticism represents the comprehender's ability to make `imag-
inative leaps' or `jump to conclusions'. Most previous research examining this
kind of behaviour has concentrated on creativity [Johnson-Laird, 1988], analogy
[Forbus and Oblinger, 1990], or related areas. This work describes how existing concepts
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may be combined in novel ways to produce `new' ideas; often, the resulting behaviour can
appear imaginative. In story comprehension research, the ISAAC system uses creative
understanding to deal with new concepts in science ction stories [Moorman, 1997].
Various control mechanisms decide when understanding has broken down and analogical
reasoning is required to form new concepts (ibid.). However, as in previous systems which
control comprehension (see section 2.4), the eort put into creating novel representations
remains constant across instances of comprehension.
Skepticism is intended as a more general cognitive ability, one which directs application
of schemas. Unlike ISAAC and its ilk, IDC cannot form new concepts, only apply old
ones. The central dierence is that IDC applies its schemas at dierent rates, depending
on how high Skepticism is: if Skepticism is high, IDC applies schemas sparingly, reserving
their use until relatively certain that it is warranted. It is thus closer to an idea like
Gernsbacher's General Comprehension Skill than it is to a `suite of techniques' for guiding
comprehension along novel avenues [Gernsbacher et al., 1990].
The initial impetus behind Skepticism was the idea of executive control in compre-
hension, inuenced by [Baddeley, 1992], [Shallice, 1982], and [Cooper and Shallice, 2000].
The central executive is a component of working memory which `coordinates activity
within working memory and controls the transmission of information between other parts
of the cognitive system' [Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993]. One model of the regulatory
functions of the central executive is provided by Shallice's supervisory attentional system
(SAS) [Shallice, 1982]. During normal cognitive functioning, various competing schemas
vie for control of behaviour. This routine competition is refereed by contention schedul-
ing, which selects for application those schemas whose activation passes some threshold
[Cooper et al., 1995]. In situations where competition cannot be resolved, the SAS may be
brought in to resolve the conict by modulating the activation of schemas, in proportion
to attention focused on the schemas involved. Attending to a particular task can excite
one or more schemas and inhibit their competitors.
Although the comparison between Skepticism and the SAS is perhaps slight, there are
some similarities. IDC's schemas receive `activation' from the text, to the extent that
they can be matched to observations: the closer the match, the better the activation of
the schema, and the lower its incoherence. Skepticism increases the probability that a
schema is deemed to match the text; in other words, it modulates activation of schemas
and causes selection of schemas which otherwise would not pass the `threshold'.
In this light, a further comparison with General Comprehension Skill is pertinent.
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Gernsbacher suggests that `Less-skilled comprehenders are less able to suppress contextu-
ally irrelevant information' [Gernsbacher et al., 1990]. Skepticism performs a similar role,
by setting standards for relevance and evidence: if Skepticism is low, irrelevant inferences
are made on the basis of little evidence, which consequently have to be replaced and/or
retracted. In one sense, the comprehender is unable to suppress inappropriate inferences.
Conversely, high Skepticism can also be a liability: it may set such exacting standards
that few inferences are made, with the result that the representation remains fragmentary.
Skepticism in Human Comprehenders
An important question is whether there is any evidence for a parameter such as Skepticism
in human comprehension, and whether it manifests in empirical data. Zwaan has carried
out a series of experiments which examine whether a control mechanism `tweaks' compre-
hension, depending on the context in which it is carried out [Zwaan, 1996]. He presented
the same texts to two sets of subjects, telling one set that they were news stories, and
the other that they were literary stories. In the literary condition, the representations
constructed, at the levels of both surface structure and textbase, were found to be richer
and more elaborated. It was also found that inconsistent information was maintained
more readily in the literary condition.
Zwaan infers that the dierences were not caused by the texts (which were the same
in both conditions), but by the comprehenders' control systems. Using the Construction-
Integration model as a basis (see pages 54 and 77), Zwaan suggests a model which is able
to modulate the integration process. He describes two methods for implementing this:
1. Set a threshold at which integration is started. This threshold would be lower in
literary comprehension, allowing more of the products of the construction phase to
remain activated. This would also result in slower processing, as more irrelevancies
and inconsistencies are maintained in the hope that they will later become relevant
and be resolved.
2. Add a layer of nodes to the Construction-Integration model which is activated
according to the comprehension context. For example, in a literary comprehension
context, these nodes would activate those nodes in the representation which are more
relevant in literature, such as surface form and textbase, while inhibiting those of
lesser importance such as the situation model.
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While Zwaan sides with the latter approach, my own model is closer to the former.
Skepticism acts like a threshold for determining which elements remain activated and
even which elements become activated in the rst place, as described in the previous
section. However, Skepticism only controls the `thoroughness' of the inference process
and not the types of products it produces (it does not discriminate between the textbase
and the situation model, for example).
How Skepticism Acts as a Coherence Threshold
More evidence for a Skepticism-like parameter is present in the coherence need theory
of van den Broek et al. (see section 5.2.4). It may seem that Skepticism is remote from
coherence need as it is not explicitly a threshold. However, it does mimic a threshold when
it is used to decide whether to produce more inferences or continue reading observations
from the text. This is because IDC monitors the incoherence change caused by inferences
and only accepts those which create a net decrease in incoherence. Because Skepticism
inuences the incoherence of inferred elements it also inuences whether an inference
produces a drop in incoherence or not.
Figure 5.12 gives an example of how Skepticism produces a threshold-like eect. The
diagram shows a decision point where IDC has a choice between inferring an explanation
(either #a or #b) for event @x, or leaving it unexplained.
The diagram is based on the following rules:
7
(i) a  ! x, y.
(ii) b  ! x, z.
In representation (1), @x is not integrated into any kind of structure. This ts case 1 of
table 5.2 (on page 118): an observed instance with no parents or children. Its incoherence
is calculated as the instance incoherence of @x:
inc(1) = (inf(x)  1) + (ubi(x)  1) (5.10)
In representations (2) and (3), x is explained by a single higher-level element (a and b
respectively). Both t case T
3
of gure 5.11; the incoherence of these representations is
calculated as follows:
7
I've used abstract rules to improve legibility; an example of incoherence calculation using full schemas
is shown in appendix A.
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#a
@x #y
(2) #b
@x #z
(3)
# = inferred instance @ = observed instance
(1)
@x
Figure 5.12: An incoherence decision point: Skepticism governs whether an explanation
is inferred
inc(2) = instance inc(@x) + instance inc(#a) + instance inc(#y) +
altexpls inc(#a; [@x;#y])
= (inf(x)  1) + (ubi(a)  S) + (inf(y)  S) + (ubi(b)  (S + 0:5)) (5.11)
inc(3) = instance inc(@x) + instance inc(#b) + instance inc(#z) +
altexpls inc(#b; [@x;#z])
= (inf(x)  1) + (ubi(b)  S) + (inf(z)  S) + (ubi(a)  (S + 0:5)) (5.12)
Note that in neither case is there any altelabs inc: this is because neither a nor b occurs
as the antecedent of any other schema.
If rules (i) and (ii) are the only rules available to IDC, the informativities and ubiquities
of the nodes in the knowledge base are as follows:
Node Informativity Ubiquity
(inf) (ubi)
a 3 1
b 3 1
x 1 3
y 1 2
z 1 2
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Using these gures, it is now possible to calculate the incoherence of each representation,
as given in equations 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12.
inc(1) = 2 (5.13)
inc(2) = (1  1) + 1S + 1S + (1  (S + 0:5))
= 3S + 1:5 (5.14)
inc(3) = inc(2)
= 3S + 1:5 (5.15)
IDC is thus indiscriminate between representations (2) and (3), as both require the same
number of inferred nodes, at the same level of detail. However, there is a benet in
inferring representation (2) or (3) from representation (1) if such an inference produces a
benecial (i.e. negative) incoherence change. In other words, there is a benet if:
inc(2 ) or inc(3 ) < inc(1 )
(inc(2 ) or inc(3 ))  inc(1 ) < 0
Substituting the values from equation 5.11 or 5.12 and equation 5.10 gives:
(3S + 0:5)  2 < 0
3S   1:5 < 0
3S < 1:5
S < 0:5
When S < 0:5, choosing one of representations (2) or (3) is perceived as more productive
than simply maintaining representation (1); when S >= 0:5, representation (1) is per-
ceived as a safer bet than either of the other two. So, Skepticism is acting as a threshold
by determining when an inferred representation is perceived to be more coherent/less
incoherent than a current representation.
The next section explains why incoherence change is used to determine whether a new
representation should be constructed.
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5.3.7 Incoherence Change
Incoherence change is used as a criterion for halting inference generation, rather than sim-
ple comparison of the coherence of representations, for one main reason: IDC's perception
of incoherence is focused on the contents of its short-term store; thus, it is not measured
across the whole representation (including everything in the long-term store (LTS)), but
calculated only in terms of r-elts aected by an inference. The calculation may include
elements in LTS, but doesn't necessarily. It is worth nothing that this feature of IDC is
a departure from many other coherence metrics, which consider the whole representation
during evaluation (e.g. [Ng, 1992], [Thagard and Verbeurgt, 1998]). Because far fewer
elements have to be evaluated when the metric is applied, the calculation is considerably
faster.
Also, because incoherence in the short-term store (STS) is considered the main source
of `potential structure', it alone drives the inference process. Information which has
already been processed is no longer accessible for initiation of inferences, only as a store
from which elements may be `retrieved' [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. However, if an
inference incorporates r-elts in the LTS into a new tree, or causes LTS r-elts to become
redundant, this contributes to incoherence change. For example, if a tree in the LTS
is made redundant and removed, the incoherence of the r-elts unique to the tree is also
removed from the representation.
As a result, it is more eÆcient (from a computational perspective) to measure the
incoherence change of individual r-elts and sum them, rather than measure the incoherence
of the representation as a whole. In the case of representations (1) - (3) above, all elements
are considered equally accessible and all are aected by the inference, so changes to the
LTS do not impact on incoherence change. A more complete example, demonstrating
how LTS elements can impact on incoherence change, is given in appendix A; and more
details of how r-elts are maintained in the STS and transferred to the LTS are given
in section 6.4.1. Another factor is the number of representations maintained by IDC:
for example, IDC may infer both (2) and (3) and store both in the interpretation (see
section 3.2.5).
The description of incoherence has so far focused on its relationships with coherence.
In the next section, I return to the other types of quality metric with which I began this
chapter. In each case, I describe how the incoherence metric encapsulates parts of these
metrics.
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5.3.8 Specicity and Incoherence
As I stated in section 5.1.1, the specicity of a representation depends on how completely
it has been explicated (i.e. explained and elaborated). In terms of the incoherence metric,
any representation whose potential structure has been fully utilised (i.e. whose incoherence
has been reduced to 0) is considered maximally specic. However, the only situation where
a representation can be considered fully specied occurs when all of the elements of all
schemas which match a text are instantiated by that text. For example, consider these
two schemas (loosely based on [Ng and Mooney, 1989]):
(i) go to work(agt:A)  ! go(agt:A, loc to:P), type(P, place of work),
put on(agt:A, pat:U), type(U, uniform).
(ii) type(P, super market)  ! type(P, place of work).
If each of the seven nodes in these two schemas were observed in a text, both schemas
could be fully instantiated and incoherence would be zero. However, it is unlikely that a
text would explicitly contain all of these statements as this would become very tedious
for the comprehender. Thus, normal texts leave space for the comprehender to make
inferences and become engaged in representing them. Some texts leave large areas of
the representation unspecied (e.g. allusive poetry [Eliot, 1958]), while others specify
to a ne level of detail (e.g. the `nouveau roman' [Robbe-Grillet, 1959]). However, the
comprehender's own requirement for specicity (the threshold set by their Skepticism,
as described on page 125) governs how much of this `space' is represented explicitly.
Incoherence thus measures specicity implicitly, as incoherence is inversely proportional
to specicity (more incoherent = less specic).
To show why this is the case, see gure 5.13 (page 130).
In this gure, there are three representations, (1)-(3), constructed by applying schemas
(i) and (ii). In (1), neither schema has been applied; in (2), schema (i) has been applied,
but schema (ii) has not; in (3), both schemas have been applied. As a rough measure,
I let specicity = A=P , where A = the number of links between instances which have
actually been specied in the representation and P = the number of links in the schema
lattice.
8
This gives the following specicities:
specicity(1 ) = 0
8
No actual specicity measure has been proposed, to my knowledge, so this is an approximate measure.
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@go(agt:sharon, loc_to:s) @type(s, supermarket)
@go(agt:sharon, loc_to:s)
@type(s, supermarket)
@go(agt:sharon, loc_to:s)
#go_to_work(agt:sharon)
#type(U, uniform)#put_on(agt:sharon, pat:U)#type(s, place_of_work)
(3) @type(s, supermarket)
#go_to_work(agt:sharon)
#type(U, uniform)#put_on(agt:sharon, pat:U)#type(s, place_of_work)
(2)
(1)
Figure 5.13: Three representations for `Sharon went to the supermarket'
specicity(2 ) = 4=5
specicity(3 ) = 1
In other words, representation (3) is the most specic. The incoherence metric assigns
the following values to the three representations:
inc(1 ) = 2
inc(2 ) = 4S + 1
inc(3 ) = 4S
Representation (3) is always perceived as less incoherent than representation (2). However,
unlike specicity, it is not always the case that representation (3) will be chosen over
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representation (1). This is only the case when:
inc(3) < inc(1)
4S < 2
S < 0:5
Therefore, incoherence captures some aspects of specicity, while at the same time
going beyond it in recognising the importance of the comprehender's desired level of
specicity (as described in section 5.1.1).
5.3.9 Simplicity, Breadth and Incoherence
Recall that in section 5.1.3 I dened simplicity in terms of breadth and vagueness: sim-
plicity = breadth / vagueness. Looking again at gure 5.13, the simplicity of the three
representations evaluates to:
simplicity(1) = 0=2
= 0
simplicity(2) = 0:5
simplicity(3) = 0:5
The greater the simplicity of a representation, the better its quality, so (2) and (3)
are recognised as being better representations than (1). However, simplicity cannot
distinguish between (2) and (3), relying as it does on the explanation of observations
for its numerator: unless more observations are explained, simplicity remains static. The
incoherence metric can distinguish between them, as it takes account of the number of
links in the representation.
A caveat: both simplicity and incoherence are reliant for their eects on the structure
of the knowledge base. In systems which use simplicity, the rules are usually Horn clauses
(i.e. they have multiple antecedents and a single consequent [Sterling and Shapiro, 1994]);
the schemas shown above are not Horn clauses, so the metric goes slightly awry. However,
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I think it is intuitively clear that representation (3) is better than representation (2), by
virtue of its greater connectivity; this failing provided the impetus for Ng's coherence
metric [Ng and Mooney, 1990]. I think incoherence thus provides a better measure in
these circumstances.
5.3.10 Competitiveness and Incoherence
As I've stated before, competitiveness is central to incoherence: the existence of competing
sets of explanations and/or elaborations increases the incoherence of a representation.
Referring back to gure 5.2 (page 90), the incoherence metric takes account of the
dierence between the knowledge bases of (a) and (b). In (a), there is no altexpls inc
to take into account, as there is no hypothesis which provides an alternative explanation
for the observations. The incoherence of (a) = 3S.
By contrast, in (b) there is a pregnant(mary) hypothesis available which can explain all
three observations. Thus, there is additional altexpls inc = ubi(pregnant( )) (S+0:5)S
(see gure 5.11 on page 121). The total incoherence is therefore calculated as:
inc(b) = 3S + altexpls inc(b)
= 3S + (1  (S + 0:5)  S)
= 3S + (S
2
+ S=2)
= S
2
+ 7S=2
Whatever the value of S, (a) has lower incoherence than (b) (i.e. 3S < S
2
+ 7S=2 is
always true for values of S such that 0 < S < 1). It is also generally true that whenever a
broad hypothesis for observations O
1
; : : : ; O
n
is available, IDC prefers this over multiple
narrow hypotheses which together explain O
1
; : : : ; O
n
.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I introduced the idea of representation quality: a measure of how well a
representation encapsulates a set of observations. Many previous metrics for quality have
been suggested in the literature, including:
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 Specicity
 Simplicity
 Breadth
 Competitiveness
 Probability
 Coherence
I drew comparisons between the various metrics, showing how some could be seen as
components of others (e.g. breadth as part of simplicity). I also showed some drawbacks
associated with the most popular metrics, probability and coherence. The following points
are central to these criticisms:
1. Comprehension does not depend on probabilities in the real world, but on the
probability of a representation being satisfactory in the context of a given knowledge
base.
2. Comprehension control depends on acknowledging when an inference is productive.
In turn, this depends on acknowledging the existence of the possible representations
space. Without this, it is diÆcult to see how a comprehender can make a decision
about when inferences are appropriate.
3. Individual comprehenders produce inferences at varying rates, and at varying points
in comprehension. Without a mechanism for modulating the decision process (see
previous point), there is no way to model this.
I suggested a metric based on incoherence which attempts to resolve some of these
issues. The main inuences behind the metric are:
1. Incorporating into a single metric as many aspects of representation quality as
possible.
2. Incorporating the comprehender's knowledge base as a central determinant of qual-
ity.
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3. Incorporating parameters which allow inferences to be made with more or less
skepticism
Although coherence is a by-product of the management of incoherence, incoherence
is a more inclusive concept. Coherence is often viewed as being distinct from other
measures of representation quality (such as simplicity and competition) [Ng, 1992] or
as being entirely constituted by those measures [Thagard and Verbeurgt, 1998]. Very few
authors have tried to specify the importance of structure, abstracted away from other
measures of quality. Ideally, this is what a theory of coherence should be. However,
my reasons for employing incoherence were triggered by the realisation that coherence
is meaningless outside the context of potential structure. Specication of `amount of
structure' is dependent on structure available.
The incoherence metric is a central part of the implementation of IDC. In the next
chapter, I describe the implementation and how the metric is integrated into it.
Chapter 6
The Incoherence-Driven
Comprehender
The Incoherence-Driven Comprehender (IDC) is a set of Prolog programs which together
implement the comprehension model described in this thesis. IDC has two core modules:
1. The IDC setup module sets up the external les used by the IDC module. It rst
produces indexes for the schemas in the knowledge base; then, it determines the
ubiquity and informativity of nodes in the set of schemas using those indexes. Its
output is a le containing the indexes and a set of annotated nodes.
 Indexes are used to retrieve an appropriate schema from the knowledge base.
A schema is retrieved by matching node instances against either the second
or third argument of an index I; the rst argument of I, representing an
appropriate schema ID, is then used to retrieve the schema proper. Indexes
are purely for computational convenience: Prolog can retrieve indexes far
more eÆciently than it can match a node instance against the consequents
of schemas.
 Annotated nodes are data structures which store the node's content (see sec-
tion 6.1) along with its informativity and ubiquity, determined as described in
the previous chapter.
2. The IDC module is the comprehension model which does the main processing. It
uses the indexes and annotated nodes produced by the IDC setup module.
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The IDC module is the main subject of this chapter. As a preamble to my explanation
of how the module produces interpretations, I describe the types of representation it
employs.
6.1 Semantic Representations: Schemas
IDC's schemas have a format familiar from the previous chapters.
26 : habit(care_about, [exp:A, exp:B]) / [A \== B] --->
[
habit(live, [exp:C, loc_in:D]) / [C ==> A],
habit(live, [exp:E, loc_in:D]) / [E ==> B]
].
This schema represents a relationship between three nodes. The number before the
antecedent (ID) is a unique identier for the schema. This is used to give fast access
to schemas through their indexes (see previous section).
Each node within the schema has the following form:
Eventuality type(Predicate, Roles)
Each element of a node's content is described below.
6.1.1 Eventuality Types
The eventuality types are based very loosely on the work of Moens and Steedman (among
others) [Moens and Steedman, 1988], and are limited to the following:
1. Event: this is used to represent eventualities which have a dened beginning and
end.
2. Habit: this is used to represent eventualities which are indenitely extending or
`habitual'. I used the word `habit' rather than `state' because `habit' has a broader
sense, encapsulating both traditional states and types. Types can be viewed as
habitual states which extend over the entire lifetime of an entity, in the sense
suggested in [Dalrymple, 1988].
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3. Relation: this represents relationships between eventualities (e.g. temporal, causal,
partonomic). Relations are themselves represented by instances. For example,
a causal relationship between going somewhere and being at that place may be
represented by the schema:
relation(physically_causes, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, go, [agt:A, loc_to:L]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, be, [agt:A, loc_at:L]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(before, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
The reason for this is that it allows relations to `explain' lower level eventualities.
4. Goal: this represents cognitive states of individuals and provides a very primitive
means of describing modal statements.
Events and goals are assigned unique tokens which can be used to refer to them in relations
(see section 6.1.2).
I have concentrated on events and habits as these are the easiest types of eventuality
to handle. Note that I treat events at the `script' level in the same way as events at
other levels, in the manner of [Kautz, 1990]. Types are separated out from the role list
so that information about their distribution through schemas can be used in calculating
informativity and ubiquity.
I make no claims about temporal/modal reasoning, though my original intention
was the incorporate both into the implementation. I quickly realised that tackling the
complexities of these topics in addition to those of inferential control was beyond the
scope of my thesis. As a result, the temporal ontology is very nave and restricted.
6.1.2 Roles
Roles is a list of roles involved in the eventuality. Each role consists of a name and a value;
for example, the role agt:A has name = agt and value = A. Role values in the schema
lattice are always variables; during comprehension, these variables are instantiated where
possible with values from the text, or from other inferred r-elts. The variable identiers
in a schema are important, as they inuence which elements of the text can be bound to
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roles, according to the schemas's constraints. The role names used in IDC are shown in
table 6.1 (page 139).
In cases where an entity may be represented by two or more roles the more specic
is used. For example, in `Karen went to the garage', `to the garage' is represented as
loc to:garage, rather than pat:garage.
In the case of relation nodes, the role list contains event tokens. For example:
relation(physically causes, [E1b, E2b])
This role list contains tokens for two eventualities, E1b and E2b.
It is worth mentioning that the role names of table 6.1 do not limit what can be in-
cluded in a schema (as the eventuality types do); rather, they merely provide a convenient
shorthand. Where propositions are diÆcult to express using these role names, there is
nothing to prevent the use of arbitrary new ones. This is especially true of script-like
eventualities, which are frequently inexpressible as a solitary proposition: for example,
the `restaurant script' schema has roles such as waiter, diner and meal.
6.1.3 Constraints
The [Value1 Op Value2] terms attached to each node in the schema are constraints on
the values taken by roles in the schema. Value1 and Value2 are two values in the schema,
and Op is an operator used to compare them. Occasionally, I have also used the built-in
Prolog procedure nonvar/1 as a constraint (see below).
It is important to note that constraints are attached to schemas, not nodes; they only
inuence binding of variables between nodes within that particular schema.
The four types of constraint are:
1. == works as the match operator in Prolog, i.e. the constraint only holds if Value1
and Value2 are literally identical.
2. \== holds when Value1 and Value2 are not literally identical.
3. nonvar(A) holds if A is an instantiated variable. This constraint is usually used in
conjunction with a node with eventuality type habit. This enforces strict conditions
for application of the schema, preventing its use except in cases where an instance
of the right `habit' has been previously instantiated.
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Role Role Meaning Example
type name
Agent agt The entity performing a
particular action.
`John' - agt:john
Patient pat The entity an action is per-
formed upon.
`John hates Mary' -
pat:mary
Experiencer exp An entity who/which pas-
sively experiences an even-
tuality.
`Tom sleeps' - exp:tom
Object obj A subsidiary entity involved
in an eventuality.
`Frank gave the knife to
Jane' - obj:knife
Instrument inst An object which assists an
entity in carrying out an
action.
`Pete ate with a fork' -
inst:fork
Location
from
loc from Physical location from
which a travelling action
originates.
`Paul left the house' -
loc from:house
Location to loc to Physical location at which a
travelling action terminates.
`Mike went to the city' -
loc to:city
Location at loc at Physical location where an
eventuality takes place.
`They met in the park' -
loc at:park
Time of when Time when an event took
place.
`He arrived at noon' -
when:noon
Theme thm An event which is the sub-
ject of another event.
`He worried about driving
home' - thm:driving home
Table 6.1: Basic roles used in IDC
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4. ==> is a constraint which enforces directed binding. This constraint is particularly
important as it both restricts schema application and infers bindings between role
values in a tree. A constraint like [A ==> B] has the following eects:
 If both A and B are uninstantiated variables, they are unied with each other
and the constraint holds. If one of the two variables is instantiated later, the
binding thus propagates to the other variable.
 If A is an instantiated variable and B an uninstantiated variable, they are unied
with each other (i.e. B takes on the same binding as A) and the constraint holds.
 If A and B are both instantiated and A == B is true, the constraint holds. Note
that no binding is performed here.
 If A is uninstantiated and B is instantiated, the constraint fails.
Constraints are tested in the order in which they occur in the schema as trees are
built. This means that construction of a tree may be halted if a constraint fails part way
through; hence, constraints limit inferences by preventing creation of trees which violate
them.
6.2 Semantic Representations: Texts
The texts processed by IDC are represented in the same format as nodes; the only dier-
ence is that role values in text observations are either partially or completely instantiated.
For example, the text:
John was on his way to school.
He was worried about the maths lesson.
Last week he lost control of the class. (after [Sanford and Garrod, 1981])
is represented in IDC as a list of terms:
event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s])
habit(school, [exp:s])
event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m1])
habit(teacher, [exp:john])
habit(math lesson, [exp:m1])
Chapter 6. The Incoherence-Driven Comprehender 141
relation(precedes, [e1, e2])
event(e3, lost control, [agt:john, pat:m2])
habit(math lesson, [exp:m2])
relation(precedes, [e3, e1])
relation(precedes, [e3, e2])
This is necessarily a compromised representation of the text: predicates like worry about
and lost control are not satisfactory in many respects, but dealing with the complexities of
eventualities embedded within each other would distract from my central goal. As far as
possible, I have tried to be consistent in my translations of texts, following the work of psy-
chologists such as [Fletcher et al., 1996], [Kintsch, 1998], and [van den Broek et al., 1999].
Roughly speaking, each sentence in a text is translated to a single event; types involved
in the sentence are specied separately using `habit' eventualities; and temporal relations
between events are manually derived and added to the input representation. In the latter
case, it would be better if temporal relations were derived by inference from verb tenses,
aspect etc.. Again, this proved to be too impractical and time-consuming.
6.3 Episodic Representations
IDC distributes each of its representations over two memory stores, the short-term store
(STS) and the long-term store (LTS). These memory stores are common to most re-
cent comprehension models [Alterman and Bookman, 1992], [Graesser et al., 1994]; their
functions in IDC are described below.
6.3.1 The Short-Term Store (STS)
The STS contains the part of the representation which is currently under examination
or in `focus'; the part `that the system can currently access' [Anderson, 1983]. I have
avoided use of the term `working memory' as this is more often associated with a whole
system of attentional mechanisms and modality-specic stores (e.g. the visuo-spatial
sketch-pad, the phonological loop) [Baddeley, 1992]. Instead, I focus on the idea of a `con-
ceptual buer' which holds information produced by activated inferences, plus recently-
accessed parts of the text representation [Haberlandt and Graesser, 1990], [Jonides, 1995],
[Just and Carpenter, 1992]. The STS is constantly updated during comprehension: new
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r-elts are added to it from the text, new inferred r-elts are constructed in it, and r-elts
are continuously retrieved into it and transferred out of it.
The capacity of the STS is determined by a Tolerance parameter, chiey inuenced
by the work in [Just and Carpenter, 1992]. This parameter acts as a threshold against
which the incoherence of STS r-elts is compared: when incoherence passes the level of
Tolerance, the comprehender engages in reducing incoherence, either by creating inferences
which utilise it or by transferring information from the STS to the LTS. Tolerance thus
determines the amount of information the comprehender can keep in the STS from one
cycle to the next.
Tolerance can be used to model dierent integration strategies: if Tolerance is low,
there is a drive to integrate new information as quickly as possible into trees; if it is
high, information is `buered' (maintained) until it reaches some critical mass, at which
point integration is attempted [Haberlandt and Graesser, 1990]. Depending on the other
parameters in the system, a low Tolerance may drive the comprehender to make mistakes
which later have to be retracted; conversely, high Tolerance may disrupt the smooth
ow of comprehension: because information is being maintained for long periods of time,
when integration is eventually attempted there may be many possible extensions to the
representation to consider.
A model which is close to this in spirit is the Current State Selection model, devised by
Fletcher, Bloom and their colleagues [Fletcher et al., 1990], [Fletcher et al., 1996]. They
describe the short-term memory component of the most recent version of the model as
follows:
As propositions are added to short-term memory, the model focuses its at-
tention on the propositions that are essential to the causal role played by the
most recent clause that has causal antecedents, but no consequences, in the
preceding text. When a sentence boundary is reached, all propositions that are
not essential to this current state clause are dropped from short-term memory
to make room for the following sentence. [Fletcher et al., 1996]
In a comparable fashion, IDC `focuses' on those elements which are essential to the
`structuring' of the r-elts most recently added to the STS. It does this by centering its
inferential behaviour on r-elts which have not been connected to other r-elts. R-elts which
have been connected have little remaining incoherence and are purged from the STS, as
they have less potential for integrating new observations. These r-elts are `not essential'
for integrating new observations, as their potential connections have been realised.
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However, unlike the Fletcher et al. model, IDC's `breadth of focus' can be altered. If
Tolerance is low, the breadth of focus is low, and information which is not immediately
integrated may simply be passed into the LTS. If Tolerance is high, breadth of focus is high,
and r-elts which are not relevant to the causal role of recent clauses may be maintained,
simply because there is space for them in the STS. There is less of an emphasis on clausal
boundaries and causality than in their model: IDC treats the potential structure of r-elts
as the chief determinant of whether they should be maintained in the STS.
6.3.2 The Long-Term Store (LTS)
The LTS contains the parts of the representation which have already passed through
the STS. I have not implemented sophisticated retrieval algorithms, such as those sug-
gested in the current literature (e.g. [Myers and O'Brien, 1998]). When constructing
trees, IDC simply examines the r-elts in the LTS to determine: (1) whether any of the
instances there could be incorporated into the tree; (2) whether any trees have become
unnecessary as a result of the new tree's creation (see section 6.4.1). In some respects
this is a primitive model of retrieval from long-term memory as it ignores `forgetting'
in its most general sense (e.g. there is no facilitation for recently-comprehended r-elts
over those which were comprehended less recently, as is found in human comprehenders
[Myers and O'Brien, 1998]).
6.3.3 Interpretations and Representations
In computational terms, the comprehender's interpretation is a list of episodic repre-
sentations. IDC thus explicitly maintains multiple representations, using the multiple
representations strategy of gure 3.7 (page 48). The number of representations maintained
depends on the Range parameter, as described in section 6.4.2. (N.B. it is also possible
to set the number of retained representations to 1.)
Each representation is a data structure of the following form:
repr(STS, LTS, Incoherence)
STS and LTS each consist of a set of instances and a forest (a set of trees), i.e.:
STS = STS_Instances ^ STS_Forest
LTS = LTS_Instances ^ LTS_Forest
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The ^ symbol is used to connect the instances to the forest so that they can be manipulated
together in the program.
The term r-elts is used to collectively refer to elements of the representation, which
may be either instances or trees. Instances and forests (sets of trees) are described below.
Instances
Instances are instantiated or partially-instantiated copies of nodes in the schema lattice.
Two types of instance are used:
1. Observed instances are marked with an @ symbol. They are initially derived from
the text, but may be modied later if one or more of their roles have anonymous
values. For example, the observation `Jack was worried' may be represented by the
initial observed instance:
instance(@event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat: ]), n, n, 10)
Note that the patient role has an anonymous value ( ). The `n' ags denote
whether an instance has parents or children, in that order. The `10' represents
the incoherence of the instance. If a later observation species that Jack's marriage
is in trouble, the value of the pat role may be instantiated:
instance(@event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m]), n, n, 10)
instance(@habit(marriage, [exp:m])
2. Inferred instances are marked with a # symbol. These are always derived by
inference of trees. For example, if the comprehender inferred `Jack was worried',
this might be represented as:
instance(#event( , worry about, [agt:john, pat: ]), y, n, 5)
If a later observation can be merged with an inferred instance, the symbol for the
instance is updated, as is its incoherence. Merging of a new observation with an
existing inferred instance uses the ==> constraint, specied in section 6.1.3. This
ensures that bindings gravitate from observations to inferred instances: to merge
observation O with inferred instance I, the following constraints must hold:
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(a) If O and I are both of type `event' or both of type `goal', and the eventuality
token of O = t
O
and that of I = t
I
, t
O
==> t
I
must be true. In addition, their
predicates and roles must unify (using Prolog's `=' operator).
(b) If both O and I are of type `relation', their predicates must unify and their
role lists match (i.e. the role list of O == the role list of I).
(c) If both O and I are of type `habit', their predicates and role lists must unify.
These constraints are necessary to prevent tokens being bound to the incorrect
events and goals. There is a good possibility that complex texts would require more
complex constraints, but these are suÆcient for my purposes.
The procedure can be demonstrated by showing how an inferred instance may be
merged with a new observation:
Inferred instance:
instance(#event( , worry about, [agt:john, pat: ]), y, n, 5)
Observation:
event(e3, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m])
New instance:
instance(@event(e3, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m]), y, n, 3)
Forests
A forest is a set of trees describing relationships between instances. An important point is
that instances in a forest in one memory store are not necessarily stored in that memory
store: for example, a tree in the STS forest may contain a reference to an instance which
currently resides in the LTS.
As described previously, a tree is a structured object representing the relationship
between a parent node and the child instances it subsumes (see section 5.3.5).
6.4 Comprehension Processes
The main comprehension process is described in this section. At the top level, this
procedure makes gross-level decisions about what action to take next: whether to halt
comprehension, read in the next observation, or process the current representations in an
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eort to lower incoherence. This decision is made at the beginning of each comprehension
cycle.
A cycle consists of two steps:
1. Creation of new extensions to the current representations. This may involve creation
of new r-elts or transfer of existing r-elts from the STS to the LTS (see section 6.4.1).
2. Sorting and trimming of the extensions. This involves deciding which representa-
tions to maintain in the interpretation and which to discard (see section 6.4.2).
6.4.1 Creating New Extensions
If all of the observations in the text have been observed and the incoherence of the best
representation is within Tolerance, IDC transfers the contents of the STS to the LTS and
halts comprehension, displaying its results. In this case, there is no need to sort and trim
representations.
If some statements remain to be observed and the current incoherence of the r-elts in
the STS is equal to or below the level of Tolerance, IDC reads in the next observation.
This may be merged with existing instances in either memory store, or a new observed
instance representing the observation may be generated.
If the current incoherence of the STS is above Tolerance, IDC creates new extensions
based on its current representations in an eort to lower incoherence. IDC has three
methods for creating extensions:
1. Create new trees
IDC connects instances into trees, inferring new instances where necessary. As this
procedure is the core of IDC, it is described in more detail in the next section.
2. Transfer trees from the STS to the LTS
IDC transfers a single tree from the STS to the LTS; simultaneously, any instances
which occur only in that tree and not in any other tree are transferred to the LTS.
This represents IDC's ability to prioritise the content of the STS when Tolerance is
exceeded. Instances which are already part of a tree have been integrated (at least
partially), so are less important than instances which are wholly isolated.
3. Transfer isolated instances from STS to LTS
If no trees can be transferred from STS, IDC can transfer isolated instances (i.e.
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those which occur in no tree) from the STS to the LTS. This is a last resort, as it
means that those instances are being `put aside' for integration at a later date. The
least incoherent instances are transferred rst, as they have the least potential for
being connected to the remainder of the text.
IDC uses each method in turn, applying it several times to each of the representations
currently constituting the interpretation. Each application of the method to a represen-
tation R creates a new extension E; E contains both a new representation R
0
derived
from R and a value representing the incoherence dierence between R
0
and R; this is the
incoherence change (inc change) of the extension. The format of an extension is thus:
ext(R
0
, inc change)
If the incoherence change is  0, the extension is a viable way for IDC to lower the
incoherence of the STS; if the value > 0, the extension is immediately discarded. When
a new tree is created there is no guarantee that incoherence will fall; however, transfers
from the STS to the LTS guarantee a drop in incoherence.
Thus, each method either produces a batch of extensions whose (global) incoherence
is lower than the representations currently in the interpretation, or no extensions at all
(only possible in the case of new tree creation). (Some of the extensions may have a higher
incoherence than the original representations, but there is a general trend towards lower
incoherence across the interpretation.) If no viable extensions were produced, the next
method in the list is tried. This process ensures that transfers are not tried until creation
has failed to produce a viable extension; otherwise, information would pass through the
STS `without touching the sides'.
Once a set of viable extensions has been created, they are sorted with reference to the
Range parameter. As this has important psychological ramications, it is described in
detail in section 6.4.2.
In the next section, I cover in greater depth the process by which new trees are created.
Creating New Trees
The creation of new trees which connect and integrate nodes is IDC's principle method
for lowering incoherence. All possible extensions based on the creation of trees are tried
before r-elts are moved to LTS; this simulates the `drive for coherence' central to compre-
hension, which encourages integration of inputs over raw storage [Graesser et al., 1994],
[van den Broek et al., 1995].
Chapter 6. The Incoherence-Driven Comprehender 148
A tree can be constructed either top-down or bottom-up. In both cases, the process is
based on a production system style of programming [Frost, 1986]:
1. Select a `trigger instance' from the STS.
2. Match the trigger instance against an antecedent or consequent node of a schema.
(Instances are not literally matched against the data structures representing IDC's
schemas, but are matched against the indexes produced by the IDC setup module.)
3. Retrieve the matched schema.
4. Construct a tree using the schema, with the trigger instance as its rst element.
The trigger instance may be the tree's parent or one of its children, depending on
the direction in which the tree is being constructed:
 If the trigger instance matched the antecedent of a schema, the tree is con-
structed top-down (by forward-chaining).
 If the trigger instance matched a consequent of a schema, the tree is constructed
bottom-up (by backward-chaining).
The rest of the tree is constructed by matching nodes in the schema with instances
in the STS; then by matching with instances in the LTS; then by creating new
instances to ll any `blanks' in the tree. When an instance is matched with a node
in the schema, the constraints on that node are checked.
Note that all of the nodes specied in the schema are added to the representation.
Thus, the schema's contents are being asserted as a single `cognitive unit' (see
section 4.2.1).
5. Update the incoherence of instances included in the tree, and/or determine the
incoherence of newly-introduced instances. These gures are used to determine the
incoherence change generated by construction of the tree.
A detailed example of tree creation is given in appendix A.
When a new tree is added to a representation, IDC checks for r-elts (trees and
instances) which have become unnecessary as a consequence of the new tree. This
procedure is described in more detail in the next section.
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Detecting Unnecessary R-elts
Although IDC is capable of maintaining multiple representations (see section 6.3.3), it is
also capable of correcting existing representations. This approach diers slightly from
the traditional one in AI, where representations are not corrected; instead, they are
deleted when their quality falls too far behind the best representation's [Goldman, 1990],
[Hobbs et al., 1993], [Ng, 1992].
The model of representation correction in IDC has some similarities with Krems and
Johnson's model of anomalous data integration in abduction [Krems and Johnson, 1995].
In their model, inconsistent explanations are deliberately rejected and an attempt is made
to re-explain the data that they explained. After re-explanation, the best explanation is
retained, whether this is the original explanation or the re-explanation (in this case, the
best explanation is the one which `explains the most data with the fewest number of
explanatory components' (ibid.), c.f. simplicity). IDC is slightly dierent, in that new
inferences are generated from a representation to produce new trees which may explain or
elaborate existing instances. There is no initial rejection of existing trees. Then the new
trees are compared with existing trees (in both memory stores) to determine whether any
of them have become (potentially) unnecessary. Whether potentially unnecessary trees
are removed depends on whether this causes a reduction in incoherence.
IDC marks existing trees as potentially unnecessary in three situations:
1. Redundancy by subsumption
Briey, an existing tree E may be made redundant by subsumption with respect to
a new tree N if the observations explained by E are also explained by N . In more
detail, subsumption occurs if the following conditions hold:
 The parent of E is not a child of N . (The reason for this condition is to allow
whole trees to be subsumed under a new tree.)
 The observed children of E are a subset or equal to the observed children of
N .
 E has higher incoherence than N .
2. Redundancy by replication
An existing tree E may be made redundant by replication with respect to a new
tree N if both E and N have the same parent but dierent children. Replication
occurs if the following conditions hold:
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 The parent of E unies with the parent of N .
1
 E has higher incoherence than N .
3. Spuriousness
Spurious trees tend to result from removal of a tree which has been produced by
elaboration from another tree. An existing tree E may be spurious if the following
conditions hold:
 E has an inferred parent and no observed children (i.e. E is groundless).
 The parent of E does not occur as a child in another tree and no child of E
occurs as a parent of another tree (i.e. E is isolated).
After removal of a tree, the instances in both memory stores are updated. Their parent
and child ags are set, according to whether the instance occurs as a parent or child of
any tree which remains in memory. This may result in some inferred instances being both
parent- and child-less (i.e. its parent and child ags set to `n'). IDC removes any such
instances from memory, which again contributes to incoherence change.
The removal of trees in IDC is psychologically unrealistic because IDC has full access
to all of the contents of memory. For example, if a tree formed early in comprehension
becomes redundant towards the end of comprehension, that tree may be removed with
relatively little eort. What is required is some limit on the distance over which necessity
checking operates. However, I have been unable to adequately decide this limit: for the
purpose of preventing endless useless inferences, the system must be allowed to retrieve
and remove trees which are superseded by better ones, and the process must be allowed
to occur over arbitrary distances. In versions of the system which do not incorporate tree
removal, the system is quickly overcome by multiple, often contradictory explanations
of the same events. As there is no mechanism in IDC for consistency checking beyond
incoherence change (e.g. no checking for contradictory types assigned to the same entity),
tree removal provides the only mechanism for enforcing consistency in representations.
Transferring R-elts to the LTS
As noted in section 6.4, IDC attempts to transfer r-elts from the STS to the LTS if no
viable extension(s) can be created by inference. Trees or isolated instances (i.e. instances
1
Strictly speaking, if a copy of E unies with a copy of N . Copies are used to prevent erroneous
changes to the content of instances which are only being tested for redundancy.
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which do not participate in any tree) may be transferred.
IDC attempts to transfer trees rst, along with their dependent instances. Dependent
instances are dened as follows:
An instance is dependent on a tree T in the STS if it occurs only in T and not
in any other tree in the STS.
If there are no trees in the STS, instances are transferred. Instances with low incoher-
ence are transferred rst.
The transfer process itself is basic, simply involving removing r-elts from the STS of
a representation and appending them to the r-elts of the LTS of the same representation.
There is no possibility for errors in coding, forgetting, better encoding for more active
components [van den Broek et al., 1999], etc..
6.4.2 Updating the Interpretation
IDC's interpretation consists of one or more representations (see section 6.3). After each
cycle when comprehension processes are applied (see section 6.4), one or more extensions
are returned. IDC now has to decide which of those extensions to maintain as part of its
interpretation and which to discard.
To do this, IDC uses a type of beam search algorithm to `sort' and `trim' the list of
representations. The width of the beam employed is dened by IDC's Range parameter:
the greater the Range, the more representations will (generally) be maintained. If Range
is set to -1, only one representation is maintained at the end of each cycle.
The sort and trim algorithm is as follows:
1. Sort extensions in ascending order of incoherence: the extension with the lowest
incoherence is placed at the front of the list.
For example, if the extensions list were:
[ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, 10.2), -1), ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, 11), -1.5),
ext(repr(STS3, LTS3, 10), -1.2)]
The sorted extensions list would be:
[ext(repr(STS3, LTS3, 10), -1.2), ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, 10.2), -1),
ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, 11), -1.5)]
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Note that incoherence change is not used here, but is maintained for displaying on
screen.
2. Select the rst extension as the `best' extension B.
3. Set the total width of the interpretation to 0.
4. Set the list of representations to be carried over to the next cycle, C, to [B].
5. For each remaining extension E in the list:
(a) Subtract inc(B) from inc(E). The resulting gure is the divergence of E.
(b) Add the divergence of E to total width.
(c) If total width  Range, add E to C. Otherwise, discard E and return C.
For the example above, the divergence of the second extension in the list = 10:2 
10 = 0:2 and the divergence of the third extension is = 11  10 = 1. If Range were
set to 0.2, only extensions one and two would be maintained; if it were set to 1.2 or
higher, all three extensions would be maintained.
If the divergence of a representation is 0 (with respect to the best representation),
it is maintained (even if Range is set to 0).
6.4.3 Psychological Correlates of Range
Range acts in tandem with Tolerance to manage inference generation. The role of
Tolerance is to determine when an inference should be attempted; it species the amount
of information (`potential structure') IDC judges as being required before useful infer-
ences are likely to be produced. Range examines the results of inference generation and
decides how many alternatives to maintain. However, is there any evidence that human
comprehenders are able to perform the same feats?
Most previous work on multiple representations has focused on the sentence level. For
example, Just and Carpenter examined whether multiple representations of syntactically-
ambiguous sentences are maintained in short working memory span and high span subjects
[Just and Carpenter, 1992]. They found that high span subjects had slower reading
times on ambiguous sentences than on unambiguous sentences, while low span subjects
had equivalent reading times for both. Their hypothesis is that high span subjects
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have suÆcient capacity to maintain the alternative representations; however, while doing
this, they have to manage more information and so are unable to read as quickly as in
unambiguous contexts. By contrast, low span subjects maintain a single representation
in both the ambiguous and unambiguous contexts; they only have suÆcient capacity to
maintain one representation. However, Just and Carpenter did not examine alternative
representations at the schema level: for example, if presented with an eventuality which
could potentially be explained by two higher-level plans, do comprehenders maintain one,
both or neither of those plans?
There is little research on maintenance of multiple representations at the schema level.
As I showed in section 3.2.5, symbolic-connectionist implementations broach this subject,
as the simultaneous activation of nodes representing competing explanations can be viewed
as multiple representations. However, the problem is again the lack of executive function
in these models: it is diÆcult to take a single model and change its behaviour without
altering the inner workings of its relaxation algorithm (but see section 5.3.6 for Zwaan's
possible solution).
Range is intended as a representation of some aspect of the central executive re-
sponsible for monitoring the progress of the interpretation as a whole. This diers from
Skepticism, which monitors the progress of individual representations and denes the
comprehender's attitude towards the utility of inferences. Instead, Range is akin to
Skepticism at the level of the interpretation: it represents the comprehender's willingness
to explore alternative representations.
Range can be used to test hypotheses about how/if multiple representations are main-
tained by human comprehenders without having to change the details of the knowledge
base or the quality metric. In IDC, maintenance of a single representation is eÆcient for
texts which are not misleading, or even predictable: because comprehenders' inferences
tend to be conrmed by future statements in the text, there is no need for retraction of
incorrect inferences. However, where texts are misleading or ambiguous, maintenance of
multiple representations may be more eÆcient: the comprehender may have a preference
for one representation over the others, but retain alternatives in case they are useful
later. If the preferred representation fails to account for a statement in the text, the
comprehender can switch it with one of the alternatives which is able to account for it.
However, as multiple representations may be maintained throughout comprehension, the
storage capacity required is higher than in the single representation condition.
One area where dierences between maintenance of single and multiple representations
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may manifest is during comprehension of role-shift texts [Sanford and Garrod, 1981]. I
have carried out some experiments with IDC on such texts, and present some predictions
about human behaviour on the basis of these experiments in the next chapter.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter gives a high level account of the processes used by IDC. The emphasis of the
system is the continual assessment and management of extensions to the interpretation.
The key inferential control processes can be divided into three groups:
1. Controls on which inferences are possible
These limits are largely due to technical details of the implementation:
(a) No inferences beyond the available schemas can be made.
(b) No inferences can be triggered by a relation node. There are technical reasons
for this: it prevents two events being accidentally assigned the same token, e.g.
it prevents two distinct events from both having the token e1.
(c) No inferences can be made which violate variable-binding restrictions. While
this is largely for technical reasons, there may also be a grain of psychological
truth in this: for example, this prevents inference of a stabbing event from a
single observation of someone holding a knife.
2. Controls on which inferences are useful
These constitute important theoretical limits, relying as they do on examining
Tolerance and the incoherence change created by inferences:
(a) Tolerance determines when to make inferences, and when enough have been
made.
(b) Skepticism determines which inferences are most useful by modulating the
incoherence change created by an inference.
3. Controls on which inferences are maintained
Range governs which representations are considered `good enough' to be retained
for further investigation.
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Of these three forms of control, the rst type is the most psychologically suspect. The
other two types may approximate some mechanisms of human comprehension: Skepticism
(see section 5.3.6), Tolerance (see section 6.3.1), and Range (see section 6.4.3) have been
discussed in this capacity.
In the next chapter, I explore how these processes operate in various contexts.
Chapter 7
Examples of IDC's Behaviour
I have used IDC to model several types of text comprehension:
1. Plan Recognition
As the program was designed primarily as an abductive system, plan recognition is
naturally a suitable task for it. This strand of my work follows in the tradition of
[Ng and Mooney, 1990], [Ng, 1992], [Hobbs et al., 1993], and [Charniak and Goldman, 1993].
2. Inference Protocols
Much of the development of the implementation took place within the context of
a simulation of verbal protocols described in [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. As a
result, the metrics were designed to cope with this and similar texts, producing an
inference trace similar to that of human comprehenders.
3. Role-Shift Texts
The initial prototype of IDC only had facilities for maintenance of a single rep-
resentation. However, members of my thesis group suggested that multiple rep-
resentations may be necessary in cases where texts are ambiguous; I incorporated
this suggestion into the nal version of the implementation. One useful aspect
of this is that hypotheses about the maintenance of multiple representations can
be generated on the basis of IDC's behaviour. The eect of multiple representa-
tions may be most pronounced and accessible during comprehension of particularly
awkward, deliberately-misleading texts, known as role-shift texts in the literature
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981]. Here, the comprehender may be led to make one
assumption about the roles of the characters involved in a text, only to nd that
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these assumptions must be revised and replaced later in the text. IDC's behaviour
demonstrates two potential mechanisms for dealing with such corrections: assertion
of new trees and deletion of existing trees; or simultaneous maintenance of alterna-
tive representations until one becomes suÆciently more determined than the others,
at which point the others can be discarded.
In the rest of this chapter, I describe each of these three areas of application, giving
examples of IDC's comprehension of dierent kinds of text.
7.1 Plan Recognition
IDC can be equipped with schemas in the style of traditional plan recognition systems;
many of the examples earlier in this thesis were based on such schemas. The schemas I
have used in IDC for plan recognition are based on those of ACCEL [Ng, 1992]. I have
used ACCEL as a basis, partly because the work is closest to my own intentions and partly
because the code is freely available for scrutiny.
1
Ng's thesis also contains a denitive set
of plan recognition texts, some of which I have used for testing IDC.
The main dierence between ACCEL's rules and IDC's schemas is that ACCEL uses
Horn clauses (rules with a single consequent node), while IDC uses schemas with a single
antecedent node. As a result, IDC's schemas are an amalgamation and merging of several
ACCEL rules. For example, consider the ACCEL rules:
(<- (inst ?g going) (inst ?s shopping) (go-step ?s ?g))
(<- (goer ?g ?p) (inst ?s shopping) (go-step ?s ?g) (shopper ?s ?p))
(<- (dest-go ?g ?str) (inst ?s shopping) (go-step ?s ?g)
(store ?s ?str))
(<- (inst ?sp shopping-place) (inst ?s shopping) (store ?s ?sp))
These rules have the form:
( consequent antecedent
1
; : : : ; antecedent
n
)
The rules may be manually converted into the partial schemas:
1
from ftp://ftp.cs.utexas.edu/pub/mooney/accel.
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event(S, shopping, [shopper:P, store:S, ...]) / [] --->
[
event(G, going, [agt:P, loc_to:S, ...]) / [],
habit(shopping_place, [exp:S]) / [],
...
].
habit(store, [exp:S1]) / [S1 ==> S2] --->
[
habit(shopping_place, [exp:S2]) / []
].
`...' stands for other events and roles which could be added to a schema, as each schema
integrates information from several ACCEL rules into a single unit.
Note that a constraint has been added to the second schema: [S1 ==> S2]. This
ensures that a vague inference is not made from any kind of shopping place to the more
specic store. This technique is used throughout IDC's isa hierarchy to limit inferences
from less-specic to more specic nodes (remember that ---> represents a generalisation
relationship, with the antecedent node being a more specic description of the consequent
nodes). Such inferences are possible if instances of both nodes in the schema already exist
in the representation; however, if there is only an instance of the more general node (the
consequent), inference to the specic node is prevented.
(Also note that I have not retained the go-step of Ng's rule. This is because `step'
eventualities are not introduced unless they are required to discriminate two dierent
means of instantiating a step within a plan. For example, if there were several dierent
ways for go-step to be instantiated (e.g. going by bus, by taxi, on foot), the go-step node
would spawn a schema for each alternative. However, until the schemas which dene
these alternatives are added to the knowledge base, it is assumed that there is no need to
discriminate types of `going'.)
Using the conversion scheme described above, it is possible to derive a set of IDC
schemas capable of deriving results similar to those of ACCEL. A listing of the schemas
is given in section B.1.1 (page 222).
The texts analysed by these schemas are translations of those analysed by ACCEL,
such as:
Bill got a gun. He went to the supermarket.
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The translation of this text into a format readable by IDC is:
[event(e1, get, [agt:bill, pat:w, ]), habit(gun, [exp:w]), event(e2, go, [agt:bill,
loc to:sm]), habit(supermarket, [exp:sm])]
Note that no temporal information is used in plan descriptions or in texts. This is because
ACCEL does not use temporal relations, and because of unresolved issues concerning
relations in IDC (see section 8.2.1).
Evaluation of ACCEL compared the program's output with the author's intuitions
about the best interpretation for a text. In the case of IDC, I was more interested in
showing how interpretations could vary according to dierent parameter settings and the
time-course of comprehension; this means that the correctness of interpretations is a less
important criterion. However, at `average' parameter settings, IDC's outputs at the end
of comprehension are close to those of ACCEL.
An example of IDC's performance on plan recognition texts is given in the following
section.
7.1.1 An Illustrative Example
Consider the following example, a `classic' in the plan recognition literature:
Bob went to the liquor-store. He pointed a gun at the owner.
The IDC version of this text is:
[event(e1, go, [agt:bob, loc to:ls]), habit(liquor store, [exp:ls]), event(e2, point,
[agt:bob, pat:w, obj:o]), habit(gun, [exp:w]), habit(owns, [agt:o, pat:ls])]
What kinds of behaviour are possible, given this text? According to both Goldman and
Ng [Goldman, 1990], [Ng, 1992], after reading the rst sentence, the obvious explanation
is that Bob is going shopping for liquor. Then, after reading the second sentence, the
explanation shifts, so that Bob is robbing the liquor store. This is the order in which
these explanations are formed in both of their systems.
However, as I've tried to make clear throughout this thesis, it is not necessarily the case
that an explanation will be formed on the basis of `Bob went to the liquor-store' alone.
Comprehenders' construction of this explanation relies on several factors, including:
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1. The amount of attention they are focusing on the text.
2. The amount of control they have over their inference processes.
3. The capacity of their working memory.
These are the factors which are modelled in IDC, and which mean that the above
explanations are not necessarily inferred after comprehending the rst sentence of the
text. On the next page, the results for various runs of IDC with dierent parameter
settings are shown (table 7.1). The results are shown in English (rather than Prolog)
to make them more concise. For the sake of completeness, examples of the actual trees
constructed by IDC are included in section B.1.2 (page 229).
Table 7.1 shows the program's output for three settings of Tolerance, but not for
alternative settings of Skepticism and Range. This is because there are a limited number
of potential representations for this text, so the results are the same for any setting of
Range. Similarly, Skepticism makes no dierence to the rate at which inferences are made,
as only one representation is possible; as a result, the above results are true for cases where
0 < Skepticism  0:5. However, when Skepticism is over 0.5 no inferences are produced at
all. This is because the text supplies few cues (with respect to the schema lattice) which
uniquely determine an appropriate schema (with respect to Skepticism > 0:5).
The entries in the table show the particular operation for each comprehension cycle
(see section 6.4). `Observed' means that the next statement in the text was read into the
STS (possibly merged with existing parts of representations); `Inferred' means that a new
tree was inferred (see section B.1.2 for details of the exact content of trees); `Transferred'
means that a tree was moved from the STS to the LTS.
There are several interesting points to note:
 The initial inference of robbing in the rst two cases (Tolerance = 1, Tolerance =
2) refers only to some location, not to the liquor-store. This is because the robbing
schema contains a ==> constraint which prevents ls being bound as the place
robbed when the schema is initially applied (shown in bold below):
event( , robbing, [robber:A, weapon used:W, place robbed:P2,
thing robbed:V, victim:M]) / [V \== W] --->
[
event( , get, [agt:A, pat:W, ]) / [],
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Tolerance Cycle(s) Operation
1 1 Observed: Bob going to ls.
2 Inferred: Bob's going isa go-step.
3 Transfer: Bob's going isa go-step.
4 Observed: ls is of type `liquor-store'.
5 Observed: Bob pointed w at o.
6 Inferred: `robbing' event - Bob robbed some place using the weapon w, with o
the victim.
7 Observed: w is of type `gun'.
8 Inferred: w is of type `weapon' (integrates w with `robbing' event).
9 Transfer: `robbing' event.
10 Observed: o owns ls.
11 Inferred: o is in charge of ls (integrates o's ownership of the store with the
robbing event, and binds ls as its location).
12-14 Transfer: trees in the STS transferred to the LTS.
2 1 Observed: Bob going to ls.
2 Observed: ls is of type `liquor-store'.
3 Inferred: Bob's going isa go-step.
4 Observed: Bob pointed w at o.
5 Inferred: `robbing' event - Bob robbed some place using the weapon w, with o
the victim.
6 Transfer: `robbing' event.
7 Observed: w is of type `gun'.
8 Inferred: w is of type `weapon' (integrates w with `robbing' event).
9 Observed: o owns ls.
10 Inferred: o is in charge of ls (integrates o's ownership of the store with the
robbing event, and binds ls as its location).
11-14 Transfer: remaining trees transferred to the LTS.
3 1 Observed: Bob going to ls.
2 Observed: ls is of type `liquor-store'.
3 Observed: Bob pointed w at o.
4 Observed: w is of type `gun'.
5 Inferred: w is of type `weapon'.
6 Observed: o owns ls.
7 Inferred: o is in charge of ls.
8 Inferred: Bob's going isa go-step.
9 Inferred: `robbing' event - Bob robbed ls using the weapon w, with o the victim.
10-14 Transfer: remaining trees transferred to the LTS.
Table 7.1: Plan recognition inferences: operations during comprehension of the liquor-
store text.
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event( , go step, [agt:A, loc to:P2]) / [],
event( , point, [agt:A, pat:W, obj:M]) / [],
event( , get, [agt:A, pat:V, from:M]) / [],
habit(valuable, [exp:V]) / [],
habit(business, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2],
habit(weapon, [exp:W]) / [],
habit(in charge, [agt:M, pat:P2]) / []
].
However, the constraint does ensure that if any of the elements later bind the location
to a constant, the changes are propagated throughout the tree. Thus, when the
inference is made that the owner of ls is in charge of ls (cycle 10 when Tolerance =
1, and cycle 11 when Tolerance = 2), the binding is propagated through all of the
trees, allowing the liquor-store ls to become the location where the robbing takes
place.
 When Tolerance < 3, the go step inferred from the going event is not recognised
as being the same go-step as that of the robbing event. This is because of the
constraint mentioned in the previous paragraph, which prevents the loc to of the
go step of robbing being bound before the business child's exp role.
However, when Tolerance = 3, the go step is inferred before the robbing event. This
means that the going event with Bob as its agent is recognised as constituting the
go step of the robbery.
This sequence of inferences is slightly arbitrary: the lack of integration between the
inferred go step and the robbing event is partly due to the way IDC compares and
matches events when building trees. However, there is the interesting possibility
that the failure to connect the events is due to the inaccessibility of the previous
inference. It may be that human comprehenders fail to revise inaccessible parts of
their representations due to a similar problem: once elements of the representation
are lost from the STS, they are less available for revision and possible connections
to them may be missed [Johnson and Seifert, 1999].
 A general point is that as Tolerance increases, the eÆciency of comprehension also
increases. At high Tolerance, there is less time wasted on moving r-elts between the
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two stores, as more can be maintained simultaneously in the STS. This means that
inferences are made in a continuous stream (cycles 7-9), eÆciently tying together
the r-elts in the STS without the need for retrieval and transfer.
One criticism might be the tendency for a large number of r-elts to be
maintained in the STS when Tolerance is greater than 1. This number far
exceeds the limits suggested by various researchers, e.g. [Fletcher et al., 1990],
[Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. However, Ericsson and Kintsch's Long-Term
Working Memory (LT-WM) theory [Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995] suggests that the
number of elements readily available during comprehension is greater than the
relatively small 5-9 adhered to by many researchers (as a result of Miller's work
[Miller, 1956]):
...links between propositions currently in the focus of attention and propo-
sitions in the long-term episodic text memory, which are established inci-
dentally by the very nature of the comprehension process, make available
to the reader a large subset of the text memory in LTM, thus generating
what we call LT-WM. [Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995]
In addition, it is diÆcult to produce computational models with a very limited
capacity [Anderson, 1983]. The inferences suggested by psychologists are at a high
level of abstraction, and require various subsidiary inferences to make sense compu-
tationally (see section 7.2). With a very small STS capacity, it is hard to manipulate
suÆcient data for such detailed inferences.
Table 7.1 demonstrates how increasing Tolerance delays the inference process until more
information is in the STS. However, the end result is almost the same for all three settings
of Tolerance, as the inferences which are actually made and accepted depend not on
Tolerance, but on Skepticism and Range. In this case, as I explained previously, the
lack of alternative explanations means that Skepticism and Range exert no inuence over
comprehension of the text. In the next two sections, I describe some changes to the
knowledge base which do inuence comprehension.
Adding Other Schemas
The rst alteration I made to the knowledge base was the addition of a new schema:
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event(_, mugging, [mugger:A, weapon_used:W, thing_robbed:V,
victim:M]) / [] --->
[
event(_, point, [agt:A, pat:W, obj:M]) / [],
event(_, get, [agt:A, pat:V, from:M]) / [],
habit(valuable, [exp:V]) / [],
habit(weapon, [exp:W]) / []
].
This changes comprehension because it provides an alternative explanation for Bob
pointing a gun at the owner of a liquor store (i.e. Bob is mugging the owner).
By adding a schema for mugging events which has a point node as one of its conse-
quents, IDC has two alternative representations for the text (assuming the constraint in
the liquor store shopping schema has not been removed):
1. A representation where Bob is mugging the owner of the liquor store.
2. A representation where Bob is robbing the liquor store.
Is inference of a mugging event valid in this context? If the robbing and mugging
schemas are compared, it is clear that robbing trees have more children than mugging
ones. Therefore, given that IDC prefers to assume as few new nodes as possible, the
mugging representation is preferred. More of the robbing schema's nodes are instantiated
by the text than are the mugging schema's nodes; however, there are fewer of the mugging
schema's nodes left uninstantiated by the text than there are of the robbing schema.
The addition of this schema changes the behaviour of IDC, depending on the settings
of the Skepticism and Range parameters. I will not go into any great detail, but merely
note the following:
 If Skepticism is low ( 0.1), the tendency is for two representations to be con-
structed, one representing the robbing explanation and one the mugging explanation.
Depending on the setting for Range, both may be maintained, or only the least
incoherent (the mugging explanation).
 If Skepticism is higher ( 0.5), IDC refuses to produce any inferences. This is
reasonable behaviour, given that the support for either representation with respect
to the knowledge base is fairly slim. However, there is a problem here, as pointing
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events in combination with the presence of objects of type gun should provide a good
cue about which schemas to apply. The fact that no inferences are made seems to
contradict our intuitions about the correct representation, that Bob is robbing the
liquor store.
A remaining question is whether the mugging representation is valid at all in an indoor
context. Do muggings occur indoors? Or, by denition, do muggings occur outside
buildings? Is there perhaps a way to block the mugging representation on this basis?
Perhaps if the conditions under which muggings take place were specied more clearly in
the schema, the dierence in incoherence between the representations derived from the
two schemas may be lessened; it may even be the case that the robbing representation
would have lower incoherence. However, without a subjective judgement of which schema
should `win' the competition, for every possible combination of conditions, it is impossible
to decide on these conditions.
Removing Constraints
The second change I made to the knowledge base was to remove the constraint which
prevents liquor store shopping being inferred. The unaltered schema is:
event( , liquor store shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing bought:B2]) / [] --->
[
event( , shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing bought:B2]) / [],
habit(liquor store, [exp:T1]) / [T1 ==> T2],
habit(liquor, [exp:B1]) / [nonvar(B1), B1 ==> B2]
].
I removed the constraint shown in bold. Normally, this prevents inference of a
liquor store shopping event unless there is an explicit mention of a liquor instance in
the representation. In other words, the instance instantiating the habit(liquor, [exp:B1])
node must bind the variable B1 to some constant, e.g. x; this binding is then passed to
the shopping event, and then up to the liquor store shopping event.
By removing the constraint, a liquor store shopping event may be inferred without
explicit mention of a liquor entity; the actual eect again depends on Skepticism.
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With low Skepticism, both the liquor store shopping and the robbing trees are added
to the representation. This is because the robbing tree makes no explicit reference to
a liquor store: any business can be instantiate the place robbed role value. By contrast,
the liquor store shopping tree incorporates the liquor store of the text directly, with no
intermediate inferences; it is thus a much `purer' method of integrating liquor store into
the representation than the robbing tree, which requires an inference from liquor store to
business.
If Skepticism is around 0.5, the representations will not change: the derived
representations are as those of table 7.1. The reason for this is that the constrained
liquor store shopping schema still exerts an inuence over whether a robbing event is
inferred, even though it will not be inferred itself. This is because the liquor store shopping
schema alters the informativity and ubiquity of the nodes in the robbing event, even though
there is no direct overlap. Instead, the eect occurs because both the shopping schema and
the robbing schema contain a go step node; and the liquor store shopping schema contains
a shopping node; thus, the ubiquity of the shopping node is increased; and this has the
knock-on eect of increasing the ubiquity of the go step node.
Consequently, if the constraint is removed, it makes no dierence to whether IDC with
Skepticism = 0.5 infers a liquor store shopping event: the incoherence of any inference is
too high. This shows clearly how constraints exert control over inference generation (see
section 6.5).
7.1.2 General Discussion
IDC can simulate the plan recognition behaviour typical of abductive systems. However, it
is diÆcult to evaluate IDC using the evaluation criteria of these systems. IDC is inherently
unstable, in that changes to the knowledge base can irrevocably change the system's
behaviour. This makes measures such as precision and recall unreliable as indicators of
the system's capabilities [Ng, 1992].
This is not necessarily a damaging criticism. The strength in IDC is its demonstration
of how changes to the knowledge base have a profound eect on representation quality
measurement. This point is not often made in connection with quality metrics based on
structural criteria, such as simplicity (see section 5.1.2) and ACCEL's coherence metric
(see section 5.2.4). However, in such metrics, alterations to the knowledge base may shift a
representation's quality from `good' to `bad' (or vice versa). These metrics are successful
by virtue of the way the rules are structured; changes to these structures change the
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representations which are possible, and thus the measurement of quality.
In IDC, the instability of comprehension (with respect to the knowledge base) is
precisely what I intended to model when designing the metric. However, getting the
balance right between nodes which allow discrimination between schemas (i.e. nodes
which occur infrequently) and nodes which actually trigger tree construction (i.e. nodes
which occur frequently) is very complicated. Too often, a small change to the knowledge
base can have drastic (and/or disastrous) eects. In this respect, the metric is more
sensitive to slight changes (e.g. addition of a constraint) than I would have liked.
In other respects, if the knowledge base remains constant and is reasonably well-
designed (e.g. through extensive trial and error), it is possible to produce inference
protocols which resemble those of human comprehenders. In the next section, I describe
the inference protocol which IDC produces from longer texts which are not wholly plan-
based.
7.2 Inference Protocols
Verbal protocol methods have for several years been used to uncover the inference
processes of human comprehenders [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. Such protocols often
involve question answering and/or `think aloud' protocols. In the latter category is
the work described in [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]. They analysed some think aloud
protocols gathered by Suh, where each protocol was produced by a comprehender
who was told to communicate their understanding of the text to the researcher (Suh)
[Suh and Trabasso, 1993]. Trabasso and Magliano's aim was to specify the memory
operations and inference processes of comprehension. To do this, they parsed the protocols
into clauses, and annotated each clause with the inference operation which produced it
and the memory operation it involved. As the clauses were produced during reading, they
could be aligned with the sentences which engendered them.
The resulting parsed protocols are some of the most detailed descriptions of
on-line inference behaviour I have discovered in the cognitive psychology literature.
For this reason, they proved useful when designing IDC: I took a protocol (from
[Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]) and devised a set of schemas which could conceivably
produce it. The text on which the protocol is based is the `Ivan Story':
S1. Ivan was a great warrior.
S2. Ivan was the best archer in his village.
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S3. Ivan heard that a giant was terrifying the people in his village.
S4. The giant came to the village at night and hurt people.
S5. Ivan was determined to kill the giant.
S6. Ivan waited until dark.
S7. The giant came and Ivan shot an arrow at him.
S8. Ivan hit the giant and the giant fell down.
S9. The people were overjoyed.
(adapted from Trabasso and Magliano [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996])
The protocol associated with this text is presented by Trabasso and Magliano sentence
by sentence, as follows:
Sentence Clauses Inference Memory
Operation Operation
S5. Ivan was determined c1. As expected
to kill the giant. c2. Ivan being a warrior explanation retrieval
c3. and caring about people explanation activation
c4. will want to kill the giant. paraphrase
Table 7.2: A fragment of a text comprehension protocol (from
[Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]).
They also represent the protocol using a causal network notation; my own adaptation
of this diagram, incorporating the actual content of each clause, is shown in gure 7.2
(page 170).
To construct the schemas, I used the protocols in tandem with my translation of
the text into IDC-readable form. For each statement in the IDC-readable text, I looked
at the corresponding sentence in the protocol and the clauses it was aligned with; I then
attempted to translate the corresponding causes into IDC format; then I designed a schema
which would allow the clauses to be derived from the IDC statement. In addition, I used
Trabasso and Magliano's network representation of the protocol as a basis for determining
causal relations (see the next section). For example, the crux of the clauses in the above
protocol fragment is as follows:
 Ivan cares about people; specically, he cares about the people being hurt by the
giant.
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 Ivan cares about the people being hurt by the giant because they are villagers from
his village.
 In itself, living in the same village as someone is not suÆcient motivation for caring
about them; presumably, the comprehender makes an inference about them being
friends or acquaintances as a result of living in the same village.
 Because Ivan cares about the people in his village, he wants to stop them being
hurt; one way of doing this is to disable the enemy which is hurting them.
 Because Ivan is a warrior, one way he has of disabling enemies is to kill the source
of the threat; in this case, the giant.
It is clear that the protocols do not contain the various micro-level inferences which are
necessary for even the most supercial analysis. By this, I mean that the pair of clauses
`Ivan being a warrior' and `Ivan caring about people' do not explain `Ivan wants to kill
the giant'. If one were to construct a schema representing this relationship, it might look
something like:
great warrior(X), cares about(X, Y)  ! goal(X, kill(Z)).
This is clearly inadequate as a computational description of the relationships between X
caring about some entity Y and wanting to kill some other entity Z as a result (reading
 ! as a causal relationship).
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The human protocol is spartan because it was delivered to another human being;
therefore, the comprehender was engaging in a dialogue with the researcher and followed
Grice's conversational maxim of Quantity: they only communicated the minimum infor-
mation necessary about their understanding, expecting the researcher to make inferences
from this information [Grice, 1975]. In other words, the comprehender's understanding
is a narrative which they expect the researcher to comprehend, making inferences where
required. In this light, a reported inference such as `Ivan is going to try not to be seen
to try to kill the giant that way' should not be taken at face value. It is obvious that the
comprehender is trying to communicate the idea of surprise attack or ambush: there is no
direct causal connection between being hidden and being better able to attack an enemy.
What is required, then, is a chain of inference resembling the one given in the bullet
points above. This involves far more nodes than are suggested by Trabasso and Magliano:
for example, after adding the auxiliary nodes, the nal representation produced by IDC
contains more instances than the representation given by Trabasso and Magliano (52
distinct instances (for Skept = 0.1, Range = -1) vs. 18 respectively).
In the next section, I describe the representational scheme used to design the schemas
to produce inferences at the required level of detail.
7.2.1 Making Sense of the Protocol
The representational scheme I required had to allow generation of the same types
of inference as the inference protocol, but at a level of detail that was sensible in
computational terms (see previous section). As the inference protocol contained many
causal descriptions, I chose as a starting point the causal network theories of van den
Broek and his co-workers [Trabasso and van den Broek, 1985], [Trabasso et al., 1989],
[Trabasso et al., 1995], [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996], [van den Broek, 1990b],
[van den Broek, 1990a], [van den Broek, 1994]. According to their scheme, a
comprehender's representation is dominated by causal relations between instances.
Four types of causal relation are specied:
1. motivates
A motivates B if:
 A is temporally prior to B
 A is operative when B occurs (i.e. A exerts some inuence on events in the
text)
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 A is necessary for B (i.e. B would not have occurred in the circumstances of
the text if A had not occurred)
 A contains goal information
2. psychologically causes
A psychologically causes B if:
 A is temporally prior to B
 A is operative when B occurs
 A is necessary for B
 A implies emotion or a cognitive state
3. physically causes
A physically causes B if:
 A is temporally prior to B
 A is operative when B occurs
 A is necessary for B
 A is suÆcient for B (i.e. B is likely to occur in the circumstances of the story
if A occurs)
4. enables
A enables B if:
 A is temporally prior to B
 A is operative when B occurs
 A is necessary for B
Because of the structure of schemas in IDC and the emphasis on `encapsulation', I
decided to treat relations between nodes as nodes themselves. A causal relation then
becomes a method for specifying the possible representations space for a pair of events: a
representation where they occur as a pair is actualised, rather than one where they occur
as separate events (see section 5.3.1). (There are some problems with this approach, which
I will cover in section 8.2.1.)
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For the purpose of writing schemas, it was necessary to analyse the relationships
between elements of the protocol, and those between the protocol and the text. This
analysis was carried out by hand as consistently as possible, following the specication of
causal relations given above and including the auxiliary inferences which would make sense
of the protocol. The resulting schemas include some which could be used to comprehend
the fragment in table 7.2:
habit(care_about, [exp:A2, exp:B2]) / [A2 \== B2] --->
[
habit(live, [exp:A1, loc_in:L]) / [A1 ==> A2],
habit(live, [exp:B1, loc_in:L]) / [B1 ==> B2]
].
relation(psycs, [E2, G2]) / [] --->
[
event(E1, terrorise, [agt:T, pat:P]) / [E1 ==> E2],
goal(G1, kill, [agt:A, pat:T]) / [G1 ==> G2],
habit(care_about, [exp:A, exp:P]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E2, G2]) / []
].
In the second schema, psycs indicates a relation of type psychologically causes: in other
words, if T terrorises P, A cares about P, and A has the goal of killing T, then the
terrorise event psychologically causes the killing goal. Note that this schema denes a
relationship between four sub-nodes, and can thus be used in several ways: if one of the
sub-nodes occurs in the text, IDC can backward chain to infer a causal antecedent or
causal consequent (see gure 3.4 on page 40); alternatively, if all four sub-nodes occur in
the text, the relation may be inferred as a means of connecting those nodes.
As well as the causal schemas shown above, IDC also has script-level schemas similar
to those of section 7.1. These dene larger event sequences, such as ambushes and heroes
protecting victims. The full set of schemas for the inference protocol is included in
appendix B.2.
In the following section, I compare the time course and content of IDC's comprehension
of the Ivan Story with the verbal protocol referred to in section 7.2.
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7.2.2 Time Course and Content of Comprehension
Table 7.3 (below and on the next two pages) shows the results of a run of IDC on the
Ivan Story. Each row represents a single comprehension cycle and shows the action taken
by IDC during the cycle. The results shown were produced with the parameters set
as follows: Skept = 0.5, Range = -1 (i.e. only one representation is maintained), and
Tolerance = 0 (i.e. no information is buered and every observation prompts an attempt
to lower incoherence).
It might seem strange to set Tolerance to 0, as I've previously stated that Tolerance
embodies the capacity of the short-term store (see section 6.3.1 on page 141). With
Tolerance set to 2 and the other parameters at the same values, the same inferences are
produced, but the order in which they are generated is dierent; they also tend to occur
in bunches, rather than in smooth progression as they do in the human protocol.
It may be that on-line inferences do occur in groups, at clause and/or sentence bound-
aries; however, this is not reected in the talk-aloud protocols because comprehenders
were specically instructed to demonstrate their understanding. This goal actually alters
the comprehension process, meaning that the inferences produced do not necessarily
mirror inferences routinely produced on-line [Graesser et al., 1996]. As Tolerance is a
drive towards integration of r-elts, I simulated the requirement to show understanding by
setting Tolerance so that inferences are made at the end of each observation. In other
words, Tolerance is set to 0, which forces inferences to be tried after each observation is
added to the representation(s). The result is that any reductions in incoherence are tried
immediately, rather than observations being `stock-piled'.
Cycle Action
1 observed: habit(great warrior, [exp:ivan])
2 associative inference: Ivan is a great warrior because he is a good ghter
3 transfer: tree from 2
4 observed: habit(best archer, [exp:ivan, loc in:village])
5 associative inference: Ivan is an archer
6 associative inference: Ivan uses armour, a bow and arrows, because he is an archer
7 associative inference: arrows are a kind of weapon
8 transfer: tree from 4
9 transfer: tree from 6
10 transfer: tree from 7
11 observed: habit(live, [exp:ivan, loc in:village])
12 predictive inference: Ivan cares about the others who live in his village
continued on next page
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Cycle Action
13 transfer: tree from 12
14 observed: event(e1, terrorise, [agt:giant, pat:people])
15 associative inference: the giant's terrorising the people constitutes an attack on the people
16 predictive inference: the giant's terrorising the people psychologically causes Ivan to be angry
17 transfer: tree from 15
18 transfer: tree from 16
19 observed: habit(live, [exp:people, loc in:village]) (merged with prediction from 12)
20 observed: event(e2, come, [agt:giant, loc to:village, when:night])
21 predictive inference: the giant's coming physically causes some hurting event, with the
villagers as its patient
22 transfer: tree from 21
23 observed: event(e3, hurt, [agt:giant, pat:people, inst: 712]) (merged with prediction from
21)
24 observed: relation(precedes, [e2,e3]) (merged with prediction from 21)
25 observed: goal(g1, kill, [agt:ivan, pat:giant])
26 explanatory inference: the giant's terrorising the people psychologically causes Ivan's goal to
kill the giant
27 transfer: tree from 26
28 observed: relation(overlaps, [e3, g1])
29 explanatory inference: the giant's hurting the people psychologically causes Ivan's goal to kill
the giant
30 transfer: tree from 29
31 observed: event(e4, wait for, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, loc at:village, when:night])
32 explanatory inference: the giant's coming to the village enables Ivan's waiting
33 transfer: tree from 32
34 observed: relation(overlaps, [g1, e4])
35 transfer: instance from 24
36 transfer: instance from 34
37 observed: event(e5, arrive, [agt:giant, loc at:village, when:night])
38 transfer: instance from 37
39 observed: relation(overlaps, [e4, e5])
40 transfer: instance from 39
41 observed: event(e6, shot, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, inst:a])
42 explanatory inference: Ivan's goal to kill the giant motivates his shooting the giant
43 transfer: tree from 42
44 observed: habit(arrows,[exp:a]) (merged with prediction from cycle 6)
45 observed: relation(precedes, [e5, e6])
46 transfer: instance from 44
continued on next page
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Cycle Action
47 transfer: instance from 45
48 observed: event(e7, hit, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, inst:a])
49 explanatory inference: shooting the giant physically causes hitting the giant
50 transfer: tree from 49
51 observed: relation(precedes, [e6, e7]) (merged with tree from cycle 49)
52 observed: event(e8, fall, [agt:giant, loc to:ground])
53 explanatory inference: Ivan killed the giant by shooting him and hitting him
54 transfer: tree from 53
55 observed: relation(precedes, [e7, e8]) (merged with tree from cycle 53)
56 observed: event(e9, overjoy, [agt:people])
57 transfer: instance from 55
58 transfer: instance from 56
59 observed: relation(precedes, [e8, e9])
60 transfer: instance from 59
Table 7.3: Protocol for IDC's comprehension of the Ivan Story
The Action column shows three types of action taken by IDC, corresponding to the
processes described in section 6.4 (page 145): observe actions take a text statement and
add it to the current representation(s); transfer actions move either (a) a tree and its
dependent instances; or (b) instances alone, from the STS to the LTS; inference actions
infer a new tree and instances on the basis of an instance in the STS. In the table, I
have marked each inference action according to whether it is explanatory, predictive, or
associative. IDC does not produce these categories, as it treats all inferences uniformly.
However, depending on the content of the resulting tree by comparison with existing parts
of the representation, it is possible to retrospectively assign a category (e.g. by following
the guidelines given in section 3.2.2 on page 36). For example, the tree inferred in cycle 21
is predictive, as it takes an existing come event and infers a hurt event, such that the come
event precedes the hurt event; whereas the tree inferred in cycle 42 is explanatory, as the
two instances connected (kill giant goal and shooting event) have already been observed
at this point in comprehension. (This distinction between predictive and explanatory
inferences is shown diagrammatically in gure 3.4 on page 40.)
Some comments on IDC's protocol:
 There is not a strict one-to-one correspondence between elements of the human
protocol and IDC's protocol. The main reason for this is that some of the subtlety
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of the human protocol is lost in translation, partly due to the need to add auxiliary
inferences and partly due to my primitive modal notation.
 Some inferences which seem intuitively unavoidable and which are made in the
human protocol are missing from IDC's protocol: for example, the inference that
Ivan's waiting is part of an ambush. Some of these absences are due to the level of
Skepticism set: IDC does have a schema for connecting sub-nodes into an ambush
event, but this schema is too unreliable to be applied when Skepticism = 0.5. Simi-
larly, the human protocol contains a predictive inference that the people celebrated
because they were overjoyed; with Skepticism = 0.5, this inference is also missed.
However, both inferences are made when Skepticism is set to 0.1.
The rest of the absences are due to problems with mapping between the human
protocol and IDC schemas. For example, the human protocol includes the inference
`Ivan probably hopes that the giant is dead', which is very diÆcult to translate into
IDC's restrictive notation.
 Some inferences are part of IDC's protocol but not part of the human protocol.
These are generally inferences about causal relationships, e.g. cycle 32's action is
inference of an enablement relation between the giant's coming to the village and
Ivan's waiting in the village. In turn, this relation could be used to infer an ambush
plan (see previous point), though this is not done when Skepticism = 0.5.
These inferences do not manifest in the human protocol because they are only
implicit in the inferences reported. For example, the inference `Ivan shot an arrow
at him [the giant] and tried to kill him' does not explicitly mark the relation Ivan's
goal to kill the giant motivated his shooting the arrow; However, causal relations are
represented in Trabasso and Magliano's causal network for the story, which I used
as another source for IDC's schemas (see gure 7.2).
Comparisons Between the Human Protocol and IDC's
Is there any meaningful correspondence between IDC's protocol and the human protocol,
in terms of the time course of comprehension? By comparing the observations in IDC's
text with the sentences in the English text, one can divide the propositions into groups,
each of which corresponds to a sentence in the English text. For example, the rst three
statements in IDC's text can be mapped to the English text as follows:
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habit(great warrior, [exp:ivan]) = S1.`Ivan was a great warrior.'
habit(best archer, [exp:ivan, loc in:village]) = S2.`Ivan was the best archer'
habit(live, [exp:ivan, loc in:village]) = S2.`in his village.'
It is then possible to determine how IDC's inferences correspond to sentences in the
text, and compare this with inferences in the human protocol, as shown in table 7.4 (next
page). In the interests of clarity, the human clauses shown in the table are paraphrases
of the actual clauses from the protocol; I have also ignored paraphrases in the human
protocol and only included associations, explanations, and predictions (paraphrases are
simply repetitions of information in the text and not generated as inferences).
The various problems described earlier in this section mean that there is not a close
correspondence between the output produced by IDC and by the human comprehender.
The central diÆculty is in translating the ad-hoc protocol presented by Trabasso and
Magliano into a machine-readable form. As a rough and generous estimate, IDC makes
inferences which correspond with those of the human comprehender 40% of the time. For
the other 60% of the time, IDC's inferences either have no counterpart in the human
protocol, or have a counterpart which occurs earlier or later in the human protocol.
7.2.3 General Discussion
The monitoring and control of incoherence in IDC generates inference protocols which
bear some resemblance to those of a human comprehender. The important feature of
the human protocol is how inferences are made on-line to integrate the most-recently
comprehended sentence with the evolving representation. Once suÆcient coherence is
established, comprehension continues. This pattern seems to correspond with the idea
of establishing causal suÆciency suggested by van den Broek and colleagues (see sec-
tion 5.2.4). The protocol seems to support their idea of suÆcient causal explanation: an
observation is processed until suÆcient causal explanation has been established, then the
next sentence is read. Predictive inferences are explained as follows: `If the information
in the prior text is highly suÆcient for a consequence, then a specic inference is made.'
[van den Broek et al., 1995]. In other words, if the text strongly suggests a particular
continuation, that continuation may be inferred.
However, the idea of structural suÆciency embodied in IDC produces a protocol similar
to the human one. In addition, IDC explicitly quanties `coherence need' in terms of
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Sentence Human Inferences IDC Inferences
S1. Ivan is good at ghting. Ivan is a great warrior because he is a good
ghter.
S2. I have an image of a medieval archer. Ivan is an archer.
Ivan's ghts with a bow and arrow. Ivan uses armour, a bow and arrows, because
he is an archer.
Arrows are a kind of weapon.
S3. Because Ivan is an archer he will try to kill the
giant.
Ivan will try to kill the giant to stop the
villagers being frightened.
The giant's terrorising the people constitutes
an attack on the people.
The giant's terrorising the people psychologi-
cally causes Ivan to be angry.
S4. Ivan is getting angry.
The giant's coming physically causes some
hurting event, with the villagers as its patient.
S5. Because Ivan cares about the villagers, he
wants to slay the giant.
The giant's terrorising the people psychologi-
cally causes Ivan's goal to kill him.
The giant's hurting the people psychologically
causes Ivan's goal to kill him.
S6. Ivan is going to try not to be seen.
Ivan is trying to ambush the giant.
The giant's coming to the village enables Ivan's
waiting.
S7. Ivan tried to kill the giant by shooting an arrow
at him.
Ivan's goal to kill the giant motivates his
shooting the giant.
S8. Ivan hopes that the giant is dead.
Shooting the giant physically causes hitting
him.
Ivan killed the giant by shooting him and
hitting him.
S9. The people were happy because the giant died.
The people were happy because they were no
longer frightened.
The people celebrated because they were
happy.
Table 7.4: Comparison of human and IDC protocols
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minimisation of incoherence, with respect to Tolerance and Skepticism, as follows:
1. The number and type of known representations which could explain/elaborate an
r-elt (i.e. absolute incoherence);
2. How thoroughly the comprehender requires those representations to be explicated
(i.e. Skepticism);
3. How much pressure is placed on the short-term store by r-elts currently maintained
(i.e. Tolerance).
Of course, this does not prove that the human comprehender produced their protocol
via the same or similar mechanisms (birds and planes both y, but employ radically
dierent mechanisms). I'm not claiming that human comprehenders explicitly employ
incoherence criteria, merely that they are aware of the structural potential of the texts
they are comprehending and attempt to make eective use of this potential. This diers
from most previous models of coherence, where it is assumed that structure is added to
the representation by inference; instead, I am claiming that structure is automatically
inherent in the interaction between the text and a particular comprehension context. The
comprehender's goal is not to establish structure, but to dismiss irrelevant structures and
maintain relevant ones.
The distinction I'm making is subtle, but allows one to make sense (in the abstract)
of ideas like `causal suÆciency', `standards for coherence' [van den Broek et al., 1995],
`requirements for understanding', and `satisfaction of reader goals' [Graesser et al., 1994].
Without recognising their possible representations for a text, how can a comprehender
decide when their representation is adequate? (see section 5.2.4). For example, how could
a comprehender judge whether they had established suÆcient causes for an eventuality,
without knowing the range of causes available? As an analogy, consider quality control in
a factory which produces `widgets': without knowing the components which go together
to make a widget, how could the quality controller know whether a widget was defective
or not? Choosing one or more representations relies on a similar acknowledgement of the
space of possibilities.
How would one demonstrate that human comprehension involves `monitoring the pos-
sible representations space' rather than `nding connections'? Supercially, as discussed
above, the results/outputs of the two processes may be very similar, as incoherence and
coherence are two sides of the same coin (see section 134). This means that distinguishing
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incoherence-minimising from coherence-seeking may be diÆcult on the basis of outputs
alone. Another problem is that IDC only models a fragment of the complete comprehen-
sion process: it is possible that comprehension of unusual texts relies on far more creative
methods.
However, an interesting possibility suggested by IDC is that commonplace eventualities
do not engender signicant explanatory inferences, while the interaction between common-
place and less-common eventualities does.
2
This is because commonplace eventualities
occur in many schemas, and so do not readily discriminate between them; IDC is thus
reticent to actualise one of the potential explanations. But, in tandem with a more
discriminating eventuality, a commonplace eventuality provides many opportunities for
building structure into the representation. As a consequence, IDC tends to avoid making
inferences on the basis of instances of the commonplace node, but quickly makes inferences
where they occur in the company of discriminating instances.
As an example, consider the following texts:
Text 1
1a. John entered a building.
1b. He went to the counter.
Text 2
2a. John entered a bank.
2b. He went to the counter.
Given text 1, it is unlikely that a comprehender would make signicant inferences from
sentence 1a alone. It is possible that some inferences would be generated after 1b, but
I'd expect their quantity and specicity to be lower than those produced by text 2. Text
2 should produce more inferences on the basis of the sentence 2a, as the specicity of the
building involved is much greater. Sentence 2b should also be easily processed, as it can
be readily incorporated into a representation based on a `bank visit' schema. In addition,
one would expect this sentence to be processed relatively more quickly (with respect to
sentence 2a) than sentence 1b (with respect to sentence 1a).
3
2
Here, I intend `commonplace' to mean nodes which have many possible explanations, and thus high
ubiquity (e.g. go events).
3
Of course, Skepticism may allow generation of inferences on the basis of a commonplace eventuality
alone. For example, with a low enough Skepticism, the statement `John entered a building' may trigger
a large number of explanatory inferences (see next section for more details).
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Coherence theories cannot adequately account for comprehension time dierences in
the above types of circumstance. While these theories could be used to make similar
predictions by invoking ideas of global coherence, availability of schemas and so forth,
they have never satisfactorily dened why/whether general texts should produce fewer
inferences than more specic ones; in particular, there are no computational theories in
this vein. Many coherence theories based on referential and/or causal connectivity would
fail to distinguish between the above texts, treating them as equally coherent. In each text,
both sentences can be connected causally, for example by an enables relation (entering
the building/bank enables John to go to the counter) (see section 7.2.1). They thus seem
to be equally coherent in the sense of allowing an equal number of direct causal relations.
However, it is still possible that they are not equally coherent in other ways: for
example, the strength of the causal relation may be greater in text 2, as the fact that
John enters a bank, rather than an arbitrary type of building, increases the likelihood of
his going to some counter. According to van den Broek's equation for causal strength,
the greater the suÆciency of a cause for its eect, the greater the causal strength between
them [van den Broek, 1990a]. This suggests that van den Broek is echoing the view that
coherence is tied to probability, following the lead of work such as [Smolensky, 1986] and
[Thagard, inpr]. A problem here is denoting what the probabilities represent: as I argued
earlier, the only way in which probabilities can make sense is with respect to the knowledge
base (see section 5.3 on page 94).
Coherence is often equated with how well-connected elements of a representation
are, but texts 1 and 2 hint that connectivity must be determined with respect to a
knowledge base. There has been little previous work on the processing load induced
by `number of alternative representations'. One notable exception is the work of Sanford
and Garrod, some of whose work is similar to (and has inuenced) my incoherence theory
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981]. In their 1981 book, they examine anaphora in discourse,
stating that each term which introduces a new entity into a discourse also `opens up [...]
a range of potential anaphors' (ibid.). Depending on the specicity of the term, the range
of potential anaphors may be wide (e.g. `vehicle') or narrow (e.g. `tank'). Given some
subsequent, coreferential information, the time taken to integrate this information varies
with the number of potential anaphors introduced by the preceding term: for example,
if the word `tank' is followed by the word `vehicle', integration occurs more quickly than
when `vehicle' is followed by `tank'. The incoherence theory I have developed in this thesis
provides a computational slant on this idea, focused at the level of integrating eventualities
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into plan and goal structures rather than resolution of anaphors.
In the next section, I discuss another aspect of IDC's behaviour: maintenance of
multiple representations and representation revision.
7.3 Accounting for `Role-Shift' Texts
My work describes how a comprehender's interpretation may be changed in response to
new information. Although my original ideas didn't mention belief revision, I eventually
realised that this was my principle concern: deciding when to create a new interpretation,
and as a consequence delete all or some of a previous representation, according to the
information available at a given point in time.
A similar process occurs in sentence-level comprehension, when so-called garden path
sentences cause globally-incorrect interpretations to be constructed based on incomplete
information. A famous example:
The horse raced past the barn fell. [Crain and Steedman, 1985]
The syntactic processor may create a parse of the rst part of this sentence, The horse
raced past the barn, which treats The horse as the subject of the sentence, raced as the
main verb, and past the barn as a prepositional phrase, with the barn as the sentence's
object.
4
However, on reaching the end of the sentence, the reader has to `undo' their
interpretation, now treating fell as the main verb of the sentence.
In some garden path sentences, pragmatic information (e.g. world knowledge) allows
discrimination between competing interpretations. However, garden-path-like eects can
also occur at this pragmatic level. While the sentences of a text may be locally unam-
biguous, a text as a whole may encourage local interpretations which later turn out to be
incorrect. By analogy with the syntactic eect, I call these pragmatic garden path texts.
One example of pragmatic garden paths involves role-shifts
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981]. In such stories, `garden-path'-like eects are experienced by
comprehenders: they make default inferences about the roles of the characters in the
story, which later turn out to be incorrect and have to be retracted. One famous example
(adapted from (ibid.)) is:
4
Various explanations of how this occurs have been put forward, such as attachment preferences
[Frazier and Fodor, 1978] and parser heuristics [Pereira, 1985].
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John was on his way to school.
He was worried about the maths lesson.
Last week he lost control of the class.
It was unfair of the maths teacher to leave him in charge.
After all, teaching wasn't part of a janitor's duties.
In this story, sentences 1 and 2 encourage the explanation that John is a schoolchild,
worried about a maths lesson.
Sentence 3 undoes the initial explanation: as John lost control of the class, he must
have been in control of the class; normally, teachers are in control of a class, not schoolchil-
dren; therefore, John must be a schoolteacher. His worry can then be explained retro-
spectively in terms of his fear of failure as a teacher.
Sentence 4 again upsets this explanation: John isn't a teacher, but someone unfairly
left in charge of the class. The previous explanation, that John is a schoolchild, may be
reactivated: schoolchildren may be left in charge of a class. The worry may again be
re-interpreted, as worry about the responsibility of being in charge of a class, and losing
control again.
Sentence 5 leaves some parts of the representation in place: John was still left in charge
of the class, but is no longer a schoolchild - instead, he is denitely a janitor. By a stretch
of the imagination, a janitor may be left in charge of a class, though this is unlikely.
This seems to intuitively reect a normal comprehender's behaviour when presented
with this text. In the next section, I compare IDC's behaviour with this intuitive
description.
7.3.1 Revision of Representations
This section describes IDC's behaviour when presented with the `Janitor Text' of the pre-
vious section and demonstrates how explanations are revised as comprehension proceeds.
Each of the tables below shows results for a particular class of inferences. The numbers
represent the processing cycle when an inference was rst made, and the processing cycle
when it was retracted in response to a new tree. Retractions occur when a new tree
causes a previous one to become redundant or spurious, as discussed on page 149. The
resulting behaviour is akin to syntactic garden-path eects at the level of plan/motivation
recognition.
The results are shown for three dierent settings of Skepticism. In all cases, Tolerance
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= 5.267 and Range = -1; on each run, IDC maintained a single representation throughout
and had to revise this representation to account for new observations. The behaviour un-
der these conditions diers from behaviour where multiple representations are maintained,
as described in section 7.3.2.
Inference Skept Skept Skept
= 0.1 = 0.5 = 0.9
John is a schoolchild going to school to learn. 3 3 3
Retracted 17 34 33
John is a teacher going to school to teach. 17 n/a n/a
Retracted n/a n/a n/a
John is a janitor going to school to earn a living. n/a 34 33
Retracted n/a n/a n/a
Table 7.5: Inferences about John's reason for going to school
The inferences in table 7.5 are based around the observation of John on his way to
school. IDC has three schemas which explain people going to school (others are obviously
possible). Initially, there is equal evidence to support all three; the schoolchild explanation
is selected (as it is the rst schema matched, and the schemas are ordered so that the
most used will be matched rst). In the multiple representations condition, one or both
of the alternatives may be explicitly represented (see next section).
Once IDC infers that John is a teacher (see next table), the inference that he is
a schoolchild becomes unnecessary to explain him being on his way to school - the
information that he is a teacher (supported by his worry about professional failure)
is used in two separate trees, enhancing connectivity and lowering incoherence. This
demonstrates how changes to trees can have a knock-on eect, causing the removal of
seemingly unrelated trees.
However, note that in the Skepticism = 0.1 case, the inference that John is going
to school to work as a janitor is not made, even though the text explicitly states that
John is a janitor. Here, IDC's lack of a consistency checking mechanism is demonstrated,
as John is assigned two roles, one as a teacher and one as a janitor. In the other two
cases (Skepticism = 0.5, Skepticism = 0.9), no inference is made about John's status as
a teacher, but the inference about him going to school to work as a janitor is made. The
reasons for this are complex but chiey due to maintenance of single, rather than multiple,
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representations. This important point is discussed in more detail in the next section.
Inference Skept Skept Skept
= 0.1 = 0.5 = 0.9
John is afraid of a test during the lesson. 6 n/a n/a
Retracted 15 n/a n/a
John is afraid of failing as a teacher. 15 n/a n/a
Retracted 29 n/a n/a
John is a replacement teacher and is afraid
of losing control of the class. 29 25 24
Retracted n/a n/a n/a
Table 7.6: Inferred explanations for John's worry
The interesting feature of table 7.6 is the relationship between Skepticism and the
speed with which conclusions are reached. For example, the explanations that John is
afraid of a test and that he is afraid of failing as a teacher are never generated when Skept
= 0.5 or 0.9; however, the explanation that he is a replacement teacher who can't control
the class is made earlier in these cases than in the Skepticism = 0.1 cases, mainly because
incorrect inferences are not made which must be retracted.
Lower Skepticism causes IDC to `jump to conclusions', which later may turn out to
be incorrect; lower Skepticism also causes IDC to make more predictive inferences than
high Skepticism. However, the higher Skepticism cases seem cognitively unrealistic as
IDC comprehends the majority of the text before making any inferences at all.
Inference Skept Skept Skept
= 0.1 = 0.5 = 0.9
The maths lesson m1 is a kind of lesson. 8 10 n/a
The maths lesson m2 is a kind of lesson. 23 26 27
John is a janitor who has been drafted in
as a replacement teacher. 33 35 32
Table 7.7: Auxiliary inferences which contribute to explanations
The nal row of table 7.7 is the most interesting, as it shows how the Skepticism = 0.1
comprehender makes the connection between John being a janitor and being a replacement
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teacher, while not retracting the inference that John is a teacher (see table 7.5). The latter
inference is retracted in the other two cases, as the higher Skepticism comprehenders
revise their explanation of John's going to school which results in removal of the instance
corresponding to `John is a teacher'.
The result of retaining this instance in the Skepticism = 0.1 case is that John is rep-
resented both as a janitor and a teacher. This intuitively seems like a contradictory state
of aairs for a human comprehender. However, it may shed some light on inconsistency
of representations in human comprehenders (see page 124).
Inference Skept Skept Skept
= 0.1 = 0.5 = 0.9
John is a child because he is a schoolchild. 9 4 4
The teacher t goes to school to teach. n/a 24 22
The teacher t is an adult. n/a 23 23
John attends the school because he is a janitor. 30 n/a n/a
John is an adult. 16 n/a n/a
Table 7.8: Irrelevant/elaborative inferences
Table 7.8 shows that some elaborative inferences (i.e. inferences which don't tie observa-
tions together) were made under all Skepticism conditions. A point of interest is how the
higher Skepticism settings require elaboration of the representation of the teacher t, as
teacher instances have several potential elaborations which are not specied in the text.
In this case, the inferences are made to `specify' the details of the instance. In the lower
Skepticism setting, this is not required, as the potential elaborations are more readily
discounted.
7.3.2 Multiple Representations
The results of the previous section show how IDC behaves when maintaining a single
representation. One central feature of this behaviour is IDC's concentration on localised
inferences. If a new piece of information requires extensive revision of the representation
in both the STS and the LTS, IDC may not make all the necessary revisions. This is the
case where Skepticism = 0.5: this setting causes IDC to miss the inference that John is
afraid of professional failure as a teacher (see table 7.6 on page 186).
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However, if Range is adjusted (e.g. to 1) to allow multiple representations to be
maintained, this inference is made. The reason for this is that maintenance of multiple
representations gives greater scope for the integration of new observations as there are
more possible attachment points for them. The result is that the inference about John's
fear of professional failure is made in cycle 14 (note that the inference that he is worried
about a test is still not made) and retracted in cycle 24.
More accurately, the reason for this inference being made when Range = 1
and not made when Range = -1 is because of the limitations of gradient search
[Rich and Knight, 1991]. In this kind of search, all possible extensions to the current
problem state are generated, then the best of the new states selected as the new problem
state (c.f. IDC's behaviour when Range = -1). The problem with this type of search is
that it can settle on local maxima: states which are optimal locally (i.e. where there is no
better state within one `move') but which are are not globally optimal.
As an alternative, Range can be set to zero or greater, making IDC engage in beam
search. This means that it potentially maintains multiple states (representations) on
each cycle (depending on their divergence, as described in section 6.4.2). When new
information is observed, it can be added to each of the current representations; hopefully,
it will then be an easy matter to nd a connection between the new observation and one
of the existing representations. (Of course, beam search is not infallible, and it is often
the case that IDC misses `correct' representations.)
Returning to the example above (making the `fear of professional failure' inference),
the progress of IDC's interpretation when Range = 1 proceeds as shown in gure 7.2 on
page 189. It is important to note that the diagram only shows inferences about John's
role (schoolchild, teacher, janitor) and the reasons for his worry about the lesson (fear
of professional failure, fear of losing control again). The arrows show the progress of
comprehension; where there are multiple arrows leaving a cycle, this indicates a point
where multiple representations are either derived or maintained. Where multiple repre-
sentations are shown for a cycle, their quality (as determined by the incoherence metric)
decreases from left to right: the left-most representation has the lowest incoherence and
the highest quality, while the right-most representation has the greatest incoherence and
lowest quality.
As can be seen from the diagram, three representations are initially generated, each
of which assigns a dierent role to John (in the Range = -1 case, only the representation
where John is a schoolchild is maintained). When the next two observations are processed,
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inferred: John is
schoolchild
inferred: John is
a janitor
inferred: John is
a teacher
inferred: John is afraid
John is a teacher
of professional failure
John is a teacher
inferred: John is a replacement
teacher; he is afraid of losing
control of the class again of professional failure
he is afraid
John is a teacher;
John is a replacement teacher;
he is afraid of losing control of the class again
inferred: John is a replacement teacher
because he is a janitor
Observations Inferred r-elts Retained r-elts
observed: ‘John was on his way to school.’
observed: ‘He was worried about the maths lesson.’
observed: ‘Last week he had lost control of the class.’
observed: ‘It was unfair of the teacher to put him in charge.’
observed: ‘After all, he was only a janitor.’
Figure 7.2: Multiple representations of the Janitor Story (Skepticism = 0.5, Range = 1)
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it is a small step from the representation where John is a teacher to the representation
where he is afraid of professional failure. However, an inference which increases incoher-
ence is required to get from either of the other two representations to the `professional
failure' representation. As IDC inhibits inferences which create a positive change in
incoherence (see section 6.4.1), it is unable to make either of these leaps. Range thus
plays an important role in which representations are generated, especially in situations
where there are several competing representations.
7.3.3 Implications for Human Comprehension?
In the two previous sections, I showed IDC's behaviour when maintaining a single vs.
multiple representations. The important dierences between the two cases are:
 The multiple representation case (i.e. Range is not equal to -1) requires greater
storage capacity when a text prompts alternative representations (for example, the
role-shift stories prompt multiple representations as they are ambiguous as to the
role of the main character). Of course, storage capacity required is only greater
if maintaining many elements in the STS requires greater storage capacity than
maintaining fewer elements: hopefully, this is an uncontroversial point.
In general, this may cause the multiple representations comprehender to store al-
ternatives for unambiguous texts as well as ambiguous ones, which may lead to
ineÆciencies and longer reading times. But, in cases where a text strongly suggests a
single representation, the multiple representations comprehender may only maintain
a single representation anyway.
 Maintenance of multiple representations provides more possibilities for attaching
new observations to a representation (as there are more representations available).
Opportunities for integration may be missed in the single representation case due
to excessive distance from the current representation to a representation which can
incorporate an observation (see the comments on gradient search in the previous
section).
I have tested these predictions by comparing IDC's data for role-shift and non-role-
shift text comprehension to human data. Human data for these texts concentrates on the
reading time for sentences where the role-shift actually occurs [Sanford and Garrod, 1981].
For example, Sanford and Garrod asked readers to produce continuations of the sentence
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`John was on his way to school'; they found that those readers who mentioned John's
role `indicated that he was being thought of as a schoolboy' (ibid.). They then used this
information to produce two versions of a variant of the Janitor Text to ascertain the time
advantage for non-role-shift texts over role-shift texts:
1. Non-role-shift (John is assumed to be a teacher throughout comprehen-
sion)
1a. John was worried about teaching maths.
1b. He was on his way to school.
1c. Last week he lost control of the class.
2. Role-shift (from ambiguous role in rst sentence to `teacher' role in nal
sentence)
2a. John was on his way to school.
2b. He was worried about the maths lesson.
2c. Last week he lost control of the class. [Sanford and Garrod, 1981]
Their hypothesis is that when role changes occur (e.g. in sentence 2c), comprehension
time for that sentence is increased (ibid.). This is due to the need for mental reorganisa-
tion, as the assignment of a schoolboy role to John is found to be incorrect and must be
revised (e.g. by assigning John the role `teacher'). They found that the reading time for
sentence 2c was 10% greater than that for 1c, indicating that extra `work' was required for
revision of the representation and supporting their idea that representations are produced
very rapidly, even for short texts.
The Time-Course of (Non-)Role-Shift Text Comprehension
What can IDC tell us about representation revision of the sort described above? One
problem in answering this question is the diÆculty of precisely aligning human reading
times with IDC's comprehension cycles. Unlike models which limit the work done on each
cycle (e.g. Just and Carpenter's CAPs model [Just and Carpenter, 1992]), IDC cannot
be directly compared with measures such as gaze duration [Thibadeau et al., 1982] as its
cycles are not limited in the amount of work they can do. However, it is possible to look
at IDC's protocols on dierent texts, under dierent Range conditions (i.e. maintaining
single or multiple representations), and use these to determine the amount of time that
IDC spent comprehending the individual sentences of the two texts. Unlike Sanford and
Chapter 7. Examples of IDC's Behaviour 192
Garrod's data, this data is based on the relative amounts of time spent on all of the
sentences of a text; it thus suggests the kinds of results which may be expected if factors
such as Range and Skepticism are manipulated in human comprehenders, as described
in section 7.3.4; it does not predict the precise amount of time (e.g. in seconds) that
comprehenders will spend on individual sentences.
I produced some IDC protocols and calculated the length of time IDC spent on
comprehension of sentences in the two texts (role-shift and non-role-shift) as follows:
1. I ran IDC twice on each of the two texts, for a total of 8 runs, with the following
parameters:
(a) Text = 1, Skepticism = 0.1, Range = -1 (single representation)
(b) Text = 1, Skepticism = 0.1, Range = 1 (multiple representations)
(c) Text = 1, Skepticism = 0.5, Range = -1 (single representation)
(d) Text = 1, Skepticism = 0.5, Range = 1 (multiple representations)
(e) Text = 2, Skepticism = 0.1, Range = -1 (single representation)
(f) Text = 2, Skepticism = 0.1, Range = 1 (multiple representations)
(g) Text = 2, Skepticism = 0.5, Range = -1 (single representation)
(h) Text = 2, Skepticism = 0.5, Range = 1 (multiple representations)
In all cases, Tolerance was set at 2.
2. For each run, IDC calculates a load for each cycle. Load is equal to the incoherence
of the unique r-elts across all representations maintained on a cycle; it is thus a
measure of the total storage cost for the interpretation, or the amount of working
memory resources required to maintain the interpretation.
I used the total load for the whole run divided by the number of cycles in the run
to give average load per cycle, A.
3. The time spent on each cycle (T ) was calculated using A and the load for that cycle
(L):
T =
L
A
(7.1)
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4. The cycles in each run were then split depending on the sentence to which they
applied. The rst step was to decide which observations in the input belonged to
which sentence of the text, e.g. for text 1 (sentences 1a to 1c):
1a. = event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m1]),
habit(teacher, [exp:john]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m1]).
1b. = event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s]),
habit(school, [exp:s]),
relation(precedes, [e2,e1]).
1c. = event(e3, lost control, [agt:john, pat:m2]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m2]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e1]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e2]).
For each run, I used these groupings to split the cycles into groups, with each group
representing the set of cycles during which a single sentence was being compre-
hended. I did this by marking the output from each run: cycles occurring from
the rst observation of a sentence S
i
to the rst observation of sentence S
i+1
were
treated as relating to sentence S
i
.
5. Given the cycles relating to each sentence, it is possible to calculate the total load
experienced during comprehension of that sentence.
The result of these calculations is a list of three numbers for each run, describing the
relative load during comprehension of each sentence of a text. For example, the loads for
each sentence of text 1 when Skepticism = 0.1 and Range = 1 are:
1a. 4.708
1b. 8.905
1c. 9.387
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 (on the next page) show the relative times spent by IDC on each of
the sentences of the non-role-shift (text 1) and role-shift (text 2) texts respectively; in
all four cases, Skepticism = 0.5. In each diagram, the results for a single representation
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(Range = -1) version of IDC and a multiple representations (Range = 1) version are
shown: the single representation comprehender with Skepticism = 0.5 is denoted C
0:5
s
and
the multiple representation comprehender with Skepticism = 0.5 C
0:5
m
.
The graphs have some interesting features:
 In gure 7.3, C
0:5
m
spends more time on sentence 1a than C
0:5
s
. However, C
0:5
m
spends relatively less time on comprehending the next two sentences. This is because
C
0:5
m
's comprehension of the rst sentence makes several alternative representations
available for when the second sentence is comprehended; the observations of those
sentences are thus `slotted' into whichever representation best accommodates them,
and other representations may be discounted. Although there are no striking am-
biguities, as there are in the role-shift text, there is still potential for alternative
representations, e.g. alternative elaborations.
 In gure 7.4, the time spent on the second sentence by C
0:5
m
is greater than that of
C
0:5
s
. The reason for this is that C
0:5
m
maintains several explanations for why John
might be worried about the maths lesson, e.g. he is a teacher worried about failing
professionally or a schoolchild worried about a test. However, by the third sentence,
the information that John lost control of the class in the previous week causes these
multiple representations to be collapsed to a single representation, that John is a
teacher afraid of failing professionally. C
0:5
s
, meanwhile, ignores the new information
and retains the `John is a schoolboy' representation due to the myopia I described
in section 7.3.2: it is unable to integrate the information that John is worried about
the lesson, and as a result has to maintain isolated information, creating a higher
overall load and longer reading time.
If Skepticism is lowered to 0.1, the results are slightly dierent but in some respects
more striking. These are shown in gures 7.5 and 7.6; the single representation com-
prehender is denoted C
0:1
s
and the multiple representations comprehender C
0:1
m
. Some
comments on these graphs:
 C
0:1
s
does not suer the myopia of C
0:5
s
(see previous bullet points): it is able to
integrate the observation `John lost control of the class in the previous week' as the
lower Skepticism allows it to pass the local maximum. As a result, C
0:1
m
does not
gain an advantage on this text and spends more time on comprehending it. This
reects the prediction made in section 7.3.3, that comprehenders who maintain
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Figure 7.3: Relative time spent on sentences of the non-role-shift-text (text 1), Skepticism
= 0.5
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Figure 7.4: Relative time spent on sentences of the role-shift-text (text 2), Skepticism =
0.5
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Figure 7.5: Relative time spent on sentences of the non-role-shift-text (text 1), Skepticism
= 0.1
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Figure 7.6: Relative time spent on sentences of the role-shift-text (text 2), Skepticism =
0.1
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multiple representations are disadvantaged on unambiguous texts. This eect does
not manifest itself when Skepticism = 0.5, as most potential representations are
immediately discarded, being too incoherent for serious consideration.
 C
0:1
s
and C
0:1
m
spend more time on the role shift text than C
0:5
s
and C
0:5
m
. This is
because the lower Skepticism allows more unnecessary inferences to be made and re-
quires more revision when new information becomes available. However, C
0:1
m
spends
less time on sentence 2c than C
0:1
s
; again, the availability of multiple `attachment
points' (in various representations) results in more eort being expended on sentence
2b.
7.3.4 General Discussion
These results demonstrate the complexity of comprehension and the myriad factors which
inuence the length of time taken to comprehend a given sentence. To summarise:
 Interactions between Skepticism and the number of representations maintained can
complicate the reading time data, for example where maintenance of a single repre-
sentation results in inferential myopia.
 If multiple representations are maintained, reading time for the third sentence of the
role-shift text is lower than that for the second sentence. In the single representation
case, reading time for the third sentence is higher than for the second sentence.
 At low Skepticism values, the reading times for role-shift texts are higher than
those for non-role-shift texts, due to the need to revise representations. At higher
Skepticism values, there is a tendency for reading times to `level out', as there is
less of a tendency to make early inferences which later require correction.
While these are only tentative conclusions, they present some interesting avenues
for experiments involving human subjects. The important factors inuencing reading
time in IDC are Range and Skepticism, both of which could be manipulated in human
comprehenders. I have so far dened both of these parameters as aspects of the central
executive (see sections 6.4.3 and 5.3.6 respectively). Is there any reason to believe these
parameters are separable in human comprehenders?
As I've stated earlier, Range monitors the quality of the whole interpretation: it deter-
mines whether alternatives to the least incoherent representation should remain as part
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of the interpretation. Skepticism is responsible for monitoring the quality of individual
representations: it determines whether individual inferences should be made within a given
representation. In previous psychological accounts of strategic control of comprehension
(though they are few in number), these ideas (interpretation monitoring vs. representa-
tion/inference monitoring) have rarely been considered together. The issue of multiple rep-
resentations is not seen as important in accounts of interpretation revision: the emphasis
has been on revision of a single representation, rather than switching between alternative
ones (e.g. [Johnson and Seifert, 1999], [van Oostendorp and Bonebakker, 1999]). Where
switching is considered (e.g. [Gernsbacher et al., 1990]), switches go from a current
representation to a new one. At the same time, psychological accounts of inferential control
rarely mention the possibility of inferences occurring at dierential rates, dependent on a
Skepticism-like parameter (with the exception of [van den Broek et al., 1995]). Instead,
there is a focus on particular types of goals which may drive comprehension, such as goals
engendered by reading literature [Graesser et al., 1994] or goals to maintain a certain class
of coherence structure (e.g. superordinate goals [Long et al., 1996]).
As a consequence of the failure to consider strategic monitoring of coherence, both
types of account are missing a description of its underlying `abstract' mechanisms. These
mechanisms can be thought of as the machinery which is employed while processing
particular types of goal; for example, both `literary' goals and `news' comprehension goals
may be implemented by running a single `thresholding machine' [Zwaan, 1996].
In IDC, the Skepticism and Range parameters play the role of these abstract mech-
anisms. To determine whether they bear any resemblance to the underlying machinery
in human comprehenders, it is necessary to speculate on what could aect one parameter
while leaving the other intact; or, from another perspective, how one parameter could be
manipulated without altering the other. This would then demonstrate that Skepticism
and Range are separable, and thus add weight to my previous suggestions about how these
factors aect human comprehension (i.e. how they control the generation of inferences
and maintenance of alternative representations). It may also shed some light on various
processing disorders, as described in section 8.3.2.
Because it is diÆcult to get at these abstract mechanisms directly, the only way to
access them is by changing the comprehender's goals. Two techniques for manipulating
Skepticism and Tolerance are given below:
 Skepticism: change the comprehender's goals by giving instructions to be more
or less imaginative/fanciful in making inferences. As Skepticism represents the
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comprehender's caution in jumping to conclusions, one possibility would be to
change the reading situation between groups of subjects. For example, both groups
could be presented with a text, with one group being told the text is a news story
(high Skepticism) and another told the text is a piece of ction (low Skepticism)
[Zwaan, 1996].
 Range: change the comprehender's goals to encourage more or less alternatives to
be maintained. One possibility would be to encourage fast, skim-comprehension
in one group of subjects, and more leisurely, studied comprehension in the other.
As maintenance of multiple representations requires more eort, the pressure to
comprehend at a particular rate should inuence the amount of time available for
generating alternative representations; in the skim-comprehension condition, the
pressure would hopefully force maintenance of a single, most-coherent representa-
tion.
An alternative piece of evidence which may strengthen the argument for a separate
Range parameter can be found in research on children's recognition of alterna-
tive interpretations of texts. Bonitatibus and Beal found that older children were
more likely to report multiple interpretations of a text than were younger children
[Bonitatibus and Beal, 1996].
5
However, in both the younger and older children,
the interpretation formed is `complete' in that it provides a reasonable account of
the text's events. This suggests that older children have a greater Range than the
younger children, while both could have equivalent Skepticism. Another interesting
point is that younger children are less able to repair interpretations in the face of
conicting information: perhaps they are suering from `inferential myopia', caused
by their inability to maintain multiple representations during comprehension (see
section 7.3.3)?
Some evidence which undoes this reading of the results comes from a variant on the
experiment, where children were informed that the text was either a narrative or an
expository text (c.f. previous bullet point). In this case, it was found that both the
younger and older children reported more alternative interpretations. However, in
situations where subjects are asked to report on their understanding it is always
diÆcult to avoid the possibility that the attempt to answer a question causes
construction of an alternative interpretation `on the y', rather than uncovering
5
Interpretation is used here in the common sense of explanation for a story's events.
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a genuine multiplicity of representations. (Below, I suggest some tests for multiple
representations which can be carried out during comprehension.)
The reading times in the various circumstances (produced by varying Range and
Skepticism via goal manipulation, and text type) could be gathered using a technique
such as self-paced reading, where subjects push a button after completing each sentence
[Graesser et al., 1997]. However, this is a primitive technique at best. A technique such
as gaze duration analysis is a more advanced possibility [Thibadeau et al., 1982]. With
this technique, eye movements during comprehension are measured (usually for individual
words); the hypothesis is that the length of time spent processing individual words reects
the cognitive eort spent on processing those words (the `eye-mind' hypothesis (ibid.)).
Individual eye movements for words which trigger role-assignment in the comprehender
(such as `school', `teaching') could be measured to determine the amount of processing
carried out on reading these words. (However, it would be necessary to factor out eects
such as word length, word frequency, etc. [Graesser et al., 1997].) These reading times
could then be compared with IDC's to determine whether the eects mentioned at the
start of this section occur in human comprehenders. For example:
 Does the word `school' engender more processing in the multiple representations
condition than the single representation condition, because multiple roles may be
assigned to John?
 Does the word `worried' engender more processing in the role-shift text (where
John's role is ambiguous) than in the non-role-shift text (where it can only really
be interpreted in the context of John's concern about professional failure)?
 In the multiple representations condition, are reading times for the third sentence
of the role-shift text shorter than reading times for the second sentence?
IDC's reading times suggest positive answers to all of these questions.
A nal point: it is perhaps controversial to claim that comprehenders maintain mul-
tiple representations at all. To support the above experiments, it would be necessary to
determine whether the multiple representations maintained by IDC are in fact mirrored
in human comprehenders; for example, by testing for activation of roles during compre-
hension of role-shift and non-role-shift texts. Otherwise, any similarities between human
reading times and IDC's may be attributable to other eects, such as lexical access, word
familiarity, etc.
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As I showed in section 7.2.2, IDC can be used to give some clues about the time-
course of concept activation. This information could be used alongside expert judgements
to determine where roles (and other concepts) are likely to be active during compre-
hension of the role-shift and non-role-shift texts. The resulting list of potential concept
activations, tied to sentences of a text, could be employed to carry out a lexical decision
task [Long et al., 1990].
6
In this task, a subject is presented with a letter string during
comprehension and required to decide whether the word is a word or a nonword (ibid.).
If a concept is active in memory, judgements about words related to that concept should
be faster than judgements about words not attached to the concept.
To test whether multiple representations are generated during comprehension of the
role-shift (ambiguous) text, the rst step would be to derive a list of letter strings relating
to the roles in the text (e.g. `teacher', `schoolchild', `janitor'). A comprehender would
then be asked to read the text. After reading a particular sentence, they could be probed
with a letter string from the list, such as `teacher'. The time to respond (i.e. to make
a decision about whether the word is a non-word or a word) is then recorded. These
results would have to be compared to those for the non-role-shift text, to ensure that
the text is causing multiple representations to be generated, rather any other factor (such
as the comprehender's world knowledge). For example, concepts hypothesised as being
activated in the role-shift condition but not in the non-role-shift condition could be probed
for during non-role-shift comprehension.
If the decision time for a probe relating to a role is faster than the decision time for
unrelated letter strings and non-words, this is taken as evidence that the role is encoded
into memory at the point when the probe is administered.
The results of these experiments could then give some idea of whether multiple rep-
resentations are indeed maintained by comprehenders who are confronted by ambiguous
texts. It would also be necessary to test for multiple representations under low and
high Range conditions, by manipulating the comprehender's interpretation monitoring
mechanisms (see page 198). Under the low Range condition, IDC predicts that only a
single role is likely to be activated, regardless of the ambiguity of the text; there should
thus only be a decision time advantage for the letter string relating to this role.
It is also important to point out that the explicit multiple representations maintained
by IDC may not be reected in the comprehender's interpretation. For example, if the
representation merely consists of a set of activations across nodes (as in the Construction-
6
This idea was suggested to me by Mark Torrance.
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Integration Model), the results would be the same, without the interpretation being
explicitly divided across representations. The contrast is between the partitioned relations
strategy simulated by IDC (see gure 3.7 on page 48) and the implicit representation of
alternatives in a symbolic-connectionist model (see gure 3.11 on page 57). It is diÆcult to
say how one would test which of the possible ways of maintaining multiple representations
is actually implemented in human comprehenders; the advantage of making maintenance
explicit, as in IDC, is that the instances belonging to each representations can be separated
out from irrelevant ones and reported to the outside world.
7.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I showed how I have experimented with IDC on various types of text
comprehension problem, from pure AI (plan recognition) to psychological (time course of
comprehension):
 Plan Recognition
At the very least, IDC is a reasonable plan recognition program, even though my
emphasis on hesitations and mistakes in comprehension makes quantitative judge-
ments diÆcult. This emphasis is the very feature of IDC which also distinguishes
it from previous research: although some researchers have designed quality metrics,
there have been few who have approached the time course of plan recognition in
this context. IDC demonstrates how decisions about whether to make inferences or
not (`weighing of evidence') can be founded on the notion of incoherence.
 Inference Protocols
IDC shows how inference protocols can be produced using the same incoherence
metric as is used for plan recognition. I feel that this work has been least successful,
as it is diÆcult to tie the output of the program directly to a human protocol. The
reasons behind this are manifold (see section 7.2), including factors such as:
{ DiÆculty in translation from a human protocol to a computable target repre-
sentation (i.e. something for IDC to aim at).
{ Restrictions of the ontology in IDC (e.g. lack of support for modal statements,
primitive temporal representation).
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{ Problems with uncovering the `micro-inferences' which would describe the hu-
man protocol at a ne level of detail.
{ Unpredictable interactions between IDC's parameters which cause inferences
to be generated in the incorrect order or be missed (see section 8.5).
 Role-Shift Comprehension
Some of my most interesting results come from my work on role-shift comprehension.
I have used IDC as the basis for some predictions about text comprehension:
{ The kinds of processing likely to cause diÆculties for the comprehender (e.g.
maintaining single vs. multiple representations, low vs. high Skepticism).
{ Some experiments which could shed light on whether comprehenders maintain
single or multiple representations.
{ How some comprehenders may suer `inferential myopia', where correct infer-
ences are missed because of an inability to maintain `bridging' representations
(bridging representations allow local maxima to be avoided).
In the next chapter, I discuss the more general achievements, problems and conclusions
resulting from my work.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Early chapters described the theoretical basis of the incoherence model and its computa-
tional implementation in IDC. The previous chapter demonstrated how the implementa-
tion could be applied to various issues in text comprehension. In this chapter, I provide
an overview of the work as a whole, emphasising my achievements and the diÆculties
raised by the research.
8.1 Evaluation and Summary of Research
IDC represents one step towards a complete model of text comprehension. It covers only
a fragment of the work required to produce a complete model, something which has not
been satisfactorily achieved by any researcher in this eld. Obvious shortcomings of my
work are its limitations as regards extent of the comprehension processes: for example,
there is no treatment of morphology, syntax, or semantics (in the normal sense of the
term). These are issues which I have deliberately avoided (though, in the rst few months
of the thesis, I was convinced I could tackle all of these and more). Expenditure of more
time on these areas would have resulted in a broad but shallow model, perhaps capable
of supercially understanding stories from English to `representation'; however, there are
dozens of programs with this kind of capability (e.g. [Lehnert et al., 1983], [Ram, 1991],
[Williams, 1992]).
Instead, I chose to carry out a deeper study of a single, relatively muddled and under-
explored area of comprehension: strategic control. Many previous psychological models
avoid this topic, instead concentrating on the relatively automatic, associative-network
style of processing [Kintsch, 1998]. Admittedly, these models work from individual words,
204
Chapter 8. Conclusion 205
rather than an articial, computer-style language as IDC does; in this respect, they are
more `complete' than IDC. On the other hand, these models avoid discussion of strategic
inference.
As a way into the problem, I analysed comprehension systems (both psychological
models and implemented models) in terms of articial intelligence architectures. This
resulted in a partitioning of the problem into several issues:
1. What kinds of semantic representation support comprehension?
2. What kinds of inference process are supported by those semantic representations?
3. What kinds of episodic representation are generated by those inferences?
4. How does a comprehender make decisions about which representations constitute
their nal interpretation?
5. Are there any ways in which the results of these analyses could be slotted into a
computational model?
6. Can the output of such a model be compared with human behaviour in a meaningful
way?
I feel that the work presented in this thesis goes some way towards clarifying is-
sues 1 to 4: few other researchers have even recognised that these are issues. Issue 4
has been particularly neglected. Part of the reason for this oversight is the tendency
to rely on partly `black box' mechanisms, such as relaxation and spreading activation
in symbolic-connectionist networks. Where strategic control is discussed, such as in
[van den Broek et al., 1995] and [Graesser et al., 1994], there is often a diÆcult gap to
bridge between the idea of strategic control and symbolic-connectionism. Work such
as [Cooper and Shallice, 2000] and [Zwaan, 1996], along with implementations such as
WanderECHO [Hoadley et al., 1994], go some way towards addressing these problems,
but there is still much to do. Perhaps it is simply the case that connectionism does not
provide the right level of description for control processes [Eysenck and Keane, 1995].
I feel I have made less headway on issues 5 and 6. Even though IDC does `work', the
results are diÆcult to analyse and there are fundamental problems in the implementation.
As these are the main failings in my work, I describe them in more detail in the next
section.
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8.2 Evaluation of IDC
The theory of incoherence seems to me (intuitively) to be along the right lines. It corre-
sponds with my personal experience of text comprehension and theoretically encapsulates
coherence, while avoiding some problems such as how coherence and other quality metrics
can be integrated. It is at the same time a computational philosophy of comprehen-
sion which has been inuenced by recent work in literary theory (e.g. [Ronen, 1994],
[Ryan, 1985]). Theoretically, at least, it provides a framework for analysis of several
related, `structure-building' tasks.
Simultaneously, there is a chasm between my theory and its computational implemen-
tation. As is often the case, it is diÆcult to create a program which lives up to one's
expectations. Some major problems in the implementation are:
1. Limitations of relations. Because temporal and causal information is treated in the
same manner as categorisation information, certain types of reasoning are impossible
due to IDC's syntax for representing knowledge.
2. Lack of consistency checking.
3. Problems with comprehension management.
4. Problems with the metric.
Each of these areas is described below.
8.2.1 Limitations of Relations
A problem with treating causal relations as schemas is the impossibility of recursive
denitions. IDC's comprehension process is akin to categorisation, and so does not admit
recursive structures: the idea of ubiquity and informativity rests on this. However, in a
general reasoning system, relations of a certain type should be inferable on the basis of
other relationships of the same type. For example, a common form of reasoning utilises
the transitivity of temporal relations such as `before', `after', `during', etc. [Allen, 1984].
This requires rules of the following form:
before(A, B), before(B, C)  ! before(A, C).
Chapter 8. Conclusion 207
In IDC, a schema such as this would break the informativity and ubiquity calculations: to
determine these values for before(A, B) and before(B, C), IDC would have to determine
them for before(A, C) (and vice versa). In one sense, this is because the rules make no
sense in terms of a partonomy (the basis of IDC's schema lattice); if the content of the
rule is changed, this becomes clearer:
sheep(A), sheep(B)  ! sheep(C).
In other words, in IDC's terms the rule denes one category (before) in terms of itself,
which is as ridiculous conceptually as one sheep being composed of two other sheep. The
temporal reasoning rule is not partonomic and so cannot be handled sensibly by IDC.
Another problem with relations is the vague, ad hoc way in which they are handled.
Schemas simply dene causality in terms of the co-occurrence of two eventualities and a
pre-dened temporal relation between them. The temporal relation is not derived by IDC
but supplied in the texts it analyses. A complete system for causal and temporal reasoning
would need to derive temporal relations on the basis of verb tense and aspect, combined
with world knowledge (c.f. [Kamp and Reyle, 1993], [Moens and Steedman, 1988]).
These are major failings of the system; they are also inexcusable in some respects,
as causal and temporal reasoning are central to comprehension [Trabasso et al., 1995].
However, putting them right would require a research project to produce a complete
ontology for both partonomic and temporal reasoning (e.g. something in the style of the
CYC system, which has been in development for 16 years and currently uses 1,000,000
rules [Cycorp, 2000]).
8.2.2 Lack of Consistency Checking
If IDC's Skepticism is set low enough, there is no mechanism which prevents inference of
multiple, possibly competing explanations. Incoherence puts the `brake' on generation of
inferences: so long as an inference lowers incoherence change in the representation as a
whole, there is nothing to prevent that inference being made (assuming that the schema's
constraints have been met, as described in section 6.1.3 on page 138). As a result, IDC
will occasionally produce conicting explanations: for example, a story where John buys
a milkshake in a diner then points a gun at the owner can cause confusion, with both
robbing and restaurant visit plans being inferred.
This problem seems to stem from the lack of a consistency checking mechanism, such
as the one in ACCEL [Ng, 1992]. Such a mechanism would provide a list of `NOGOODS'
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after the fashion of the ATMS (see page 48). Each NOGOOD would specify a set of
instances which are inconsistent and must not co-occur in a representation; any extension
to a representations which included a NOGOOD would immediately be discarded.
While this sounds ne in principle, it is hard to dene a list of NOGOODS which
is broad enough to allow multiple explanations or elaborations whilst simultaneously
excluding inconsistencies. In the example I gave above, is John actually dining in the
restaurant, or robbing it, or doing both? How many of the subevents associated with
restaurant dining would John have to be involved in for restaurant dining to become a
valid inference? On some occasions, someone may enter a diner with the intention of
having a meal then robbing the diner.
Some possible alternative solutions to this problem include:
 The NOGOODS approach, where either restaurant dining or robbing may be in-
ferred, but not both. The choice between the two would have to be based on a
criterion like simplicity (i.e. maintain the simplest explanation and assume the
other one is incorrect).
 The `dierential activation' approach. If using a spreading-activation algorithm,
the alternatives are maintained if neither `falls out' of the representation during
network relaxation. If one explanation is suÆciently more activated than another it
is maintained while the other becomes deactivated.
In the symbolic-connectionist paradigm, there is the suggestion that the best inter-
pretations will result from such processes. However, as I showed in section 4.3.3
(page 77), this is sometimes because legitimate competitors have been pruned from
the competition, by the action of an unseen and undocumented strategic inference
processor: the researcher.
 The `compound schema' approach. A special schema describing robberies involving
decoys could be added to the knowledge base. This would allow both John's buying
the milkshake and pointing the gun to be seen as part of a robbery with decoy plan.
This partially works in IDC, as a tree based on the compound schema will have less
incoherence than two trees based on the restaurant dining and robbing schemas.
The problem here is the combinatorial explosion of the knowledge base. For every
likely combination of schemas, one would require a compound schema (visits to the
restaurant which are also birthday parties, trips to the beach which are also marriage
ceremonies, dinner parties which are also business meetings).
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 A mixture of the above strategies. However, even if one had combined schemas, it
might be the case that prohibition of representations based on a certain combined
schema and a certain simple schema would be required. For example, it would be
necessary to ensure that the robbery with decoy schema and the restaurant dining
schema are never used to create two trees in a single representation. The need for
prohibition may be lessened for models which employ representation quality metrics
such as coherence or simplicity.
This issue is a perennial problem in comprehension systems and not one I have solved.
I have attempted implementations of several of these methods but none have proven
satisfactory.
My own feeling is that explicit negation (NOGOODS) and compound schemas are
unworkable; dierential activation seems to be the best alternative (to a certain extent,
this is the strategy IDC employs anyway).
8.2.3 Problems with Comprehension Management
IDC's comprehension management consists of the `meta-control' processes which guide
construction of the interpretation. Problems with these processes originate primarily
from technical aspects of the implementation, such as how existing trees are replaced by
new ones.
Some comments on technical problems with IDC:
1. Failure to maintain reasonable alternative representations
IDC's interpretation is composed of one or more alternative representations. If the
incoherence of the best representation is above Tolerance, IDC attempts to generate
a tree in each representation which lowers the incoherence of that representation.
The problem here is that representations tend to converge on a single, best repre-
sentation. If a new tree is generated in a representation, older trees may be replaced
where they become unnecessary (see page 149). So, for example, a hypothetical
tree T
1
, initially maintained as an alternative to another tree T
2
and explaining
the same observations but with higher incoherence than T
2
, may be replaced by a
newly-inferred `replica' of T
2
. This is not to say that there will be multiple identical
representations: IDC ensures that duplicates are removed from the interpretation.
However, the diversity of the representations tends to disappear as alternative trees
are displaced by the trees for which they provide alternatives.
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2. IneÆcient use of search
When IDC constructs extensions to a representation R, it nds all possible
extensions which lower the incoherence of R; these extensions are then sorted
and trimmed, as described in section 6.4.2 (page 151). However, this is a source
of ineÆciency: all possible extensions are generated before sorting and trimming
begin. A better policy would be to halt generation of extensions on the basis
of available resources, following the lead of Capacity Constrained Comprehension
[Just and Carpenter, 1992] or WanderECHO [Hoadley et al., 1994]. Using such a
control would prevent construction of extensions once the capacity for the cycle was
`consumed'. While this would in eect act as another kind of `beam search', the
point where control is applied is dierent, corresponding (approximately) to step 4
of gure 2.2 (page 21).
A heuristic based on schema size could be combined with this idea: matches against
the knowledge base could be ranked on the basis of schema size, with smaller schemas
being preferred. Then, schema applications could be applied in order of schema size,
smallest rst, up to the capacity limits suggested in the previous paragraph. This
corresponds to step 3 of gure 2.2 (page 21).
A solution to both problems would be better management of alternative representa-
tions. One possibility would be to allow either multiple representations or deletion of
unnecessary trees. It is clear that these processes are related: deletion of unnecessary
trees in a single representation equates with retracting alternatives in the multiple rep-
resentations case. However, in the current version of IDC, these processes co-exist. I
again feel that a symbolic-connectionist approach may provide answers to this problem:
multiple representations correspond to distribution of activation over nodes representing
alternative `trees', while deletion of unnecessary trees corresponds to deactivation of those
nodes (see section 3.2.5, page 46).
8.2.4 Problems with the Metric
Perhaps the main problems with IDC involve its incoherence metric. As the metric is the
core of my work, these problems are also the most serious.
One particular problem is the general arbitrariness of the metric. I had originally
intended the calculation of informativity and ubiquity to be based on a probabilistic
measure such as entropy, but still derived from the structure of the knowledge base (e.g.
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following the work in [Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1964]). The idea was to determine the utility
of applying a particular schema in terms of how it reduced the entropy of the resulting
representation; entropy would be related to the number of alternative possible extensions
to the representation (ibid.). However, this approach depends on very unwieldy calcula-
tions and requires a denition of what the probabilities actually mean (see section 5.1.5
on page 91).
I then turned to logical methods for determining the utility of applying a schema,
following the work of Appelt on model preference default reasoning [Appelt, 1990]. This
formalism provides the semantics behind cost-based abduction.
1
However, the problem
here was specifying how the comprehender's subjective control mechanisms (which even-
tually became Skepticism, Tolerance and Range) could inuence costs on abductive rules.
The solution on which I eventually settled has little resemblance to any of the pre-
vious comprehension metrics. Incoherence is largely heuristic and incorporates aspects
of coherence, similarity, competition and other metrics in a single measure. As a result
of inventing these concepts virtually from scratch, some of the terminology associated
with the metric is unfortunate, partly for historical reasons and partly due to the lack of a
suitable vocabulary. The philosophy behind the metric also means that the comprehension
process in IDC produces representations which are logically inconsistent, invalid and re-
dundant: because I was interested in how a `lazy' or `poor' comprehender could be realised
computationally, the system has loopholes which can undermine `normal' comprehension.
IDC really needs to be placed on rmer ground to make it computationally sound. I
think the most fruitful direction would be to nd a probabilistic rationale for the idea
of incoherence. I feel the idea of `possible representations' is helpful in this light, tied to
calculation of entropy with respect to a knowledge base. Some work which has already
been carried out in this vein includes [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996] and [Nagao, 1993].
These improvements also need to be tied to a learning mechanism. At present, the
hierarchy of knowledge in IDC is hand-coded; this makes its behaviour unstable and
unpredictable as changes to schemas alter the representations which are derivable and
their quality ratings. The eect is nonmonotonicity in IDC's behaviour: as the rulebase
changes, representations which were previously seen as high quality may be discarded,
while previously poor representations become more acceptable.
To remove these inuences from the incoherence metric and make the schemas more
1
I have not explicitly discussed cost-based abduction, primarily because it has been shown to be a
variant of probabilistic abduction [Charniak and Shimony, 1990].
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`objective', one could write a program which derives the knowledge base automatically,
e.g. from some kind of corpus. This would of course require a suitable corpus; as IDC's
knowledge base is used to make inferences about `meaning', the corpus would also need to
contain this information. One possibility would be to use a corpus of inference protocols
and their associated texts: IDC could derive its rulebase by looking at the frequency
with which a particular inference and a particular text segment co-occur; the resulting
schemas could then be annotated with these frequencies, which could be used in the
entropy calculations mentioned earlier.
There is little current research in this area. The main area of current corpus analysis
research in text comprehension concerns the strength of associations between concepts,
based on Latent Semantic Analysis [Kintsch, 1998]. This technique is being used to derive
associative networks (used by researchers such as Kintsch) which can then be used in
symbolic-connectionist modelling.
8.3 Extensions
I have hinted at some of the more mundane extensions to the model in previous sections:
for example, adding other levels of processing (e.g. syntactic), improving the temporal on-
tology, and adding facilities such as question answering. However, I think these additions
are not particularly interesting.
Instead, I think any future work would rst have to deal with the metric. There is
still much to do here and my formulation is by no means denitive. I describe some ways
to improve the metric in the next section.
A second area where improvements need to be made is in aligning IDC's protocols with
human data. Potentially, analysis of comprehenders suering executive function decits
could clarify the separation of various functions (e.g. whether Skepticism and Tolerance
are really two separate parameters, whether Range is psychologically instantiated). This
topic is covered in section 8.3.2.
8.3.1 Increasing the Formality of the Metric
As I hinted above, it would be interesting to overhaul the whole idea of incoherence using
more formal techniques such as probability and connectionist relaxation algorithms. For
example, the idea of potential representations obviously resembles possible worlds theory
[Nagao, 1993] and model preference default theories [Appelt, 1990].
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A possible technique for revamping the metric would be specifying the probability of a
representation in terms of the probabilities in the space of representations. The probability
that a particular representation is true could be based on frequency of occurrence of
the rules used to construct it (with respect to the knowledge base); this is similar to
my approach, but would require a more formal denition of frequency of occurrence.
For example, this could be based on something as simple as IDC's `number of times an
element occurs as a consequent or antecedent'; or on something more sophisticated, such
as the rmness of rules in [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996]. The latter work ranks each
representation (worlds) on the basis of how many rules tolerate it.
Another approach could use actual protocols to determine the probability that a
particular representation is correct. I envisage a procedure similar to case-based parsing
here, although this is only a tentative suggestion.
8.3.2 Insights from Analysis of Executive Function
Skepticism and Range are two chief modulators of comprehension performance. As
I've already suggested, one can examine how and if similar parameters inuence human
comprehension by examining protocols gathered in varying circumstances.
Another approach may be to attempt to gather protocols from individuals with as-
sumed executive dysfunctions. In particular, individuals on the autistic spectrum and
those with frontal lobe disorders have both been suggested as suering from executive
dysfunction. Thus, it may be fruitful to use these groups as cases for comparison with
IDC. If their protocols are comparable to IDC's, this may give some support to the idea
of `using potential structure'. A corollary of this idea exists in the literature on autism in
the form of the weak drive for central coherence.
In the normal cognitive system there is a built-in propensity to form coherence
over as wide a range of contexts as possible. It is this drive that results in
grand systems of thought, and ultimately in the world's great religions. It is
this capacity for coherence that is diminished in autistic children. [Frith, 1989]
Frith seems to suggest that there is no drive in autistic individuals towards utilisation of
structure. It is not that autism impairs semantic knowledge; some autistic individuals can
have highly developed semantic knowledge bases while lacking the `control mechanisms'
which enable others to apply this knowledge:
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Some individuals with autism possess a large store of information, but
seem to have trouble applying or using this knowledge meaningfully.
[Ozono et al., 1991]
This idea is comparable to aspects of my own model, where a rich knowledge base
may be thwarted by lack of a drive to integrate information, resulting in impoverished
representations. IDC's equivalent of central executive disorder is formed by increasing the
level of Skepticism so that schemas have to be thoroughly instantiated by a text before
an inference is made.
IDC may form the basis of a modularisation of the decits which occur as a result
of central executive dysfunction. For example, is the weak drive for central coherence
really a single `modulator', or are there component processes which together produce this
eect? Is the weak drive the result of a failure to admit inferences (due to an inuence
like Skepticism), or the result of a phenomenon like inferential myopia (see section 7.3.3),
caused by an inability to avoid local maxima? In addition to the model perhaps providing
a framework for analysing executive dysfunction, I think analysis of protocols from such
comprehenders could clarify issues in the model.
The main barrier to an analysis such as the one I've suggested is the failure to
communicate intelligibly which often accompanies central executive dysfunction. I have
not thoroughly examined ways to bypass this problem.
8.4 Achievements
From the beginning of my Ph.D. work I have been interested in the mechanisms which
allow comprehenders to make sense of texts. My focus has always been on the ways
in which representations can be compared with each other: this seems to me to be the
central problem. The complexity of this task is increased when one realises that it occurs
incrementally, based on a fragment of the comprehender's complete representation, and
in the context of a theoretically unbounded inference process.
An early realisation was that metrics could be divided into two camps: those based on
explicit annotation of rules, specifying an ordering on the desirability of their employment;
and implicit measurement of the `structure' and/or `quality' of representations. My aim
was to try to nd a way to bring these two approaches together.
The novel parts of my thesis can be summarised as follows:
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 I have unravelled some of the tangle of previous work, where considerations of
metrics, representations (semantic and episodic) and processes are entangled. This
gives a clearer idea of where eort needs to be directed by future researchers.
 I have designed and implemented a theory of `potential structure'. This shows one
possible method for annotating a knowledge base without reference to the outside
world. There are issues to resolve here: for example, where do schemas come from
in the rst place? Why are schemas organised the way they are?
 I have not sidestepped the (philosophical) issue of why comprehension occurs. My
model uses ideas inuenced by information theory to specify construction of repre-
sentations in terms of `reduction of uncertainty'.
 I have incorporated some psychological data on comprehension into a computational
model and suggested methods for comparing the model with human comprehenders.
A main result of my work is the nding that reliance on the structure of the knowledge
base for rating representations makes a system very fragile and unpredictable. Ng claims
that his system (ACCEL) is resistant to changes to the knowledge base, but this is only
so if the rules are written in a particular way in the rst place. The same is true of many
symbolic-connectionist systems: they only reach the correct conclusions if the networks
are designed correctly.
This is perhaps a slightly negative result, indicating that representation quality metrics
based on the structure of the representation are too arbitrary; once you start looking at
their underpinnings they seem to fall apart.
8.5 Last Words
I think a major criticism of my model may be its separation from `the real world'. As rep-
resentations are accepted/rejected on the basis of other representations (not with reference
to absolute probabilities outside the knowledge base), I may seem to be suggesting that
comprehension is hermetically-sealed. In one sense I am: comprehension is an entirely
subjective activity, governed by the vicissitudes of individual bias, error, ignorance, and
imagination. However, commonalities of experience arise because people develop in a
shared environment; it is the overlap in their experiences which gives rise to similar
schemas, and hence some crossover in their interpretations.
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My model suers from the complexity of the interactions between its parameters: there
are far too many of them, and slight adjustments to any one of them can cause havoc.
However, this perhaps demonstrates that `normal' comprehension exists along a relatively
slim boundary between complete refusal to form representations and wild abandon. If
nothing else, IDC gives an idea of the fragility and complexity of the comprehension
system and its dependence on subjective judgement.
We observe, we regard from one or more points of view, we choose them among
the millions that exist. [Tzara, 1918]
Appendix A
Example of Tree Creation
Important note: the example given in this appendix was generated using IDC's
plan recognition schema set only. Note that the behaviour of the system changes
if the whole schema set is used (see section 7.1.1).
In this appendix I give a more detailed example of IDC's tree creation. The representations
shown are copied from the information produced by IDC during comprehension of a simple
text. The text used is based on one of Ng's and is as follows:
Bill took a bus to a restaurant. [Ng and Mooney, 1992]
IDC's representation of this story consists of ve observations:
event(e1, get on, [agt:jack, loc at:bs, pat:v]),
habit(bus, [exp:v]),
habit(bus station, [exp:bs]),
event(e2, get o, [agt:jack, loc at:r, pat:v]),
habit(restaurant, [exp:r]).
The example below shows the transition from a state where IDC has read the rst four
observations but has not connected them together, to a state where it makes an inference
about John's high-level plan.
The schema used by IDC connects the rst four observations with a go by bus node.
As IDC has a get o and bus instances in focus, it uses this schema to create a new tree
from the bottom-up, as shown in the new representation. Although the inference actually
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increases the incoherence in the STS (as it introduces new r-elts and a new tree), it reduces
the overall incoherence of the representation.
Some points to note:
 The inference is initiated because the incoherence in the initial representation's
STS (= 4) is greater than IDC's tolerance (= 1.836). If no extension generated by
creating a new tree had lowered incoherence, a transfer from the STS to the LTS
would have been attempted (see section 6.4.1).
 All of the nodes in the schema which are not present in the representation are
inferred as new instances. The schema is thus acting as a unit for retrieval and
inference purposes and its activation is `all-or-nothing'.
 If Skepticism is lowered to 0.1 but the other parameters left the same, IDC makes a
high-level inference about a go by vehicle plan after reading only the rst observation
of this text. In other words, it jumps to the conclusion that John is going by vehicle,
on the basis of him getting onto some thing v whose type is unknown. By contrast,
with Skepticism = 0.5, this evidence alone is not considered strong enough to warrant
inference of the high-level plan.
If Skepticism is raised to 0.9, IDC fails to make any high-level inferences: the
go by bus event requires too many subsidiary events to be inferred, so IDC considers
it safer to make none at all.
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Parameter settings:
Skepticism = 0.5
Tolerance = 1.836
Range = 0
Initial representation:
STS Instances:
instance(@event(e2, get off, [agt:jack, loc at:r, pat:v]), n, n, 3.0),
instance(@habit(bus, [exp:v]), n, n, 1.0).
STS Forest:
no trees
LTS Instances:
instance(@habit(bus station, [exp:bs]), n, n, 1.0),
instance(@event(e1, get on, [agt:jack, loc at:bs, pat:v]), n, n, 3.0).
LTS Forest:
no trees
Incoherence:
4 (STS); 4 (LTS)
Schema used to create new tree:
2: event( , go by bus, [goer:A, bus:B, driver:C,
token:D, loc from:E, loc to:F]) / []  !
[event( , go, [agt:A, loc to:E]) / [],
event( , get on,[agt:A, loc at:E, pat:B]) / [],
event( , give, [agt:A, pat:C, obj:D]) / [],
event( , sit, [agt:A, pat:G]) / [],
event( , get off, [agt:A, loc at:F, pat:B]) / [F \== E],
habit(bus station, [exp:H]) / [H ==> E],
habit(bus, [exp:I]) / [nonvar(I), I ==> B],
habit(vehicle seat, [exp:G]) / [],
habit(bus driver, [exp:C]) / [],
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relation(part of, [G, B]) / [],
habit(token, [exp:D]) / [] ].
New representation:
STS Instances:
instance(@event(e2, get off, [agt:jack, loc at:r, pat:v]), y, n, 0.0),
instance(#event( 10719, go, [agt:jack, loc to:bs]), y, n, 1.0),
instance(#event( 10692, give, [agt:jack, pat: 10683,
obj: 10678]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#event( 10660, sit, [agt:jack, pat: 10651]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#habit(vehicle seat, [exp: 10651]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#habit(bus driver, [exp: 10683]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#relation(part of, [ 10651, v]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#habit(token, [exp: 10678]), y, n, 0.5),
instance(#event( 10550, go by bus, [goer:jack, bus:v,
driver: 10683, token: 10678, loc from:bs, loc to:r]), n, y, 0.5),
instance(@habit(bus, [exp:v]), y, n, 0.0).
STS Forest:
tree(2, #event( 10550, go by bus, [goer:jack,
bus:v, driver: 10683, token: 10678, loc from:bs, loc to:r]),
[#event( 10719, go, [agt:jack, loc to:bs]),
@event(e1, get on, [agt:jack, loc at:bs, pat:v]),
#event( 10692, give, [agt:jack, pat: 10683, obj: 10678]),
#event( 10660, sit, [agt:jack, pat: 10651]),
@event(e2, get off, [agt:jack, loc at:r, pat:v]),
@habit(bus station, [exp:bs]),
@habit(bus, [exp:v]),
#habit(vehicle seat, [exp: 10651]),
#habit(bus driver, [exp: 10683]),
#relation(part of, [ 10651, v]),
#habit(token, [exp: 10678])], 0.0).
LTS Instances:
instance(@habit(bus station, [exp:bs]), y, n, 0.0),
instance(@event(e1, get on, [agt:jack, loc at:bs, pat:v]), y, n, 0.0).
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LTS Forest:
no trees
Incoherence:
4.5 (STS); 0 (LTS)
Incoherence change:
(4 + 4) - (4.5 + 0) = -3.5
Appendix B
IDC Schema Code, Texts and
Examples
B.1 Plan Recognition
B.1.1 Plan Recognition Schemas
event(_, go_by_vehicle, [goer:A, vehicle:V, loc_from:P,
loc_to:D]) / [] --->
[
event(_, get_on, [agt:A, loc_at:P, pat:V]) / [],
event(_, sit, [agt:A, pat:S]) / [],
event(_, get_off, [agt:A, loc_at:D, pat:V]) / [],
habit(vehicle, [exp:V]) / [],
habit(vehicle_seat, [exp:S]) / [],
relation(part_of, [S, V]) / []
].
event(_, go_by_bus, [goer:A, bus:V2, driver:R, token:T,
loc_from:P2, loc_to:D]) / [] --->
[
event(_, go, [agt:A, loc_to:P2]) / [],
event(_, get_on, [agt:A, loc_at:P2, pat:V2]) / [],
event(_, give, [agt:A, pat:R, obj:T]) / [],
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event(_, sit, [agt:A, pat:S]) / [],
event(_, get_off, [agt:A, loc_at:D, pat:V2]) / [D \== P2],
habit(bus_station, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2],
habit(bus, [exp:V1]) / [nonvar(V1), V1 ==> V2],
habit(vehicle_seat, [exp:S]) / [],
habit(bus_driver, [exp:R]) / [],
relation(part_of, [S, V2]) / [],
habit(token, [exp:T]) / []
].
event(_, go_by_taxi, [goer:A, taxi:V2, driver:R,
loc_from:P, loc_to:D]) / [] --->
[
event(_, go, [agt:A, loc_to:P]) / [],
event(_, get_on, [agt:A, loc_at:P, pat:V2]) / [],
event(_, sit, [agt:A, pat:S]) / [],
event(_, pay_step, [payer:A, payee:R, _]) / [],
event(_, get_off, [agt:A, loc_at:D, pat:V2]) / [D \== P],
habit(vehicle_seat, [exp:S]) / [],
habit(taxi, [exp:V1]) / [nonvar(V1), V1 ==> V2],
habit(taxi_driver, [exp:R]) / [],
relation(part_of, [S, V2]) / []
].
event(_, supermarket_shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing_bought:B]) / [] --->
[
event(_, shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing_bought:B]) / [],
habit(super_market, [exp:T1]) / [T1 ==> T2],
habit(food, [exp:B]) / []
].
event(_, liquor_store_shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing_bought:B2]) / [] --->
[
event(_, shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
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thing_bought:B2]) / [],
habit(liquor_store, [exp:T1]) / [T1 ==> T2],
habit(liquor, [exp:B1]) / [nonvar(B1), B1 ==> B2]
].
/*
% Liquor-store shopping alternative schema
event(_, liquor_store_shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing_bought:B]) / [] --->
[
event(_, shopping, [shopper:S, store:T2,
thing_bought:B]) / [],
habit(liquor_store, [exp:T1]) / [T1 ==> T2],
habit(liquor, [exp:B]) / []
].
*/
event(_, shopping, [shopper:S, store:T,
thing_bought:B]) / [] --->
[
event(_, go_step, [agt:S, loc_to:T]) / [],
event(_, find, [agt:S, pat:B]) / [],
event(_, buy_step, [buyer:S, bought:B]) / [],
habit(shopping_place, [exp:T]) / []
].
event(_, rest_visit, [diner:A, restaurant:R2,
thing_ordered:O, utensils:I]) / [] --->
[
event(_, dining, [diner:A, place:R2,
thing_ordered:O, utensils:I]) / [],
habit(restaurant, [exp:R1]) / [R1 ==> R2]
].
event(_, dining, [diner:A, place:R, thing_ordered:O,
utensils:I]) / [] --->
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[
event(_, go_step, [agt:A, loc_to:R]) / [],
event(_, order, [agt:A, pat:O]) / [],
event(_, ingest_step, [agt:A, ingested:O, inst:I]) / [],
event(_, pay_step, [payer:A, _, paid_for:O]) / [],
habit(eating_place, [exp:R]) / []
].
event(_, robbing, [robber:A, weapon_used:W, place_robbed:P2,
thing_robbed:V, victim:M]) / [V \== W] --->
[
event(_, get, [agt:A, pat:W, _]) / [],
event(_, go_step, [agt:A, loc_to:P2]) / [],
event(_, point, [agt:A, pat:W, obj:M]) / [],
event(_, get, [agt:A, pat:V, from:M]) / [],
habit(valuable, [exp:V]) / [],
habit(business, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2],
habit(weapon, [exp:W]) / [],
habit(in_charge, [agt:M, pat:P2]) / []
].
/*
% Mugging schema
event(_, mugging, [mugger:A, weapon_used:W, thing_robbed:V,
victim:M]) / [] --->
[
event(_, point, [agt:A, pat:W, obj:M]) / [],
event(_, get, [agt:A, pat:V, from:M]) / [],
habit(valuable, [exp:V]) / [],
habit(weapon, [exp:W]) / []
].
*/
habit(owns, [agt:M, pat:P]) / [] --->
[habit(in_charge, [agt:M, pat:P]) / []].
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habit(runs, [agt:M, pat:P]) / [] --->
[habit(in_charge, [agt:M, pat:P]) / []].
event(_, pay, [agt:S, _, obj:B]) / [] --->
[event(_, buy_step, [buyer:S, bought:B]) / []].
event(_, pay, [agt:S, pat:P, obj:B]) / [] --->
[event(_, pay_step, [payer:S, payee:P, paid_for:B]) / []].
event(_, ingest_step, [agt:A, ingested:O, inst:I]) / [] --->
[
event(_, drink, [agt:A, pat:O, inst:I]) / [],
habit(beverage, [exp:O]) / []
].
event(_, ingest_step, [agt:A, ingested:O, inst:I]) / [] --->
[
event(_, eat, [agt:A, pat:O, inst:I]) / [],
habit(food, [exp:O]) / []
].
event(_, go_by_vehicle, [goer:A1, vehicle:_, loc_from:_,
loc_to:P1]) / [A1 ==> A2, P1 ==> P2] --->
[event(_, go_step, [agt:A2, loc_to:P2]) / []].
event(_, go_by_bus, [goer:A1, bus:_, driver:_, token:_,
loc_from:_, loc_to:P1]) / [A1 ==> A2, P1 ==> P2] --->
[event(_, go_step, [agt:A2, loc_to:P2]) / []].
event(_, go_by_taxi, [goer:A1, taxi:_, driver:_,
loc_from:_, loc_to:P1]) / [A1 ==> A2, P1 ==> P2] --->
[event(_, go_step, [agt:A2, loc_to:P2]) / []].
event(_, go, [agt:A, loc_to:P]) / [] --->
[event(_, go_step, [agt:A, loc_to:P]) / []].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% ISA HIERARCHY
habit(liquor-store, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(store, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(supermarket, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(store, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(store, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(shopping_place, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(shopping_place, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(business, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(restaurant, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(eating_place, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(eating_place, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(business, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(bank, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2] --->
[habit(business, [exp:P2]) / []].
habit(gun, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(sword, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(milkshake, [exp:A]) / [] --->
[habit(beverage, [exp:A]) / []].
habit(bread, [exp:E1]) / [E1 ==> E2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:E2]) / []].
habit(bourbon, [exp:E1]) / [E1 ==> E2] --->
[habit(liquor, [exp:E2]) / []].
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habit(knife, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(razor, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(knife, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(sharp_object, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(razor, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(sharp_object, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(sword, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(sharp_object, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(money, [exp:V1]) / [V1 ==> V2] --->
[habit(valuable, [exp:V2]) / []].
habit(antique, [exp:V1]) / [V1 ==> V2] --->
[habit(valuable, [exp:V2]) / []].
habit(banana, [exp:F1]) / [F1 ==> F2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:F2]) / []].
habit(potato, [exp:F1]) / [F1 ==> F2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:F2]) / []].
habit(beef, [exp:F1]) / [F1 ==> F2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:F2]) / []].
habit(tomato, [exp:F1]) / [F1 ==> F2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:F2]) / []].
habit(chips, [exp:F1]) / [F1 ==> F2] --->
[habit(food, [exp:F2]) / []].
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B.1.2 Example Plan Recognition Trees
This section contains examples of trees constructed by IDC during comprehension of the
liquor-store text of section 7.1.1 (page 159). This text is repeated here for convenience:
[event(e1, go, [agt:bob, loc to:ls]), habit(liquor store, [exp:ls]), event(e2, point,
[agt:bob, pat:w, obj:o]), habit(gun, [exp:w]), habit(owns, [agt:o, pat:ls])]
A rough English version of each tree is given, then the Prolog structure generated by
IDC. The format of the trees follows the description given in section 5.3.5 (page 118); no
incoherence values are given for the trees, as this varies according to parameter settings.
I have replaced Prolog's obscure internal variables with uninstantiated variables (capital
letters); it is easy to track the embedding of one plan inside another by matching instances
in one tree with those of another tree.
The trees actually inferred by IDC under various parameter settings are shown in
section 7.1.1.
It is worth noting that IDC may infer certain instances which are not appropriately
merged with other instance. For example, when Skepticism is low (= 0.1), IDC infers
a robbing event without tying it to the go event. This results in the construction of a
go step instance which is distinct from the go step previously inferred from the go event.
An example of such a situation is shown in bullet point 5.
1. Bob went liquor-store shopping.
tree(5, #event(M, liquor_store_shopping, [shopper:bob, store:ls,
thing_bought:B]),
[#event(E, shopping, [shopper:bob, store:ls, thing_bought:B]),
@habit(liquor_store, [exp:ls]), #habit(liquor, [exp:B])])
2. Bob went shopping in a shopping place (the liquor-store).
tree(6, #event(E, shopping, [shopper:bob, store:ls, thing_bought:B]),
[#event(F, go_step, [agt:bob, loc_to:ls]),
#event(G, find, [agt:bob, pat:B]),
#event(A, buy_step, [buyer:bob, bought:B]),
#habit(shopping_place, [exp:ls])])
3. Bob's going isa go-step.
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tree(19, @event(e1, go, [agt:bob, loc_to:ls]),
[#event(F, go_step, [agt:bob, loc_to:ls])])
4. Bob robbed the liquor-store using the gun; the victim of the crime was the owner of the
store.
tree(9, #event(H, robbing, [robber:bob, weapon_used:w, place_robbed:ls,
thing_robbed:I, victim:o]),
[#event(J, get, [agt:bob, pat:w, from:K]),
#event(F, go_step, [agt:bob, loc_to:ls]),
@event(e2, point, [agt:bob, pat:w, obj:o]),
#event(L, get, [agt:bob, pat:I, from:o]),
#habit(valuable, [exp:I]), #habit(business, [exp:ls]),
#habit(weapon, [exp:w]), #habit(in_charge, [agt:o, pat:ls])])
5. Bob robbed the liquor-store using the gun; the victim of the crime was the owner of the
store.
tree(9, #event(M, robbing, [robber:bob, weapon_used:w, place_robbed:ls,
thing_robbed:I, victim:o]),
[#event(J, get, [agt:bob, pat:w, from:K]),
#event(N, go_step, [agt:bob, loc_to:ls]),
@event(e2, point, [agt:bob, pat:w, obj:o]),
#event(L, get, [agt:bob, pat:I, from:o]),
#habit(valuable, [exp:I]), #habit(business, [exp:ls]),
#habit(weapon, [exp:w]), #habit(in_charge, [agt:o, pat:ls])])
(Note that the go step here is distinct from the go step of bullet point 4.)
6. The shopping-place (the liquor-store) is a business.
tree(23, #habit(shopping_place, [exp:ls]),
[#habit(business, [exp:ls])])
7. The gun is a weapon.
tree(27, @habit(gun, [exp:w]),
[#habit(weapon, [exp:w])])
8. The owner of the liquor-store is in charge of it.
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tree(10, @habit(owns, [agt:o, pat:ls]),
[#habit(in_charge, [agt:o, pat:ls])])
N.B. The rst two trees, while supercially similar in their English translations, actually
depict two dierent hypotheses: the second denotes a general shopping plan at some
`shopping place', while the rst is a specialised shopping plan, specically related to
liquor shopping.
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B.2 Inference Protocols
B.2.1 Ivan Story Text
This section contains the original text and the IDC version of `The Ivan Story' (based
on [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996]). IDC's comprehension of this text is described in
section 7.2.
Original text of `The Ivan Story'
S1. Ivan was a great warrior.
S2. Ivan was the best archer in his village.
S3. Ivan heard that a giant was terrifying the people in his village.
S4. The giant came to the village at night and hurt people.
S5. Ivan was determined to kill the giant.
S6. Ivan waited until dark.
S7. The giant came and Ivan shot an arrow at him.
S8. Ivan hit the giant and the giant fell down.
S9. The people were overjoyed.
(adapted from Trabasso and Magliano [Trabasso and Magliano, 1996])
IDC version of `The Ivan Story'
habit(great warrior, [exp:ivan]),
habit(best archer, [exp:ivan, loc in:village]),
habit(live, [exp:ivan, loc in:village]),
event(e1, terrorise, [agt:giant, pat:people]),
habit(live, [exp:people, loc in:village]),
event(e2, come, [agt:giant, loc to:village, when:night]),
event(e3, hurt, [agt:giant, pat:people, inst: ]),
relation(precedes, [e2,e3]),
goal(g1, kill, [agt:ivan, pat:giant]),
relation(overlaps, [e3,g1]),
event(e4, wait for, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, loc at:village, when:night]),
relation(overlaps, [g1,e4]),
event(e5, arrive, [agt:giant, loc at:village, when:night]),
relation(overlaps, [e4,e5]),
event(e6, shot, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, inst:a]),
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habit(arrows, [exp:a]),
relation(precedes, [e5,e6]),
event(e7, hit, [agt:ivan, pat:giant, inst:a]),
relation(precedes, [e6,e7]),
event(e8, fall, [agt:giant, loc to:ground]),
relation(precedes, [e7,e8]),
event(e9, overjoy, [agt:people]),
relation(precedes, [e8,e9]).
B.2.2 Ivan Story Schemas
habit(good_fighter, [exp:A]) / [] --->
[habit(great_warrior, [exp:A]) / []].
habit(archer, [exp:A]) / [X2 \== Y2, X2 \== Z2, Y2 \== Z2] --->
[
habit(armour, [exp:X1]) / [X1 ==> X2],
habit(bow, [exp:Y1]) / [Y1 ==> Y2],
habit(arrows, [exp:Z1]) / [Z1 ==> Z2],
habit(use, [agt:A, inst:X2]) / [],
habit(use, [agt:A, inst:Y2]) / [],
habit(use, [agt:A, inst:Z2]) / []
].
habit(best_archer, [exp:A1, _]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(archer, [exp:A2]) / []].
event(E4a, protect, [agt:Champion1, pat:Villagers1, from:Threat]) /
[E4a ==> E4b, Champion1 ==> Champion2, Villagers1 ==> Villagers2] --->
[
event(E1a, come, [agt:Threat, loc_to:Place1, when:_]) /
[E1a ==> E1b, Place1 ==> Place2],
event(E2a, hurt, [agt:Threat, pat:Villagers1, inst:_]) /
[E2a ==> E2b],
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:Champion1, pat:Threat]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
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event(E3a, fight, [agt:Champion1, pat:Threat]) / [E3a ==> E3b],
habit(care_about, [exp:Champion2, exp:Villagers1]) / [],
habit(live, [exp:Villagers2, loc_in:Place2]) / [],
habit(good_fighter, [exp:Champion2]) / [],
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [],
relation(phycs, [E2b, G1b]) / [],
relation(motivates, [G1b, E3b]) / [],
relation(includes, [E4b, [E1b, E2b, G1b, E3b]]) / []
].
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, come, [agt:Threat, loc_to:Place1, when:_]) /
[E1a ==> E1b, Place1 ==> Place2],
event(E2a, hurt, [agt:Threat, pat:Villagers, inst:_]) /
[E2a ==> E2b],
habit(live, [exp:Villagers, loc_in:Place2]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(psycs, [E1b, G1b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, hurt, [agt:Threat, pat:People, inst:_]) /
[E1a ==> E1b],
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
habit(care_about, [exp:Champion, exp:People]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E1b, G1b]) / []
].
relation(motivates, [G1b, E1b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E1a, fight, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
relation(overlaps, [G1b, E1b]) / []
].
habit(care_about, [exp:A2, exp:B2]) / [A2 \== B2] --->
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[
habit(live, [exp:A1, loc_in:L]) / [A1 ==> A2],
habit(live, [exp:B1, loc_in:L]) / [B1 ==> B2]
].
relation(psycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, terrorise, [agt:_, pat:Friend2a]) /
[E1a ==> E1b, Friend2a ==> Friend2b],
event(E2a, anger, [exp:Friend1a]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, Friend1a ==> Friend1b],
habit(care_about, [exp:Friend1b, exp:Friend2b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(psycs, [E1b, G1b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, terrorise, [agt:Threat, pat:People]) /
[E1a ==> E1b],
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
habit(care_about, [exp:Champion, exp:People]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E1b, G1b]) / []
].
habit(villagers, [exp:P1]) / [] --->
[
habit(people, [exp:P1]) / [P1 ==> P2],
habit(village, [exp:V1]) / [V1 ==> V2],
habit(live, [exp:P2, loc_in:V2]) / []
].
event(E1, stab, [agt:A, pat:B, inst:K1]) / [K1 ==> K2] --->
[
event(E2, hurt, [agt:A, pat:B, inst:K2]) / [K1 ==> K2],
habit(knife, [exp:K1]) / [],
relation(simultaneous, [E1, E2]) / []
].
Appendix B. IDC Schema Code and Examples 236
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, hit, [agt:_, pat:B]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, pain, [exp:B]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, strike, [agt:A, pat:B1]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, light, [agt:A, exp:B1]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
habit(match, [exp:B2]) / [B1 ==> B2],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
habit(care_about, [exp:A2, exp:B2]) / [] --->
[habit(at_uni_together, [exp:A1, exp:B1]) /
[A1 ==> A2, B1 ==> B2]].
habit(care_about, [exp:A2, exp:B2]) / [] --->
[habit(brothers, [exp:A1, exp:B1]) / [A1 ==> A2, B1 ==> B2]].
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, in_trouble, [exp:B1]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, help, [agt:A1, pat:B1]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, A1 ==> A2, B1 ==> B2],
habit(care_about, [exp:A2, exp:B2]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
event(E1a, terrorise, [agt:Threat, pat:People]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, attack, [agt:Threat, pat:People, inst:_, when:_]) /
[E2a ==> E2b],
relation(simultaneous, [E1b, E2b]) / []
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].
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, attack, [agt:_, pat:P, inst:_, when:_]) /
[E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, in_trouble, [exp:P]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(enables, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, come, [agt:A, loc_to:P, when:_]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, at, [agt:A, loc:P]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(psycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, terrorise, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, fear, [agt:P, obj:A]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
habit(know, [agt:A2, pat:B2]) / [] --->
[
habit(live, [agt:A1, loc_in:L]) / [A1 ==> A2],
habit(live, [agt:B1, loc_in:L]) / [B1 ==> B2]
].
event(E1a, successful_goal, [agt:A]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E2a, kill, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(overlaps, [G1b, E2b]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E2b, E1b]) / []
].
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relation(motivates, [G1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, hide_from, [agt:A, loc_at:L, pat:_]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E2a, wait, [agt:A, loc_at:L, when:night]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(overlaps, [G1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(motivates, [G1b, G2b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
goal(G2a, hide_from, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [G2a ==> G2b],
relation(overlaps, [G1b, G2b]) / []
].
relation(enables, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, come, [agt:A, loc_to:P, when:Time]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, wait_for, [agt:B, pat:A, loc_at:P, when:Time]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, B \== A],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
event(E1a, fight, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, shot, [agt:Champion, pat:Threat, inst:I1]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, I1 ==> I2],
habit(weapon, [exp:I2]) / [],
relation(simultaneous, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(motivates, [G1b, E1b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, kill, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E1a, shot, [agt:A, pat:P, inst:I1]) /
[E1a ==> E1b, I1 ==> I2],
habit(weapon, [exp:I2]) / [],
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relation(overlaps, [G1b, E1b]) / []
].
event(E1a, ambush, [agt:A, pat:B]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, wait_for, [agt:A, pat:B, loc_at:P, when:Time]) /
[E2a ==> E2b],
event(E3a, arrive, [agt:B, loc_at:P, when:Time]) /
[E3a ==> E3b],
event(E4a, fight, [agt:A, pat:B, inst:I1]) /
[E4a ==> E4b, I1 ==> I2],
habit(weapon, [exp:I2]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E3b, E4b]) / [],
relation(includes, [E1b, [E2b, E3b, E4b]]) / []
].
relation(phycs, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, shot, [agt:A, pat:P, inst:I]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, hit, [agt:A, pat:P, inst:I]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
event(E1a, kill, [agt:A, pat:P]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, shot, [agt:A, pat:P, inst:I]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
event(E3a, hit, [agt:A, pat:P, inst:I]) / [E3a ==> E3b],
event(E4a, fall, [agt:P, loc_to:_]) / [E4a ==> E4b],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E3b, E4b]) / [],
relation(overlaps, [E4b, E1b]) / []
].
relation(enables, [E1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, overjoy, [agt:A]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
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event(E2a, celebrate, [agt:A]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
relation(overlaps, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
relation(phycs, [E2b, E3b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, fear, [agt:A, obj:P]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, kill, [agt:_, pat:P]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
event(E3a, no_fear, [agt:A, obj:P]) / [E3a ==> E3b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / []
].
relation(psycs, [E2b, E3b]) / [] --->
[
event(E1a, fear, [agt:A, obj:P]) / [E1a ==> E1b],
event(E2a, no_fear, [agt:_, pat:P]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
event(E3a, overjoy, [agt:A]) / [E3a ==> E3b],
relation(precedes, [E1b, E2b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / []
].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% ISA HIERARCHY
habit(gun, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(sword, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
habit(arrows, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:A2]) / []].
habit(knife, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
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habit(razor, [exp:W1]) / [W1 ==> W2] --->
[habit(weapon, [exp:W2]) / []].
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B.3 Role Shift Texts
B.3.1 Janitor Story Text
This section contains the IDC versions of three Janitor Story texts (based on
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981]):
1. The full Janitor Story.
2. The shortened role-shift version of the Janitor Story.
3. The shortened non-role-shift version of the Janitor Story.
IDC's comprehension of these texts is described in section 7.3.
1. Full Janitor Story: English text
John was on his way to school.
He was worried about the maths lesson.
Last week he lost control of the class.
It was unfair of the maths teacher to leave him in charge.
After all, teaching wasn't part of a janitor's duties.
Full Janitor Story: IDC version
event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s]),
habit(school, [exp:s]),
event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m1]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m1]),
relation(precedes, [e1,e2]),
event(e3, lost control, [agt:john, pat:m2]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m2]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e1]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e2]),
event(e4, put in charge, [agt:t, pat1:john, pat2:m2]),
habit(teacher, [exp:t]),
relation(precedes, [e4, e3]),
habit(janitor, [exp:john]).
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2. Non-role-shift Janitor Story: English text
John was worried about teaching maths.
He was on his way to school.
Last week he lost control of the class.
Non-role-shift Janitor Story: IDC version
event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m1]),
habit(teacher, [exp:john]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m1]),
event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s]),
habit(school, [exp:s]),
relation(precedes, [e2,e1]),
event(e3, lost control, [agt:john, pat:m2]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m2]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e1]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e2]).
3. Role-shift Janitor Story: English text
John was on his way to school.
He was worried about the maths lesson.
Last week he lost control of the class.
Role-shift Janitor Story: IDC version
event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s]),
habit(school, [exp:s]),
event(e2, worry about, [agt:john, pat:m1]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m1]),
relation(precedes, [e1,e2]),
event(e3, lost control, [agt:john, pat:m2]),
habit(math lesson, [exp:m2]),
relation(precedes, [e3,e1]),
relation(precedes, [e3, e2]).
B.3.2 Janitor Story Schemas
relation(motivates, [G1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
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goal(G1a, learn, [exp:A, loc_at:S2]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E2a, go, [agt:A, loc_to:S2]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
habit(school, [exp:S1]) / [S1 ==> S2],
habit(schoolchild, [exp:A]) / []
].
relation(motivates, [G1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, teach, [exp:A, loc_at:S2]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E2a, go, [agt:A, loc_to:S2]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
habit(school, [exp:S1]) / [S1 ==> S2],
habit(teacher, [exp:A]) / []
].
relation(motivates, [G1b, E2b]) / [] --->
[
goal(G1a, earn_living, [exp:A, loc_at:S2]) / [G1a ==> G1b],
event(E2a, go, [agt:A, loc_to:S2]) / [E2a ==> E2b],
habit(school, [exp:S1]) / [S1 ==> S2],
habit(janitor, [exp:A]) / []
].
habit(schoolchild, [exp:A]) / [] --->
[
habit(attend, [agt:A, exp:S]) / [],
habit(school, [exp:S]) / []
].
habit(teacher, [exp:A]) / [] --->
[
habit(attend, [agt:A, exp:S]) / [],
habit(school, [exp:S]) / []
].
habit(janitor, [exp:A]) / [] --->
[
habit(attend, [agt:A, exp:S]) / [],
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habit(school, [exp:S]) / []
].
event(E1a, afraid_of_professional_failure, [agt:A2]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, worry_about, [agt:A1, pat:M1]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, A1 ==> A2],
event(E3a, lost_control, [agt:A1, pat:M2]) /
[E3a ==> E3b, M2 \== M1],
habit(lesson, [exp:M1]) / [],
habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / [],
habit(teacher, [exp:A2]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E3b, E2b]) / [],
relation(simultaneous, [E1b, E2b]) / []
].
event(E1a, afraid_of_test, [agt:A2, pat:T2]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, worry_about, [agt:A1, pat:M1]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, A1 ==> A2, M1 ==> M2],
event(E3a, fail, [agt:A1, thm:T1]) / [E3a ==> E3b, T1 ==> T2],
habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / [],
habit(test, [exp:T2]) / [],
habit(schoolchild, [exp:A2]) / [],
relation(part_of, [T2, M2]) / [],
relation(simultaneous, [E1b, E2b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / []
].
event(E1a, afraid_of_losing_control_again, [agt:B2]) / [E1a ==> E1b] --->
[
event(E2a, put_in_charge, [agt:A1, pat1:B1, pat2:L1]) /
[E2a ==> E2b, A1 ==> A2, B1 ==> B2, L1 ==> L2],
event(E3a, lost_control, [agt:B1, pat:L1]) / [E3a ==> E3b],
event(E4a, worry_about, [agt:B1, pat:M1]) /
[E4a ==> E4b, M1 ==> M2],
habit(lesson, [exp:L2]) / [L2 \== M2],
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habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / [L2 \== M2],
habit(teacher, [exp:A2]) / [],
habit(replacement_teacher, [exp:B2]) / [B2 \== A2],
relation(precedes, [E2b, E3b]) / [],
relation(precedes, [E3b, E4b]) / [],
relation(simultaneous, [E1b, E4b]) / []
].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% ISA HIERARCHY
habit(english_lesson, [exp:M1]) / [M1 ==> M2] --->
[habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / []].
habit(math_lesson, [exp:M1]) / [M1 ==> M2] --->
[habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / []].
habit(geography_lesson, [exp:M1]) / [M1 ==> M2] --->
[habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / []].
habit(history_lesson, [exp:M1]) / [M1 ==> M2] --->
[habit(lesson, [exp:M2]) / []].
habit(parent, [exp:A2]) / [] --->
[habit(replacement_teacher, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2]].
habit(schoolchild, [exp:A2]) / [] --->
[habit(replacement_teacher, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2]].
habit(janitor, [exp:A2]) / [] --->
[habit(replacement_teacher, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2]].
habit(teacher, [exp:A2]) / [] --->
[habit(replacement_teacher, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2]].
habit(teacher, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(adult, [exp:A2]) / []].
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habit(janitor, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(adult, [exp:A2]) / []].
habit(parent, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(adult, [exp:A2]) / []].
habit(schoolchild, [exp:A1]) / [A1 ==> A2] --->
[habit(child, [exp:A2]) / []].
Appendix C
IDC Program Code
C.1 Running IDC
IDC was implemented in SICStus Prolog, version 3.8; the code is available to interested
parties. Installation should be fairly simple, mainly involving copying the IDC les into
a dedicated directory called `IDC dir'. This directory should contain a subdirectory
`Output dir' for storing les produced by the le comp procedure (see below).
On UNIX, this directory should be attached to the user's root directory, to minimise
problems caused by incorrect paths (e.g. when IDC setup writes informativities and
ubiquities to the knowledge base). If using IDC on a PC, changes will have to be made
across the various program les: each occurrence of ~/IDC_dir should be replaced by
C:/IDC_dir/ (assuming IDC is installed on the C: drive. However, there should be no
compatibility problems caused by the operating system, and the code should probably
also run in older versions of SICStus Prolog. Compatibility with other avours of Prolog
has not been tested.
The les necessary for running IDC are:
 IDC.pl: core program.
 IDC setup.pl: knowledge base derivation.
 schemas.pl: le containing hand-coded schema denitions.
 texts.pl: le of texts. Each text is encoded as a two place predicate of the form:
text(Identier, ListOfTextStatements)
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For example, a simple text representing `John goes to school' might be:
text(1, [event(e1, go, [agt:john, loc to:s]), habit(school, [exp:s])]).
The identier is used in the top-level call to IDC (see below).
 shared.pl: utility procedures, some of which are shared between IDC.pl and
IDC setup.pl.
 tests.pl: this is an optional le which contains various test procedures: for exam-
ple, there is a facility which allows all extensions of a single representation to be
generated, regardless of their incoherence.
C.1.1 Preparing IDC's Knowledge Base
The rst step in running IDC is to set up the knowledge base using the IDC setup.pl
le. This program consults schemas.pl, creating indexes and assigning informativities and
ubiquities to the nodes in the schema lattice. The results are written to the le kb.pl,
which is then used by the core program (see next section).
The program runs automatically once it is loaded into the interpreter. The only
adjustments the user may want to make may be changing the schema set accessed by
IDC.
C.1.2 Running the Comprehension Simulation
Once the knowledge base has been prepared, the main IDC.pl program can be loaded into
the Prolog interpreter. It is probably best to run the main program in a separate session
from the setup program.
IDC has three `modes' of operation:
1. comp(TextIdentier, Skepticism, Range, ToleranceFactor)
This is the normal method I've used. TextIdentier represents the rst argument of
a text clause in texts.pl (see above).
2. lecomp(FilePrex, TextIdentier, Skepticism, Range, ToleranceFactor)
This call works exactly as a call to comp (see above), but writes the output to the le
specied by FilePrex. FilePrex is an atom consisting of alphanumeric characters
and underscores (usually). The actual output lename is:
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`~/IDC dir/Output dir/' + FilePrex + `.idc'
So, if FilePrex == text2010101, the le holding the output is called:
~/IDC dir/Output dir/text2010101.idc
3. text comp(Text, Skepticism, Range, ToleranceFactor)
This call allows a text to be input directly, bypassing the need for a texts.pl le.
However, this is impractical for anything but very small texts.
In all cases, the other arguments are instantiated as follows: Skepticism is a value greater
than 0 but less than 1; Range is either a number  0 (for multiple representations), or
-1 to maintain a single representation; Tolerance is any number  0. (Note that the
actual Tolerance of the comprehender is equal to the average informativity of nodes in
the knowledge base multiplied by ToleranceFactor.)
IDC will always attempt to comprehend a text, regardless of the schemas in its
knowledge base. It is worth bearing this in mind if it seems to be do nothing at all;
however, it is worth pointing out that at high Skepticism settings, IDC can have a tendency
to simply move r-elts around without making any inferences.
If the lecomp mode is used, the output le is a plain text le containing the entire
session's content. This can be cumbersome to analyse in a text editor, so I have imple-
mented a viewer for these les (written in Python). This can also be supplied with the
rest of the program code.
The full code for the main IDC procedures constitutes the rest of this appendix.
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C.2 IDC setup.pl
/*********************************************************************
IDC_SETUP
FILENAME:
['~/IDC_dir/idc_setup.pl'].
FILES USED:
schemas.pl
lists.pl
PURPOSE:
Creates the files used by idc.pl, namely:
1. nodes.pl
File containing node definitions, listing informativity
and ubiquity.
2. indices.pl
File containing schema indexes.
METHOD:
Automatically creates files via a call of create_files/0.
*********************************************************************/
% set up a gensym for assigning ID numbers to schemas
:- dynamic(id/1).
id(1).
% declare operator for schema construction
:- op(600, xfx, --->).
% operator for schema constraints
:- op(700, xfx, ==>).
% declare operator for inferred nodes
:- op(100, fy, #).
% declare operator for observed nodes
:- op(100, fy, @).
% QUICK RELOAD
rl :- ['~/IDC_dir/idc_setup.pl'].
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% SHARED PROCEDURES
% (variable binding, constraint checking, output, lists)
:- ['~/IDC_dir/shared.pl'].
% FILE CONTAINING ALL SCHEMAS
:- ['~/IDC_dir/schemas.pl'].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TOP-LEVEL SETUP PREDICATES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% create_kb/0
% Create the two files to be used by the main program, idc.pl
% Both of these programs rely on the data in schemas.pl
% NB it is necessary to load the kb.pl file once generated, as
% it is used by define/3
create_kb :-
process_raw_schemas(Indexes, AnnotatedSchemas),
open('~/IDC_dir/kb.pl', write, File1),
set_output(File1),
write_clauses_to_stream(Indexes),
nl, nl,
close(File1),
consult('~/IDC_dir/kb.pl'),
define(NodesList, TotalInformativity, AverageInformativity),
open('~/IDC_dir/kb.pl', append, File2),
set_output(File2),
write_clauses_to_stream(AnnotatedSchemas),
nl, nl,
write_clauses_to_stream([total_inf(TotalInformativity),
avg_inf(AverageInformativity) | NodesList]),
close(File2),
nl, nl,
write_nodes(NodesList),
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nl, nl,
write('Total informativity of network = '),
write(TotalInformativity), nl, nl,
write('Average node informativity = '),
write(AverageInformativity), nl, nl.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% INDEXING PREDICATES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% process_raw_schemas/2
% arg1 = list of indexes of all schemas in knowledge base.
% arg2 = a list of annotated schemas, i.e. each schema of form
% LH ---> RH/Constraints becomes a schema of form
% ID:LH ---> RH/Constraints.
% NB first sets up the gensym used to number schemas.
process_raw_schemas(Indexes, AnnotatedSchemas) :-
retract(id(_)),
assert(id(1)),
findall(schema(ID, LH, RHs),
schema(ID, LH, RHs),
Schemas),
process_all(Schemas, Indexes, AnnotatedSchemas).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% schema(SchemaID, LH, RHs)
% Used to find the ID, left-hand and right-hand nodes of all
% schemas in the knowledge base.
schema(ID, LH, RHs) :-
LH ---> RHs,
make_id(ID).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% make_id(ID)
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% Looks up the value in the id/1 clause, retracts that value,
% and updates it. Creates an ID for a schema by attaching to ID
% value to the string 's'.
make_id(Val) :-
id(Val),
retract(id(Val1)),
Val2 is Val1 + 1,
assert(id(Val2)).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% process_all(Schemas, Indexes, AnnotatedSchemas)
% arg1 = list of lists of all schemas in knowledge base; each
% sublist represents a schema and has form
% schema(ID, LH, [RH1,..., RHn], Annotated).
% arg2 = list of indexes of those schemas.
% arg3 = list of schemas annotated with ID numbers.
% Creates index/3 clauses for all schemas in knowledge base,
% and the list of all schemas annotated with their IDs
process_all([],[],[]).
process_all([schema(ID, LH/Cons, RHs) | RestSchemas], Indexes,
[ID:LH/Cons ---> RHs | RestAnnotated]) :-
index_one(RHs, ID, LH, IndexSchema),
process_all(RestSchemas, RestIndexes, RestAnnotated),
append(IndexSchema, RestIndexes, Indexes).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% index_one(RHs, SchemaID, LH, SchemaIndexes)
% where LH is the left-hand node of the schema,
% RHs is the set of right-hand nodes of that schema,
% and SchemaIndexes a list of index/3 clauses for that schema.
% Creates a new index of form index(SchemaID, LH, RH) for each
% member of RHs.
index_one([], _, _, []).
index_one([RH/_ | RestRHs], ID, LH, [index(ID, LH, RH) | RestIndexes]) :-
index_one(RestRHs, ID, LH, RestIndexes).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% NODE DEFINITION PREDICATES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% define(NodesList, TotInf, AvgInf)
% annotates nodes with their informativity and ubiquity,
% determines total_inf and avg_inf, then writes them to the screen.
define(NodesList, TotInf, AvgInf) :-
annotate_nodes(NodesList, TotInf),
length(NodesList, L),
AvgInf is TotInf / L.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREDICATES FOR INFORMATIVITY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% annotate_nodes(NodesList, TotInf)
% Collects each of the nodes in the set of schemas, annotates them
% with informativities, works out total informativity of all nodes,
% then determines ubiquities. Output is bound to the NodesList
% argument: it consists of all nodes.
% Informativities and Ubiquities are worked out separately,
% then joined into a single list using combine/3; it was too
% complicated to use the list of nodes with their informativities
% as an input to with_ubiquities
annotate_nodes(FinalNodesList, TotInf) :-
collect_nodes(Roots, Leaves, Others),
append(Roots, Others, NonLeaves),
with_informativities(Leaves, NonLeaves, NodesList1),
with_ubiquities(NodesList1, NodesList2),
flat(NodesList2, FinalNodesList),
total_inf(FinalNodesList, 0, TotInf). % 2nd arg is accumulator.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% collect_nodes/2
% arg1 = Leaves = list of all leaf nodes in all schemas, in
% list of form [Node1, ..., NodeN]; NB a leaf is a node which
% doesn't appear as a schema antecedent arg2 = Others = list of
% all non-leaf nodes in all schemas
collect_nodes(Roots, Leaves, Others) :-
findall(Node,
(index(_, Node, _); index(_, _, Node)),
AllNodes),
split(AllNodes, Roots, Leaves, Others).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% split(AllNodes, Roots, Leaves, Others)
% arg1 = list of all nodes (not including duplicates)
% arg2 = list of root nodes
% arg3 = list of all leaf nodes
% arg4 = list of all nodes which are not leaf or root nodes
% cuts prevent backtracking and reassignment of nodes to wrong lists
% 1 - all nodes processed
split([], [], [], []).
% 2 - when the node doesn't occur as a schema head, it is a leaf node
% and can immediately be assigned to Leaves
split([Node | RestNodes], Roots, [Node | RestLeaves], Others) :-
\+ index(_, Node, _), !,
split(RestNodes, Roots, RestLeaves, Others).
% 3 - when a node occurs as a schema head and in any consequent, assign
% it to Others
split([Node | RestNodes], Roots, Leaves, [Node | RestOthers]):-
index(_, Node, _),
index(_, _, Node), !,
split(RestNodes, Roots, Leaves, RestOthers).
% 4 - otherwise, assign to Roots
split([Node | RestNodes], [Node | RestRoots], Leaves, Others) :-
split(RestNodes, RestRoots, Leaves, Others).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREDICATES FOR INFORMATIVITIES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% with_informativities(Leaves, Others, NodesList)
% Leaf nodes are assigned an informativity of 1;
% Others have an informativity = sum of child node informativities + 0.5
% NodesList is a list of form [node(Node1, Inf1),..., node(NodeN, InfN)]
with_informativities(Leaves, Others, NodesList) :-
leaf_informativities(Leaves, LeafList),
other_informativities(Others, LeafList, NodesList).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% leaf_informativities/2
% arg1 = Leaves = list of leaf nodes
% arg2 = NodesList = list of nodes of form node(Content, Informativity)
% 1 - terminating: all leaves assigned their informativity
leaf_informativities([], []).
% 2 - recursive: assign an informativity of 1 to next leaf node,
leaf_informativities([Node | T], [node(Node, 1) | NewT]) :-
leaf_informativities(T, NewT).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_informativities/3
% arg1 = list of all non-leaf nodes, not annotated with informativities
% arg2 = Sofar = list of nodes so far annotated with informativity
% arg3 = NodesList = list of nodes of form node(Content, Informativity)
% NB when first called, the list of leaves is used as the sofar list
% 1 - terminating
other_informativities([], Sofar, Sofar).
% 2 - recursive: process the next element, then recurse
other_informativities([Node | T], Sofar, NodesList) :-
node_informativity(Node, Sofar, NewSofar, _),
other_informativities(T, NewSofar, NodesList).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% node_informativity(Node, NodesSofar, NewSofar, Informativity)
% arg1 = a node to be processed, so far not assigned informativity
% arg2 = list of nodes processed so far, in format
% [node(N1, Inf1), ..., node(Nm, Infm)]
% arg3 = used to update the sofar list, depending on whether Node
% has already been processed: if it has, NewSofar is the same as Sofar;
% if not, then Sofar is passed to sum_inf_rhs and may be updated from there
% arg4 = informativity of Node
% if Node has already been assigned informativity, then Sofar
% doesn't change; if not assigned, then find the sum of its right-hand
% sides and add 1; the new Sofar list is updated with the informativity
% of Node, plus any other definitions found along the way
node_informativity(Node, Sofar, NewSofar, Informativity) :-
member(node(Node, Informativity), Sofar)
-> % if
(NewSofar = Sofar); % then
(findall(RH, % else
index(_, Node, RH),
RHs),
sum_inf_rhs(RHs, Sofar, Sofar2, InfRHs),
Informativity is InfRHs + 1,
NewSofar = [node(Node, Informativity) | Sofar2]).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_inf_rhs(RHs, NodesSofar, NewNodesSofar, InfRHs)
% sums the informativity of a list of right-hand side nodes
% arg1 = list of all possible right-hands of a node
% arg2 = nodes so far assigned informativity
% arg3 = new list of nodes so far assigned
% arg4 = total informativity of all right-hand side nodes
% this calls sum_inf_rhs/5 - extra argument is an accumulator for keeping
% track of informativity so far
sum_inf_rhs(RHs, Sofar, NewSofar, InfRHs) :-
sum_inf_rhs(RHs, Sofar, NewSofar, 0, InfRHs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_inf_rhs(RHs, NodesSofar, NewNodesSofar, Accumulator, InfRHs)
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% find the informativity of the first consequent, add to accumulator,
% then recurse
% NB this calls node_informativity, which may update the Sofar list!
% These two procedures are embedded in each other: difficult to
% describe in English
sum_inf_rhs([], Sofar, Sofar, InfRHs, InfRHs).
sum_inf_rhs([Node | T], Sofar, NewSofar2, Acc, InfRHs) :-
node_informativity(Node, Sofar, NewSofar, Informativity),
NewAcc is Acc + Informativity,
sum_inf_rhs(T, NewSofar, NewSofar2, NewAcc, InfRHs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TOTAL INFORMATIVITY OF ALL NODES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% total_inf/3
% determines the total informativity of all nodes
% arg1 = list of nodes of form node(Content, Inf)
% arg2 = accumulator
% arg3 = total informativity of all nodes
% 1 - terminating: informativity of all nodes has been summed
total_inf([], Sum, Sum).
% 2 - recursive: find the basic_i value of each consequent,
% then call recursively
total_inf([node(_, Inf, _) | T], Acc, Sum) :-
NewAcc is Acc + Inf,
total_inf(T, NewAcc, Sum).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% PREDICATES FOR UBIQUITY %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% with_ubiquities/2
% arg1 = NodeList1 = list of nodes of form node(NodeID, Informativity)
% arg2 = NodeList2 = the new list of nodes of form
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% node(NodeID, Informativity, Ubiquity)
% NB NodesList1 should not have any duplicates, as this is checked
% when assigning informativity
with_ubiquities(NodesWithInf, NodesWithInfAndUbi) :-
with_ubiquities(NodesWithInf, [], NodesWithInfAndUbi).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% with_ubiquities/3
% Each node is assigned a ubiquity rating, equal to
% sum of ubiquities of parents + 1
% arg1 = NodeList1 = list of nodes of form node(NodeID, Informativity)
% arg2 = accumulated list of node definitions of form
% node(NodeID, Informativity, Ubiquity)
% arg3 = NodeList2 = the new list of nodes of form
% node(NodeID, Informativity, Ubiquity)
with_ubiquities([], Sofar, Sofar).
with_ubiquities([node(Node, Inf) | RestWithInf], Sofar,
NodesWithInfAndUbi) :-
node_ubiquity(node(Node, Inf), Sofar, NewSofar, _),
with_ubiquities(RestWithInf, NewSofar, NodesWithInfAndUbi).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% node_ubiquity(Node, NodesSofar, NewSofar, Informativity)
% arg1 = a node to be processed, so far not assigned ubiquity
% arg2 = list of nodes processed so far, in format
% [node(N1, Inf1), ..., node(Nm, Infm)]
% arg3 = used to update the sofar list, depending on whether Node
% has already been processed: if it has, NewSofar is the same as Sofar;
% if not, then Sofar is passed to sum_ubi_parents and may be updated
% from there
% arg4 = ubiquity of Node (NB this is used by sum_ubi_parents)
% if Node has already been assigned ubiquity, Sofar isn't updated;
% else, find the ubiquity of all parents (updating Sofar simultaneously);
% NewSofar has the new node definition as a head and the updated Sofar
% as a tail
node_ubiquity(node(Node, Inf), Sofar, NewSofar, Ubiquity) :-
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member(node(Node, [Inf, Ubiquity]), Sofar) % if
->
(NewSofar = Sofar) % then
;
(findall(Parent, % else
index(_, Parent, Node),
Parents),
sum_ubi_parents(Parents, Sofar, Sofar2, UbiParents),
Ubiquity is UbiParents + 1,
NewSofar = [node(Node, [Inf, Ubiquity]) | Sofar2]).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_ubi_parents(Parents, NodesSofar, NewNodesSofar, UbiParents)
% sums the ubiquity of a list of parents
% arg1 = list of parents of a node
% arg2 = nodes so far assigned ubiquity
% arg3 = new list of nodes so far assigned
% arg4 = total ubiquity of all parents
% this calls sum_ubi_parents/5 - extra argument is an accumulator
% for keeping track of ubiquity so far
sum_ubi_parents(Parents, Sofar, NewSofar, UbiParents) :-
sum_ubi_parents(Parents, Sofar, NewSofar, 0, UbiParents).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_ubi_parents(Parents, NodesSofar, NewNodesSofar, Accumulator,
% UbiParents)
% find the ubiquity of the first parent, add to accumulator, then recurse
% NB this calls node_ubiquity, which may update the Sofar list!
% These two procedures are embedded in each other: difficult to
% describe in English
% 1 - terminating: all parents processed
sum_ubi_parents([], Sofar, Sofar, UbiParents, UbiParents).
% 2 - recursive: Ubi = sum Ubi(parents) + 1
sum_ubi_parents([Node | T], Sofar, NewSofar2, Acc, UbiParents) :-
node_ubiquity(node(Node, _), Sofar, NewSofar, Ubiquity),
NewAcc is Acc + Ubiquity,
sum_ubi_parents(T, NewSofar, NewSofar2, NewAcc, UbiParents).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% flat(NodesList1, NodesList2)
% For matching purposes, NodesList1 has node definitions of the form
% node(Node, [Inf, Ubi])
% This procedure flattens these definitions into node/3 clauses of form
% node(Node, Inf, Ubi)
flat([], []).
flat([node(Node, [Inf, Ubi]) | RestNodes],
[node(Node, Inf, Ubi) | RestFlat]) :-
flat(RestNodes, RestFlat).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% AUTOMATIC SETUP CALL %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% RUN ALL PROCEDURES WHICH CREATE FILES USED BY idc.pl
:- create_kb.
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C.3 IDC.pl
/*********************************************************************
IDC
(Incoherence-Driven Comprehender)
FILENAME:
['~/IDC_dir/idc.pl'].
FILES USED:
lists.pl
kb.pl
texts.pl
DATA STRUCTURES:
A representation has the form:
repr(STS, LTS, STSInc)
STS = short-term store
LTS = long-term store
Memory stores have the form
[Instance1, ..., InstanceN] ^ [Tree1, ..., TreeM]
where the first argument represents the instances, and the
second the forest (list of trees).
Each instance has the form
instance(Content, Parents, Children, Inc)
Parents (Par) is y if an instance occurs as a child in any tree
(i.e. it has parents);
Children (Chd) is y if an instance occurs as a parent of any tree
(i.e. it has children).
Content consists of raw content and a status marker
(# = inferred, @ = observed)
There are four types of instance content:
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1. event - something which begins and ends within the time
period of the story.
2. habit - something which is constant throughout the story
(e.g. types, habitual propositions).
3. goal - mental events.
4. relation - describes a relationship between two or
more instances.
There are a limited number of relation types, but unlimited habits,
events and goals (i.e. there are no primitives here).
Where the ---> is placed between an event E and its subevents S
(for example) this is taken to mean 'E explains S', where 'explains'
has the broad meaning 'conceptually encapsulates or connects'. So,
a relation can be used to explain the co-occurrence of two event instances.
Each tree has the form
tree(ID, Parent, Children, Inc)
where ID is the schema ID used in constructing the tree,
Parent the parent instance of the tree, and Children the child
instances list of the tree.
Instances and trees are collectively known as representational
elements (r-elts). An r-elt only occurs in LTS or STS; never both.
Extensions - an extension has the structure:
ext(Repr, IncChange)
where Repr is a representation, and IncChange a term in one
of the following forms:
obs(Message, IncChange)
% a string describing how observation was
% incorporated into representation; one of:
% 'by merging with STS'
% 'by merging with LTS'
% 'by creation of a new instance'
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infer(Method, Created, Removed)
% Method = top-down, bottom-up, Created =
% incchange due to tree
% creation, Removed = incchange due to tree removal
transfer(IncChange)
*********************************************************************/
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% quick reload
rl :- ['~/IDC_dir/idc.pl'].
% declare operator for inferred instances
:- op(100, fy, #).
% declare operator for observed instances
:- op(100, fy, @).
% declare operator for schema construction
% (so can load schemas.pl, with texts in it)
:- op(600, xfx, --->).
% operator for schema constraints
:- op(700, xfx, ==>).
% hack to allow direct output to a file
:- dynamic(output_mode/1).
output_mode(screen).
% SHARED PROCEDURES
% (variable binding, constraint checking, output, lists)
:- ['~/IDC_dir/shared.pl'].
% FILE CONTAINING INDICES, SCHEMAS AND NODE DEFINITIONS
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:- ['~/IDC_dir/kb.pl'].
% FILE CONTAINING TEXTS
:- ['~/IDC_dir/texts.pl'].
% FILE CONTAINING TESTS
:- ['~/IDC_dir/tests.pl'].
remind:-
nl,
write('Top-level call is:'),
nl, tab(10),
write('comp(Text, Skept, Range, ToleranceFactor)'), nl,
write('OR'),
nl, tab(10),
write('filecomp(Filename, Text, Skept, Range, ToleranceFactor)'),
nl, nl.
:- remind.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%% TOLERANCE-DRIVEN COMPREHENSION TOP LEVEL %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% text_comp(Text, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor)
% Tolerance equals (AvgInf - 1) * ToleranceFactor
% Enter a text directly
text_comp(Text, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor) :-
avg_inf(AvgInf),
Tolerance is ToleranceFactor * (AvgInf - 1),
comprehend(Text, [repr([]^[], []^[], 0)], Skept, Tolerance,
Width, 1).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% comp(TextNum, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor)
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% Tolerance equals (AvgInf - 1) * ToleranceFactor
comp(TextNum, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor) :-
text(TextNum, Text),
avg_inf(AvgInf),
Tolerance is ToleranceFactor * (AvgInf - 1),
comprehend(Text, [repr([]^[], []^[], 0)], Skept, Tolerance,
Width, 1).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% filecomp(Filename, TextNum, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor)
% As comp/4, but outputs to a text file rather than screen.
% Filename is an atom; the procedure creates an absolute file path
% in the IDC_dir directory, to which output is written.
filecomp(Filename, TextNum, Skept, Width, ToleranceFactor) :-
retractall(output_mode(_)),
assert(output_mode(file)),
text(TextNum, Text),
avg_inf(AvgInf),
Tolerance is ToleranceFactor * (AvgInf - 1),
name('~/IDC_dir/Output_dir/', L1),
name(Filename, L2),
name('.idc', L3),
append(L1, L2, L4),
append(L4, L3, L5),
name(Outfile, L5),
open(Outfile, write, Output1),
set_output(Output1),
write('FILENAME = '), write(Outfile), nl,
write('TEXT = '), nl, write(Text), nl, nl,
write('SKEPTICISM = '), write(Skept), nl,
write('BEAM WIDTH = '), write(Width), nl,
write('TOLERANCE FACTOR = '), write(ToleranceFactor),
write(' TOLERANCE = '), write(Tolerance), nl, nl,
write_line, nl, nl,
comprehend(Text, [repr([]^[], []^[], 0)], Skept, Tolerance,
Width, 1),
retractall(output_mode(_)),
assert(output_mode(screen)),
close(Output1).
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 268
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% comprehend(Text, CurrentReprs, Skept, Tolerance, BeamWidth, Cycle)
% CurrentReprs is sorted in ascending incoherence order, so the first
% representation should have the lowest incoherence (or equal lowest).
% 1 - recursive: text is not empty and incoherence is =< tolerance.
% OBSERVE NEXT STATEMENT
comprehend([Obs | RestObs], [Repr | RestCurrentReprs], Skept, Tolerance,
Range, Cycle1) :-
inc_too_high(Repr, Tolerance, no),
write_status(Cycle1, Skept, Tolerance, Range),
write('Incorporating observation'), nl,
tab(5), write(Obs), nl,
write('into current representations'), nl,
include_obs([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], Obs, Skept, NewExts),
sort_exts(NewExts, [BestExt | RestSorted]),
strip_exts([BestExt | RestSorted], NewReprs),
storage(NewReprs, Load),
write_storage(Load),
write_exts([BestExt | RestSorted]),
Cycle2 is Cycle1 + 1,
comprehend(RestObs, NewReprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle2).
% 2 - recursive: Text can be empty or full.
% N.B. this also prunes the number of representations, according to Range
% and will only be called if at least one representation contains instances
% in STS
% This clause fails if no extensions are returned by action/4
% CREATE AND CHECK
comprehend(Text, [Repr | RestCurrentReprs], Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle1) :-
member(repr([_ | _] ^ _, _, _), [Repr | RestCurrentReprs]),
action([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], create_and_check, Skept, NewExts),
sort_and_trim_exts(Range, NewExts, [BestExt | RestSorted]),
write_status(Cycle1, Skept, Tolerance, Range),
write('Incoherence in STS too high, so creating new inferences'),
nl,
strip_exts([BestExt | RestSorted], NewReprs),
storage(NewReprs, Load),
write_storage(Load),
write_exts([BestExt | RestSorted]),
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Cycle2 is Cycle1 + 1,
comprehend(Text, NewReprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle2).
% 3 - recursive: Text can be empty or full, but there must be
% something in the first representation
% TRANSFER
comprehend(Text, [Repr | RestReprs], Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle1) :-
\+ Repr = repr([]^[], _, _),
inc_too_high(Repr, Tolerance, yes),
clear_STS([Repr | RestReprs], Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle1,
NewReprs, Cycle2),
comprehend(Text, NewReprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle2), !.
% 4 - terminating: text is empty and no further operations can lower
% incoherence
comprehend([], Reprs, _, _, _, _) :-
write('TEXT IS FULLY PROCESSED'), nl,
write('COHERENCE VALUES BELOW ARE ABSOLUTE, WRT SKEPTICISM =
0.5'), nl, nl,
write_final_reprs(Reprs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% clear_STS(Text, NewReprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle, NewReprs2,
% Cycle2)
% Remove elements from STS until incoherence falls below Tolerance
% 1 - terminating: return if incoherence of first representation is
% below tolerance
clear_STS([Repr | RestReprs], _, Tolerance, _, Cycle, [Repr | RestReprs],
Cycle) :-
inc_too_high(Repr, Tolerance, no), !.
% 2 - recursive: do a transfer, then call recursively
clear_STS(Reprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle1, NewReprs2, Cycle3) :-
do_transfer(Reprs, Skept, NewExts),
sort_exts(NewExts, [BestExt | RestSorted]),
write_status(Cycle1, Skept, Tolerance, Range),
write('Transferring elements from current representations
STS to LTS'),
nl,
strip_exts([BestExt | RestSorted], NewReprs),
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storage(NewReprs, Skept, Load),
write_storage(Load),
write_exts([BestExt | RestSorted]),
Cycle2 is Cycle1 + 1,
clear_STS(NewReprs, Skept, Tolerance, Range, Cycle2, NewReprs2,
Cycle3).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% inc_too_high(Repr, Tolerance, Answer)
% Returns 'no' if the incoherence of Repr =< Tolerance; otherwise, 'yes'
% (Saves some ugly code in comprehend)
inc_too_high(repr(_, _, Inc), Tolerance, Answer) :-
Inc =< Tolerance
->
Answer = no
;
Answer = yes.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% strip_exts(Extensions, Reprs)
% Strips the rating off each extension in Extensions to leave the
% corresponding representations Reprs
strip_exts([], []).
strip_exts([ext(Repr, _) | RestExts], [Repr | RestReprs]) :-
strip_exts(RestExts, RestReprs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% STORAGE BASED ON REPRESENTATIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% storage(Reprs, Load)
% Load = fixed incoherence of unique instances and trees in Reprs
% N.B. it uses a copy of current representations, to prevent
% untoward unification
storage(Reprs, Load) :-
copy_term(Reprs, ReprsCopy),
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storage(ReprsCopy, [], [], Load).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% storage(Reprs, InstancesSofar, TreesSofar, Load)
% Calculates storage cost for a list of representations (i.e. total
% fixed inc of unique Instances and Trees
% 1 - terminating: all unique instances and trees determined, so
% calculate
storage([], UniqueInstances, UniqueTrees, Load) :-
fixed_incoherence(UniqueInstances ^ UniqueTrees, Load).
% 2 - recursive: update current lists of instances and trees with
% next representation
storage([repr(STSInstances ^ STSTrees, LTSInstances ^ LTSTrees, _) |
RestReprs], InstancesSofar, TreesSofar, Load) :-
new_sofar(STSInstances, LTSInstances, InstancesSofar,
NewInstancesSofar),
new_sofar(STSTrees, LTSTrees, TreesSofar, NewTreesSofar),
storage(RestReprs, NewInstancesSofar, NewTreesSofar, Load).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% new_sofar(List1, List2, CurrentSofar, NewSofar)
% List1 and List2 are appended to each other, and to CurrentSofar to
% give List4; then duplicates are removed from List4 to leave NewSofar
% Used to find the number of unique instances or trees in a list of
% representations
new_sofar(List1, List2, CurrentSofar, NewSofar) :-
append(List1, List2, List3),
append(List3, CurrentSofar, List4),
loose_remove_duplicates(List4, NewSofar).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_storage(Load)
% Write the load to stream
write_storage(Load) :-
write('Load = '), write(Load), nl.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% WRITING FINAL REPRESENTATIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_final_reprs(Reprs)
% For each representation in Reprs, determines the fixed incoherence
% (wrt a Skepticism of 0.5) of the representation and writes it to the
% screen
% 1 - terminating: all final representations written
write_final_reprs([]) :-
write('ALL REPRESENTATIONS WRITTEN'), nl, nl.
% 2 - recursive: determine the fixed incoherence of the next
% representation and write to screen, then recurse
write_final_reprs([repr(STS, LTS, _) | RestReprs]) :-
fixed_incoherence(STS, STSInc),
fixed_incoherence(LTS, LTSInc),
FixedInc is STSInc + LTSInc,
write_repr(repr(STS, LTS, FixedInc)),
coherence(FixedInc, Cohr),
write('Coherence is '), write(Cohr), nl, nl,
continue(repr(STS, LTS, FixedInc)),
write_final_reprs(RestReprs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% fixed_incoherence(Exgraph, FixedInc)
% Evaluates an exgraph with respect to a skepticism of 0.5;
% this gives the 'absolute' value of a exgraph
fixed_incoherence(Instances ^ Forest, FixedInc) :-
fixed_instances_inc(Instances, 0, FixedInstancesInc),
fixed_trees_inc(Forest, 0, FixedForestInc),
FixedInc is FixedInstancesInc + FixedForestInc.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% fixed_instances_inc(Instances, Acc, FixedInstancesInc)
fixed_instances_inc([], Acc, Acc).
fixed_instances_inc([instance(Content, Par, Chd, _) | RestInstances],
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Acc, FixedInstancesInc) :-
instance_inc(instance(Content, Par, Chd), 0.5, _, OneInc),
NewAcc is Acc + OneInc,
fixed_instances_inc(RestInstances, NewAcc, FixedInstancesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% fixed_trees_inc(Forest, Acc, FixedTreesInc)
fixed_trees_inc([], Acc, Acc).
fixed_trees_inc([tree(ID, Parent, Children, _) | RestTrees], Acc,
FixedTreesInc) :-
tree_inc(tree(ID, Parent, Children), 0.5, _, OneInc),
NewAcc is Acc + OneInc,
fixed_trees_inc(RestTrees, NewAcc, FixedTreesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% coherence(FixedInc, Cohr)
coherence(FixedInc, Cohr) :-
total_inf(TotInf),
findall(N, node(N, _, _), Nodes),
length(Nodes, TotalNoNodes),
MaxInc is ((TotInf - TotalNoNodes) * 2),
IncUsed is MaxInc - FixedInc,
Cohr is IncUsed / MaxInc.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% GENERATING NEW EXTENSIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% action(CurrentReprs, ActionType, Skept, NewReprs)
% Carries out ActionType on all reprs in CurrentReprs in turn.
% 1 - terminating
action([], _, _, []).
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 274
% 2 - recursive: find extensions of first representation, then recurse.
action([Repr | RestReprs], Type, Skept, NewReprs) :-
action_narrative(Type, Repr, Skept, Goal, Output),
findall(Output,
Goal,
OneNewGen),
action(RestReprs, Type, Skept, RestNewGen),
append(OneNewGen, RestNewGen, NewReprs).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% action_narrative(ActionType, ReprIn, Skept, Goal, ReprOut)
% ActionType =
% create_and_check (connect instances then remove redundancies
% and spuriousness in a single cycle)
% transfer_tree (move tree and dependent instances from STS to LTS)
% transfer_instance (move isolated instance from STS to LTS)
% Each action has the same input but a different set of procedure
% calls in Goal.
% 1 - create_and_check: extend the representation, then check whether the
% new tree used to extend the representation has made any others redundant.
% For reprs with at least one instance in STS
action_narrative(create_and_check, repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc), Skept,
((STS1 = [_ | _] ^ _), create_and_check(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc),
Skept, repr(STS2, LTS2, NewInc), infer(Method, Created, Removed)),
Incchange is Created + Removed, Incchange < 0),
ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, NewInc), infer(Method, Created, Removed))).
% 2 - create_and_check for empty STS
action_narrative(create_and_check, repr(STS, LTS, Inc), _,
(STS = [] ^ _),
ext(repr(STS, LTS, Inc), infer('no inference', 0, 0))).
% 3 - transfer_tree: transfer a tree to LTS, along with its
% dependent instances.
% IncChange for a transfer = NewInc - InitialInc.
% This clause works when STS actually has something in it
action_narrative(transfer_tree, repr(STS, LTS, Inc), Skept,
(\+(STS = _ ^ []), transfer_tree(repr(STS, LTS, Inc),
Skept, repr(NewSTS, NewLTS, NewInc)), IncChange is NewInc - Inc,
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IncChange =< 0),
ext(repr(NewSTS, NewLTS, NewInc), transfer(IncChange))).
% 4 - transfer_tree for representations with empty STS forest
action_narrative(transfer_tree, repr(STS, LTS, Inc), _,
(STS = _ ^ []),
ext(repr(STS, LTS, Inc), transfer(0))).
% 5 - transfer_instance: transfer a parent- and child-less instance to LTS.
% For representations containing at least one instance
action_narrative(transfer_instance, repr(STS, LTS, Inc), _,
(\+ (STS = [] ^ _), transfer_instance(repr(STS, LTS, Inc),
repr(NewSTS, NewLTS, NewInc)), IncChange is NewInc - Inc,
IncChange =< 0),
ext(repr(NewSTS, NewLTS, NewInc), transfer(IncChange))).
% 6 - transfer_instance for representations with empty STS instances
action_narrative(transfer_instance, repr(STS, LTS, Inc), _,
(STS = [] ^ _),
ext(repr(STS, LTS, Inc), transfer(0))).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% SORT AND TRIM %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sort_and_trim_exts(Range, Extensions, NewExts)
% NewExts consists of the best extension in Extensions1, plus other
% extensions whose inc is within Range * Inc of the best representation.
% The larger range is, the more extensions are acceptable.
% If Range = 1, all representations with the same incoherence are maintained.
% providing they consist of different trees.
% 1 - if Range = -1, only a single best extension is accepted
sort_and_trim_exts(-1, [ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc), Rating) | RestExtensions],
[BestExt]) :-
find_best(RestExtensions, ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc), Rating),
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BestExt), !.
% 2 - for Range >= 0; total incoherence of extensions kept, above
% the inc of standard (i.e. repr with lowest inc) must fall within Range
sort_and_trim_exts(Range, Extensions, NewExts) :-
Range >= 0,
sort_exts(Extensions, SortedExtensions),
range_trim(Range, SortedExtensions, NewExts).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% find_best(Extensions, Sofar, BestExt)
% 1 - terminating: set the best ext to sofar
find_best([], BestRepr, BestRepr).
% 2 - recursive: if next extension has lower incchange than sofar, set it
% as the new sofar; otherwise, maintain current sofar.
find_best([ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating1) | RestExts],
ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, Inc2), Rating2), BestExt) :-
Inc1 < Inc2
->
find_best(RestExts, ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating1), BestExt)
;
find_best(RestExts, ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, Inc2), Rating2), BestExt).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% CODE FOR TRIM, SORT_EXTENSIONS and SWAP modified from
% http://www-it.fmi.uni-sofia.bg/ai/search2.pl
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sort_exts(Extensions, SortedExtensions)
% Sorts the list of extensions so that the one with lowest inc is at the front.
sort_exts(Extensions, SortedExtensions) :-
swap_ext(Extensions, Extensions2), !,
sort_exts(Extensions2, SortedExtensions).
sort_exts(Extensions, Extensions).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% swap_ext(Extensions, Swapped)
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% If first extension in Extensions has higher inc than the second,
% swap them over; otherwise, leave first where it is, and move onto second.
% 1 - first extension has lower inc than second
swap_ext([ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating1),
ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, Inc2), Rating2) | RestExts],
[ext(repr(STS2, LTS2, Inc2), Rating2),
ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating1) | RestExts]) :-
Inc2 < Inc1.
% 2 - leave first two elements in same order
swap_ext([H | T1], [H | T2]) :-
swap_ext(T1,T2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% range_trim(Range, ListIn, ListOut)
% Use the first element of ListIn as the `standard'; each other
% representation whose inc is above the standard consumes part of
% that resource (so range acts like an 'activation pool' and thus
% more like 'capacity')
range_trim(Range, [ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating) | RestIn], ListOut) :-
range_trim(RestIn, Inc1, Range, 0,
[ext(repr(STS1, LTS1, Inc1), Rating)], ListOut).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% range_trim(ExtsIn, LowestInc, Range, EffortAcc, ExtsSofar, ExtsOut)
% LowestInc is the incoherence of the best repr found so far
% 1 - terminating: no more extensions to check, so set outputs to
% accumulators
range_trim([], _, _, _, ExtsOut, ExtsOut).
% 2 - check that next extension has a valid rating and won't
% exceed Range:
% if it doesn't, all usable exts have been checked, so call
% with empty list to terminate; if it does, call attempt_append,
% which tries to add the extension to the sofar list
range_trim([ext(repr(STS, LTS, Inc), Rating) | RestExts],
LowestInc, Range, Effort1, Sofar, ExtsOut) :-
EffortForExt is (Inc - LowestInc),
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clip(EffortForExt, EffortForExt2),
Effort2 is Effort1 + EffortForExt2,
Effort2 =< Range
->
attempt_append(ext(repr(STS, LTS, Inc), Rating),
EffortForExt, Sofar, ActualEffort, NewSofar),
Effort3 is Effort1 + ActualEffort,
range_trim(RestExts, LowestInc, Range, Effort3, NewSofar, ExtsOut)
;
range_trim([], _, _, _, Sofar, ExtsOut).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% attempt_append(Extension, EffortForExt, Sofar, ActualEffort, NewSofar)
% If Extension in not duplicated in Sofar, add it to Sofar and set
% Effort3 to EffortForExt; else, NewSofar = Sofar and ActualEffort = 0
attempt_append(Extension, EffortForExt, Sofar, ActualEffort, NewSofar) :-
\+ duplicate_ext(Sofar, Extension)
->
ActualEffort = EffortForExt,
append(Sofar, [Extension], NewSofar)
;
ActualEffort = 0,
NewSofar = Sofar.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% duplicate_ext(OtherExtensions1, Extension)
% Extension is duplicated in OtherExtensions if its
% incoherence, STSF and LTSF match the Inc, STSF and LTSF of some extension
% in OtherExtensions.
% 1 - next extension is a duplicate of Extension as forests contain
% identical trees, not necessarily occurring in the same order.
duplicate_ext([ext(repr(_ ^ STSF1, _ ^ LTSF1, Inc), _) | _],
ext(repr(_ ^ STSF2, _ ^ LTSF2, Inc), _)) :-
identical_forests(STSF1, STSF2),
identical_forests(LTSF1, LTSF2), !.
% 2 - recursive: next extension is not a duplicate, try elsewhere in list
duplicate_ext([_ | T], Extension) :-
duplicate_ext(T, Extension).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% identical_forests(Forest1, Forest2)
% True if the set of trees in Forest1 = the set of trees in Forest2
% 1 - terminating: both forests empty, therefore identical
identical_forests([], []) :- !.
% 2 - terminating: non-empty but unifying forests are identical
identical_forests(Forest, Forest) :-
\+ Forest == [], !.
% 3 - recursive: the next tree of the first forest can be removed
% from the second forest
identical_forests([Tree | RestTrees], Forest2) :-
\+ [Tree | RestTrees] = Forest2,
tree_duplicated(Tree, Forest2, Forest3),
identical_forests(RestTrees, Forest3).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MERGING NEW OBSERVATIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% include_obs(CurrentReprs, Obs, Skept, NewExts)
% Adds a new observation's instance to the STS instances or LTS
% instances and updates trees in STS and in LTS for each current
% representation; each extension produced records the change to
% inc for sorting purposes.
% 1 - terminating: unify the output list with the sofar list
include_obs([], _, _, []).
% 2 - recursive: incorporate observation into first repr, then recurse.
include_obs([Repr | T], Obs, Skept, [NewExt | RestNewExts]) :-
integrate_obs_with_repr(Repr, Obs, Skept, NewExt), !,
include_obs(T, Obs, Skept, RestNewExts).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% integrate_obs_with_repr(Repr, Obs, Skept, NewExt)
% Repr = repr(STSExgraph, LTSExgraph, STSInc)
% Obs = a new observation, without any status token (no '@')
% NewExt = Repr with Obs integrated into it, plus message and incchange
% A new observation may be merged with an existing instance in
% STS or LTS, or added to STS or LTS without merging.
% If merged with an existing instance, updating of trees in STS and/or LTS is
% required (i.e. changing inferred instances to observed instances).
% Wherever structures are altered by the new observation, incoherence of
% those structures is updated; STSInc is also updated if STS is
% changed in any way.
% 1 - merge observation with an existing STS instance, and update trees.
integrate_obs_with_repr(repr(I1a ^ F1a, I2a ^ F2a, Inc), Obs, Skept,
ext(repr(I1c ^ F1c, I2a ^ F2b, NewInc), obs('merging with STS', IncChange))) :-
merge_obs_with_instance_list(I1a, Obs, Skept, NewInstance, I1b),
update_forest(F1a, NewInstance, Skept, F1b),
update_forest(F2a, NewInstance, Skept, F2b),
inc([NewInstance | I1b] ^ F1b, Skept, I1c ^ F1c, NewInc),
IncChange is NewInc - Inc, !.
% 2 - merge observation with an existing LTS instance, and update trees.
% Note that the LTS instance is considered to have been retrieved into STS -
% this allows new inferences based on the new observation to be made.
integrate_obs_with_repr(repr(I1a ^ F1a, I2a ^ F2a, Inc), Obs, Skept,
ext(repr(I1b ^ F1c, I2b ^ F2b, NewInc), obs('merging with LTS', IncChange))) :-
merge_obs_with_instance_list(I2a, Obs, Skept, NewInstance, I2b),
update_forest(F1a, NewInstance, Skept, F1b),
update_forest(F2a, NewInstance, Skept, F2b),
inc([NewInstance | I1a] ^ F1b, Skept, I1b ^ F1c, NewInc),
IncChange is Inc - NewInc, !.
% 3 - add observation to STS instances without updating any r-elts.
integrate_obs_with_repr(repr(I1 ^ F1, I2 ^ F2, Inc), Obs, Skept,
ext(repr([NewInstance | I1] ^ F1, I2 ^ F2, NewInc),
obs('creating new instance', InstanceInc))) :-
instance_inc(instance(@Obs, n, n), Skept, NewInstance, InstanceInc),
NewInc is Inc + InstanceInc.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MERGING AN OBSERVATION WITH A INSTANCE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% merge_obs_with_instance_list(CurrentInstances, NewObs, Skept,
% NewInstance, CurrentInstancesLeft)
% Merges NewObs with an element of CurrentInstances to leave
% CurrentInstancesLeft; NewInstance is the instance created from
% NewObs (e.g. if an existing inferred instance has instantiated
% arguments which unify with arguments of NewObs).
% This is used to update the trees in STS and LTS.
% NewObs is not marked as an observation with '@' at this point.
% 1 - terminating: next elt can be merged with the next instance
% in the instance list.
merge_obs_with_instance_list([Instance1 | RestInstances1], NewObs,
Skept, instance(@Content, Par, Chd, Inc), RestInstances1) :-
combine_obs_with_instance(NewObs, Instance1, Skept,
instance(@Content, Par, Chd, Inc)), !.
% 2 - recursive: try next element of Instances1.
merge_obs_with_instance_list([Instance1 | RestInstances1], NewObs,
Skept, NewInstance, [Instance1 | RestInstances2]) :-
merge_obs_with_instance_list(RestInstances1, NewObs, Skept,
NewInstance, RestInstances2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% combine_obs_with_instance(NewObs, ExistingInstance, Skept, NewInstance)
% Combines a new obs with an existing instance (which may have unbound
% event tokens). This should bind the values in the new instance to
% unbound values in the existing instance. NewContent is the content
% of a new observation, while ExistingInstance has is an instance with
% inc assigned.
% NB a new observation cannot be combined with a previous observation.
% 1 - for all except relations
combine_obs_with_instance(C1, instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, _),
Skept, NewInstance) :-
\+ C2 = @_,
\+ C1 = relation(_, _),
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raw_content(C2, C2a),
combine_raw_content(C1, C2a),
instance_inc(instance(@C2a, Par2, Chd2), Skept, NewInstance, _).
% 2 - for relations: must unify from an existing relation to the new
% observation, otherwise relations can be instantiated with
% incorrect event tokens.
combine_obs_with_instance(C1, instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, _), Skept,
NewInstance) :-
\+ C2 = @_,
C1 = relation(_, _),
raw_content(C2, C2a),
combine_raw_content(C2a, C1),
instance_inc(instance(@C1, Par2, Chd2), Skept, NewInstance, _).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% UPDATING A FOREST %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% update_forest(Forest, NewInstance, Skept, NewForest)
% Updates any occurrence of NewInstance in Forest which exactly
% matches the content of NewInstance; updates inferred instances
% to observed ones.
% 1 - terminating: no more trees to update
update_forest([], _, _, []).
% 2 - recursive: if-then structure, which updates the next tree if
% possible, or just puts the next tree onto the output; then recurse
% with the rest of the forest.
update_forest([Tree | RestTrees], NewInstance, Skept,
[NewTree | NewRestTrees]) :-
update_tree(NewInstance, Tree, Skept, NewTree)
->
update_forest(RestTrees, NewInstance, Skept, NewRestTrees)
;
NewTree = Tree,
update_forest(RestTrees, NewInstance, Skept, NewRestTrees).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% update_tree(NewInstance, Tree, Skept, NewTree)
% Updates any instance in Tree whose content exactly matches the
% content of NewInstance. Inc is calculated for the updated tree.
% NB the checks on flag content ensure that the correct clause is called.
% 1 - update a tree's parent.
update_tree(instance(@Content, _, y, _), tree(ID, #Parent, Children, _),
Skept, NewTree) :-
Content == Parent,
tree_inc(tree(ID, @Content, Children), Skept, NewTree, _).
% 2 - update a tree's child.
update_tree(instance(@Content, y, _, _), tree(ID, Parent, Children1, _),
Skept, NewTree) :-
indexed(ID, _, @Content),
update_children(Content, Children1, Children2),
tree_inc(tree(ID, Parent, Children2), Skept, NewTree, _).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% update_children(Content, Children1, Children2)
% Updates the status of any child whose content matches Content
% (which is the content of an observed instance).
update_children(C1, [#C2 | Rest], [@C2 | Rest]) :-
C1 == C2, !.
update_children(C1, [C2 | Rest2], [C2 | Rest3]) :-
\+ loose_match(@C1, C2),
update_children(C1, Rest2, Rest3).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CREATE_AND_CHECK PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% create_and_check(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange)
% Extends a repr, then removes from that repr any trees and
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% associated instances which have become redundant as a result (i.e.
% any trees which explain a subset of the observations explained by
% the new tree used to extend content of memory store).
create_and_check(repr(STS, LTS1, _), Skept, repr(STS4, LTS4, NewInc),
infer(Method, ClippedCreated, ClippedRemoved)) :-
create(repr(STS, LTS1, _), Skept,
repr(STSI1 ^ [NewTree | RestSTSF1], LTS2, _), Created, Method),
clip(Created, ClippedCreated),
remove_redundancies(NewTree, STSI1 ^ RestSTSF1, LTS2,
Skept, STSI2 ^ STSF2, LTS3, IncChange2),
remove_spurious(STSI2 ^ STSF2, LTS3, Skept,
STSI3 ^ STSF3, LTS4, IncChange3),
Removed is IncChange2 + IncChange3,
clip(Removed, ClippedRemoved),
inc(STSI3 ^ [NewTree | STSF3], Skept, STS4, NewInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%% EXTENDING REPRESENTATIONS TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP %%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% create(Repr, Skept, NewRepr)
% Adds a new tree and associated instances to Repr (wrt Skept) to
% generate NewRepr. An instance in STS is used as the trigger for
% this process; one or more existing instances in STS or LTS are used
% to fill slots in a triggered schema; any slots which remain unfilled
% have instances created for them.
create(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange, top_down) :-
create_top_down(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange).
create(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange, bottom_up) :-
create_bottom_up(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% EXTEND_TOP_DOWN %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% create_top_down(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange)
% Finds a possible top-down extension NewRepr of Repr.
% NB CANNOT INFER DOWNWARDS FROM A RELATION
% Keeps track of the change to incoherence caused by making the
% extension - both in STS, in terms of new instances created and
% instances which gain parents or children.
% IncChange is the change in incoherence of STS elts: if positive,
% incoherence has been increased and coherence reduced; if negative,
% incoherence has been reduced by that amount.
create_top_down(repr(STSI1 ^ STSF1, LTSI1 ^ LTSF, _), Skept,
repr(NewSTS, LTSI2 ^ LTSF, NewInc), IncChange2) :-
% select instance for parent
select_instance(any, STSI1, instance(P, Par, _, NInc1), STSI2),
raw_content(P, RawP),
% prevent inferring down from relations
\+ RawP = relation(_, _),
ID: RawP/Cons ---> RHs,
% prevent duplication
\+ tree_present(tree(ID, P, _, _), STSF1),
instance_inc(instance(P, Par, y), Skept, ParentInstance, NInc2),
Acc is NInc2 - NInc1,
construct_children(RHs, ID, STSI2, LTSI1, Skept, Acc,
STSI3, LTSI2, Children, IncChange1),
check(Cons),
tree_inc(tree(ID, P, Children), Skept, NewTree, TreeInc),
IncChange2 is IncChange1 + TreeInc,
inc([ParentInstance | STSI3] ^ [NewTree | STSF1], Skept,
NewSTS, NewInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% EXTEND_BOTTOM_UP %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% create_bottom_up(Repr, Skept, NewRepr, IncChange)
% Finds a possible bottom up extension NewRepr of Repr.
% NB CANNOT INFER UPWARDS FROM A RELATION
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 286
create_bottom_up(repr(STSI1 ^ STSF1, LTSI1 ^ LTSF, _), Skept,
repr(NewSTS, LTSI3 ^ LTSF, NewInc), IncChange4) :-
% select instance for first child
select_instance(any, STSI1, instance(C, _, Chd1, Inc1), STSI2),
raw_content(C, RawC),
% prevent inferring up from relations
\+ RawC = relation(_, _),
indexed(ID, #P, C),
ID: P/Cons ---> RHs,
% prevent duplication
\+ tree_present(tree(ID, #P, _, _), STSF1),
construct_parent(LTSI1, STSI2, P, ID, Skept, LTSI2, STSI3,
Parent, IncChange1),
construct_first_child(C, RHs, Children1),
instance_inc(instance(C, y, Chd1), Skept, NewInstance, Inc2),
IncChange2 is IncChange1 + (Inc2 - Inc1),
construct_children(Children1, ID, STSI3, LTSI2, Skept,
IncChange2, STSI4, LTSI3, Children2, IncChange3),
check(Cons),
tree_inc(tree(ID, Parent, Children2), Skept, NewTree, TreeInc),
IncChange4 is IncChange3 + TreeInc,
inc([NewInstance | STSI4] ^ [NewTree | STSF1], Skept,
NewSTS, NewInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TREE AND INSTANCE CONSTRUCTION %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% construct_parent(LTSI1, STSI1, RawContent, ID, Skept, LTSI2, STSI2,
% Parent, IncChange)
% ParentInstance is either constructed by directed unification with
% an instance in LTS, or by creation of a new instance.
% 1 - RawContent doesn't match any instance in LTSI1, so create a
% new instance (providing it isn't already present in STSI)
construct_parent([], STSI, C, _, Skept, [], [NewInstance | STSI],
#C, IncChange) :-
\+ instance_duplicated(instance(#C, n, y, _), STSI),
instance_inc(instance(#C, n, y), Skept, NewInstance, IncChange).
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% 2 - RawContent matches the next instance in LTSN
construct_parent([instance(C2, Par, _, Inc1) | RestStore], STSI,
C1, ID, Skept, [NewInstance | RestStore], STSI, C2, IncChange) :-
indexed(ID, C2, #_),
raw_content(C2, RawC2),
combine_raw_content(RawC2, C1),
instance_inc(instance(C2, Par, y), Skept, NewInstance, Inc2),
IncChange is Inc2 - Inc1, !.
% 3 - try later instance in LTSN
construct_parent([Instance | RestInstances1], STSI1, C, ID, Skept,
[Instance | RestInstances2], STSI2, Parent, IncChange) :-
construct_parent(RestInstances1, STSI1, C, ID, Skept,
RestInstances2, STSI2, Parent, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% construct_first_child(Content, RHs, Children)
% Takes the trigger instance's content and inserts it into the
% correct place in the RHs list to give Children1; this ensures
% that the instance which triggered the bottom-up extension is
% included in the resulting tree.
% 1 - terminating: next RHs instance matches Content.
construct_first_child(C, [RH/Cons | RestRHs], [C | RestRHs]) :-
raw_content(C, RawC),
combine_raw_content(RawC, RH),
check(Cons), !.
% 2 - recursive: check later RHs instances.
construct_first_child(C, [RH | RestRHs1], [RH | RestRHs2]) :-
construct_first_child(C, RestRHs1, RestRHs2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% construct_children(Children1, ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, Acc, STSI2,
% LTSI2, Children2, IncChange)
% Children1 = list of RH nodes of a schema and possibly one
% already-inferred child; RH nodes have form Content/Constraints.
% ID = ID of schema used to construct new tree, used to speed processing.
% 1 - terminating: no more RH nodes to match.
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construct_children([], _, STSI, LTSI, _, IncChange, STSI, LTSI, [],
IncChange).
% 2 - recursive: next RH node can be matched with an instance in STS.
construct_children([C/Cons | RestChildren1], ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept,
Acc, STSI3, LTSI2, [Child | RestChildren2], IncChange) :-
unify_RH_with_instance(C/Cons, ID, STSI1, Skept, STSI2, Child,
SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
construct_children(RestChildren1, ID, STSI2, LTSI1, Skept, NewAcc,
STSI3, LTSI2, RestChildren2, IncChange), !.
% 3 - recursive: next RH node can be matched with an instance in LTS.
construct_children([C/Cons | RestChildren1], ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, Acc,
STSI2, LTSI3, [Child | RestChildren2], IncChange) :-
unify_RH_with_instance(C/Cons, ID, LTSI1, Skept, LTSI2, Child,
SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
construct_children(RestChildren1, ID, STSI1, LTSI2, Skept,
NewAcc, STSI2, LTSI3, RestChildren2, IncChange), !.
% 4 - recursive: no match in STS or LTS, so infer new instance and add to STS.
construct_children([C/Cons | RestChildren1], ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, Acc,
[NewInstance | STSI2], LTSI2, [#C | RestChildren2], IncChange) :-
check(Cons),
instance_inc(instance(#C, y, n), Skept, NewInstance,
NewInstanceInc),
NewAcc is Acc + NewInstanceInc,
construct_children(RestChildren1, ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept,
NewAcc, STSI2, LTSI2, RestChildren2, IncChange).
% 5 - recursive: next child has already been constructed
% (e.g. by construct_first_child)
construct_children([C | RestChildren1], ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, Acc,
STSI2, LTSI2, [C | RestChildren2], IncChange) :-
raw_content(C, _),
construct_children(RestChildren1, ID, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept,
Acc, STSI2, LTSI2, RestChildren2, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% unify_RH_with_instance(RH, ID, CurrentInstances, Skept, NewInstances,
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% Child, IncChange)
% RH = a right-hand node, complete with its constraints list.
% ID = ID of the schema being used to construct the tree.
% CurrentInstances = list of instances current in a store.
% NewInstances = updated list of instances.
% Child = a new child for a tree, based on the unification of RH and an
% instance in the store.
% IncChange = change to the incoherence of the instance which was matched.
% 1 - terminating: InstanceContent matches next RH node and constraints hold.
unify_RH_with_instance(RH/Cons, ID,
[instance(N, _, Chd, Inc1) | RestInstances], Skept,
[NewInstance | RestInstances], N, ChildIncChange) :-
indexed(ID, #_, N),
raw_content(N, RawN),
combine_raw_content(RawN, RH),
check(Cons),
instance_inc(instance(N, y, Chd), Skept, NewInstance, Inc2),
ChildIncChange is Inc2 - Inc1, !.
% 2 - recursive: try a later instance in the list.
unify_RH_with_instance(RH/Cons, ID, [Instance | RestInstances1], Skept,
[Instance | RestInstances2], Child, ChildIncChange) :-
unify_RH_with_instance(RH/Cons, ID, RestInstances1, Skept,
RestInstances2, Child, ChildIncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%% PROCEDURES FOR REMOVING REDUNDANT ELEMENTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_redundancies(Tree, STS1, LTS1, Skept, STS2, LTS2, IncChange)
% Removes all redundant trees and associated instances from STS1 and
% LTS1 to give STS2 and LTS2.
% 1. Check each tree in STS first - if made redundant by Tree,
% remove from STS then call update_repr on the remainder of
% STS and current LTS.
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% 2. Check each tree in LTS - do as 1 for each redundant tree.
remove_redundancies(Tree, STS1, LTS1, Skept, STS3, LTS3, IncChange2) :-
remove_redundant_trees(Tree, STS1, LTS1, Skept, 0, STS2, LTS2,
IncChange1),
remove_redundant_trees(Tree, LTS2, STS2, Skept, IncChange1,
LTS3, STS3, IncChange2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_redundant_trees(Tree, Exgraph1a, Exgraph2a, Skept, Acc,
% Exgraph1b, Exgraph2b, IncChange)
% Checks each tree in Exgraph1a: if it is redundant wrt Tree,
% propagate the changes through both Exgraph1a and Exgraph2a to
% give new exgraphs which are passed to the recursive call; otherwise
% (the tree isn't redundant), make no changes.
% Acc keeps track of the changes to inc.
remove_redundant_trees(Tree, I1a ^ F1a, I2a ^ F2a, Skept, Acc,
I1b ^ F1b, I2b ^ F2a, IncChange) :-
append(F1a, F2a, AllTrees),
remove_redundant_trees1(F1a, Tree, AllTrees, I1a, I2a,
Skept, Acc, I1b, F1b, I2b, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_redundant_trees1(F1a, Tree, AllTrees, I1a, I2a, Skept, Acc,
% I1b, F1b, I2b, IncChange)
% Each tree in F1a is checked in turn; if redundant with respect to Tree,
% update the values of the instances in I1a and I2a to give I1b and
% I2b respectively to take account of removal of this tree.
% If a tree is not redundant, it can just be added to the output.
% 1 - terminating: all trees checked.
remove_redundant_trees1([], _, _, I1, I2, _, Acc, I1, [], I2, Acc).
% 2 - recursive: if next tree is redundant, update stores to account
% for this; otherwise, add it to the output.
remove_redundant_trees1([Tree1 | RestTrees], Tree2, AllTrees, I1a,
I2a, Skept, Acc, I1c, F1, I2c, IncChange) :-
redundant(Tree1, Tree2)
->
remove(Tree1, AllTrees, AllTrees2),
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update_stores(Tree1, [Tree2 | AllTrees2], I1a, I2a,
Skept, I1b, I2b, SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
remove_redundant_trees1(RestTrees, Tree2, AllTrees2, I1b,
I2b, Skept, NewAcc, I1c, F1, I2c, IncChange)
;
remove_redundant_trees1(RestTrees, Tree2, AllTrees, I1a,
I2a, Skept, Acc, I1c, F1T, I2c, IncChange),
F1 = [Tree1 | F1T].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% REDUNDANCY CHECKING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% redundant(Tree1, Tree2)
% Checks whether Tree1's observed children are a variant subset of
% the observed children of the second tree; if this is the case,
% the first tree is redundant (i.e. the first tree explains the
% same or fewer observations as second tree). The first tree is required
% to have at least one observed child, otherwise it cannot be considered
% redundant with respect to a second tree.
% (It could be considered spurious, though.)
% 1 - Tree1 is redundant wrt Tree2 if Tree1's observed children
% are a variant of Tree2's and Tree2 has lower inc than Tree1;
% also, the parent of Tree1 must not be a child of Tree2, and
% the trees must not unify.
redundant(tree(_, P1, C1, Inc1), tree(_, P2, C2, Inc2)) :-
\+ tree(_, P1, C1, Inc1) = tree(_, P2, C2, Inc2),
% ensure that Tree1 has at least one observed child
member(@_, C1),
\+ strict_child_present(P1, C2),
variant(C1, C2),
Inc1 >= Inc2, !.
% 2 - Tree1 is redundant wrt Tree2 if their parents and IDs exactly
% match, but Tree2 has equal or lower inc, e.g. if the same instance
% is used to construct two trees and one has more accurate
% `elaborations' (less incoherent).
redundant(tree(ID, P1, _, Inc1), tree(ID, P2, _, Inc2)) :-
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P1 == P2,
Inc1 >= Inc2.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% variant(Children1, Children2)
% True if the first tree's observed children are a subset or equal to
% the observed members of Children2.
% 1 - terminating: all observed elements of Children1 are present
% in Children2.
variant([], _).
% 2 - recursive: next child of the first tree is observed and
% strictly present in Children2.
variant([@Child1 | Rest1], Children2) :-
strict_remove(@Child1, Children2, Children3),
variant(Rest1, Children3).
% 3 - recursive: next child of the first tree is inferred, so ignored.
variant([#_ | Rest1], Children2) :-
variant(Rest1, Children2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%% PROCEDURES FOR REMOVING SPURIOUS ELEMENTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% A potentially spurious tree is recognised by the fact that it
% contains no observations, either as its parent or among its
% observations; and its parent has no parent of its own (i.e.
% Parent flag set to 'n'); and its children have no children of their own.
% A spurious tree T1 generally comes about when a tree T2 is
% superceded by a new tree T3; if one of the children of T2 was
% inferred, and this child was the parent of T1, then T1 may
% become spurious (as its parent was dependent on a now-redundant tree).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_spurious(Exgraph1, Exgraph2, Skept, NewExgraph1, NewExgraph2,
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% IncChange)
% If a spurious tree can be found and removed, along with its
% associated r-elts, then recurse with the remainder of the representation;
% otherwise, just return the current STS and LTS;
% Acc is the IncChange so far generated by removing spurious trees.
% NB this is quite complicated, as it first tries removing the tree and
% its instances; if this produces an improvement, the tree can be
% removed from the list of trees to be processed - however, it still
% has to be in AllTrees, for the purposes of updating other instances
% which may be in potentially spurious trees.
remove_spurious(STS1, LTS1, Skept, STS3, LTS3, IncChange2) :-
remove_spurious_trees(STS1, LTS1, Skept, 0, STS2, LTS2,
IncChange1),
remove_spurious_trees(LTS2, STS2, Skept, IncChange1, LTS3,
STS3, IncChange2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_spurious_trees(Exgraph1a, Exgraph2a, Skept, Acc, Exgraph1b,
% Exgraph2b, IncChange)
remove_spurious_trees(I1a ^ F1a, I2a ^ F2a, Skept, Acc, I1b ^ F1b,
I2b ^ F2a, IncChange) :-
append(F1a, F2a, AllTrees),
remove_spurious_trees1(F1a, AllTrees, I1a, I2a, Skept,
Acc, I1b, F1b, I2b, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_spurious_trees1(F1a, AllTrees, I1a, I2a, Skept, Acc, I1b,
% F1b, I2b, IncChange)
% Check each tree in the forest F1a; if a tree is spurious,
% remove it and propagate the changes through I1a and I2a ^ F2a;
% if not spurious, add it to the output forest (F1b).
% 1 - terminating: all trees in forest checked.
remove_spurious_trees1([], _, I1, I2, _, IncChange, I1, [], I2,
IncChange).
% 2 - recursive: if first tree spurious, update instances and second
% forest; otherwise, just add to output forest.
remove_spurious_trees1([Tree1 | RestTrees], AllTrees, I1a, I2a,
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Skept, Acc, I1c, F1, I2c, IncChange) :-
spurious(Tree1, I1a, I2a)
->
remove(Tree1, AllTrees, AllTrees2),
update_stores(Tree1, AllTrees2, I1a, I2a, Skept, I1b, I2b,
SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
remove_spurious_trees1(RestTrees, AllTrees2, I1b, I2b, Skept,
NewAcc, I1c, F1, I2c, IncChange)
;
remove_spurious_trees1(RestTrees, AllTrees, I1a, I2a, Skept,
Acc, I1c, F1T, I2c, IncChange),
F1 = [Tree1 | F1T].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% spurious(Tree, STSInstances, LTSInstances)
% Tree is spurious with respect to the instances of a representation
% if it is groundless (i.e. contains no observed elements) and isolated
% (i.e. parent and children do not occur in any other tree).
spurious(Tree, STSInstances, LTSInstances) :-
groundless(Tree),
isolated(Tree, STSInstances, LTSInstances).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% groundless(Tree)
% A tree is groundless if it contains no observed elements either
% as its parent or among its children
groundless(tree(_, #_, C, _)) :-
\+ member(@_, C).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% isolated(Tree, STSInstances, LTSInstances)
% Tree is isolated wrt Repr if the parent instance of Tree has its
% parent flag set to 'n' and all its child instances have their child
% flag set to 'n'
isolated(tree(_, P, C, _), STSI, LTSI) :-
orphan(P, STSI, LTSI),
childless(C, STSI, LTSI).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% orphan(Parent, STSInstances, LTSInstances)
% A tree's parent is an orphan if it has no parents of its own.
orphan(P, STSI, LTSI) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(P, STSI, instance(P, n, _, _), _)
;
strict_retrieve_instance(P, LTSI, instance(P, n, _, _), _).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% childless(Children, STSInstances, LTSInstances)
% True if all members of the list Children can be strictly retrieved
% from either STSInstances or LTSInstances, and all have 'n' in their
% child flag.
% 1 - terminating: all children retrieved successfully.
childless([], _, _).
% 2 - recursive: retrieve first child's instance from STS, recurse
% with remainder.
childless([H | T], STSInstances1, LTSInstances) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(H, STSInstances1, instance(H, _, n, _),
STSInstances2),
childless(T, STSInstances2, LTSInstances).
% 3 - recursive: retrieve first child's instance from STS, recurse
% with remainder.
childless([H | T], STSInstances, LTSInstances1) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(H, LTSInstances1, instance(H, _, n, _),
LTSInstances2),
childless(T, STSInstances, LTSInstances2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% PROPAGATING CHANGES CAUSED BY REDUNDANT OR SPURIOUS TREES %%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% Once a tree has been removed, some instances may be rendered redundant.
% These procedures update the parent and child flags of instances
% in the repr; any inferred instances which no longer have either
% parents or children are removed; observations remain in the repr
% with their new flag settings.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% update_stores(RemovedTree, AllTrees, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, STSI2,
% LTSI2, IncChange)
% RemovedTree is a tree removed from a representation;
% OldSTS and OldLTS are updated to take account of the removal
% of the tree - parent and child flags are set, and any inferred
% instances with both flags set to 'n' are removed (not explicitly,
% but during the building of new instance lists in set_flags via
% rationalise_instances/3); IncChange tracks the incoherence change
% caused by switching of flags and removal of redundant instances;
% it also includes the IncChange caused by removing the redundant tree.
update_stores(tree(_, P, C, Inc), AllTrees, STSI1, LTSI1, Skept, STSI2,
LTSI2, ClippedIncChange) :-
set_instances([P | C], STSI1, LTSI1, AllTrees, Skept, 0,
STSI2, LTSI2, IncChange1),
IncChange2 is IncChange1 - Inc,
clip(IncChange2, ClippedIncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% set_instances(RemovedTreeInstances, STSI1, LTSI1, AllTrees,
% Skept, Acc, STSI2, LTSI2, IncChange)
% For each instance in RemovedTreeInstances:
% 1. Retrieve that instance from either STSI1 or LTSI1;
% designate the remainder of the store of instances as RestStore;
% let the updated store (i.e. STSI2 or LTSI2)
% be called NewStore; let its original inc = Inc1.
% 2. Set the flags of instance wrt AllTrees.
% 3. Determine the inc of the new instance = Inc2.
% 4. Set IncChange for that instance to Inc2 - Inc1.
% 5. Recurse with the remainder of RemovedTreeInstances.
% 1 - terminating: all instances in RemovedTreeInstances have
% had their flags updated.
set_instances([], STSI, LTSI, _, _, IncChange, STSI, LTSI, IncChange).
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% 2 - recursive: retrieve the next instance in
% RemovedTreeInstances from STSN and update its flags; if not retrievable,
% it must be in LTS, so retrieve it from there and update its flags;
% once retrieved, recurse with remaining instances in RemovedTreeInstances.
set_instances([I | Rest], STSI1, LTSI1, AllTrees, Skept, Acc, STSI4,
LTSI4, IncChange) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(I, STSI1, instance(C, _, _, Inc), STSI2)
->
update_instance(AllTrees, instance(C, n, n), NewRawInstance),
rationalise_instances(NewRawInstance, STSI2, Inc, Skept,
STSI3, SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
set_instances(Rest, STSI3, LTSI1, AllTrees, Skept, NewAcc,
STSI4, LTSI4, IncChange)
;
strict_retrieve_instance(I, LTSI1, instance(C, _, _, Inc),
LTSI2),
update_instance(AllTrees, instance(C, n, n), NewRawInstance),
rationalise_instances(NewRawInstance, LTSI2, Inc, Skept,
LTSI3, SubIncChange),
NewAcc is Acc + SubIncChange,
set_instances(Rest, STSI1, LTSI3, AllTrees, Skept, NewAcc,
STSI4, LTSI4, IncChange).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% update_instance(AllTrees, Instance, NewRawInstance)
% Updates the flags of Instance wrt Forest.
% 1 - both flags set to y, so halt
update_instance([_ | _], instance(N, Par, Chd), instance(N, y, y)) :-
Par == y,
Chd == y,
!.
% 2 - no more trees to check.
update_instance([], Instance, Instance) :- !.
% 3 - next tree's parent unifies with instance, so set children flag to y.
update_instance([tree(_, I1, _, _) | RestForest], instance(I2, Par, _),
UpdatedInstance) :-
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I1 == I2,
update_instance(RestForest, instance(I2, Par, y), UpdatedInstance), !.
% 4 - next tree contains instance as a child, so set parent flag to y.
update_instance([tree(ID, _, C, _) | RestForest], instance(N, _, Chd),
UpdatedInstance) :-
indexed(ID, #_, N),
strict_child_present(N, C),
update_instance(RestForest, instance(N, y, Chd),
UpdatedInstance), !.
% 5 - none of the above apply, so ignore the next tree
update_instance([_ | RestForest], Instance, UpdatedInstance) :-
update_instance(RestForest, Instance, UpdatedInstance).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% REMOVING UNNECESSARY INSTANCES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% rationalise_instances(Instance, CurrentInstances, Inc, Skept,
% NewInstances, IncChange)
% If Instance is inferred and both flags set to 'n', it isn't added to
% NewInstances; otherwise, it is, providing it doesn't occur elsewhere
% in CurrentInstances; Inc is the original Inc of the instance;
% if it is removed, IncChange is - Inc; otherwise, IncChange is
% NewInc - Inc. Better to determine the inc of instances here,
% as it saves finding inc for instances which are going to be
% removed anyway.
% 1 - terminating: if instance is inferred and occurs in no trees, remove it.
rationalise_instances(instance(#_, n, n), Instances, Inc, _,
Instances, ClippedIncChange) :-
IncChange is 0 - Inc,
clip(IncChange, ClippedIncChange), !.
% 2 - terminating: instance has child or parent flag set to y,
% so add to output if it is not duplicated in the list of
% CurrentInstances; otherwise, return original list and incchange = 0
rationalise_instances(instance(C, Par, Chd), Instances, Inc, Skept,
NewInstances, ClippedIncChange) :-
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instance_duplicated(instance(C, Par, Chd, _), Instances)
->
Instances = NewInstances,
ClippedIncChange = 0
;
instance_inc(instance(C, Par, Chd), Skept, NewInstance, NewInc),
IncChange is NewInc - Inc,
clip(IncChange, ClippedIncChange),
NewInstances = [NewInstance | Instances], !.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TRANSFER PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TRANSFERRING WHOLE TREES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% do_transfer(Reprs, Skept, NewExts)
% Tries to do either a tree + instances, or instance only, transfer
% with the current set of representations; will fail if no
% representation in Reprs has a transferrable tree or instance
% 1 - try to transfer a tree: requires at least one representation
% to have at least one tree in STS
do_transfer([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], Skept, NewExts) :-
member(repr(_ ^ [_ | _], _, _), [Repr | RestCurrentReprs]),
action([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], transfer_tree, Skept, NewExts), !.
% 2 - try to transfer an instance: requires at least one
% representation to have at least one instance in STS
do_transfer([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], Skept, NewExts) :-
member(repr([_ | _] ^ _, _, _), [Repr | RestCurrentReprs]),
action([Repr | RestCurrentReprs], transfer_instance, Skept, NewExts).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% transfer_tree(repr(STSExgraph, LTSExgraph, Inc), Skept,
% repr(NewSTSExgraph, NewLTSExgraph, NewInc))
% Transfers elts from STS to LTS, reducing incoherence of STS
% in the process.
% Transfer is initially tree-based, and follows these steps:
% 1. Select the tree in STS with lowest incoherence;
% 2. Find all instances dependent on that tree;
% 3. Transfer the tree and its dependent instances to LTS.
% An instance is dependent on a tree T in STS if it is a child of
% T and the child of no other tree in STS.
transfer_tree(repr(STSI1 ^ STSF1, LTSI1 ^ LTSF1, _), Skept,
repr(NewSTS, LTSI2 ^ LTSF2, NewInc)) :-
select_transfer_tree(STSF1, Tree, STSF2),
dependent_instances(Tree, STSF2, STSI1, STSI2, Dependents),
move_to_LTS(Dependents, LTSI1, LTSI2),
move_to_LTS([Tree], LTSF1, LTSF2),
inc(STSI2 ^ STSF2, Skept, NewSTS, NewInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% select_transfer_tree(Forest1, Tree, Forest2)
% Selects the tree Tree from Forest1 with lowest inc, with Forest2
% as the remainder.
% Sets the first tree in Forest1 as the 'sofar', then attempts to
% find a tree with lower inc using an accumulator.
% N.B. have to select it then remove it to prevent forest ordering
% being disrupted
select_transfer_tree([Tree | Rest], Selected, Forest2) :-
select_transfer_tree1(Rest, Tree, Selected),
remove(Selected, [Tree | Rest], Forest2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% select_transfer_tree1(Forest, SelectedTreeSofar, SelectedTree)
% Selects the least incoherent tree as the tree to be transferred;
% if two trees have equal inc, the oldest one (i.e. created earliest) is
% selected as the transfer tree.
% 1 - terminating: Forest is empty, so best tree found Sofar is
% SelectedTree
select_transfer_tree1([], Sofar, Sofar).
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% 2 - recursive: if next tree has equal to or lower inc than the
% current Sofar, make it the sofar; otherwise, retain the current sofar.
% This should ensure that if trees are equally incoherent, oldest is
% transferred first.
select_transfer_tree1([tree(ID1, P1, C1, Inc1) | Rest],
tree(ID2, P2, C2, Inc2), Selected) :-
Inc1 =< Inc2
->
select_transfer_tree1(Rest, tree(ID1, P1, C1, Inc1), Selected)
;
select_transfer_tree1(Rest, tree(ID2, P2, C2, Inc2), Selected).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% dependent_instances(Tree, Forest, Instances, RestInstances,
% DependentInstances)
% Tree = tree selected for transfer
% Forest = trees currently in STS (other than Tree)
% Instances = list of instances in STS
% DependentInstances = instances in Instances which occur in a
% parented tree and not anywhere else in Forest
% RestInstances = Instances with all DependentInstances removed
% (i.e. instances which will remain in STS after transfer).
dependent_instances(tree(_, Parent, Children, _), Forest, Instances1,
Instances2, Dependents) :-
dependent_on_tree([Parent | Children], Instances1, Forest, [],
Instances2, Dependents).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% dependent_on_tree(TreeInstances, Instances1, Forest, Sofar,
% Instances2, TreeDependents)
% TreeInstances = the parent and children of a tree to be transferred
% to LTS. Each element of TreeInstances is checked against Forest -
% If the element occurs in no other tree and the corresponding instance
% is in STS, it is removed from Instances1 and added to the sofar list;
% If the element occurs in no other tree and is not in STS, it is ignored;
% If it occurs in another tree, it is not dependent on the tree,
% and remains in Instances1.
% 1 - terminating: all elements of tree have been checked.
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dependent_on_tree([], Instances, _, Dependents, Instances, Dependents).
% 2 - recursive: if the next element's corresponding instance is in
% STS, then check whether it can be transferred (i.e. whether it
% occurs in another tree in STS); if the corresponding instance is
% not in STS, then that element is ignored, as it cannot be transferred
% (it's already in LTS).
dependent_on_tree([Elt | RestElts], Instances1, Forest, Sofar,
InstancesLeft, TreeDependents) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(Elt, Instances1, Retrieved, Instances2)
->
transferrable(Forest, Retrieved, Instances2, Instances3,
Sofar, NewSofar),
dependent_on_tree(RestElts, Instances3, Forest, NewSofar,
InstancesLeft, TreeDependents)
;
dependent_on_tree(RestElts, Instances1, Forest, Sofar,
InstancesLeft, TreeDependents).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% transferrable(Forest, Instance, CurrentInstances, NewInstances,
% DependentsSofar, NewDependentsSofar)
% If RetrievedInstance occurs in Forest, it is not transferrable, and the
% NewDependentsSofar = DependentsSofar
% and NewInstances = [RetrievedInstance | CurrentInstances];
% Else, RetrievedInstance is transferrable, and is added to the
% sofar list and NewInstances = CurrentInstances.
% So, once the instance has been retrieved, this procedure
% decides whether it can be added to the list of instances to be
% transferred, or whether it has to remain in STS.
% 1 - terminating: RetrievedInstance hasn't strictly matched a
% child of any tree in Forest, so can be added to the list of dependents.
transferrable([], instance(Content, Par, Chd, Inc), Instances,
Instances, Sofar, [instance(Content, Par, Chd, Inc) | Sofar]).
% 2 - terminating: RetrievedInstance strictly matches a child of
% the next tree in Forest, so isn't transferrable.
transferrable([tree(_, _, Children, _) | _], instance(Content, y, Chd, Inc),
Instances, [instance(Content, y, Chd, Inc) | Instances], Sofar, Sofar) :-
strict_child_present(Content, Children), !.
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% 3 - terminating: RetrievedInstance strictly matches a parent
% of the next tree in Forest, so isn't transferrable.
transferrable([tree(_, Parent, _, _) | _], instance(Content, Par, y, Inc),
Instances, [instance(Content, Par, y, Inc) | Instances], Sofar, Sofar) :-
Content == Parent, !.
% 4 - recursive: RetrievedInstance doesn't strictly match a child
% or parent of the next tree, so recurse with the rest of Forest.
transferrable([_ | RestForest], Instance, Instances1, Instances2,
Sofar, NewSofar) :-
transferrable(RestForest, Instance, Instances1, Instances2,
Sofar, NewSofar).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% TRANSFERRING SINGLE INSTANCES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% transfer_instance(Repr, NewRepr)
% NB When instances are transferred, all trees will already have gone;
% remaining instances will therefore have no parents or children.
transfer_instance(repr(STSI1 ^ STSF1, LTSI1 ^ LTSF1, Inc),
repr(STSI2 ^ STSF1, LTSI2 ^ LTSF1, ClippedNewInc)) :-
select_transfer_instance(STSI1, instance(C, Par, Chd, InstanceInc),
STSI2),
move_to_LTS([instance(C, Par, Chd, InstanceInc)], LTSI1, LTSI2),
NewInc is Inc - InstanceInc,
clip(NewInc, ClippedNewInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% select_transfer_instance(STSInstances, Selected, STSInstancesLeft)
% 1 - transfer out least incoherent instances first
select_transfer_instance(STSI1, instance(C, Par, Chd, InstanceInc), STSI2) :-
select_instance(least_inc, STSI1,
instance(C, Par, Chd, InstanceInc), STSI2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% MOVING R-ELTS TO LTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% move_to_LTS(EltsToMove, LTSElts, NewLTSElts)
% Attaches a set of r-elts to the current LTS to produce NewLTSElts.
% Could make this more complicated, so that transfer is probabilistic,
% e.g.: Transfer failure probability = inc of elt/total inc of STS
% (This is a measure of relative incoherence.)
% As more elts are transferred out, the remaining elements occupy a
% larger portion of the remaining inc, so failure probability increases.
% Could also try bulk transfer, where the transfer success
% probability for a whole block of information = new inc / original inc, etc.
% Would be more complicated, as lost information would require updating
% of trees (similar to the updating process when unnecessary elements
% are removed).
move_to_LTS(Elts, LTSElts, NewLTSElts) :-
append(Elts, LTSElts, NewLTSElts).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% INCOHERENCE METRIC PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% inc(ExgraphIn, Skepticism, ExgraphOut, TotalInc)
% The format for individual instances and trees is described in the
% head of the program.
inc(InstancesIn ^ TreesIn, Skept, InstancesOut ^ TreesOut, ClippedInc) :-
instances_inc(InstancesIn, Skept, InstancesOut, InstancesInc),
trees_inc(TreesIn, Skept, TreesOut, TreesInc),
Inc is InstancesInc + TreesInc,
clip(Inc, ClippedInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% instances_inc(InstancesIn, Skept, InstancesOut, InstancesInc)
% Adds together inc values of instances which have been assigned them;
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% otherwise, calculates inc and annotates the instance.
instances_inc(InstancesIn, Skept, InstancesOut, InstancesInc) :-
instances_inc(InstancesIn, Skept, InstancesOut, 0, InstancesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% instances_inc(InstancesIn, Skept, InstancesOut, Acc, InstancesInc)
% 1 - terminating: no more trees to process
instances_inc([], _, [], InstancesInc, InstancesInc).
% 2 - recursive: next instance has already been assigned incoherence
instances_inc([instance(Content, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestInstances], Skept,
[instance(Content, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestOut], Acc, InstancesInc) :-
NewAcc is Acc + Inc,
instances_inc(RestInstances, Skept, RestOut, NewAcc, InstancesInc).
% 3 - recursive for 'raw' instances (i.e. those without incoherence calculated)
instances_inc([instance(Content, Par, Chd) | RestInstances], Skept,
[NewInstance | RestOut], Acc, InstancesInc) :-
instance_inc(instance(Content, Par, Chd), Skept, NewInstance, Inc),
NewAcc is Acc + Inc,
instances_inc(RestInstances, Skept, RestOut, NewAcc, InstancesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% trees_inc(TreesIn, Skept, TreesOut, TreesInc)
% Determines the inc of a forest; each tree will already have been assigned
% its individual incoherence when it was created, so this just adds these
% values together. Alternatively, if a tree has no incoherence assigned,
% this procedure can assign it; the trees are output in annotated form.
trees_inc(TreesIn, Skept, TreesOut, TreesInc) :-
trees_inc(TreesIn, Skept, TreesOut, 0, TreesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% trees_inc(Trees, Skept, TreesOut, Acc, TreesInc)
% 1 - terminating: no more trees to process
trees_inc([], _, [], TreesInc, TreesInc).
% 2 - recursive: next tree has already been assigned incoherence
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trees_inc([tree(ID, P, C, Inc) | RestTrees], Skept,
[tree(ID, P, C, Inc) | RestOut], Acc, TreesInc) :-
NewAcc is Acc + Inc,
trees_inc(RestTrees, Skept, RestOut, NewAcc, TreesInc).
% 3 - recursive for 'raw' trees (i.e. those without incoherence calculated)
trees_inc([tree(ID, P, C) | RestTrees], Skept, [NewTree | RestOut],
Acc, TreesInc) :-
tree_inc(tree(ID, P, C), Skept, NewTree, Inc),
NewAcc is Acc + Inc,
trees_inc(RestTrees, Skept, RestOut, NewAcc, TreesInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ONE INSTANCE INC PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Used to determine inc caused by those instances which are at the
% roots or leaves of the exgraph; NB has nothing to do with alternative
% explanations, alternative elaborations, and so on - these are dealt
% with by processing the trees.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% instance_inc(Instance, Skept, AnnotatedInstance, InstanceInc)
instance_inc(instance(Instance, Parents, Children), Skept,
instance(Instance, Parents, Children, InstanceInc2), InstanceInc2) :-
lookup_node(Instance, Inf, Ubi),
value(Instance, Parents, Ubi, Skept, Xinc),
value(Instance, Children, Inf, Skept, Einc),
InstanceInc is Xinc + Einc,
clip(InstanceInc, InstanceInc2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% value(Instance, Present, Value, Skept, InstanceInc)
% Used to determine both types of inc (xinc and einc) for individual
% instances.
% Instance = @_ (observed) or #_ (inferred)
% Present is either a y or n, denoting whether an instance has
% parents or children, depending on context;
% Value is either inf or ubi, depending on context.
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% 1 - observed instance with parents or children not present
value(@_, n, Value, _Skept, InstanceInc) :-
InstanceInc is Value - 1.
% 2 - observed instance with parents or children present
value(@_, y, _, _, 0).
% 3 - inferred instance with parents or children not present
value(#_, n, Value, Skept, InstanceInc) :-
InstanceInc is Value * Skept.
% 4 - inferred instance with parents or children present
value(#_, y, _, _, 0).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ONE TREE INC PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% tree_inc(Tree, Skept, AnnotatedTree, TreeInc)
% Determines the incoherence caused by missing trees, based on
% which tree is present.
% Used to determine the incoherence of a tree of form
% tree(ID, Parent, Children, CurrentInc)
% Returns the tree unchanged except for its inc.
tree_inc(tree(ID, P, C), Skept, tree(ID, P, C, TreeInc2), TreeInc2) :-
alt_expls_inc(tree(ID, P, C), Skept, AltExplsInc),
alt_elabs_inc(tree(ID, P, C), Skept, AltElabsInc),
TreeInc is AltExplsInc + AltElabsInc,
clip(TreeInc, TreeInc2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% alt_expls_inc(Tree, Skept, AltExplsInc)
% Finds all alternative explanations of the observed children of Tree
% 1 - if no inferred children, schema is completed, so other possible expls
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% have even less influence
alt_expls_inc(tree(ID, Parent, Children), Skept, AltExplsInc2) :-
member(#_, Children)
->
other_parents(Children, ID, OtherExpls),
other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, AltExplsInc2)
;
other_parents(Children, ID, OtherExpls),
other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, AltExplsInc1),
AltExplsInc2 is AltExplsInc1 * Skept, !.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_parents(Children, ID, OtherPossParents)
% OtherPossParents is the set of schema parents which could
% potentially explain the observed Children of a tree.
% Sets up the accumulator with all possible explanations of the
% first child and calls other_parents1/4.
% 1 - no children are observed, so OtherPossParents is empty
other_parents([], _, []).
% 2 - if the first child is observed, set up accumulator.
other_parents([@H | T], ID1, OtherExpls) :-
find_one_parents(H, ID1, OneParents),
other_parents1(T, OneParents, ID1, OtherExpls).
% 3 - if first child is inferred, ignore it.
other_parents([#_ | T], ID1, OtherExpls) :-
other_parents(T, ID1, OtherExpls).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_parents1(Children, Acc, ID, OtherPossParents)
% The accumulator initially contains the other possible parents
% of the first child, connected to the IDs of the schemas which
% could have been used.
% 1 - terminating: unify the list of other possible parents with
% the sofar list.
other_parents1([], PossParents, _, PossParents).
% 2 - recursive: find all possible parents of the next observed
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% child, and intersect this with the list of possible parents
% of previous children.
other_parents1([@H | T], Acc, ID1, OtherPossParents) :-
find_one_parents(H, ID1, OneParents),
intersection(OneParents, Acc, NewAcc),
other_parents1(T, NewAcc, ID1, OtherPossParents).
% 3 - recursive: next child inferred, so ignore it.
other_parents1([#_ | T], Acc, ID, OtherPossParents) :-
other_parents1(T, Acc, ID, OtherPossParents).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% find_one_parents(Child, ParentID, ChildsOtherParents)
% Finds the other possible parents of child, given the actual ParentID
find_one_parents(H, ID1, OneParents) :-
findall([ID2, P],
(index(ID2, P, H), ID2 \== ID1),
OneParents).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% intersection(L1, L2, L3)
% L3 is the intersection between L1 and L2;
% Note that this also strips off the IDs of possible parents, leaving
% just the node.
% 1 - terminating: no more elts in first list
intersection([], _, []).
% 2 - terminating: no more elts in second list
intersection(_, [], []).
% 3 - next element of the first list occurs in the second list, so can be
% added to the list of intersections
intersection([[ID, P] | T1], [[ID, P] | T2], [[ID, P] | T3]) :-
intersection(T1, T2, T3), !.
% 4 - next element of first list doesn't match the next element of
% second list, and has a smaller id, so add it as a possible parent
intersection([[ID1, _] | T1], [[ID2, P2] | T2], L3) :-
ID1 < ID2,
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intersection(T1, [[ID2, P2] | T2], L3).
% 5 - next element of second list doesn't match the next element
% of first list, and has a smaller id
intersection([[ID1, P1] | T1], [[ID2, _] | T2], L3) :-
ID1 > ID2,
intersection([[ID1, P1] | T1], T2, L3).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, AltExplsInc)
% Sets up accumulator
other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, AltExplsInc) :-
other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, 0, AltExplsInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_parents_inc(OtherExpls, ID, Parent, Skept, Acc, AltExplsInc)
% For each member E of OtherExpls:
% If E is indexed to Parent
% inc(E) = 0
% Else
% Lookup ubi of E
% If Parent observed
% inc(E) = ubi(E) * Skept/2
% Else (Parent inferred)
% inc(E) = ubi(E) * (Skept + 0.5)
% Endif
% Endif
%
% OtherExpls = list of [PossID, Parent] pairs
% ID = ID of actual explanation
% 1 - terminating: no more other expls to add
other_parents_inc([], _, _, _, AltExplsInc, AltExplsInc).
% 2 - if next member of OtherExpls is indexed to Parent, inc = 0;
% otherwise, lookup the ubi of E wrt parent's type token (# or @)
other_parents_inc([[_, OtherExpl] | T], ID, Parent, Skept, Acc,
AltExplsInc) :-
indexed(ID, Parent, #OtherExpl)
->
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other_parents_inc(T, ID, Parent, Skept, Acc, AltExplsInc)
;
other_expl_inc(Parent, OtherExpl, Skept, OneInc),
NewAcc is Acc + OneInc,
other_parents_inc(T, ID, Parent, Skept, NewAcc, AltExplsInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% other_expl_inc(Parent, OtherExpl, Skept, OneInc)
% 1 - if actual Parent is observed
other_expl_inc(@_, OtherExpl, Skept, OneInc) :-
node(OtherExpl, _, Ubi),
OneInc is Ubi * Skept / 2.
% 2 - if actual Parent is inferred
other_expl_inc(#_, OtherExpl, Skept, OneInc) :-
node(OtherExpl, _, Ubi),
OneInc is Ubi * (Skept + 0.5).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ALTERNATIVE ELABORATION SETS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% alt_elabs_inc(Tree, Skept, AltElabsInc)
% Determines the Inc caused by alternative elaborations:
% (NB this gives the informativity caused by possible elaborations that
% aren't under the schema ID used to create the exgraph)
alt_elabs_inc(tree(ID, Parent, Children), Skept, AltElabsInc) :-
poss_elabs(ID, Parent, PossElabs),
sum_informativity(PossElabs, PossElabsInf),
lookup_node(Parent, Inf, _),
BasicInc is Inf - PossElabsInf,
alt_elabs_inc1(Children, BasicInc, Skept, AltElabsInc).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% poss_elabs(ID, Parent, PossElabs)
% PossElabs is the set of possible elaborations of Parent, wrt schema
% identified by ID
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poss_elabs(ID, Parent, PossElabs) :-
raw_content(Parent, P),
ID: P / _ ---> PossElabs.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% alt_elabs_inc1(Children, BasicInc, Skept, AltElabsInc)
% Applies Skept to BasicInc, according to whether any member of Children
% has been observed (this gives lower AltElabsInc)
% The figure by which Skept is multiplied determines (generally) how
% eager the system is to make elaborative inferences: the closer it is
% to 1, the more reticent it is; when value = 1, elaborative inferences
% which aren't based on the presence of existing observations cease
% to be made, as the elaboration has the same inc as a childless
% inferred instance. Raising this value reduces the amount of top-down
% inference from inferred instances.
alt_elabs_inc1(Children, BasicInc, Skept, AltElabsInc) :-
member(@_, Children)
->
AltElabsInc is 0
;
AltElabsInc is BasicInc * Skept * 0.8.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_informativity(NodeList, SumInf)
% calls accumulator
sum_informativity(NodeList, SumInf) :-
sum_informativity(NodeList, 0, SumInf).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% sum_informativity(NodeList, Acc, SumInf)
% NB these are raw nodes, not marked with # or @
% 1 - terminating: all nodes processed
sum_informativity([], SumInf, SumInf).
% 2 - recursive
sum_informativity([H/_ | T], Acc, SumInf) :-
node(H, Inf, _),
NewAcc is Acc + Inf,
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sum_informativity(T, NewAcc, SumInf).
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C.4 shared.pl
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% ADMINISTRATION AND SHARED PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% CHECKING CONSTRAINTS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% check(Constraints)
% Calls each constraint in turn to pass variable bindings along the rule.
% This ensures that relations are dependent on the events they connect, and
% prevents inferring event tokens from the presence of unrelated relations.
check([]).
check([H | T]) :-
call(H),
check(T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% X1 ==> X2
% Binds variables between two terms, from the term on the left of the
% arrow to the one on the right (directed unification).
% 1 - two variables
X1 ==> X2 :-
var(X1),
var(X2),
X1 = X2, !.
% 2 - atom and variable
X1 ==> X2 :-
\+ X1 == [],
atomic(X1),
var(X2),
X1 = X2, !.
% 3 - two non-variables
X1 ==> X2 :-
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X1 == X2.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% combine_raw_content(InstanceRawContent1, InstanceRawContent2)
% Combines the raw content of two nodes, ensuring that bindings go
% only from InstanceContent1 to InstanceContent2.
% (Raw content means that the status symbols have
% been stripped from the content, i.e. the '@' and '#'.)
% InstanceContent2 contains the output, once unification has been checked.
combine_raw_content(event(T1, Pred, Args), event(T2, Pred, Args)) :-
T1 ==> T2.
combine_raw_content(goal(T1, Pred, Args), goal(T2, Pred, Args)) :-
T1 ==> T2.
combine_raw_content(relation(Pred, Args1), relation(Pred, Args2)) :-
Args1 == Args2.
combine_raw_content(habit(Pred, Args), habit(Pred, Args)).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% STRUCTURE ACCESS %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% NB loose procedures combine the content of the instance to be
% retrieved with the content used for retrieval; strict procedures
% only match the content of two instances
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% loose_remove_duplicates(Items1, Items2)
% Items2 is Items1 with all duplicated items removed;
% 1 - terminating
loose_remove_duplicates([], []).
% 2 - recursive: FOR INSTANCES
% if next item is duplicated in the tail of the input instance list,
% remove it from consideration; else, add next item to the output
% and recurse with the tail of the first list
loose_remove_duplicates([instance(C, Par, Chd, Inc) | T], List2) :-
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 316
instance_duplicated(instance(C, Par, Chd, Inc), T)
->
loose_remove_duplicates(T, List2)
;
loose_remove_duplicates(T, RestList2),
List2 = [instance(C, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestList2].
% 3 - recursive: FOR TREES
% if next item is duplicated in the tail of the input instance list,
% remove it from consideration; else, add next item to the output
% and recurse with the tail of the first list
loose_remove_duplicates([tree(ID, Par, Chd, Inc) | T], List2) :-
tree_duplicated(tree(ID, Par, Chd, Inc), T, _)
->
loose_remove_duplicates(T, List2)
;
loose_remove_duplicates(T, RestList2),
List2 = [tree(ID, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestList2].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% instance_duplicated(Instance, InstancesList)
% True when Instance is duplicated by another instance in InstancesList
% 1 - terminating:
% instance X is duplicated in list L if the raw content of X can
% be combined with the raw content of an instance Y in L, and X and
% Y have the same Parent and Children flag settings, and the same inc
instance_duplicated(instance(Content1, _, _, _),
[instance(Content2, _, _, _) | _]) :-
raw_content(Content1, Raw1),
raw_content(Content2, Raw2),
copy_term(Raw1, Raw1Copy),
copy_term(Raw2, Raw2Copy),
(combine_raw_content(Raw1Copy, Raw2Copy) ;
combine_raw_content(Raw2Copy, Raw1Copy)), !.
% 2 - recursive: try a later item in InstancesList1:
instance_duplicated(instance(C, Par, Chd, Inc), [_ | T]) :-
instance_duplicated(instance(C, Par, Chd, Inc), T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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% tree_duplicated(Tree, Forest1, Forest2)
% Forest2 is Forest1 minus the duplication of Tree
% 1 - terminating
tree_duplicated(tree(ID, Parent1, _, Inc),
[tree(ID, Parent2, _, Inc) | Rem], Rem) :-
copy_term(Parent1, Parent1Copy),
copy_term(Parent2, Parent2Copy),
loose_match(Parent1Copy, Parent2Copy), !.
% 2 - recursive: try a later item in List1
tree_duplicated(Item, [H | T], [H | Rem]) :-
tree_duplicated(Item, T, Rem).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% strict_retrieve_instance(Content, Instances1, RetrievedInstance,
% Instances2)
% Instances2 is Instances1 minus RetrievedInstance; the content of
% RetrievedInstance exactly matches Content. Doesn't update
% status or variable bindings.
% 1 - terminating: next instance's content exactly matches Content
strict_retrieve_instance(Content1, [instance(Content2, Par, Chd, Inc) | Rest],
instance(Content2, Par, Chd, Inc), Rest) :-
Content1 == Content2, !.
% 2 - recursive: try later instances for exact match.
strict_retrieve_instance(Content1, [Instance | Rest1], Retrieved,
[Instance | Rest2]) :-
strict_retrieve_instance(Content1, Rest1, Retrieved, Rest2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% loose_retrieve_instance(ContentToRetrieve, Instances1,
% RetrievedInstance, Instances2),
% Instances2 is Instances1 minus RetrievedInstance; the content of
% RetrievedInstance can be combined with the content of ContentToRetrieve.
% Also note that this updates the status of the retrieved instance,
% e.g. from '#' to '@'.
% 1 - terminating: next instance in instance list is observed,
% and can be combined with Content1.
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loose_retrieve_instance(Content1,
[instance(@Content2, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestInstances],
instance(@Content1, Par, Chd, Inc), RestInstances) :-
combine_content(Content2, Content1), !.
% 2 - terminating: next instance in instance list is inferred,
% and can be combined with Content1.
loose_retrieve_instance(Content1,
[instance(#Content2, Par, Chd, Inc) | RestInstances],
instance(#Content1, Par, Chd, Inc), RestInstances) :-
combine_content(Content2, Content1), !.
% 3 - recursive: next instance doesn't combine, so recurse with rest
% of instance list.
loose_retrieve_instance(Content, [Instance | RestInstances1],
RetrievedInstance, [Instance | RestInstances2]) :-
loose_retrieve_instance(Content, RestInstances1,
RetrievedInstance, RestInstances2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% tree_present(Tree, Forest)
% 1 - terminating: Tree has same ID and matching parent as next tree in
% Forest.
tree_present(tree(ID, P1, _, _), [tree(ID, P2, _, _) | _]) :-
loose_match(P1, P2), !.
% 2 - terminating: as 1, but for trees not assigned incoherence yet
tree_present(tree(ID, P1, _, _), [tree(ID, P2, _) | _]) :-
loose_match(P1, P2), !.
% 3 - recursive
tree_present(Tree, [_ | T]) :-
tree_present(Tree, T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% strict_child_present(Child, Children)
% Child must exactly match a member of Children, i.e. have the same
% token and variable bindings
% 1 - terminating: next element of Children matches Child.
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 319
strict_child_present(Child1, [Child2 | _]) :-
Child1 == Child2, !.
% 2 - recursive
strict_child_present(Child, [_ | T]) :-
strict_child_present(Child, T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% loose_child_present(Child, Children)
% Child is instance content annotated with @ or #; children is a
% list of the same format elements.
% 1 - terminating: next element of Children matches Child.
loose_child_present(Child1, [Child2 | _]) :-
loose_match(Child1, Child2), !.
% 2 - recursive
loose_child_present(Child, [_ | T]) :-
loose_child_present(Child, T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% loose_match(Instance1, Instance2)
% Matches two instances, which may or may not be inferred.
% NB the content of the instance must be the same, regardless of
% whether both or either are inferred.
% 1 - covers cases where both are observed, or both inferred
loose_match(I, I).
% 2 - first instance inferred
loose_match(#I, @I).
% 3 - second instance inferred
loose_match(@I, #I).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% select_instance(Which?, Instances, SelectedInstance, OtherInstances)
% Which? = 'least_inc' for the instance in Instances with lowest inc,
% or 'most_inc' for the instance with the highest inc, or 'any'.
% Calls accumulator with first instance as sofar.
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% 1a - any instance, so select the first one
select_instance(any, [Instance | Rest], Instance, Rest).
% 1b - any instance from further down the list
select_instance(any, [Instance | Rest1], Selected, [Instance | Rest2]) :-
select_instance(any, Rest1, Selected, Rest2).
% 2 - first instance in instance list
select_instance(first, [Instance | Rest], Instance, Rest).
% 3 - most or least inc: call sub-procedure
select_instance(Which, [Instance | Rest], Selected, OtherInstances) :-
(Which == most_inc; Which == least_inc),
select_instance(Rest, Which, Instance, Selected, OtherInstances).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% select_instance(Instances, Sofar, SelectedInstance, OtherInstances)
% 1 - terminating: no more instances, so set sofar instance to
% SelectedInstance
select_instance([], _, Selected, Selected, []).
% 2 - recursive: next instance has higher incoherence, so make
% it sofar and put current sofar onto output.
select_instance([NextInstance | Rest], Which, Sofar, Selected,
[Output | Other]) :-
compare_incs(Which, NextInstance, Sofar, Output, NewSofar),
select_instance(Rest, Which, NewSofar, Selected, Other).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% compare_incs(Which, Instance1, Sofar, Output, NewSofar)
% Compares the inc of Instance1 and Sofar; depending on the instantiation
% of Which, will put the instance with lowest or highest inc into
% NewSofar, and the other instance into Output
compare_incs(least_inc, instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2), instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2)) :-
Inc2 =< Inc1, !.
compare_incs(least_inc, instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
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instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2), instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2),
instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1)).
compare_incs(most_inc, instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2), instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2)) :-
Inc2 >= Inc1, !.
compare_incs(most_inc, instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1),
instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2), instance(C2, Par2, Chd2, Inc2),
instance(C1, Par1, Chd1, Inc1)).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% raw_content(Content, RawContent)
% Returns the raw content of an instance's content, i.e. strips off
% the # or @ symbol.
raw_content(#I, I).
raw_content(@I, I).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% indexed(ID, I1, I2)
% Determines whether there is an index that links instances I1 and I2,
% regardless of whether they are inferred or observed.
% 1
% Both instances inferred
indexed(ID, #I1, #I2) :-
index(ID, I1, I2).
% 2
% First instance inferred
indexed(ID, #I1, @I2) :-
index(ID, I1, I2).
% 3
% Second instance inferred
indexed(ID, @I1, #I2) :-
index(ID, I1, I2).
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% 4
% Both instances observed
indexed(ID, @I1, @I2) :-
index(ID, I1, I2).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% lookup_node(Node, Inf, Ubi)
% Finds a node's definition (node/3 clause), or uses a default one for
% unknown nodes;
% Node may be prefixed with '#' or '@'.
% 1 - for known observed nodes:
% cut prevents backtracking incorrectly into second clause
lookup_node(@Node, Inf, Ubi) :-
node(Node, Inf, Ubi), !.
% 2 - for known inferred nodes:
% cut prevents backtracking incorrectly into second clause
lookup_node(#Node, Inf, Ubi) :-
node(Node, Inf, Ubi), !.
% 3 - for unknown nodes: set inf and ubi to 1
% As unknown nodes will not be processed, their inc always
% = inf - 1 + ubi - 1 = 1-1 + 1-1 = 0 (i.e. no potential structure)
lookup_node(_, 1, 1).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% clip(Number, NumberClipped)
% Truncates Number to three decimal places to give NumberClipped
clip(N1, N2) :-
A is floor(N1),
B is N1 - A,
C is B * 10000,
D is round(C),
E is D / 10000,
N2 is A + E.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% OUTPUT PROCEDURES %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% WRITING INDICES and NODES TO SCREEN %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% show nodes and indexes
show :-
shown,
showi.
% show nodes
shown :-
findall(node(Node, Inf, Ubi), node(Node, Inf, Ubi), AllNodes),
wl(AllNodes).
% show indexes
showi :-
findall(index(ID, LH, RH), index(ID, LH, RH), AllIndices),
wl(AllIndices).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% WRITING TO STREAM %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_status(Cycle, Skept, Tolerance, Range)
% Writes the current status of comprehension process to screen.
write_status(Cycle, Skept, Tolerance, Range) :-
write('Cycle number = '), write(Cycle), nl,
write('Skepticism = '), write(Skept), tab(10),
write('Tolerance = '), write(Tolerance), nl,
write('Range = '), write(Range), nl, nl.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_exts(Extensions)
% An extension has the form
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% ext(Repr, Rating)
% where Rating is incoherence change.
write_exts([ext(Repr, IncChange)]) :-
write_extension(ext(Repr, IncChange)),
write('ALL EXTENSIONS WRITTEN'), nl,
write_line, nl, nl,
continue(Repr).
write_exts([ext(Repr, IncChange) | Rest]) :-
write_extension(ext(Repr, IncChange)),
write('PRESS RETURN FOR NEXT EXTENSION'), nl,
continue(Repr),
write_exts(Rest).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_extensions_to_file(Extensions)
% Same as write_extensions, but without prompts.
write_extensions_to_file([]).
write_extensions_to_file([ext(Repr, IncChange) | Rest]) :-
write_extension(ext(Repr, IncChange)),
write_extensions_to_file(Rest).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_extension(ext(Repr, Rating))
% Write a single extension to output stream.
write_extension(ext(Repr, Rating)) :-
write_repr(Repr),
write_rating(Rating), nl,
nl,
write('********************************************************'),
nl.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_rating(Rating)
% Rating is a number (i.e. reduction in incoherence) or a message
% describing how an observation has been added to the representation
% or which r-elt was transferred
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% 1 - if rating describes observation
write_rating(obs(Message, _IncChange)) :-
write('Observation incorporated by '), write(Message).
% 2 - if rating decribes transfer
write_rating(transfer(Rating)) :-
write('Transfer changed incoherence by '), write(Rating).
% 3 - if rating decribes inference
write_rating(infer(Method, Created, Removed)) :-
TotalIncChange is Created + Removed,
write('Inferred new elements'), nl,
write_method(Method), nl,
write('Total inc change = '), write(TotalIncChange), nl,
write('Incchange due to creation = '), write(Created), nl,
write('Incchange due to removal = '), write(Removed).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_method(Method)
% Method is either top_down or bottom_up, depending on the inference
% method used
write_method(top_down) :-
write('Elements created top-down').
write_method(bottom_up) :-
write('Elements created bottom-up').
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_repr(Repr)
% Writes a single representation to screen.
write_repr(repr(STSExgraph, LTSExgraph, Inc)) :-
nl,
write('----------- STS -----------'),
write_exgraph(STSExgraph),
nl,
write('---------- LTS ----------'),
write_exgraph(LTSExgraph),
nl, nl,
Appendix C. IDC Program Code 326
write('-------- Incoherence = '), write(Inc), write(' --------'),
nl, nl.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_exgraph(Instances ^ Forest)
% Writes a single exgraph to screen.
write_exgraph(Instances ^ Forest) :-
nl,
write('Instances: '), write(Instances), nl, nl,
write('Forest: '), nl, nl,
write_forest(Forest).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_forest(Forest)
% Writes a list of trees to screen. If the list of trees is empty, writes
% NO TREES to screen.
write_forest([]) :-
write('NO TREES').
write_forest([H | T]) :-
write_forest1([H | T]).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_forest1(Forest)
% Called by write_forest/1.
write_forest1([]).
write_forest1([H | T]) :-
write(H), nl, nl,
write_forest1(T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_line
% writes a line of asterisks to screen, to separate processing cycles
write_line :-
write('********************************************************'),
nl.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% BOOK-KEEPING AND TESTING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% continue(Repr)
% If in file mode, just pass true; else prompts for user input if in
% screen mode: if 'r', output current best repr to file;
% otherwise, succeed and continue.
continue(CurrentBestRepr) :-
output_mode(screen), % declared in IDC.pl
get0(114) % 114 = ascii code for 'r'
->
next_number(N),
open('~/IDC_dir/tests.pl', append, Output1),
set_output(Output1),
Clause =.. [testrepr, N, CurrentBestRepr],
portray_clause(Clause),
nl, nl,
close(Output1)
;
true.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% next_number(N)
% Finds the highest numbered testrepr/2 clause, where the number of
% the clause is the first argument, and adds one to it; this is the
% number for the next testrepr/2 clause.
% 1 - find the largest numbered testrepr/2 clause if there is one;
% otherwise, set N to 1.
next_number(N) :-
findall(Num, testrepr(Num, _), Nums),
max_list(Nums, Max),
N is Max + 1.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% WRITING RESULTS TO FILE %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_exts_to_output(OriginalRepr, Extensions)
% Writes the original representation and its extensions to the output.
% USED FOR TESTING PURPOSES
write_exts_to_output(OriginalRepr, Extensions) :-
open('~/IDC_dir/output.pl', write, Output1),
set_output(Output1),
write('ORIGINAL REPRESENTATION:'), nl, nl,
write_repr(OriginalRepr),
nl, nl,
write('*********************************************************'),
nl, nl,
write('EXTENSIONS FOUND:'),
nl, nl,
write('*********************************************************'),
nl, nl,
write_extensions_to_file(Extensions),
close(Output1).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%% PREDICATES FOR WRITING NODES AND INDICES TO SCREEN %%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_nodes(NodesList)
% writes the set of nodes and their informativities and ubiquities to
% screen
% 1 - terminating: all nodes output
write_nodes([]).
% 2 - recursive: write one, then recurse
write_nodes([node(Node, Inf, Ubi) | RestNodes]) :-
write('Node: '), write(Node), nl,
write('has informativity = '), write(Inf), write(' and '),
write('ubiquity = '), write(Ubi), nl,
write_nodes(RestNodes).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%% PREDICATES FOR WRITING NODES AND INDICES TO FILE %%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% write_clauses_to_stream(TermList)
% writes a list of Prolog clauses to the current output stream
% 1 - terminating: all terms in the list have been written to the
% output stream
write_clauses_to_stream([]).
% 2 - recursive: write the first term in the list to the output stream
% then call write_clauses_to_file recursively on the rest of the terms
% in the list
write_clauses_to_stream([H | T]) :-
portray_clause(H),
write_clauses_to_stream(T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% LIST PROCESSING %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% append(L1,L2,L3)
append([], L, L).
append([H | T], L2, [H | NewT]) :-
append(T, L2, NewT).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% member(Elt, List) : true if Elt occurs as an element of List
member(Elt, [Elt|_]) :- !.
member(Elt, [_|T]) :- member(Elt, T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% strict_member(Elt, List) : true if Elt matches an element of List
strict_member(Elt1, [Elt2|_]) :-
Elt1 == Elt2, !.
strict_member(Elt, [_|T]) :- strict_member(Elt, T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_duplicates(Untidy_List, Tidy_List)
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% takes all duplicates out of a list
% e.g. remove_duplicates([a,a,b,b,c], Tidy)
% Tidy = [a,b,c]
remove_duplicates(List, Tidy_List) :-
remove_duplicates(List, [], Tidy_List).
% remove_duplicates/3
% second argument is an accumulator
remove_duplicates([], Sofar, Sofar).
remove_duplicates([H | T], Sofar, Tidy) :-
member(H, T)
->
remove_duplicates(T, Sofar, Tidy)
;
remove_duplicates(T, [H | Sofar], Tidy).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove(Elt, List, NewList)
% NewList is List with Elt removed
remove(Elt, [Elt | Tail], Tail).
remove(Elt, [H | Tail], [H | NewList]) :-
\+ Elt = H,
remove(Elt, Tail, NewList).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% remove_sublist(Sublist, List, Remainder)
% 1 - terminating: no more elements in Sublist
remove_sublist([Item], List, NewList) :-
remove(Item, List, NewList).
% 2 - recursive: remove first element of Sublist from List, then recurse
% with tail of Sublist
remove_sublist([Head | Tail], List, Remainder) :-
remove(Head, List, NewList),
remove_sublist(Tail, NewList, Remainder).
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% wl(List)
% Writes each element of List onto a separate line
wl([]).
wl([H | T]) :-
write(H),
nl,
wl(T).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% same_members(L1, L2)
% L1 has the same members as L2 (not necessarily in the same order).
same_members([], []).
same_members([H1 | T1], L2) :-
remove(H1, L2, L3),
same_members(T1, L3).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% strict_remove(Elt, List, NewList)
% NewList is List with Elt removed; Elt must strictly match a member
% of List
strict_remove(Elt1, [Elt2 | Tail], Tail) :-
Elt1 == Elt2.
strict_remove(Elt, [H | Tail], [H | NewList]) :-
Elt \== H,
strict_remove(Elt, Tail, NewList).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% max_list(NumList, Max)
% Max is the largest number in the list of numbers NumList
max_list([], 0).
max_list([H | T], Max) :-
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max_list(T, H, Max).
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% max_list(NumList, Acc, Max)
% used by max_list/2
max_list([], Max, Max).
max_list([H | T], Acc, Max) :-
Acc > H
->
max_list(T, Acc, Max)
;
max_list(T, H, Max).
Bibliography
[Aha et al., 1991] Aha, D., Kibler, D., and Albert, M. K. (1991). Instance-based learning
algorithms. Machine Learning, 6(1):37{66.
[Allen, 1984] Allen, J. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. Articial
Intelligence, 23(2):123{154.
[Alterman, 1985] Alterman, R. (1985). A dictionary based on concept coherence. Articial
Intelligence, 25(2):153{186.
[Alterman, 1991] Alterman, R. (1991). Understanding and summarization. Articial
Intelligence Review, 5(4):239{254.
[Alterman and Bookman, 1990] Alterman, R. and Bookman, L. (1990). Some computa-
tional experiments in summarisation. Discourse Processes, 13(2):143{174.
[Alterman and Bookman, 1992] Alterman, R. and Bookman, L. (1992). Reasoning about
a semantic memory encoding of the connectivity of events. Cognitive Science, 16(2):205{
232.
[Anderson, 1983] Anderson, J. (1983). The Architecture of Cognition. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Appelt, 1990] Appelt, D. (1990). A theory of abduction based on model preferences. In
Working Notes of the 1990 Spring Symposium on Automated Abduction, pages 67{71,
University of California, Irvine.
[Asher, 1993] Asher, N. (1993). Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands.
[Baddeley, 1992] Baddeley, A. (1992). Is working memory working?: The 15th Bartlett
lecture. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44A(1):1{31.
333
Bibliography 334
[Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1964] Bar-Hillel, Y. and Carnap, R. (1964). An outline of a
theory of semantic information. In Bar-Hillel, Y., editor, Language and Information:
Selected Essays on their Theory and Application, pages 221{274. Jerusalem Academic
Press, Jerusalem.
[Barsalou, 1992] Barsalou, L. (1992). Frames, concepts, and conceptual elds. In Lehrer,
A. and Kittay, E., editors, Frames, Fields, and Contrasts: New Essays in Semantic and
Lexical Organisation, pages 21{74. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Barsalou and Sewell, 1985] Barsalou, L. and Sewell, D. (1985). Contrasting the
representation of scripts and categories. Journal of Memory and Language, 24(6):646{
665.
[Bartlett, 1932] Bartlett, F. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
[Bartsch, 1987] Bartsch, R. (1987). Frame representations and discourse representations.
Theoretical Linguistics, 14:65{117.
[Bobrow, 1968] Bobrow, D. (1968). Natural language input for a computer problem-
solving system. In Minsky, M., editor, Semantic Information Processing, pages 133{215.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Bonitatibus and Beal, 1996] Bonitatibus, G. and Beal, C. (1996). Finding new meanings:
Children's recognition of interpretive ambiguity in text. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 62(1):131{150.
[Bower et al., 1979] Bower, G., Black, J., and Turner, T. (1979). Scripts in memory for
text. Cognitive Psychology, 11(2):177{220.
[Brewka et al., 1997] Brewka, G., Dix, J., and Konolige, K. (1997). Nonmonotonic
Reasoning: an Overview. Centre for the Study of Language and Information Lecture
Notes 73, Stanford, California.
[Broadbent, 1958] Broadbent, D. (1958). Perception and Communication. Pergamon
Press, London.
[Carroll, 1998] Carroll, R. (1998). The Skeptic's Dictionary. Web page:
http://skepdic.com/.
Bibliography 335
[Charniak, 1972] Charniak, E. (1972). Toward a model of children's story comprehension.
Technical Report AI-TR-266, MIT AI Lab, Cambridge, MA.
[Charniak, 1983] Charniak, E. (1983). Passing markers: A theory of contextual inuence
in language comprehension. Cognitive Science, 7(3):171{190.
[Charniak, 1986] Charniak, E. (1986). A neat theory of marker passing. In Proceedings
of the 5th National Conference on Articial Intelligence (AAAI-86), volume 1, pages
584{588, Philadelphia.
[Charniak and Goldman, 1989] Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. (1989). A semantics for
probabilistic quantier-free rst-order languages, with particular application to story
understanding. In Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Articial
Intelligence (IJCAI-89), pages 1074{1079. Detroit.
[Charniak and Goldman, 1990] Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. (1990). Plan recognition
in stories and in life. In Henrion, M., Shachter, R. D., Kanal, L. N., and Lemmer, J. F.,
editors, Uncertainty in Articial Intelligence 5, volume 10 of Machine Intelligence and
Pattern Recognition, pages 343{352. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
[Charniak and Goldman, 1993] Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. (1993). A Bayesian model
of plan recognition. Articial Intelligence, 64(1):53{79.
[Charniak and McDermott, 1985] Charniak, E. and McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction
to Articial Intelligence. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
[Charniak and Shimony, 1990] Charniak, E. and Shimony, S. (1990). Probabilistic
semantics for cost-based abduction. Technical Report CS-90-02, Department of
Computer Science, Brown University.
[Charniak and Shimony, 1994] Charniak, E. and Shimony, S. (1994). Cost-based
abduction and MAP explanation. Articial Intelligence, 66(2):345{374.
[Clancey, 1983] Clancey, W. (1983). The advantages of abstract control knowledge in
expert system design. In Proceedings of the 2nd National Conference on Articial
Intelligence (AAAI-83), pages 74{78, Washington, DC.
[Collins English Dictionary, 1994] Collins English Dictionary (1994).
Bibliography 336
[Cooper and Shallice, 2000] Cooper, R. and Shallice, T. (2000). Contention scheduling
and the control of routine activities. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17(4):297{338.
[Cooper et al., 1995] Cooper, R., Shallice, T., and Farringdon, J. (1995). Symbolic and
continuous processes in the automatic selection of actions. In Hallam, J., editor, Hybrid
Problems, Hybrid Solutions, pages 27{37. IOS Press, Amsterdam.
[Copi, 1978] Copi, I. (1978). Introduction to Logic. MacMillan, New York, NY, 5th
edition.
[Correira, 1980] Correira, A. (1980). Computing story trees. American Journal of
Computational Linguistics, 6(3-4):135{149.
[Crain and Steedman, 1985] Crain, S. and Steedman, M. (1985). On not being led up
the garden path: The use of context by the psychological syntax processor. In Dowty,
D., Karttunen, L., and Zwicky, A., editors, Natural Language Parsing: Psychological,
Computational, and Theoretical Perspectives, pages 320{358. Cambridge University
Press.
[Cycorp, 2000] Cycorp (2000). Publicity material. Web page: http://www.cyc.com/.
[Dahlgren, 1988] Dahlgren, K. (1988). Naive Semantics for Natural Language Under-
standing. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA.
[Dalrymple, 1988] Dalrymple, M. (1988). The interpretation of tense and aspect in
english. In Proceedings of 26th Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics
(ACL-88), pages 68{74, Bualo, NY.
[Davis, 1980] Davis, R. (1980). Meta-rules: Reasoning about control. Articial
Intelligence, 15(3):179{222.
[de Kleer, 1986] de Kleer, J. (1986). An assumption-based truth maintenance system.
Articial Intelligence, 28(2):127{162.
[DeJong, 1979] DeJong, G. (1979). Prediction and substantiation: A new approach to
natural language processing. Cognitive Science, 3(3):251{273.
[Doyle, 1979] Doyle, J. (1979). A truth maintenance system. Articial Intelligence,
12(3):231{272.
Bibliography 337
[Dretske, 1981] Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Blackwell,
Oxford.
[Dyer et al., 1992] Dyer, M., Cullingford, R., and Alvarado, S. (1992). Scripts. In Shapiro,
S., editor, Encyclopaedia of Articial Intelligence. John Wiley and Sons, 2nd edition.
[Eberle, 1992] Eberle, K. (1992). On representing the temporal structure of a natural
language text. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Computational
Linguistics (COLING-92), volume 2, pages 288{294, Nantes, France.
[Eliot, 1958] Eliot, T. (1958). Collected Poems 1909-1935. Faber and Faber, London.
[Enkvist, 1989] Enkvist, N. (1989). Connexity, interpretability, universes of discourse,
and text worlds. In Allen, S., editor, Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences
(Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65), pages 162{186. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
[Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995] Ericsson, K. and Kintsch, W. (1995). Long-term working
memory. Psychological Review, 102(2):211{245.
[Eysenck and Keane, 1995] Eysenck, M. and Keane, M. (1995). Cognitive Psychology: A
Student's Handbook. Psychology Press, Hove, UK, third edition.
[Fillmore, 1968] Fillmore, C. (1968). The case for case. In Bach, E. and Harms, R.,
editors, Universals in Linguistic Theory, pages 1{88. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New
York, NY.
[Fletcher et al., 1990] Fletcher, C., Hummel, J., and Marsolek, C. (1990). Causality and
the allocation of attention during comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16(2):233{240.
[Fletcher et al., 1996] Fletcher, C., van den Broek, P., and Arthur, E. (1996). A model
of narrative comprehension and recall. In Britton, B. and Graesser, A., editors, Models
of Understanding Text, pages 141{163. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[Forbus and Oblinger, 1990] Forbus, K. and Oblinger, D. (1990). Making SME greedy
and pragmatic. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society, pages 61{68, Cambridge, MA.
[Frazier and Fodor, 1978] Frazier, L. and Fodor, J. (1978). The sausage machine: A new
two-stage parsing model. Cognition, 6:417{459.
Bibliography 338
[Frith, 1989] Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Blackwell, Cambridge,
MA.
[Frost, 1986] Frost, R. (1986). Introduction to Knowledge Base Systems. Collins, London,
UK.
[Gardner, 1987] Gardner, H. (1987). The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive
Revolution. Basic Books, USA.
[Garnham, 1996] Garnham, A. (1996). Discourse comprehension models. In Dijkstra, T.
and de Smedt, K., editors, Computational Psycholinguistics, pages 221{244. Taylor and
Francis.
[Gathercole and Baddeley, 1993] Gathercole, S. and Baddeley, A. (1993). Working
Memory and Language. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hove, UK.
[George, 1982] George, M. (1982). Procedural control in production systems. Articial
Intelligence, 18(2):175{201.
[Gernsbacher et al., 1990] Gernsbacher, M., Varner, K., and Faust, M. (1990). Investi-
gating dierences in general comprehension skill. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16(3):430{445.
[Goldman, 1990] Goldman, R. (1990). A Probabilistic Approach to Language Understand-
ing. PhD thesis, Department of Computer Science.
[Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1996] Goldszmidt, M. and Pearl, J. (1996). Qualitative probabil-
ities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling. Articial Intelligence,
84(1{2):57{112.
[Graesser et al., 1994] Graesser, A., Singer, M., and Trabasso, T. (1994). Constructing
inferences during narrative text comprehension. Psychological Review, 101(3):371{395.
[Graesser et al., 1996] Graesser, A., Swamer, S., Baggett, W., and Sell, M. (1996). New
models of deep comprehension. In Britton, B. and Graesser, A., editors, Models of
Understanding Text, pages 1{32. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[Graesser et al., 1997] Graesser, A., Swamer, S., and Hu, X. (1997). Quantitative
discourse psychology. Discourse Processes, 23(3):229{263.
Bibliography 339
[Grice, 1975] Grice, H. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole, P. and Morgan, J., editors,
Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, pages 41{58. Academic Press, New York, NY.
[Haberlandt and Bingham, 1984] Haberlandt, K. and Bingham, G. (1984). The eect of
input direction on the processing of script statements. Journal of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behaviour, 23:162{177.
[Haberlandt and Graesser, 1990] Haberlandt, K. and Graesser, A. (1990). Integration and
buering of new information. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 25:71{87.
[Hayes, 1980] Hayes, P. (1980). The logic of frames. In Metzing, D., editor, Frame
Conceptions and Text Understanding, pages 46{61. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.
[Hayes-Roth, 1985] Hayes-Roth, B. (1985). A blackboard architecture for control.
Articial Intelligence, 26(3):251{321.
[Hempel, 1966] Hempel, C. (1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Clis, NJ.
[Hintzman, 1986] Hintzman, D. (1986). \Schema abstraction" in a multiple-trace memory
model. Psychological Review, 93(4):411{428.
[Hoadley et al., 1994] Hoadley, C., Ranney, M., and Schank, P. (1994). WanderECHO:
A connectionist simulation of limited coherence. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pages 421{426, Georgia Institute
of Technology.
[Hobbs, 1979] Hobbs, J. (1979). Coherence and coreference. Cognitive Science, 3(1):67{
90.
[Hobbs, 1990] Hobbs, J. (1990). Literature and Cognition. CSLI Lecture Notes 21. Center
for the Study of Language and Information.
[Hobbs et al., 1993] Hobbs, J., Stickel, M., Appelt, D., and Martin, P. (1993).
Interpretation as abduction. Articial Intelligence, 63(1{2):69{142.
[Holyoak, 1991] Holyoak, K. (1991). Symbolic connectionism: Toward third-generation
theories of expertise. In Ericsson, K. and Smith, J., editors, Towards a General Theory
of Expertise: Prospects and Limits. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY.
Bibliography 340
[Hongua, 1994] Hongua, G. (1994). Understanding a story with causal relationships.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent
Systems (ISMIS-94), pages 265{274, Charlotte, North Carolina.
[Ingarden, 1973] Ingarden, R. (1931/1973). The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation
on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature (English translation,
from 1931 Polish edition). Northwestern University Press, Evanston, ILL.
[Iser, 1971] Iser, W. (1971). The reading process: A phenomenological approach. New
Literary History, 3(2):279{299.
[Jacobs, 1988] Jacobs, P. (1988). Concretion: Assumption-based understanding. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Computational Linguistics
(COLING-88), volume 1, pages 270{274, Budapest.
[Johnson and Seifert, 1999] Johnson, H. and Seifert, C. (1999). Modifying mental
representations: Comprehending corrections. In Goldman, S. and van Oostendorp, H.,
editors, The Construction of Mental Representations During Reading, pages 303{318.
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[Johnson-Laird, 1988] Johnson-Laird, P. (1988). Freedom and constraint in creativity.
In Sternberg, R., editor, The Nature of Creativity. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
[Jonides, 1995] Jonides, J. (1995). Working memory and thinking. In Smith, E. and
Osherson, D., editors, An Invitation to Cognitive Science, volume 3: Thinking. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Josephson and Josephson, 1996] Josephson, J. and Josephson, S. (1996). Abductive
Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology. Cambridge University Press, New
York, NY.
[Just and Carpenter, 1992] Just, M. and Carpenter, P. (1992). A capacity theory of
comprehension: Individual dierences in working memory. Psychological Review,
99(1):122{149.
[Kamas et al., 1996] Kamas, E., Reder, L., and Ayers, M. (1996). Partial matching in the
moses illusion: Response bias not sensitivity. Memory and Cognition, 24(6):687{699.
Bibliography 341
[Kamp and Reyle, 1993] Kamp, H. and Reyle, U. (1993). From Discourse to Logic:
Introduction to Modeltheoretic Semantics of Natural Language, Formal Logic and
Discourse Representation Theory. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht.
[Kaplan and Berry-Rogghe, 1991] Kaplan, R. and Berry-Rogghe, G. (1991). Knowledge-
based acquisition of causal relationships in text. Knowledge Acquisition, 3:317{337.
[Kautz, 1990] Kautz, H. (1990). A circumscriptive theory of plan recognition. In Cohen,
P., Morgan, J., and Pollack, M., editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 105{133.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Kautz and Allen, 1986] Kautz, H. and Allen, J. (1986). Generalized plan recognition.
In Proceedings of the 5th National Conference on Articial Intelligence (AAAI-86),
volume 1, pages 32{37, Philadelphia.
[Kayser and Coulon, 1981] Kayser, D. and Coulon, D. (1981). Variable-depth natural
language understanding. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference
on Articial Intelligence (IJCAI-81), volume 1, pages 64{66, University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
[Keefe and McDaniel, 1993] Keefe, D. and McDaniel, M. (1993). The time course and
durability of predictive inferences. Journal of Memory and Language, 32(4):446{463.
[Kehler, 1995] Kehler, A. (1995). Interpreting Cohesive Forms in the Context of Discourse
Inference. PhD thesis, Harvard University.
[Kelley, 1973] Kelley, H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. American
Psychologist, 28(2):107{128.
[Kintsch, 1988] Kintsch, W. (1988). The role of knowledge in discourse comprehension:
A construction-integration model. Psychological Review, 95(2):163{182.
[Kintsch, 1998] Kintsch, W. (1998). Comprehension: A Paradigm for Cognition.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[Kintsch and Mannes, 1987] Kintsch, W. and Mannes, S. (1987). Generating scripts from
memory. In van der Meer, E. and Homann, J., editors, Knowledge Aided Information
Processing, pages 61{80. Elsevier Science Publishers, North Holland.
Bibliography 342
[Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978] Kintsch, W. and van Dijk, T. (1978). Toward a model of
text comprehension and production. Psychological Review, 85(5):363{394.
[Kolodner, 1992] Kolodner, J. (1992). An introduction to case-based reasoning. Articial
Intelligence Review, 6(1):3{34.
[Krems and Johnson, 1995] Krems, J. and Johnson, T. (1995). Integration of anomalous
data in multicausal explanations. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference
of the Cognitive Science Society, pages 277{282, Pittsburgh.
[Laird et al., 1987] Laird, J., Newell, A., and Rosenbloom, P. (1987). Soar: An
architecture for general intelligence. Articial Intelligence, 33(1):1{64.
[Leake, 1992] Leake, D. (1992). Using goals and experience to guide abduction. Technical
Report TR359, Computer Science Department, Indiana University.
[Lehnert et al., 1983] Lehnert, W., Dyer, M., Johnson, P., Yang, C., and Harley, S. (1983).
BORIS - an experiment in in-depth understanding of narratives. Articial Intelligence,
20(1):15{62.
[Lindsay and Norman, 1977] Lindsay, P. and Norman, D. (1977). Human Information
Processing. Academic Press, New York, NY.
[Long et al., 1990] Long, D., Golding, J., Graesser, A., and Clark, L. (1990). Goal,
event and state inferences: An investigation of inference generation during story
comprehension. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 25:89{102.
[Long et al., 1996] Long, D., Seely, M., Oppy, B., and Golding, J. (1996). The role of
inferential processing in reading ability. In Britton, B. and Graesser, A., editors, Models
of Understanding Text, pages 189{214. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[van Oostendorp and Bonebakker, 1999] van Oostendorp, H. and Bonebakker, C. (1999).
DiÆculties in updating mental representations during reading. In Goldman, S. and van
Oostendorp, H., editors, The Construction of Mental Representations During Reading,
pages 319{339. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[McCarthy, 1980] McCarthy, J. (1980). Circumscription - a form of non-monotonic
reasoning. Articial Intelligence, 13(1{2):27{39.
Bibliography 343
[McKoon and Ratcli, 1979] McKoon, G. and Ratcli, R. (1979). Priming in episodic and
semantic memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 18(4):463{480.
[McKoon and Ratcli, 1992] McKoon, G. and Ratcli, R. (1992). Inference during
reading. Psychological Review, 99(3):440{466.
[McKoon et al., 1986] McKoon, G., Ratcli, R., and Dell, G. (1986). A critical evaluation
of the semantic-episodic distinction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 12(2):295{306.
[Miller, 1956] Miller, G. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some
limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(1):81{97.
[Minsky, 1975] Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In Winston,
P., editor, The Psychology of Computer Vision, pages 211{277. McGraw-Hill, New York,
NY.
[Moens and Steedman, 1988] Moens, M. and Steedman, M. (1988). Temporal ontology
and temporal reference. Computational Linguistics, 14(2):15{28.
[Mooney, 1990] Mooney, R. (1990). Learning plan schemata from observation:
Explanation-based learning for plan recognition. Cognitive Science, 14(4):483{509.
[Moorman, 1997] Moorman, K. (1997). A Functional Theory of Creative Reading:
Process, Knowledge, and Evaluation. PhD thesis, College of Computing.
[Murray et al., 1993] Murray, J., Klin, C., and Myers, J. (1993). Forward inferences in
narrative text. Journal of Memory and Language, 32:464{473.
[Myers and O'Brien, 1998] Myers, J. and O'Brien, E. (1998). Accessing the discourse
representation during reading. Discourse Processes, 26(2{3):131{157.
[Nagao, 1993] Nagao, K. (1993). Abduction and dynamic preference in plan-based
dialogue understanding. In Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on
Articial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), volume 2, pages 1186{1192, San Mateo, CA.
[Newell and Simon, 1972] Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1972). Human Problem Solving.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clis.
Bibliography 344
[Ng, 1992] Ng, H. (1992). A General Abductive System with Application to Plan
Recognition and Diagnosis. PhD thesis, Articial Intelligence Laboratory, University of
Texas at Austin.
[Ng and Mooney, 1989] Ng, H. and Mooney, R. (1989). Abductive explanation in text
understanding: Some problems and solutions. Technical Report AI89-116, University
of Texas at Austin.
[Ng and Mooney, 1990] Ng, H. and Mooney, R. (1990). On the role of coherence in
abductive explanation. In Proceedings of the 8th AAAI, pages 337{342, Boston, MA.
[Ng and Mooney, 1992] Ng, H. and Mooney, R. (1992). A rst-order abductive system
and its use in plan recognition and diagnosis. Unpublished technical report, University
of Texas at Austin.
[Noordman and Vonk, 1992] Noordman, L. and Vonk, W. (1992). Reader's knowledge
and the control of inferences in reading. Language and Cognitive Processes, 7(3-4):373{
391.
[Noordman and Vonk, 1998] Noordman, L. and Vonk, W. (1998). Memory-based
processing in understanding causal information. Discourse Processes, 26(2{3):191{212.
[Norvig, 1989] Norvig, P. (1989). Marker passing as a weak method for text inferencing.
Cognitive Science, 13(4):569{620.
[Norvig and Wilensky, 1990] Norvig, P. and Wilensky, R. (1990). A critical evaluation
of commensurable abduction models for semantic interpretation. In Proceedings of the
13th International Conference on Computational Linguistics (COLING-90), volume 3,
pages 224{230, Helsinki.
[Nowak and Thagard, 1992] Nowak, G. and Thagard, P. (1992). Copernicus, Ptolemy,
and explanatory coherence. In Giere, R., editor, Cognitive Models of Science, pages
274{309. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
[O'Brien et al., 1988] O'Brien, E., Shank, D., Myers, J., and Rayner, K. (1988).
Elaborative inferences during reading: Do they occur on-line? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 14(3):410{420.
Bibliography 345
[Ozono et al., 1991] Ozono, S., Pennington, B. F., and Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive
function decits in high functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind.
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 32(7):1081{1105.
[Pearl, 1988] Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks
of Plausible Inference. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA.
[Peng and Reggia, 1990] Peng, Y. and Reggia, R. (1990). Abductive Inference Models for
Diagnostic Problem Solving. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY.
[Pereira, 1985] Pereira, F. (1985). A new characterization of attachment preferences.
In Dowty, D., Karttunen, L., and Zwicky, A., editors, Natural Language Parsing:
Psychological, Computational, and Theoretical Perspectives, pages 307{319. Cambridge
University Press.
[Quillian, 1968] Quillian, M. (1968). Semantic memory. In M.Minsky, editor, Semantic
Information Processing, pages 216{270. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Ram, 1991] Ram, A. (1991). A theory of questions and question asking. The Journal of
the Learning Sciences, 1(3-4):273{318.
[Read, 1987] Read, S. (1987). Constructing causal scenarios: A knowledge structure
approach to causal reasoning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(2):288{
302.
[Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993] Read, S. and Marcus-Newhall, A. (1993). Explanatory
coherence in social explanations: A parallel distributed processing account. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(3):429{447.
[Reichgelt, 1989] Reichgelt, H. (1989). Knowledge Representation: An AI Perspective.
Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, NJ.
[Reiter, 1980] Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. Articial Intelligence,
13(1{2):81{132.
[Rich and Knight, 1991] Rich, E. and Knight, K. (1991). Articial Intelligence. McGraw-
Hill, second edition.
[Richter, 1965] Richter, H. (1965). Dada: Art and Anti-Art. Thames and Hudson,
London.
Bibliography 346
[Robbe-Grillet, 1959] Robbe-Grillet, A. (1959). Jealousy. John Calder, London.
[Ronen, 1994] Ronen, R. (1994). Possible Worlds in Literary Theory. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[Rosch, 1978] Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorisation. In Rosch, E. and Lloyd, B.,
editors, Cognition and Categorisation, pages 27{48. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Rumelhart, 1975] Rumelhart, D. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In Bobrow, D.
and Collins, A., editors, Representation and Understanding, pages 211{236. Academic
Press, New York, NY.
[Ryan, 1985] Ryan, M.-L. (1985). The modal structure of narrative universes. Poetics
Today, 6(4):717{755.
[Sanford and Garrod, 1981] Sanford, A. and Garrod, S. (1981). Understanding Written
Language: Explorations of Comprehension Beyond the Sentence. John Wiley and Sons.
[Schank, 1975] Schank, R. (1975). SAM: a story understander. Technical Report 43,
Department of Computer Science, Yale University.
[Schank, 1978] Schank, R. (1978). Predictive understanding. In Campbell, R. and Smith,
P., editors, Recent Advances in the Psychology of Language: Formal and Experimental
Approaches, pages 91{101. Plenum Press, New York, NY.
[Schank, 1982] Schank, R. (1982). Reminding and memory organisation: An introduction
to MOPs. In Lehnert, W. and Ringle, M., editors, Strategies for Natural Language
Processing, pages 455{493. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Schank and Abelson, 1977] Schank, R. and Abelson, R. (1977). Scripts, Plans, Goals
and Understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Schank and Riesbeck, 1981] Schank, R. and Riesbeck, C. (1981). Inside Computer
Understanding: Five Programs Plus Miniatures. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Shallice, 1982] Shallice, T. (1982). Specic impairments of planning. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 298:199{209.
[Shanahan, 1989] Shanahan, M. (1989). Prediction is deduction but explanation is
abduction. In Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Articial
Intelligence (IJCAI-89), volume 2, pages 1055{1060, Detroit.
Bibliography 347
[Sharkey, 1990] Sharkey, N. (1990). A connectionist model of text comprehension. In
Balota, D., d'Arcais, G. F., and Rayner, K., editors, Comprehension Processes in
Reading. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Simon and Kadane, 1975] Simon, H. and Kadane, J. (1975). Optimal problem-solving
search. Articial Intelligence, 6(3):235{247.
[Singer, 1994] Singer, M. (1994). Discourse inference processes. In Gernsbacher, M.,
editor, Handbook of Psycholinguistics, pages 479{515. Academic Press, London, UK.
[Singer et al., 1994] Singer, M., Graesser, A., and Trabasso, T. (1994). Minimal or global
inference during reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 33(4):421{441.
[Singer and Halldorson, 1996] Singer, M. and Halldorson, M. (1996). Constructing and
validating motive bridging inferences. Cognitive Psychology, 30(1):1{38.
[Smolensky, 1986] Smolensky, P. (1986). Information processing in dynamical systems:
Foundations of harmony theory. In McClelland, J., editor, Parallel Distributed
Processing, volume 1, pages 194{281. MIT Press, Cambridge.
[Somers, 1992] Somers, H. (1992). Current research in machine translation. In Newton,
J., editor, Computers in Translation: A Practical Appraisal, pages 189{207. Routledge,
London.
[St. George and Kutas, 1998] St. George, M. and Kutas, M. (1998). Working memory
capacity and the uncertainty of predictive inferences. CogSci. UCSD technical report
98.02, University of California, San Diego.
[Sterling and Shapiro, 1994] Sterling, L. and Shapiro, E. (1994). The Art of Prolog. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[Suh and Trabasso, 1993] Suh, S. and Trabasso, T. (1993). Inferences during reading:
Converging evidence from discourse analysis, talk-aloud protocols, and recognition
priming. Journal of Memory and Language, 32(3):279{301.
[Thagard, 1988] Thagard, P. (1988). Computational Philosophy of Science. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
[Thagard, 1989] Thagard, P. (1989). Explanatory coherence. Behavioural and Brain
Sciences, 12:435{502.
Bibliography 348
[Thagard, 1997] Thagard, P. (1997). Coherent and creative conceptual combinations.
In Ward, T., Smith, S., and Viad, J., editors, Creative thought: An investigation
of conceptual structures and processes, pages 129{141. American Psychological
Association, Washington, D.C.
[Thagard, inpr] Thagard, P. (inpr). Probabilistic networks and explanatory
coherence. Technical report, University of Waterloo, web page:
http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/
[Thagard et al., inpr] Thagard, P., Eliasmith, C., Rusnock, P., and Shelley, C. (inpr).
Knowledge and coherence. In Elio, R., editor, Common Sense, Reasoning, and
Rationality, volume 11. Oxford University Press, New York, NY.
[Thagard and Verbeurgt, 1998] Thagard, P. and Verbeurgt, K. (1998). Coherence as
constraint satisfaction. Cognitive Science, 22(1):1{24.
[Thibadeau et al., 1982] Thibadeau, R., Just, M., and Carpenter, P. (1982). A model of
the time course and content of reading. Cognitive Science, 6(2):157{203.
[Thorndyke, 1976] Thorndyke, P. (1976). The role of inferences in discourse comprehen-
sion. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 15(4):437{446.
[Trabasso and Magliano, 1996] Trabasso, T. and Magliano, J. (1996). Conscious
understanding during comprehension. Discourse Processes, 21(3):255{287.
[Trabasso et al., 1995] Trabasso, T., Suh, S., and Payton, P. (1995). Explanatory
coherence in understanding and talking about events. In Gernsbacher, M. and
Givon, T., editors, Coherence in Spontaneous Text, pages 189{214. John Benjamins,
Amsterdam.
[Trabasso and van den Broek, 1985] Trabasso, T. and van den Broek, P. (1985). Causal
thinking and the representation of narrative events. Journal of Memory and Language,
24:612{630.
[Trabasso et al., 1989] Trabasso, T., van den Broek, P., and Suh, S. (1989). Logical
necessity and transitivity of causal relations in stories. Discourse Processes, 12(1):1{25.
[Tulving, 1985] Tulving, E. (1985). Episodic and semantic memory. In Tulving, E. and
Donaldson, W., editors, Organisation of Memory, pages 381{403. Academic Press,
London.
Bibliography 349
[Tulving, 1986] Tulving, E. (1986). What kind of a hypothesis is the distinction between
episodic and semantic memory? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 12(2):307{311.
[Tzara, 1918] Tzara, T. (1918). Dada manifesto. In Motherwell, R., editor, Dada Painters
and Poets. George Wittenborn, Inc., New York, NY.
[van den Broek, 1990a] van den Broek, P. (1990a). The causal inference maker: Towards
a process model of inference generation in text comprehension. In Balota, D., d'Arcais,
G. F., and Rayner, K., editors, Comprehension Processes in Reading. Lawrence
Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[van den Broek, 1990b] van den Broek, P. (1990b). Causal inferences and the compre-
hension of narrative texts. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 25:175{196.
[van den Broek, 1994] van den Broek, P. (1994). Comprehension and memory of
narrative texts: Inferences and coherence. In Gernsbacher, M., editor, Handbook of
Psycholinguistics, pages 539{588. Academic Press, London.
[van den Broek and Lorch, 1993] van den Broek, P. and Lorch, R. (1993). Network
representations of causal relations in memory for narrative texts: Evidence from primed
recognition. Discourse Processes, 16(1{2):75{98.
[van den Broek et al., 1996] van den Broek, P., Risden, K., Fletcher, C., and Thurlow,
R. (1996). A \landscape" view of reading: Fluctuating patterns of activation and the
construction of a stable memory representation. In Britton, B. and Graesser, A., editors,
Models of Understanding Text, pages 165{187. Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
[van den Broek et al., 1995] van den Broek, P., Risden, K., and Husebye-Hartmann, E.
(1995). The role of readers' standards for coherence in the generation of inferences
during reading. In R.F. Lorch, J. and O'Brien, E., editors, Sources of Coherence in
Reading, pages 353{373. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[van den Broek et al., 1999] van den Broek, P., Young, M., Tzeng, Y., and Linderholm,
T. (1999). The landscape model of reading: Inferences and the online construction
of a memory representation. In Goldman, S. and van Oostendorp, H., editors, The
Construction of Mental Representations During Reading, pages 165{187. Lawrence
Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Bibliography 350
[van Dijk, 1977] van Dijk, T. (1977). Semantic macro-structures and knowledge frames
in discourse comprehension. In Just, M. and Carpenter, P., editors, Cognitive Processes
in Comprehension, pages 3{32. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[van Fraassen, 1977] van Fraassen, B. (1977). The pragmatics of explanation. American
Philosophical Quarterly, 14:143{150.
[Walker and Yekovich, 1984] Walker, C. and Yekovich, F. (1984). Script-based inferences:
Eects of text and knowledge variables on recognition memory. Journal of Verbal
Learning and Verbal Behaviour, 23(3):357{370.
[Whitney et al., 1991] Whitney, P., Ritchie, B., and Clark, M. (1991). Working-memory
capacity and the use of elaborative inferences in text comprehension. Discourse
Processes, 14(2):133{145.
[Wilensky, 1983] Wilensky, R. (1983). Memory and inference. In Proceedings of the 8th
International Joint Conference on Articial Intelligence (IJCAI-83), volume 1, pages
402{404, Karlsruhe, West Germany.
[Wilensky, 1992] Wilensky, R. (1992). Discourse versus probability in the theory of
natural language interpretation. In Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium on Probability
and Natural Language Processing, pages 128{135, Cambridge, MA.
[Wilensky et al., 1988] Wilensky, R., Chin, D., Luria, M., Martin, J., Mayeld, J., and
Dekai, W. (1988). The Berkeley UNIX consultant project. Computational Linguistics,
14(4):35{84.
[Williams, 1992] Williams, C. (1992). ATLAS: A Natural Language Understanding
System. PhD thesis, Department of Computer Science.
[Zwaan, 1996] Zwaan, R. (1996). Toward a model of literary comprehension. In Britton,
B. and Graesser, A., editors, Models of Understanding Text, pages 241{255. Lawrence
Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
[Zwaan and Graesser, 1993] Zwaan, R. and Graesser, A. (1993). Reading goals and
situation models. Psycoloquy (web-based), 4(3).
[Zwaan and Van Oostendoorp, 1993] Zwaan, R. and Van Oostendoorp, H. (1993). Do
readers construct spatial representations in naturalistic story comprehension? Dis-
course Processes, 16(1{2):125{143.
Bibliography 351
Where inpr appears as the year of publication, the item was in press at the time of writing
(July 2000).
